LAMBDA LEGAL

.

Via Electronic Case Filing in Case No. 22-1927

July 7, 2023

Patricia S. Connor, Clerk of the Court
Lewis F. Powell Jr. United States Courthouse Annex
1100 East Main Street, Suite 501
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Richmond, VA 23219

Re: *Fain v. Crouch*, No. 22-1927
Notice of Supplemental Authority FRAP 28(j); Fourth Cir. R. 28(e)

Dear Ms. Connor:

Pursuant to FRAP 28(j) and Fourth Circuit Rule 28(e), Plaintiffs-Appellees respectfully submit the attached decisions, noting the issue decided and the page of argument supported in Plaintiffs-Appellees' Response Brief ("Br."). All cases below have preliminarily or permanently enjoined bans on gender-affirming care.

A. Exhibit A: *L.W. v. Skrmetti*, 2023 WL 4232308 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *10-16, 20 (finding that ban on gender-affirming care for minors discriminates based on transgender status and sex, and that *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), is distinguishable); Br. 18-20, 28-32.

B. Exhibit B: *Doe v. Thornbury*, 2023 WL 4230481 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *3-4 (finding that ban on gender-affirming care for minors constitutes sex discrimination and that *Geduldig* is inapplicable); Br. 18-20, 28-32.

C. Exhibit C: *Dekker v. Weida*, 2023 WL 4102243 (N.D. Fla. June 21, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *11-14, 20 (finding exclusion of gender-affirming care in Medicaid program discriminates based on sex and transgender status; rejecting arguments that *Geduldig* applies; and finding violation of Medicaid's Comparability Requirement); Br. 18-20, 28-32, 46-49.

D. Exhibit D: *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 2023 WL 4073727 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *29-31 (finding that the ban on gender-affirming care for minors discriminates based on sex and transgender status); Br. 18-20.

E. Exhibit E: *K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Indiana*, 2023 WL 4054086 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *8-9 (finding that ban on gender-affirming care for minors is sex discrimination, and that *Geduldig* does not apply); Br. 18-20, 28-32.

F. Exhibit F: *Doe v. Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023)
   1. *Id.* at *2, 8-10 (finding that gender-affirming care ban constitutes sex and transgender status discrimination, and that *Geduldig* is inapposite); Br. 18-20, 28-32.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Tara L. Borelli

Tara L. Borelli

Enclosures

cc: All Counsel of Record, via ECF

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that on July 7, 2023, I caused to be electronically filed the foregoing letter and attached decisions using the CM/ECF System, which will send notice of such filing to Counsel of Record.

/s/ Tara L. Borelli
Tara L. Borelli

Exhibit A

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION

L.W. et al., *by and through her parents and next friends, Samantha Williams and Brian Williams*	)	NO. 3:23-cv-00376 JUDGE RICHARDSON
Plaintiffs,	)	
v.	)	
JONATHAN SKRMETTI et al.,	)	
Defendants.		

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 21, "Motion"), which is accompanied by a memorandum in support (Doc. No. 33). Defendants filed a response (Doc. No. 112), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. No. 146). For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part. A corresponding order will be entered separately.

BACKGROUND FACTS[1]

On March 2, 2023, the Governor of Tennessee signed into law Senate Bill 1 (hereinafter "SB1" or "the law"), codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101 *et seq.* (Doc. No. 33 at 11). SB1 will go into effect on July 1, 2023. (*Id.* at 7). SB1 prohibits any minor in Tennessee from receiving

[1] The majority of the facts contained in this section are undisputed, and therefore, the Court treats these facts as true. As for facts in this section that are disputed, the Court has found an adequate basis in the record to treat these facts as true for the purposes of the instant Motion.

certain medical procedures[2] if the purpose of receiving those procedures is to enable that minor to live with a gender identity[3] that is inconsistent with that minor's sex at birth. Therefore, SB1 does not completely ban any medical treatments but rather bans specified medical treatments administered for a particular purpose.[4]

Specifically, SB1 sets forth bans as follows:

> **68-33-103. Prohibitions.**
>
> (a)(1) A healthcare provider shall not knowingly perform or offer to perform on a minor, or administer or offer to administer to a minor, a medical procedure if the performance or administration of the procedure is for the purpose of:
>
> > (A) Enabling a minor[5] to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex[6]; or
> > (B) Treating purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity.

---

[2] SB1 defines "medical procedure" as "surgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into tissues, cavities, or organs of a human being" and "prescribing, administering, or dispensing any puberty blocker or hormone to a human being." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(5)(A)–(B).

[3] SB1 does not define the term "identity," and it does not use the term "gender identity." However, it appears undisputed that the term "gender identity" refers to a person's understanding of belonging to a particular gender. (Adkins Decl. at 4). Everyone has a gender identity. (*Id.*). Those whose gender identity aligns with their sex at birth are cisgender. (*Id.*). Those whose gender identity is different from their sex at birth are transgender. (*Id.*).

Plaintiffs do not discuss what it is that accounts for a person's understanding that he or she belongs to a particular gender. Presumably, such understanding would be based on the person's particular beliefs about the defining characteristics of that gender—and the person's belief that his or her own characteristics match the gender's defining characteristics such that the person must belong to that gender. But the Court need not delve into this topic.

[4] Although SB1 bans medical procedures only when used for a particular specified purpose, for the sake of conciseness the Court hereinafter refers to the medical procedures that are banned if used for a particular specified purpose as simply being banned; such references will omit any qualification reflecting that the medical procedures are banned only if used for a particular specified purpose.

[5] SB1 defines "minor" as an individual who is under eighteen years of age. Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(6).

[6] SB1 defines "sex" as "a person's immutable characteristics of the reproductive system that define the individual as male or female, as determined by anatomy and genetics existing at the time of birth." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-102(9).

(2) Subdivision (a)(1) applies to medical procedures that are:
(A) Performed or administered in this state; or
(B) Performed or administered on a minor located in this state, including via telehealth, as defined in§ 63-1-155.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)–(2). Although SB1 becomes effective on July 1, 2023, the law permits minors who were receiving the medial procedures banned by SB1 before July 1, 2023, to continue to receive them until March 31, 2024. *See id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B) (hereinafter, the "continuing care exception"). If such a minor would like to continue receiving these procedures until March 31, 2024, then the minor's treating physician must certify in writing that "in the physician's good-faith medical judgment, based upon the facts known to the physician at the time, ending the medical procedure would be harmful to the minor." *Id.* at § 68-33-103(b)(3). The certification must also include findings supporting the certification and must be made part of the minor's medical record. *Id.*

SB1 specifies that knowingly performing or offering to perform a medical procedure on a minor does not violate the law if the "medical procedure is to treat a minor's congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease, or physical injury." *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). "Disease" does not include "gender dysphoria, gender identify disorder, gender incongruence, or any mental condition, disorder disability, or abnormality." *Id.* § 68-33-103(b)(2). Therefore, SB1 permits administration of medical procedures as defined in the law if the purpose of the procedures is to resolve a congenital defect or precocious puberty but prohibits the administration of such procedures if the purpose is to enable a minor to live with a gender identity that is different from that minor's sex at birth.

Plaintiffs L.W., John Doe, and Ryan Roe ("Minor Plaintiffs") are transgender minors who all suffer from the condition of gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 33 at 14–17 (citing Doc. Nos. 22 (Declaration of L.W.); 23 (Declaration of Samantha Williams); 25 ("Jane Doe Decl."); 24

(Declaration of John Doe); 26 (Declaration of Ryan Roe); 27 (Declaration of Rebecca Roe))). Plaintiffs Brian and Samantha Williams, James and Jane Doe, and Rebecca Roe are the parents of L.W., John Doe, and Ryan Roe, respectively. (Doc. Nos. 23; 25; 27). Plaintiff Dr. Lacy is a physician practicing in Memphis, Tennessee and has been treating patients for gender dysphoria since 2016. (Doc. No. 28 (Declaration of Dr. Susan N. Lacy) at 1–2).

Gender dysphoria is a common condition for transgender people. It arises from the incongruence that transgender people experience between their gender identity and their sex at birth. (Doc. Nos. 33 at 8–9 (citing Doc. No. 29 at 5 ("Adkins Decl.")); 113-7 at 13 ("Laidlaw Decl."). Gender dysphoria can be treated through medical intervention. (Adkins Decl. at 1; Laidlaw Decl. at 14–15). The goal of gender dysphoria treatment (sometimes called "gender-affirming treatment,"[7] "gender transition," "transition-related care," or "gender-affirming care") is to enable individuals receiving the treatment to live in alignment with their gender identity. (Adkins Decl. at 7; Laidlaw Decl. at 15). When a minor receives treatment for gender dysphoria, the goals of the treatment will always be to "enable [that] minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with [that] minor's sex" and to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between [that] minor's sex and asserted identity." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)(A)–(B). Therefore, SB1 in effect bans minors from receiving all treatment for gender dysphoria.

On April 20, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging, among other things, that SB1 violates the United States Constitution. (Doc. No. 1). The complaint includes a prayer for relief for a state-wide preliminary injunction. (*Id.*). The following day, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a

[7] The term "gender-affirming treatment" is used by both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' experts herein to describe the procedures used to treat gender dysphoria and/or to permit an individual to live in a manner that is consistent with the gender with which they identify at the time that the individual seeks treatment, and so at times the Court herein uses the same term to mean the same thing.

preliminary injunction requesting that the Court enjoin Defendants from enforcing any provision of SB1 during the pendency of this litigation. (Doc. No. 21). As noted above, Defendants filed a response (Doc. No. 112), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (Doc. No. 146). For the reasons discussed below, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." *Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov't*, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2003). "The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears a burden of justifying such relief, including showing irreparable harm and likelihood of success." *Kentucky v. U.S. ex rel. Hagel*, 759 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Michigan Cath. Conf. & Cath. Fam. Servs. v. Burwell*, 755 F.3d 372, 382 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Those seeking a preliminary injunction must meet four requirements.[8] They must show a likelihood of success on the merits; irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction; that the balance of equities favors them; and that public interest favors an injunction. *Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); *Sisters for Life, Inc. v. Louisville-Jefferson County*, 56 F.4th 400, 403 (6th Cir. 2022). Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction may not merely rely on unsupported allegations, but rather must come forward with more than "scant evidence" to substantiate their allegations. *See, e.g.*, *Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Husted*, 751 F.3d 403, 417 (6th Cir. 2014); *Cameron v. Bouchard*, 815 F. App'x 978, 986 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating

[8] Some published Sixth Circuit cased stands unmistakably for the proposition that these four items are *factors* rather than *requirements,* except that irreparable harm is a requirement (and, if it exists and thus keeps the possibility of a TRO alive, thereafter becomes a factor to be balanced along with the other three factors). *See, e.g.*, *D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch.*, 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019). Alas, this case law is inconsistent with more recent Sixth Circuit case law and with Supreme Court case law (including the two cases cited above) describing these as all being requirements. The Court believes that it is constrained the follow the latter line of cases.

preliminary injunction when plaintiffs made no evidentiary showing on some elements of their claim, but instead made mere allegations regarding the treatment of Covid-19 in prisons); *McNeilly v. Land*, 684 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding denial of preliminary injunction when plaintiff made only a "small showing" of evidence); *United States v. Certain Land Situated in City of Detroit*, No. 95-1118, 1996 WL 26915, *1 n.1 (6th Cir. Jan. 23, 1996) (noting a lack of evidence to support speculative allegations); *Boulding v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095390, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2008), *report and recommendation adopted*, No. 1:06-CV-811, 2008 WL 2095387 (W.D. Mich. May 15, 2008) ("Plaintiff did not marshal any evidence in support of his motion [for a preliminary injunction]. Plaintiff's unsupported allegations do not suffice." (citations omitted)). In deciding a motion for preliminary injunction, a court may consider the entire record, including affidavits and other hearsay evidence. *Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co.,* 368 F. Supp. 3d 723, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); *J.S.R. by & through J.S.G. v. Sessions*, 330 F. Supp. 3d 731, 738 (D. Conn. 2018). In conducting the preliminary injunction analysis, the Court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character and objectives of the injunctive proceeding. *Express Franchise Servs., L.P. v. Impact Outsourcing Sols., Inc.*, 244 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 2017); *Action NC v. Strach*, 216 F. Supp. 3d 597, 629 (M.D.N.C. 2016) (explaining that district courts may look to, and indeed in appropriate circumstances rely on, hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is warranted). *See also Ohio State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted*, 768 F.3d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2014), *vacated on other grounds*, No. 14-3877, 2014 WL 10384647 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2014).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs bring a facial challenge alleging that SB1 is unconstitutional.[9] According to Plaintiffs, SB1 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it interferes with the right of a minor's parents to direct the medical care of their children. (Doc. No. 33 at 26). Plaintiffs further contend that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the law imposes disparate treatment on the bases of transgender status and sex and is not substantially related to an important state interest.

As for the requested remedy, Plaintiffs' Motion indicates that Plaintiffs request a state-wide injunction of SB1 in its entirety. (Doc. No. 21 at 1) (requesting an injunction restraining Defendants from enforcing "any provision" of SB1); (Doc. No. 33 at 31). In their reply, however, Plaintiffs state that their proposed relief does not encompass the private right of action codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105. (Doc. No. 146 at 9). Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiffs' requested relief as an injunction to enjoin all provisions of SB1, *except* the private right of action codified at § 68-33-105. Furthermore, as discussed immediately below, Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge SB1's ban on "surgically removing, modifying, altering, or entering into

[9] The Court discusses below whether Plaintiffs have succeeded on their facial challenge.

"In an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff contends that application of the statute in the particular context in which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, would be unconstitutional." *Doe #1 v. Lee*, 518 F. Supp. 3d 1157, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 2021) (quoting *Ada v. Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists*, 506 U.S. 1011, 1012 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), *denying cert. to* 962 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1992)). When a plaintiff succeeds in an as-applied challenge, the law may not be applied to the plaintiff, but may continue to be enforced "in circumstances where it is constitutional." *Doe v. Rausch*, 461 F. Supp. 3d 747, 769 (E.D. Tenn. 2020). By contrast, a plaintiff that challenges a law "on its face" attempts "to invalidate the law in each of its applications, to take the law off the books completely." *Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett*, 791 F.3d 684, 691 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting *Speet v. Schuette*, 726 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2013)). The Court notes, however, that the effect on a law invalidated pursuant to a facial challenge is that it becomes unenforceable, not that it literally gets deleted from code books. *See United States v. Sineneng-Smith*, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1585 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring).

tissues, cavities, or organs of a human being" when the purpose of such procedures is to "enable a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity." Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-33-103(a)(1)(A)–(B); 68-33-102(5)(A)–(B). Accordingly, any relief provided Plaintiff pursuant to the Motion will not impact SB1's ban on such surgeries.[10]

1. STANDING

Before addressing the merits of the Motion, the Court first addresses two standing issues. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must establish "(1) an injury in fact, meaning an invasion of a legally protected interest [that] is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical"; (2) "a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of, i.e., the injury complained of must be fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court"; and "(3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision." *Phillips v. DeWine*, 841 F.3d 405, 414 (6th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendants argue that Dr. Lacy does not have standing to assert the rights of her patients and of the parents of her patients. (Doc. No. 112 at 21). But "[w]hen one party has standing to bring a claim, the identical claims brought by other parties to the same lawsuit are justiciable." *See Knight v. Montgomery Cnty. Tenn.*, 592 F. Supp. 3d 651, 671 (M.D. Tenn. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). So "in a multiple-plaintiff case, a court need not consider the standing of other plaintiffs once one plaintiff is determined to have standing." *Id.*; *see also Parsons v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015) ("A plaintiff must have standing for each claim

[10] For conciseness, the Court hereinafter refers to this ban as a ban on surgeries as treatment for gender dysphoria.

pursued in federal court. [] However, only one plaintiff needs to have standing in order for the suit to move forward.") (internal citation omitted). Dr. Lacy and the other Plaintiffs bring the same claims under the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. Defendants do not contest that the other Plaintiffs have standing for their due process claim and equal protection claim, and the Court is satisfied that they do in fact have standing for these claims. Because Plaintiffs other than Dr. Lacy have standing for the same claims as those brought by Dr. Lacy, the Court need not determine whether Dr. Lacy also has standing.[11]

Defendants also contend that no Plaintiff in this action has standing to challenge SB1's ban on surgeries as treatment for gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 112 at 21); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 68-33-102, 68-33-103. The Court agrees. As Defendants point out, no Plaintiff alleges that a prohibition on surgery will affect his or her treatment for gender dysphoria. Perhaps this is to be expected, given that the medical guidelines recommend surgeries involving gonadectomy or hysterectomy only once an individual has reached eighteen years of age. (Doc. No. 113-10 ("Endocrine Society Guidelines") at 27) ("We suggest that clinicians delay gender-affirming genital surgery. . . until the patient is at least 18 years old . . . ."). Regardless of the reason, however, the fact is that none of Minor Plaintiffs express a desire or plan to receive surgery for their treatment of gender dysphoria, and Dr. Lacy does not contend that SB1's prohibition on these surgeries inhibits her ability to treat patients. In their reply, Plaintiffs do nothing to counter Defendants' argument. Plaintiffs have therefore not demonstrated a likelihood that they will suffer a concrete and particularized injury due to enforcement of SB1's ban on surgeries as treatment for gender

[11] The Court notes that its finding below that Plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge SB1's ban on surgeries does not affect its analysis as to Dr. Lacy. Plaintiffs have standing in all other respects for their due process and equal protection claims, and therefore the Court need not concern itself with whether Dr. Lacy also has standing.

dysphoria. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established standing to challenge this provision of the law at the instant preliminary-injunction stage and thus are not entitled to a preliminary injunction with respect to that provision. *See Memphis A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Hargett*, 978 F.3d 378, 386 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that although the plaintiff's failure to establish a likelihood of standing on a motion for a preliminary injunction does not require dismissal of claims, it does require denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction associated with such claims); *Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health*, 900 F.3d 250, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2018) (same). *Cf. K.C. v. Individual Members of Medical Licensing Board of Ind.*, 1-23-cv-595, 2023 WL 4054086, at *7 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge surgery provisions of Indiana law banning gender-affirming treatment because it was undisputed that no plaintiff could receive such surgeries regardless of the law in question).[12]

The Court's analysis below thus focuses on whether Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their argument that the remaining portions of SB1 (*i.e.*, SB1 to the extent that it bans other kinds of "medical procedure[]") that Plaintiffs challenge violate the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.

2. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

A. Due Process Claim

i. Infringement on a Fundamental Right

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. "Substantive due process is [t]he doctrine that governmental deprivations of life, liberty or

[12] The Court declines to opine herein gratuitously on the extent to which its constitutional analysis might be different with respect to surgery than it is with respect to the other banned medical procedures (as set forth below).

property are subject to limitations regardless of the adequacy of the procedures employed." *Johnson v. City of Saginaw, Mich.*, 980 F.3d 497, 514 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). "These limitations are meant to provide heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." *Does v. Munoz*, 507 F.3d 961, 964 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the undersigned put it decades ago, "a substantive due process violation occurs when the government deprives a person of a protectable interest . . . under unconstitutional criteria." Eli J. Richardson, *Eliminating Double-Talk from the Law of Double Jeopardy*, 22 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 119, 163 (1994).

Plaintiffs allege that SB1 infringes on a parent's fundamental right to direct the medical care of his or her child. (Doc. No. 33 at 26). "The existence of a fundamental right means that [g]overnment actions that burden the exercise of [the right] are subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest." *Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep't of Health and Human Services*, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).

According to Defendants, Plaintiffs' reliance on a parent's fundamental right to direct the medical care of his or her child is flawed because Plaintiffs describe the right with excessive generality. (Doc. No. 112 at 8–9). Defendants further argue that no right of a parent to have the medical treatments banned by SB1 be administered on that parent's child existed at the time of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore such a right is not fundamental for the purposes of the Due Process Clause. (*Id.*).

The Court certainly grasps Defendants' argument. But the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Kanuszewski* stands in direct contradiction to Defendants' argument. In *Kanuszewski*, the Sixth Circuit assessed whether the Michigan Newborn Screening Program ("NSP") violated the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. *See Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 403–404. The NSP involved the mandatory collection of blood samples from newborns to test for diseases, and these blood samples would then be stored by the Michigan Neonatal BioBank for future use by the state. *See id.* The parents of minor children who had been part of the NSP sued, alleging that the program violated their fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children. *See id.* at 413.

On appeal from the district court's dismissal of the complaint, the Sixth Circuit was faced with the plaintiffs' assertion of two alleged fundamental rights, one against the *collection* of the blood samples and one against the *retention* of the blood samples. As for the alleged violation of the asserted right against collection of blood samples under the NSP, the court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not yet clearly established that parents had a right to control their children's medical care. *See id.* at 415.

The court then turned to whether the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Due Process Clause based on Defendants' *retention* of the blood sample under the NSPs. *See id.* at 418.[13] The court explained that the Supreme Court in *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) found that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the "care, custody, and control of their children, [] which would seem to naturally include the right to direct their children's medical care." *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). The court therefore found that "[p]arents possess a fundamental right to make decisions concerning the medical care of their children." *See id.* Returning to the issue of the constitutionality of the defendants' retention of the blood samples, the court found that "[d]efendants' actions constitute a denial of the parents' fundamental right to

[13] Because the plaintiffs sought prospective relief for this claim, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. *See Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 418. The Court therefore did not need to determine whether the right in question was clearly established.

direct the medical care of their children, and their actions must survive strict scrutiny." *See id.* at 420.

The court in *Kanuszewski* therefore defined the fundamental right at issue at the same level of generality as Plaintiffs do in this case. Contrary to Defendants' suggestion, the court in *Kanuszewski* did not find that the parents had a fundamental right specifically to not have their children's blood samples stored by the state and potentially used later. Instead, the court found that parents have a fundamental right more broadly to direct the medical care of their children, which encompassed the right to refuse to have their children's blood stored under the NSP. The Court therefore rejects Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs define the parents' fundamental right at too high a level of generality.

Defendants argue that the Court should decline to rely on *Kanuszewski* because it involved whether the parents had a right to *refuse* the drawing of the blood samples and long-term storage of the samples, whereas the issue in this case is a parent's right for their children to *receive* certain procedures. (Doc. No. 112 at 9). This distinction, between what may be considered a "negative" right and a "positive" right, is certainly cognizable; it is one thing to have a right against a non-consensual invasion of the body, and another thing to have a right to have affirmative treatment of the body (invasive or otherwise). But the distinction ultimately is inconsequential here. The court in *Kanuszewski* gave no indication that its analysis of the parents' due process claim turned on the fact that the parents were seeking to refuse rather than receive medical treatment for their children—*i.e.*, were asserting a negative right rather than a positive (affirmative) right. The court in *Kanuszewski* could have said that the parents had a right to refuse medical care for their children, but it did not do so; instead, it chose to define the recognized right as a right of the parent to *direct* the medical care of their children. Absent any court-provided limitation on the term, the right to

"direct" care would naturally include the right to refuse certain treatments *and* the right to request provision of certain treatments. For this reason also, Defendants' reliance on *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), is unavailing. True, in *Washington*, the Court said that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is not equal to "a right to assistance in committing suicide." *See id.* at 725–26. This point by the Court, however, has no import here where the Sixth Circuit—several years after *Washington*—has plainly found that parents have a fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children without indicating that the right pertains only to the *refusal* of certain medical treatments.

The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that under binding Sixth Circuit precedent, parents have a fundamental right to direct the medical care of their children, which naturally includes the right of parents to request certain medical treatments on behalf of their children.

The Court is not alone in finding the existence of such a right, as three other district courts to assess laws almost identical to SB1 have done likewise. *See Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (finding that the right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children includes the right to seek care for their children); *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892–893 (E.D. Ark. 2021) ("The Court finds that the Parent Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to seek medical care for their children and, in conjunction with their adolescent child's consent and their doctor's recommendation, make a judgment that medical care is necessary."), *affirmed* 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 202)[14]; *Doe v. Ladapo*,

[14] The Court further notes that on June 20, 2023, Judge Moody of the Eastern District of Arkansas rendered the final judgment in *Brandt v Rutledge*. *See Brandt*, 4-21-cv-450, 2023 WL 4073727 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023). Following a bench trial, Judge Moody found that the Arkansas law banning gender transition procedures for minors was unconstitutional because it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment as incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. *See id.* Based on his rulings, Judge Moody entered a permanent injunction. *See id.* Although this decision plainly reflects final judgment in that

4-23-cv-114, 2023 WL 3833848 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (finding that plaintiffs were substantially likely to succeed on the merits for their claim that Florida's ban violated parents' rights under the Due Process Clause). Given that SB1 infringes on a parent's fundamental right to direct the medical care of that parent's child by banning medical treatments given for particular purposes, SB1 must survive strict scrutiny.

ii. Application of Strict Scrutiny

A law that infringes on a fundamental right must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest (*i.e.*, it must survive strict scrutiny). *See Carey v. Wolnitzek*, 614 F.3d 189, 200 (6th Cir. 2010). "If a law does too much, or does too little, to advance the [state's] objectives, it will fail." *Id.* at 201. The state bears the burden of demonstrating that the law at issue survives strict scrutiny. *See Reform America v. City of Detroit, Michigan*, 37 F.4th 1138, 1156 (6th Cir. 2022). As discussed in detail below, the Court finds that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that SB1 is substantially related to an important government interest as to survive intermediate scrutiny. It necessarily follows that SB1 does meet the more demanding requirements of strict scrutiny. Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim.

B. Equal Protection Claim

The Equal Protection Clause provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. "The Equal Protection Clause provides that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." *Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett*, 791 F.3d 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To prevail on

---

case, the Court herein relies primarily on Judge Moody's opinion on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The reason being that the analysis in the preliminary injunction opinion is more apt for the Court's discussion on the instant motion, as it was provided under the same standard as the Court applies here.

an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove that the government (i) treated the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated persons, and (ii) that the disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect [or quasi-suspect] class, or has no rational basis." *Pratt Land & Development, LLC v. City of Chattanooga*, 581 F. Supp. 3d 962, 977 (E.D. Tenn. 2022).

Plaintiffs argue that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause because SB1 treats transgender minors differently from non-transgender minors, and that in doing so, SB1 targets the quasi-suspect class of transgender persons[15] and the quasi-suspect classification of sex.[16] (Doc. No. 33 at 22). In Plaintiffs' view, because SB1 targets a quasi-suspect class and reflects a quasi-

[15] Below, the court refers to class-based disparate treatment of transgender persons as disparate treatment "based on transgender status," with the understanding that the reference is (as just indicated) to disparate treatment of members of the class of transgender persons.

[16] The Court acknowledges the distinction between a "quasi-suspect *class*" and a "quasi-suspect *classification*." Though courts often use the term "class" and "classification" interchangeably in the equal-protection context, the terms undoubtedly have distinct meanings. The latter refers to a *categorization* of persons into multiple (usually two) groups (for example, categorization of persons as male or female), whereas the former refers to *one group* of individuals thus categorized (for example, females). Under the Equal Protection Clause, both quasi-suspect *classes* and quasi-suspect *classifications* are cognizable bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny. *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (finding that sex-based classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny); *37712, Inc. v. Ohio Dep't of Liquor Control*, 113 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the "legislation uniquely affect[ing]" quasi-suspect classes of "gender" or "illegitimacy" requires application of intermediate scrutiny); *Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia*, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (describing "women" and "illegitimates" as quasi-suspect classes) (Marshall J., dissenting). *Cf. City of Cleburne, Tex v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to recognize persons with intellectual disabilities as a "quasi-suspect class"). Without going into more detail than necessary here, the Court notes that in some cases the distinction makes a real difference in whether a particular plaintiff can succeed in having the law at issue subjected to something more stringent than rational-basis review. But the Court further notes, again without more ado than is necessary here, that with respect to SB1, Plaintiffs would achieve such success even if the Court were to view SB1 as raising an issue of quasi-suspect class rather than quasi-suspect classification—a view the Court declines to take because the real cognizable concern about SB1 is not that it makes a *classification* (of persons into the groups of transgender and cisgender) that needs to be justified by the state, but rather that it is directed at a particular *class* of persons and thus needs to be justified by the state.

suspect classification, intermediate scrutiny applies.[17] Defendants, on the other hand, contend that mere rational basis-review is applicable. (Doc. No. 112 at 10). As discussed in detail immediately below, the Court finds that intermediate scrutiny applies to SB1 for Plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

i. Disparate Treatment Based on Transgender Status

To show that a law violates the Equal Protection Clause based on transgender status or sex, "[g]enerally, a plaintiff must show that [] [the] policy. . . had discriminatory intent. But such a showing is unnecessary when the policy tends to discriminate on its face." *Fain v. Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313, 326 (S.D. W. Va. 2022). "The Court looks to the language of the policy to determine whether it is facially neutral or whether it explicitly references gendered or sex-related terms." *Id.*; *Kadel v. Folwell*, 620 F. Supp. 3d 339, 375 (M.D.N.C. 2022) ("A facial inquiry is what it sounds like: a review of the language of the policy to see whether it is facially neutral or deal[s] in explicitly racial [or gendered] terms.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

SB1 bans a medical procedure if (and only if) the purpose of the procedure is either (i) to enable a minor to live consistently with his or her gender identity if that identity is inconsistent with the minor's sex, or (ii) to treat discomfort from a discordance between the minor's sex and the minor's gender identity. As discussed above, transgender individuals are those whose gender identity is inconsistent with their sex at birth. Gender dysphoria is a condition that results from this incongruence.

According to Plaintiffs, SB1 facially discriminates based on transgender status. (Doc. No. 33 at 18). The court's analysis in *Crouch*, is instructive on this issue. In that case, the court had to

[17] Although Plaintiffs do not use the term "intermediate scrutiny" in their briefs, they contend that SB1 must be "substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest" (Doc. No. 33 at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted)), which is the test applied to a law when so-called "intermediate scrutiny" is warranted.

determine whether West Virginia's policy of denying healthcare coverage for "transexual surgery" violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating based on transgender status. *See id*. at 319. The court noted that "inherent in a gender dysphoria diagnosis is a person's identity as transgender. In other words, a person cannot suffer from gender dysphoria without identifying as transgender." *See id.* at 324–325. With this principle in mind, the court found that the exclusion "targets transgender people because they are transgender." *See id.* at 325.

The analysis in *Crouch* applies with equal force to SB1. Although SB1 does not use the word "transgender," the law plainly proscribes treatment for gender dysphoria—and Defendants do not contest that only transgender individuals suffer from gender dysphoria. The Court therefore agrees with Plaintiffs that SB1 expressly and exclusively targets transgender people. *See also Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (finding that Alabama law preventing minors from accessing medical procedures performed "for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor's perception of his or her gender or sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex as defined in this act" "prohibits transgender minors—and only transgender minors—from taking transitioning medications due to their gender nonconformity.").

Defendants' argument that SB1 does not discriminate based on transgender status is unpersuasive. According to Defendants, not all transgender individuals want the medical procedures banned by SB1, and therefore SB1 does not discriminate on the basis of transgender status. (Doc. No. 112 at 13). Defendants' argument, however, improperly characterizes the group of people that are affected by SB1. The relevant class is not "individuals who want to receive the medical procedures that are banned by SB1." Instead, the relevant group is transgender minors. Confronting the exact same argument in *Eknes-Tucker*, the court in that case explained that the "fundamental flaw in this argument is that the first category [*i.e.* transgender minors who want the

procedures] consists entirely of transgender minors." *See Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1147. In other words, *only* transgender minors were affected by the law at issue in *Eknes-Tucker*, even if not necessarily *all* transgender minors were affected by the law. The same is true of SB1.

It does not take much creative thinking to understand why Defendants' argument holds no weight. Imagine a law that said that "no Black individuals can attend graduate school." Under Defendants' logic, the law would not discriminate based on race, and thus strict scrutiny would not apply, because there are Black individuals who do *not* want to attend graduate school as well as Black individuals who do want to attend graduate school. But applying a standard other than strict scrutiny would be preposterous because the law clearly prescribes disparate treatment on the basis of race; under the law, *no* Black individuals could ever attend graduate school whereas individuals from other races potentially could do so. Therefore, the relevant class would be Black individuals, *not* "Black individuals who want to attend graduate school." Likewise in the present case. Under SB1, the only group of individuals that are denied treatment are transgender persons (in particular, transgender minors). It is not relevant that some transgender persons (transgender minors) may not seek out these procedures, just as it would not have been relevant in the example that some Black individuals may not want to go to graduate school.[18]

Defendants' reliance on a footnote from *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) also gets them nowhere. In *Geduldig*, the Supreme Court held that a California disability insurance system administered by the state that excluded coverage for disabilities resulting from pregnancy did not

[18] Defendants also briefly reference *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022), in support of their argument that SB1 does not discriminate based on transgender status. (Doc. No. 112 at 13). According to Defendants, *Dobbs* confirms that regulation of procedures pertaining only to one sex are not necessarily subjected to intermediate scrutiny. As the Court has noted repeatedly, SB1's prohibitions on certain procedures do not merely involve transgender status; they are directly and exclusively targeted at minors who are transgender. Therefore, Defendants' analogy to *Dobbs* is not persuasive.

violate the Equal Protection Clause. *See id.* In assessing whether the system violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court explained that pregnancy was an "objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics," and therefore classifications based on pregnancy could not automatically be understood as improper sex-based discrimination. *See id.* at 496 n.20. The Supreme Court also observed that because there are both men and women who can receive benefits under the system (as long as they were not seeking pregnancy-related disability benefits), the system did not discriminate on the basis of sex. The idea seems to be that a disability insurance system can exclude coverage for an "objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics" because such a system really is geared towards the *physical condition* rather than any class of *persons*, even if the condition is one that happens to be associated only with one particular class of persons.

Defendants' *Geduldig*-based argument is not original. In rejecting the same argument very recently in *Ladapo*, Judge Hinkle explained that California's system treated men and women the same because under that system "nobody had health coverage for pregnancy," whereas under the law at issue in *Ladapo* "transgender and cisgender individuals are not treated the same." *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *10. Judge Hinkle's rationale applies equally to SB1.[19]

Additionally, the court in *Kadel* considered whether North Carolina's state healthcare plan that excluded certain treatments for gender transformation and in connection with sex changes or modifications violated the Equal Protection Clause. 620 F. Supp. 3d at 378. In rejecting the defendants' analogy to *Geduldig*, the court explained that the unlike the system in *Geduldig*—which excluded benefits based on an "objectively identifiable physical condition with unique

[19] Although the Court does not necessarily embrace Judge Hinkle's opinion in all respects, and certainly realizes that it need not follow this non-binding opinion, the Court finds persuasive every aspect of that opinion upon which the Court relies herein.

characteristics"—North Carolina's plan could not be explained without reference to sex, gender, or transgender status. *See id*; *Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 317 (rejecting analogy to *Geduldig* because West Virginia's state Medicaid program treated non-transgender individuals more favorably by allowing them to access the same surgeries that were otherwise banned under the program's policy); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *8 (distinguishing *Geduldig* on the ground that Indiana law prohibiting procedures when used for gender transition turned on "sex-based classification," whereas pregnancy "is not "necessarily a proxy for sex."). For the reasons expressed in *Ladapo* and *Kadel*, the Court declines to find that *Geduldig* supports Defendants' argument that SB1 does not impose disparate treatment based on transgender status.

Having found that the law subjects individuals to disparate treatment based on transgender status, the Court must next determine whether doing so requires the Court to evaluate SB1 under intermediate scrutiny, as would be the case if transgender individuals constituted a so-called quasi-suspect class.[20] The Supreme Court considers four factors to determine whether a class (such as transgender persons as a group) is quasi-suspect, such that disparate treatment of members of that class is subjected to intermediate scrutiny:

> (1) whether the class has been historically "subjected to discrimination," *Lyng v. Castillo*, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S. Ct. 2727, 91 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1986); (2) whether the class has a defining characteristic that "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society," *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 440-41, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); (3) whether the class exhibits "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group," *Lyng*, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S. Ct. 2727; and (4) whether the class is "a minority or politically powerless," *id.*

Ray v. McCloud, 507 F. Supp. 3d 925, 936–937 (S.D. Ohio 2020).

[20] As for the implication of the term that something is to a degree "suspect," it bears mentioning that what is "suspect" are not the class members, but rather the *disparate treatment* of those class members.

"There is no binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court or the Sixth Circuit regarding whether transgender people are a quasi-suspect class."[21] *See id.* at 937. The overwhelming majority of courts to consider the question, however, have found that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. *See, e.g.*, *Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class); *Bd. of Educ. Of the Highland Local School District v. United States Dep't of Educ.*, 208 F.

[21] The Court finds unavailing Defendants' reliance on *Ondo v. City of Cleveland*, 795 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2015) to support their argument that transgender individuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect class. (Doc. No. 112 at 12). In *Ondo*, the Sixth Circuit declined to recognize homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class. *See Ondo*, 795 F.3d at 608. In arriving at this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has recognized a particular class or classification as suspect only when "the trait [associated with the particular class or classification] is definitively ascertainable at the moment of birth . . .." *See id.* As explained by the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court so far has recognized only illegitimacy as a quasi-suspect class and sex as a quasi-suspect classification. Defendants argue that the Court should follow the reasoning of *Ondo* and decline to recognize transgender individuals as a quasi-suspect class because transgender individuals do not (according to Defendants) have a "definitively ascertainable [characteristic] at birth."

Defendants' argument, however, would require the Court to make a logical leap. Although the Supreme Court to date has recognized quasi-suspect classes (and classifications) only where the distinguishing trait can be ascertained at birth (assuming that it in fact can be ascertained at birth), it does not necessarily follow that a group with a distinguishing trait that *cannot* be ascertained at the moment of birth cannot be either a quasi-suspect class or subject to a quasi-suspect classification. The four prongs used by the Supreme Court to identify suspect classes that warrant heightened scrutiny say nothing about whether the distinguishing characteristics of a class can be ascertained by a third party at the moment of birth. The Court therefore declines to defer to what is most likely dicta in *Ondo* in lieu of binding Supreme Court precedent. In short, until the Sixth Circuit or the Supreme Court rules on whether transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, the four prongs set forth by the Supreme Court govern the analysis.

As an aside, the undersigned queries whether the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in *Ondo* rests on solid grounds. For example, presumably the Sixth Circuit was not implying that being homosexual is something like a choice that is made later in life rather than a characteristic that a person is born with. Instead, it seems that what the Sixth Circuit in *Ondo* meant was that for a class to be quasi-suspect class, the trait associated with that class must be ascertainable based on criteria that are immediately observable at the time of birth. So sex would fit neatly into that category because most of the time, a person's sex (if designated by external genitalia as it is in Tennessee) is immediately ascertainable at birth regardless of whether that person is yet aware of their sex. But the undersigned is not persuaded that the same can be said for illegitimacy, which is the second quasi-suspect class identified by the Supreme Court. Indeed, there is nothing regarding a baby's physical appearance that indicates (*i.e.*, makes it ascertainable) that it was conceived or born out of wedlock. Presumably, a third party could ascertain this only from the say-so of the mother or father or perhaps to on-point state records to which the third party has access. Therefore, the undersigned is skeptical of *Ondo*'s identification of the common thread among the two classes that the Supreme Court has determined to be suspect classes.

Supp. 3d 850, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class both because discrimination on the basis of transgender status is discrimination based on sex and because transgender individuals as a group fulfill the four prongs used by the Supreme Court to define a quasi-suspect class); *Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. School Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 610 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class); *Brandt by and through Brandt v.* Rutledge, 47 F.4th 661, 670 n.4 (8th Cir. 2022) (finding that the district court did not commit clear error when it found that transgender individuals constituted a quasi-suspect class); *M.A.B. v. Bd. of Educ. Of Talbot Cnty.*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 704, 719–720 (D. Md. 2018) (finding that all four prongs of the quasi-suspect class test justify treating transgender people as a quasi-suspect class); *Flack v. Wis. Dep't of Health Servs.*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952–953 (W.D. Wisc. 2018) (holding that the plaintiffs had made a strong showing that transgender individuals are a quasi-suspect class); *F.V. v. Barron*, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1145 (D. Idaho 2018) (finding that transgender people bear "all of the characteristics of a quasi-suspect class. . ."); *Evancho v. Pine-Richland School Dist.*, 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (finding that transgender individuals fulfill all four prongs of the quasi-suspect-class test); *Norsworthy*, 87 F. Supp. 3d at1120 ("[T]he Court concludes that discrimination based on transgender status independently qualifies as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause because transgender persons meet the indicia of a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect classification" identified by the Supreme Court."); *Adkins v. City of New York*, 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that transgender people are a quasi-suspect class).

The Court is satisfied that current precedent supports the finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. As the court in *Ray* explained, "there is not much doubt that transgender people have historically been subject to

discrimination including in education, employment, housing, and access to healthcare." *See, e.g.*, *Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937 (internal quotation marks omitted); *Adkins*, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (finding that "transgender people have suffered a history of persecution and discrimination"); *Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local School Dist.*, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (finding that transgender individuals have been historically subject to discrimination).[22] Transgender individuals are also "no less capable of contributing value to society than"[23] non-transgender individuals. *See, e.g.*, *Ray*, 507 F. Supp. 3d at 937. Transgender individuals have "obvious immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group," namely the distinguishing characteristic that their respective gender identities do not align with their respective sexes at birth.[24] *See, e.g.*, *id.* Finally, transgender individuals are both a minority and lack political power. *See, e.g.*, *id.* (explaining that less than 1% of the adult population in the United States are transgender); *Windsor v. U.S.*, 699 F.3d 169, 184 (2d Cir. 2012) (explaining that whether a group is "politically powerless" focuses on whether the group has "strength to politically protect [itself]," for example

[22] On this point, the current record in this case is not fulsome. If Defendants wish to attempt to create such doubt at later stages of this case via presentation of evidence on point, they are free to do so. Though the Court notes that even if Defendants are able to persuade the Court that transgender individuals are not a quasi-suspect class under the four prongs provided by the Supreme Court, the scrutiny applied to the Court's analysis of Plaintiffs' constitutional claims may not change. Indeed, the Court has provided two alternative bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny herein—that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it explicitly delineates its prohibitions based on sex, and that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex because it imposes disparate treatment based on transgender status.

[23] The Court feels compelled to note, as an aside, that it feels presumptive to present oneself as an arbiter of what constitutes "value to society" and of who does and does not "contribute" to such "value." These are patently subjective and value-laden determinations. But under applicable law, it falls to the Court to call it like it sees it, and it makes the above-referenced call without difficulty.

[24] That is not to say that a transgender person's gender identity could never change so that it aligns with their sex at birth, thus rendering the person no longer transgender. In other words, the Court's view is not categorically, "once a transgender person, always a transgender person." However, even if transgender status is not "obviously immutable" for all transgender persons, transgender status is a "distinguishing characteristic" that defines persons with such status as a distinct group.

by achieving relative equal representation in political bodies), *affirmed,* 570 U.S. 744 (2013).[25] Given that transgender individuals fulfill all four prongs, the Court finds that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class. Therefore, SB1 must survive intermediate scrutiny.[26]

ii. Disparate Treatment Based on Sex

Satisfied that SB1 imposes disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status, and that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, the Court could end here its analysis of what scrutiny applies. The Court, however, finds it prudent to address, additionally and alternatively, Plaintiffs' argument that SB1 is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it imposes disparate treatment on the basis of sex. (Doc. No. 33 at 18). And as discussed below, over Defendants' opposition, the Court finds that SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex, which in turn provides an alternative basis for the application of intermediate scrutiny.

a) Sex-Based Classification

Several courts have found that laws similar to SB1 (*i.e.* those that deny access or healthcare coverage to medical procedures if the purpose is to allow the minor to live inconsistently with that minor's sex at birth) impose disparate treatment on the basis of sex. *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *8 (finding that Florida's ban discriminates based on sex because to know how the

[25] From *Windsor's* description, it appears that for purposes of this factor, a group can be deemed to lack political power even if it has a substantial voice in the media, substantial support in the non-profit and public-interest sector, and the support of a substantial number of elected representatives or executive-branch officials. In making this observation, the Court does not mean to imply that these examples apply to transgender individuals as a group; the Court's point is only that even if these examples did apply, that would not by itself suffice to show an absence of political power.

The Court notes additionally that here it is making the reasonable assumption that when the challenge is to a state law, the focus should be on the group's political power specifically within the state at issue.

[26] Defendants fail to acknowledge the weight of (non-binding) authority supporting the finding that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class; by not even dealing with such authority, Defendants lose an opportunity to show the Court why transgender persons are not a quasi-suspect class.

ban applied, one must know the sex of the person); *Fletcher v. Alaska*, 443 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1030 (D. Alaska 2020) ("AlaskaCare covers vaginoplasty and mammoplasty surgery if it reaffirms an individual's natal sex, but denies coverage for the same surgery if it diverges from an individual's natal sex. That is discrimination because of sex and makes defendant's formal policy, as expressed in the provisions of AlaskaCare, facially discriminatory."); *Kadel*, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 376 (finding that North Carolina's denial of healthcare coverage for treatments leading to or in connection with sex changes or modifications and related care discriminated on the basis of sex because "[i]t is impossible to determine whether a particular treatment is connected to "sex changes or modifications and related care"—and thus, whether the exclusion applies—without comparing the member's biological sex before the treatment to how it might be impacted by the treatment."); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *8–*9 (explaining that although Indiana law banning gender-affirming treatment for minors "prohibit[ed] both male and female minors from using puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for gender transition," it reflected a sex-based classification because under the law it was "impossible for a medical provider to know whether a treatment is prohibited without knowing the patient's sex."). And as the court in *Kadel* explained, "[a] policy that uses racial or gendered terms 'falls into an inherently suspect [or-quasi-suspect] category' even if it creates classifications that are not 'obviously pernicious.'" *See Kadel*, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 375 (quoting *Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 458 U.S. 457, 485 (1982)).

SB1 prohibits a minor from receiving medical procedures if the purpose is to enable the minor to live as an "identity inconsistent" with the minor's sex. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. 68-33-103(a)(1)(A). SB1 also prohibits these medical procedures if the purpose is to treat discomfort arising from discordance between the minor's sex and identity. *Id.* at § 68-33-103(a)(1)(B). Whether a medical procedure is banned by SB1—a case-specific question that must be asked on a

minor-by-minor basis—therefore requires a comparison between the minor's sex at birth and the minor's (gender) identity; that is, it requires the ascertainment of whether the minor's sex at birth is consistent with that minor's (gender) identity. So if a minor's sex is female at birth and that minor wants to access hormone therapies[27] to enable her to conform her gender identity to her sex at birth (*i.e.* she wants to live as a girl), SB1 would allow this minor to access such care. However, if a minor's sex at birth is male and that minor wanted access the same treatment for the same purpose (*i.e.* live as a girl), SB1 would deny that minor access to the treatment. These disparate outcomes under SB1 are due to the fact that the minors had sexes at birth different from one another. Therefore, contrary to Defendants' assertion (which is not frivolous) that SB1 merely "implicat[es]" sex, the Court finds that SB1 demarcates its ban(s) based on a minor's sex. The Court is therefore persuaded that SB1 creates a sex-based classification on its face, and thus it imposes disparate treatment on the basis of sex.

The Court's finding is also supported by the recent decision from Judge Hinkle in *Ladapo* to enjoin a Florida statute's general ban (hereinafter, "Florida's ban") on the use of puberty blockers or hormones to "affirm a person's perception of his or her sex if that perception is inconsistent with the person's [natal] sex." Fla. Stat. § 456.001(9)(a)1 & 2. In *Ladapo*, the court employed virtually identical reasoning in finding that Florida's ban discriminated based on sex:

> Consider an adolescent, perhaps age 16, that a physician wishes to treat with testosterone. Under the challenged statute, is the treatment legal or illegal? To know the answer, one must know the adolescent's sex. If the adolescent is a natal male, the treatment is legal. If the adolescent is a natal female, the treatment is illegal. This is a line drawn on the basis of sex, plain and simple. *See Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 669 ("Because the minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, [the law] discriminates on the basis of sex."); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a policy under which entry into a designated bathroom was legal or not depending on the entrant's natal sex).

[27] By "hormone therapies," the Court refers to the dispensing of puberty blockers or of cross-sex hormones.

See Ladapo, 2023 WL 3833848, at *8. The Court agrees with the point made here and rejects Defendants' argument (Doc. No. 112 at 10) that SB1 treats minors of all sexes the same. As the Court has demonstrated above, when two individuals want the same procedure under SB1 for the same purpose, whether they respectively can access that procedure will depend on their respective sexes. As many courts have found with respect to materially similar laws to SB1, this constitutes disparate treatment based on sex.[28]

On this point, Defendants' argument suffers from a major inconsistency. On the one hand, Defendants assert that minors of both sexes are treated equally under SB1, but they then invoke the Supreme Court's rationale in *Dobbs* for the proposition that the fact that only one sex can receive a medical treatment does not necessarily trigger heightened scrutiny. By thus analogizing to *Dobbs*, however, the state suggests that only one sex can receive the medical procedures described in SB1, which is directly contrary to Defendants' argument that SB1 treats all sexes equally.[29]

[28] The Court acknowledges that the sex-based classification contained in SB1 may not be characteristic of what many would consider a sex-based classification. For example, unlike sex-based classifications in some other contexts, SB1 does not state that only females or only males are subject to SB1's ban on medical procedures. And it is true that in one sense, both males and females are equally affected by SB1 if they seek treatment to live inconsistently with their sex at birth. However, as demonstrated above, it is plain that under SB1, a healthcare provider must know a prospective patient's sex in order to determine whether the patient can access care under SB1. The Court is satisfied that this is a form of disparate treatment based on sex (*i.e.* a sex-based classification). The Court's finding is also supported by the Court's reasoning in *Bostock* (albeit it provided in a different context), that a sex-based classification exists when one cannot "writ[e] out instructions" on who is affected by a law or policy "without using the words man, woman, or sex (or some synonym)." *See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1746 (2020).

[29] The Court is also not persuaded by Defendants' reliance on *Dobbs*. Writing for the majority in *Dobbs*, Justice Alito explained that the Supreme Court's precedent had made it clear that regulation of abortion is not a sex-based classification. 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2245–2246 (2022). Unlike SB1, laws regulating pregnancy generally do not make explicit sex-based classifications. Therefore, the Court does not find *Dobbs* instructive in determining whether SB1 discriminates on the basis of sex.

For these reasons, the Court finds that SB1 contains a sex-based classification on its face, and therefore intermediate scrutiny is warranted.[30]

b) Disparate Treatment Based on Transgender-Status is a Form of Imposing Disparate Treatment Based on Sex

Although the Court has found that SB1 on its face subjects individuals to disparate treatment on the basis of sex, the Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that SB1 subjects individuals to disparate treatment on the basis of sex because it imposes disparate treatment based on transgender status.[31] In support of their argument that SB1 imposes disparate treatment on the basis of sex,

[30] The Court is able to conclude that intermediate scrutiny applies to this sex-based classification without any need to apply the four-factor test to determine whether the classification is a quasi-suspect classification (and thus subject to intermediate scrutiny *on that basis*). The Supreme Court has made clear, even without using the terms "quasi-suspect classification" or "intermediate scrutiny," that classifications based on sex are subject to the above-referenced test that applies to laws subject to "intermediate scrutiny." *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996).

[31] There is a subtle, though potentially not a practically consequential, distinction between (a) finding that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it explicitly delineates based on sex and (b) a finding that SB1 contains a sex-based classification because it imposes disparate treatment based on transgender status. The first finding may be thought of as a finding of a "directly" sex-based classification, and the latter finding may be thought of as a finding of an "indirectly" sex-based classification

A finding that SB1 makes a directly sex-based classification is appropriate because as demonstrated in Section (2)(B)(ii)(a), the Court could draw its conclusion that SB1 makes a sex-based classification without ever using the word "transgender." Indeed, one would not even have to know what "transgender" means to be able to determine that SB1 contains a sex-based classification. For example, § 6-33-103(a)(1)(A) bans medical procedures if they are used to enable "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1)(A). Even without any knowledge of what it means to be transgender or of the condition of gender dysphoria, one would know, based on the text of SB1, that it is a minor's sex in relation to the minor's gender identity that determines whether the minor is subject to ban under SB1. One would also understand that if the minor's gender identity was not different from that minor's sex at birth—and thus was consistent with his or her sex at birth—that treatment would be available. This is an explicit (*i.e.,* direct) sex-based classification.

A finding that SB1 makes an indirectly sex-based classification is slightly different. Rather than relying primarily on the text of SB1, this finding hinges on the definition of the term "transgender": incongruence between a person's sex at birth and the person's gender identity. To determine whether to find that SB1 indirectly makes a sex-based classification, the Court first must determine whether SB1 in fact imposes disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status, and, if so, then determine whether disparate treatment on the basis of transgender status necessarily entails disparate treatment on the basis of

Plaintiffs rely on the rationale of the Court in *Bostock v. Clayton County*, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) and of the Sixth Circuit in *Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). Both of these cases involved the question of whether discrimination based on *transgender status* necessarily constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex.

In *Bostock*, the Court had to determine whether Title VII's proscription against discrimination "because of such individual's . . . sex" encompassed discrimination on the basis of an individual's status as transgender. *See* 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch explained that "it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being [] transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex." *See id.* 140 S. Ct. at 1741. As the Court explained,

> [T]ake an employer who fires a transgender person who was identified as a male at birth but who now identifies as a female. If the employer retains an otherwise identical employee who was identified as female at birth, the employer intentionally penalizes a person identified as male at birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified as female at birth. Again, the individual employee's sex plays an unmistakable and impermissible role in the discharge decision.

See id. 140 S. Ct. at 1741–1742.[32] Although *Bostock* was a Title VII case, the Court finds that its rationale is applicable to Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. As discussed above, SB1 bans any

---

sex, *i.e.*, a sex-based classification. Therefore, whether SB1 contains a sex-based classification on the grounds that it may impose disparate treatment based on transgender-status is a separate (though undoubtedly related inquiry) as to whether SB1 contains a sex-based classification due to an explicit delineation based on sex. The Court finds it valuable to discuss the arguments for (and against) each of these two potential findings.

[32] Defendants argue that (unlike in the employment context involved in *Bostock*) in medical-related contexts like the ones implicated by SB1, the physical differences between the sexes legitimately can be taken into account. The Court does not agree with Defendants, however, that this distinction weighs against the application of *Bostock*'s rationale to this case; this is because Justice Gorsuch's reasons for why discrimination based on transgender status is discrimination based on sex were not at all affected by or specific to the Title VII-related context implicated in *Bostock*; his reasons were general in nature rather than context-specific. And the Court notes that "inherent differences" between the sexes is one of the primary bases on which the Supreme Court has relied to justify the imposition of intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny. *See U.S. v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533–534 (1996) (explaining that something less than strict

minor from accessing certain medical procedures if their purpose is either to allow the minor to live inconsistently with the minor's sex at birth or to treat gender dysphoria. Both of these bans affect only transgender minors. The Court need not rehash (and declines to second-guess) the reasoning of *Bostock* here; suffice it to say that discordance between a person's sex at birth and gender identity is what makes the person transgender. Indeed, if the person's sex at birth had been different than it actually was (and thus was not discordant with the person's gender identity), the person would not be transgender despite having the same gender identity. Therefore, in the Equal Protection context, disparate treatment based on being transgender is disparate treatment based on sex. *See Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1147 (relying on *Bostock* to support conclusion that discrimination based on transgender status in the equal protection context constitutes discrimination based on sex); *Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 889 (citing *Bostock* in support of finding that heightened scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the law at issue discriminated on the basis of transgender status).

In arguing that the rationale of *Bostock* does not apply in this case, Defendants assert that disparate treatment based on transgender status cannot be disparate treatment based on sex because in the decades after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, laws prohibiting cross-dressing were common. (Doc. No. 112 at 10). This argument suffers from several problems.

The mere existence of these laws does not mean that they were constitutional. As Justice Thomas very recently noted: "'Standing alone,' . . . 'historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees,' *Marsh v. Chambers*, 463 U. S. 783, 790 (1983), even when the practice in question 'covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it,' *Walz v. Tax*

---

scrutiny applies to sex-based classification because "[p]hysical differences between men and women" are "enduring" and "inherent").

Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)." *United States ex rel. Polansky v. Executive Health Resources, Inc.*, 143 S. Ct. 1720 at 1740–1741 (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting).[33]

[33] The Court does not fault Defendants for drawing the Court's attention to laws passed after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to support their argument that SB1 does not unlawfully impose disparate treatment based on sex due to its targeting of transgender individuals. Defendants' approach here, with its focus on events close to the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally added to the U.S. Constitution (upon ratification), may seem to reflect some form of originalist interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, those who subscribe to "original public meaning" originalism have in the past looked to post-ratification practices to determine the original public meaning of constitutional provisions. *See, e.g., New York State Rifle Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2136 (2022) (explaining that the Court in *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) found that evidence of how the Second Amendment was interpreted immediately after its ratification was a "critical tool of constitutional interpretation"). However, as Justice Thomas recently explained in writing for the majority in *Bruen*, the use of post-ratification practices as evidence of original public meaning has some serious limitations. As Justice Thomas explained, "we must guard against giving postenactment history more weight than it can rightly bear." *See Bruen*, 142 S. Ct. at 2136–37. Justice Thomas went on to explain that "where a governmental practice has been *open, widespread, and unchallenged* since the early days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision." *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Defendants' references to laws passed at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, without more, do not meet the standard set forth in *Bruen* as to when a court can rely on post-ratification practices.

Without attempting or purporting to give a general primer on originalism, the Court further notes that original public meaning originalism, though likely the most prominent form of originalism as of late, is not the only type of originalism that exists. There are multiple forms of originalism, and more forms are conceived of and discussed by scholars over time. A *See* Lawrence B. Solum, *Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate*, 113 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1243, 1296 (2019) (listing the four primary types of originalism as 1) "public meaning," 2) "intentionalism," 3) "original methods," and 4) "original law."); Lorianne Updike Toler et. al., *Pre-"Originalism,"* 36 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 277, 290 (2013) ("Originalism has evolved, much like the Reformation, in a near-linear ideological succession until, in recent years, it has spawned a myriad of ideological streams. These camps include Intentionalism, first Framers' Intentionalism and then Ratifiers' Intentionalism, and Original Public Meaning--whose variants include Semantic Originalism, Original Expected Application Originalism, and Original Methods Originalism."). Although (as just discussed) original public meaning originalism finds some value—albeit in limited circumstances—in post-ratification practices, not all originalists place such emphasis on laws passed (or informal practices that were common) close in time to the enactment of certain provisions of the Constitution.

For some schools of originalist thought, reliance on post-Fourteenth Amendment ratification practices is inappropriate. One early school of originalism, for example, posits that "the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment reposes in the intentions of its congressional drafters, rather than in those of its state legislative ratifiers" (or, it follows, in the acts of state legislature in the decades following ratification). *See* Michael J. Klarman, *Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell*, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881, 1934 (1995) (setting forth the author's view of the kind of originalism embraced by Professor (later Circuit Judge) and now-again Professor Michael McConnell). Under this

And a plurality of the Supreme Court has outright rejected the historical approach urged by Defendants. *See Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding statute that discriminated based on sex violated the Equal Protection Clause despite numerous laws passed in the 19th century that discriminated against women) (plurality).[34] Moreover, the Court does not write on a blank slate in finding that *Bostock*'s rationale applies to the equal-protection context. The Sixth Circuit has already found that a rationale similar to that provided in *Bostock* under Title VII applies to equal protection claims.[35]

In *Smith v. City of Salem Ohio*, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Jimmie Smith, a former lieutenant of the Salem Fire Department, had stated a Title VII claim and equal protection claim based on sex discrimination after being pressured to resign and ultimately suspended due to being transgender. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). In addressing the Title VII claim, the court found that Smith had stated a claim for impermissible sex-stereotyping because the complaint pled facts that Smith had suffered adverse actions due to non-conformance to Smith's sex at birth. *See id.* at 575. Relying on *Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins*, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the court explained that an employer who discriminates against a person (like Smith) whose sex is female a birth because the

---

school of originalism, the Fourteenth Amendment should not be interpreted based on the laws passed thereafter by state legislatures.

[34] Although the plurality's analysis in *Frontiero* is not binding, the Court finds it persuasive and therefore affords it significant weight.

[35] Similarly unpersuasive is Defendants' reliance on *Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2021), for the proposition that *Bostock*'s rationale is necessarily limited to the Title VII context. True, in *Pelcha*, the Sixth Circuit found that *Bostock*'s reasoning under Title VII did not govern the outcome of the plaintiffs' ADEA claim. In arriving at this conclusion, however, the Sixth Circuit noted that there was binding precedent from the Supreme Court on the ADEA-related issue before the court, and therefore it need not defer to *Bostock*. *See id.* at 324. By contrast, in this case, there is no binding precedent to dictate the outcome on whether disparate treatment based on transgender status constitutes disparate treatment based on sex for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. True, in the present context, *Bostock* is not binding, and the Court does not treat it as such. The Court, however, does find the rationale of *Bostock* to be analytically applicable.

person does not "wear dresses or makeup," is culpable of "engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex."[36] *See Smith*, 378 F.3d at 574. The court went on to find that "sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination, irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as 'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his or her gender non-conformity." *See id.* at 575.

Turning then to Smith's equal protection claim, the court found that the facts pled by Smith in support of a Title VII claim "easily constitute a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution." *See id.* at 577. The court therefore viewed its Title VII analysis as applying to the equal protection claim. Furthermore, in finding that Smith had stated an equal protection claim, the court did not concern itself with laws passed following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment that also may have discriminated based on sex. Although the reasoning under Title VII was slightly different in *Bostock* than in *Smith*, the court's analysis in *Smith* demonstrates that when it comes to discrimination based on sex, reasoning used to analyze a claim under Title VII can be applied with relative ease to a claim under the Equal Protection Clause based on the same facts (and that the Sixth Circuit has endorsed this approach on at least one occasion). The analysis of the court in *Smith*, coupled with the rejection of the historical

[36] It makes perfect sense that a person whose sex is female at birth does not have to conform with traditional (or purportedly traditional) notions of how females are to act; as the expression goes, this is a free country, after all, and persons do not have to conform to traditional or stereotypical notions of how a female or male is supposed to act or appear. *Smith* stands for the proposition that there are multiple ways females may act or appear. That being so, one might ask what it means to have a "female" gender identity, since being "female" can mean multiple things—different things to different people. But a person born male who is transgender is transgender because they self-identify as "female," irrespective of *why* the person identifies as female and what exactly the person believes it means to be "female." Likewise, a person born female who is transgender is transgender because they self-identify as "male," irrespective of why they identify as male and what exactly the person believes it means to be "male."

approach by the plurality *Frontiero*, clearly militates against Defendants' argument that *Bostock*'s rationale cannot be extended to the present case.[37]

In summary, the Court finds that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex due to the fact that the law on its face includes a sex-based classification. In the alternative, the Court also finds that SB1 imposes disparate treatment based on sex because it treats similarly-situated individuals differently based on transgender status. For these reasons, in addition to the Court's finding that SB1 discriminates based on transgender status and that transgender individuals constitute a quasi-suspect class, SB1 must survive intermediate scrutiny. The Court now turns to whether the record supports Defendants' contention that SB1 is substantially related to an important state interest.

iii. Weight of Defendants' Expert Testimony[38]

At the outset, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the testimony of Dr. Cantor and Dr. Hruz is minimally persuasive[39] given that neither of them state that they have ever diagnosed or treated a minor with gender dysphoria. This apparent deficiency in their experience as to the topics to which they testify is relevant given that Plaintiffs present several experts that have diagnosed and treated hundreds of individuals with gender dysphoria. This diminution of their testimony is consistent with the findings of other courts on this issue. For example, in assessing whether Dr. Hruz could testify as an expert, the court in *Kadel* found that

> Hruz is not qualified to offer expert opinions on the diagnosis of gender dysphoria, the DSM, gender dysphoria's potential causes, the likelihood that a patient will

[37] Having provided three alternative bases for the application of intermediate scrutiny, the Court need not decide whether SB1 also discriminates based on sex due to sex-based stereotyping.

[38] In referring to the parties' "experts," the Court means only that the parties wish these individuals to be treated as experts by the Court. These individuals have not been certified as experts.

[39] Notably, the Court here is concerned with the relative persuasiveness of the two sides' experts based on the current record, and not with declaring which side's experts ultimately are in the right.

> "desist," or the efficacy of mental health treatments. Hruz is not a psychiatrist, psychologist, or mental healthcare professional. He has never diagnosed a patient with gender dysphoria, treated gender dysphoria, treated a transgender patient, conducted any original research about gender dysphoria diagnosis or its causes, or published any scientific, peer-reviewed literature on gender dysphoria.

See Kadel, 620 F. Supp. 3d at 364; *see also Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1142–1143 (giving Dr. Cantor's testimony "very little weight" because he had never provided care to a transgender minor under the age of sixteen). Most recently, Judge Hinkle commented that Dr. Hruz's testimony was that of a "deeply biased advocate, not [] an expert sharing relevant evidence-based information and opinions," which then led Judge Hinkle to credit Hruz's testimony only insofar as it was consistent with that of other defense experts. *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *2 n.8. The undersigned sees no current need or basis to accuse Dr. Hruz of being a deeply biased advocate posing as an expert, but he does discern the need to discount Dr. Hruz's testimony somewhat for the reasons mentioned.

Although research may be a reasonable basis on which to form conclusions, ultimately individuals who have never administered the medical procedures banned by SB1 or sought to mitigate the risks lack real-world experience regarding the negative side effects allegedly associated with these treatments.[40]

[40] The Court also notes that the testimony of both Dr. Laidlaw and Dr. Levine, on topics virtually identical to those on which they testify on behalf of Defendants in this case, has been treated by courts with a dose of skepticism. *See Edmo v. Idaho Dep't of Correction*, 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1125–1126 (D. Idaho) ("Dr. Levine is considered an outlier in the field of gender dysphoria and does not ascribe to the WPATH Standards of Care. []. His training materials do not reflect opinions that are generally accepted in the field of gender dysphoria."), *affirmed in relevant part by* 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); *C.P. by and through Pritchard v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ill.*, 3-20-cv-06145, 2022 WL 17092846 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2022) (allowing Dr. Laidlaw to testify as an expert but finding that it is a "close question" given that "[l]ess than five percent of his patients are under the age of 18 and he has treated two patients with gender dysphoria. []. He has done no original research on gender identity and bases his opinions on his general experience as an endocrinologist and a review of literature."). The Court need not decide at present whether it shares the same kind of skepticism, and instead notes that it understands these courts' concerns but also does not treat a person's status as a so-called "outlier" as *per se* dispositive of whether the person's testimony should be excluded or discounted.

The Court acknowledges that typically credibility determinations in resolving a motion for a preliminary injunction can be made only where a court has held an evidentiary hearing. *See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp.*, 511 F.3d 535, 553 (6th Cir. 2007). The Court, however, provided the parties with an opportunity to have an evidentiary hearing that included testimony from the parties' respective experts, but the parties did not indicate to the Court that they found such a hearing necessary before the resolution of the present Motion.[41] Therefore, in the Court's view, the parties have waived any argument that the Court cannot make credibility findings based on the written evidence of the parties' experts.

iv. WPATH and Endocrine Society Guidelines

Next, the Court finds it necessary to evaluate the parties' arguments regarding the reliability of the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. WPATH is the leading association of medical and mental health professionals in the treatment of transgender individuals. (Adkins Decl. at 3). The Endocrine Society is an organization representing more than 18,000 endocrinologists. (*Id.* at 6). The Endocrine Society and WPATH have published widely accepted guidelines for treating gender dysphoria. (*Id.* at 6). The guidelines are based on scientific research and clinical experience. (*Id.*). The guidelines have been endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics ("AAP"), which is an association representing more than 67,000 pediatricians. (*Id.*). AAP, WPATH, and the Endocrine Society are the largest professional associations in these fields of medicine in the United States. (*Id.*). On behalf of Plaintiffs, Dr. Adkins has testified that the "[t]he Endocrine Society Guideline for treatment of gender dysphoria is comparable to other clinical practice guidelines that I follow as a pediatric endocrinologist to treat other medical conditions

[41] The transcript of the Court's conversation with the parties on this issue is available at Doc. No. 125.

such as those practice guidelines for Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) and Polycystic Ovary Syndrome (PCOS)." (*Id.* at 8).

Defendants attempt to discredit the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines by pointing out that the conclusions contained therein are based on "low-quality evidence." (Doc. No. 112 at 15). The Court does not begrudge Defendants trying to make hay out of this, but ultimately Defendants' argument is not persuasive. As explained by Dr. Antommaria, the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation ("GRADE") system permits conclusions to be drawn based on what is considered "low-quality evidence." (Doc. No. 142 (Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Armand H. Matheny Antommaria) at 6). And as Dr. Antommaria demonstrated, the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines, to the extent that they rely on what is considered "low-quality evidence," are not unique in this respect. For example, 20% of the American Heart Association's Guideline for Pediatric Basic and Advanced Life Support include strong recommendations based on evidence of similar quality. (*Id.*). That portions of the Endocrine Society and WPATH guidelines are based on "low-quality evidence" as determined by the GRADE system is therefore not itself a reason to find the guidelines unreliable. The court in *Ladapo*, in assessing the argument regarding "low quality evidence," arrived at the same conclusion:

> [T]he fact that research-generated evidence supporting these treatments gets classified as "low" or "very low" quality on the GRADE scale does not mean the evidence is not persuasive, or that it is not the best available research-generated evidence on the question of how to treat gender dysphoria, or that medical treatments should not be provided consistent with the research results and clinical evidence. It is commonplace for medical treatments to be provided even when supported only by research producing evidence classified as "low" or "very low" on this scale

2023 WL 3833848, at *11. The Court finds further support for its reliance on information contained in the guidelines in the fact that several courts in cases similar to this have relied on

these guidelines. *See, e.g.*, *id.* (finding that WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines represent the well-established standards of care for treatment of gender dysphoria); *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1138 (relying on WPATH guidelines and explaining that "[t]he American Medical Association, the American Pediatric Society, the American Psychiatric Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, and at least eighteen additional major medical associations endorse these guidelines as evidence-based methods for treating gender dysphoria in minors."); *Edmo v. Corizon Inc.*, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that most courts agree that the WPATH guidelines are the international recognized guidelines for treatment of individuals with gender dysphoria); *Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 329–330 (explaining that the Endocrine Society has published "a clinical practice guideline providing protocols for the medically necessary treatment of gender dysphoria."). The Court thus evaluates Defendants' evidence in light of the prevailing standards of care and conclusions contained in the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines, as well as compared to the testimony of Plaintiffs' experts.

v. Important State Interest

When a law contains a quasi-suspect classification or treats individuals differently based on their membership in a quasi-suspect class, the law must survive intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme Court has stated that intermediate scrutiny requires that the law be supported by an "exceedingly persuasive justification."[42] *See, e.g.*, *Bd. of Educ. of the Highlocal Local School*

[42] The undersigned notes that the crux of the Equal Protection Clause is protection against differential treatment for individuals who are similarly situated. Therefore, unlike in a substantive due process claim, in an equal protection claim challenging a regulation of or ban on certain activity, the assertion is not that the state cannot impose the regulation or ban. Instead, the assertion is that the state is (improperly) treating *a particular class of persons differently* with respect to the regulation or ban—meaning, in the instant case, imposing a ban on specific activities upon a particular class of persons while allowing those outside that class to engage in that activity. Naturally, if a state cannot persuade a court that it has an important interest banning specific activity *at all* (i.e., *for anyone)*, then the court need not turn to whether the differential

Dist., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 871 (explaining that the Supreme Court has consistently found that a party seeking to defend "discriminatory classifications on the basis of sex must offer" an exceedingly persuasive justification). But the Supreme Court has also stated more specifically that to meet this burden, the state must demonstrate that the law is substantially related to an important state interest. *See id.* The state interest must be real rather than speculative. *See id.* The Court will rely on the specific test for intermediate scrutiny, rather than the ultimately unhelpful characterization that intermediate scrutiny requires an "exceedingly persuasive justification." *See United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion finding Virginia Military Institute's exclusion of women from citizen-solider training violative of the Equal Protection Clause, on the ground that it is supported "[o]nly by the amorphous 'exceedingly persuasive justification' phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny.").

Defendants assert that the state has an important interest in protecting minors from the risks associated with the medical procedures banned by SB1 because ultimately the risks outweigh the benefits. (Doc. No. 112 at 14–21). Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs argue the inverse—that the state does not have an important interest, because (according to Plaintiffs) the benefits outweigh the risks associated with these procedures.

The Court finds it prudent to make a few initial observations about what some may expect the effects to be of the medical procedures banned by SB1. It is feasible that one might assume

---

treatment (*i.e.*, banning the activity only for a particular class of persons) is justified. To be sure, these issues can bleed together in an equal-protection analysis.

With regard to SB1, the Court finds it prudent to assess whether the state has demonstrated an important interest in banning certain medical procedures. The Court also discusses whether the state has justified differential treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.

that because these procedures are intended to have the treated minor's body do something that it otherwise would not do (rather than allow the body to function in a purportedly "natural" manner), the procedure must be "bad" or "harmful" to the minor. But assumptions are not a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to resolve a motion for a preliminary injunction. And unlike individuals that may base their conclusions about the effects of the procedures banned under SB1 on mere assumptions, the Court fortunately has a voluminous (albeit still preliminary) evidentiary record on which to base its current conclusions. Thus, the Court can, must, and does base its current conclusions on the record to date, without resort to any unsupported, bare medical assumptions.

a) Defendants' Allegations of Harms Caused by the Medical Procedures Banned by SB1

According to Defendants, the negative side effects from the medical procedures banned by SB1 include risk of "delayed development, permanent sterilization, loss of sexual function, decreased bone density, increased risk of cardiovascular disease and cancer, negative psychological consequences, and a lifetime dependence on these drugs." (Doc. No. 112 at 14). In making these allegations, Defendants rely on the testimony of Drs. Cantor, Hruz, Levine and Laidlaw. As noted above, the Court finds Dr. Cantor and Hruz's testimony minimally persuasive based on the current record. The Court addresses each possible negative side effect in turn in light of the record.[43]

[43] The Court does not find it necessary to address in detail Defendants' allegation that the medical procedures banned by SB1 may lead to a lifetime dependence on certain medications. Defendants do not explain why such dependence should itself be considered a negative side effect. The Court, however, can infer that generally speaking, having to take medications every day is an inconvenience. To the extent that this is what Defendants mean when referring to the drawback of a lifetime of dependence, the Court is confident that helping individuals avoid this inconvenience is not an important government interest. Moreover, however severe this inconvenience may be, Minor Plaintiffs do not indicate that such inconvenience would dissuade them from pursuing their treatment. Unlike the purported *medical risks*—which the Court acknowledges may not be disregarded in the Court's analysis solely because Minor

As for causing delayed development (a reference, the Court presumes, to brain development), Defendants rely on the testimony of Dr. Cantor. (Doc. No. 112 at 15). A review of his testimony on this topic reveals that Dr. Cantor does not provide a conclusion that treatment for gender dysphoria has a negative impact on brain development. (Doc. No. 113-3 ("Cantor Decl.") at 98) (explaining that there have been no "substantial studies to identify such impacts" and that the only two existing studies had "conflicting results"). By contrast, Dr. Adkins, who has treated hundreds of transgender "youth,"[44] testified that "[t]here is no research suggesting that treatment has negative impact on brain development or executive functioning and I have not seen this in my practice at all." (Doc. No. 141 ("Adkins Rebuttal Decl.") at 7). In light of the weaknesses in Dr. Cantor's testimony and the support for Dr. Adkins' conclusion provided by her experience with treating transgender youth, the Court is not persuaded that the medical procedures banned by SB1 pose a risk of delayed development.

The risk discussed perhaps most extensively by Defendants' experts is the risk that a patient can experience infertility as a result of the procedures banned by SB1. (Doc. Nos. 113-5 ("Levine Decl.") at 70, Laidlaw Decl. at 21). However, the evidence of record overwhelmingly demonstrates that many individuals receiving puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones will remain fertile for procreation purposes, and that the risk of negative impacts on fertility can be mitigated.

Plaintiffs are willing to bear them—*inconvenience* occasioned by dependence on medications seems like a matter of interest solely to the individual who is inconvenienced.

To the extent that Defendants instead mean that a lifetime of dependence is bad because it exposes the patient to the medical risks associated with the medications, the Court believes that it has herein adequately accounted for these risks in its analysis.

[44] Dr. Adkins does not define the term "youth," but the Court infers that at least a portion of, if not all, the individuals that Dr. Adkins considers "youth" are minors.

In her declaration, Dr. Adkins testified that "[m]any transgender individuals conceive children after undergoing hormone therapy. Pregnancy among trans men after undergoing testosterone therapy is very common." (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 12); Doc. No. 30 ("Antommaria Decl.") at 19 ("[T]ransgender men and women are also capable of producing eggs and sperm respectively both during and after the discontinuation of gender-affirming hormone treatment")). Indeed, as explained by Dr. Adkins, "a recent eight-year study found that four months after stopping testosterone treatment, transgender men had comparable egg yields to non-transgender women." (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 12). Dr. Adkins also acknowledged that patients who move directly from puberty blockers to cross-sex hormones (referred to by Dr. Adkins as "gender-affirming hormones") may have their fertility impacted. (*Id.*). For these patients, fertility preservation options are available. (*Id.*). For example, as Dr. Janssen has explained, he has had adolescent transgender patients "who chose to preserve their sperm and or eggs for future assisted reproduction by stopping puberty suppression briefly before initiating gender-affirming hormones [*i.e.* cross-sex hormones]." (Doc. No. 31 ("Janssen Decl.") at 16).

The testimony of Plaintiffs' experts is consistent with the information provided by the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. Indeed, the WPATH guidelines explain that "there is evidence that fertility is still possible for individuals taking estrogen and testosterone." (Doc. No. 113-9 ("WPATH Guidelines") at 90).[45] Though the record does reflect that the procedures banned

[45] The guidelines also recommend that healthcare providers take measures to ensure that any patients facing risk of harm to fertility provide informed consent for procedures giving rise to this risk. For example, the WPATH guidelines also state that physicians should "discuss the potential impact of hormone therapy on fertility prior to initiation. This discussion should include fertility preservation options . . . ." (WPATH Guidelines at 90). The Endocrine Society guidelines contain very similar guidance. (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 4 ("We recommend that clinicians inform and counsel all individuals seeking gender-affirming medical treatment regarding options for fertility preservation prior to initiating puberty suppression in adolescents and prior to treating with hormonal therapy of the affirmed gender in both adolescents and adults.").

by SB1 pose some risk to fertility, it also demonstrates that not all individuals will experience this negative side effect of the treatments and that there are fertility preservation measures available to those who have concerns about fertility. The Court is therefore not convinced that possible negative impacts on fertility warrant an outright ban on procedures used to treat gender dysphoria in minors.

Defendants' expert Dr. Levine contends that some individuals who have received puberty blockers and then received cross-sex hormones will experience a "diminished sexual response."[46] (Levine Decl. at 70–71). Notably, Dr. Levine neither cites studies or research in support of these contentions nor defines in any way what he means by "some" individuals. Without additional detail, the Court is left in the dark as to what Levine believes the prevalence of this risk to be in individuals who receive the described treatment. Dr. Levine, seemingly without a basis, also speculates that physicians and parents are likely too "uncomfortable" to discuss this side effect with patients. (*Id.* at 71).

Moreover, the guidelines tell a different story on all fronts. The Endocrine Society guidelines state that "genital sexual responsivity and other aspects of sexual function are usually preserved" even following genital-affirming surgery.[47] (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 26). The WPATH guidelines, while acknowledging the risk of negative effects on sexual function, also state that "gender affirming care can help [transgender individuals] improve their sexual function and

[46] Though Dr. Levine does not define "sexual response," the Court infers that he is referring to the ability of an individual to participate in sexual intercourse free of abnormal obstacles.

[47] The Court acknowledges that the content of the Endocrine Society and WPATH guidelines is hearsay to the extent that it sets forth *assertions* that are cited *for the truth of the matter asserted* (as opposed to, for example, *recommendations*, which are not assertions at all). The Court, however, can rely on hearsay in resolving the instant Motion. *See Doe #11*, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 592. Furthermore, Defendants are the ones who put the guidelines in the record. Therefore, Defendants have exposed themselves to the Court's present reliance the guidelines, including aspects of the guidelines that constitute hearsay.

increase their sexual pleasure and satisfaction." (WPATH Guidelines at 170). The guidelines also recommend that physicians discuss with patients possible adverse consequences on sexual function.[48] For the reasons stated, the Court does not find Dr. Levine's testimony on this subject persuasive, particularly in light of the conclusions contained in the guidelines that contradict his findings.

Dr. Levine also testified to the concerns of bone density problems in connection with the administration of puberty blockers. (Levine Decl. at 66). Although Dr. Levine testified that the treatment cannot be considered "safe," he also admits that the "available evidence remains limited and conflicting" and that some "studies have found less-concerning effects on bone density." (*Id.*). And Dr. Adkins' testimony reveals that studies have shown "no changes in bone mineralization" among patients who received puberty blockers for a period of three to five years for precocious puberty. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 6–7). Dr. Adkins also explains that the longest her patients receive puberty blockers is three years.[49] (*Id.* at 8). Given that Dr. Levine's testimony itself contains the above-discussed inconsistencies and illogical inferences, and in light of the testimony of Dr. Adkins, the Court is not persuaded that puberty blockers pose a serious risk to a patients' bone density. The Court also notes that it is not alone in observing that Dr. Levine's testimony includes illogical inferences that undermine his conclusions. *See Norsworthy v. Beard*, 87 F. Supp.

[48] (WPATH Guidelines at 167 ("We recommend health care professionals who provide care to transgender and gender diverse people discuss the impact of gender-affirming treatments on sexual function, pleasure, and satisfaction.")). The Court further notes that Dr. Laidlaw's testimony regarding loss of sexual function is equally as unpersuasive as Dr. Levine's testimony on the subject. In discussing the potential impact of gender-affirming treatment on sexual function, Dr. Laidlaw relies on the presentation of an individual who appeared on a reality TV show. (Laidlaw Decl. at 22).

[49] The Court further notes that the record does not reflect that puberty blockers are administered for more than five years when used to treat gender dysphoria.

3d 1164, 1188 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (giving Dr. Levine's opinions "very little weight" given that his report "contains illogical inferences").

Relying on the testimony of Dr. Laidlaw and Levine, Defendants allege that the procedures banned by SB1 also increase the risk of cardiovascular disease. Dr. Levine's testimony on this topic is not persuasive. Levine explains that although there may be an increased risk of cardiovascular issues with the use of cross-sex hormones, he agrees with the Endocrine Society committee that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that these procedures have the outcome of increased risk of cardiovascular disease and that more research is necessary. (Levine Decl. at 71).

Dr. Laidlaw's testimony regarding an increased risk of cardiovascular disease appears to rest on firmer ground than that of Dr. Levine, but it ultimately falls short in light of the additional evidence in the record pertaining to this subject. (Laidlaw Decl. at 31–35). Beginning with Dr. Adkins' rebuttal declaration, based on treating over 600 "youth" for gender dysphoria, Dr. Adkins testified that an increased risk of cardiovascular disease in transgender women is "usually only present when a patient is denied care and self-administers the treatment without appropriate clinical supervision." (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 9–10). Dr. Adkins further stated that "[t]ransgender men do not have more cardiovascular disease like stroke or heart attack than cisgender men," and that risks of cardiovascular disease in transgender women (which Adkins explains can be present when the patient is taking older formulations of estrogen) can be ameliorated through being closely monitored by a physician. (*Id.* at 10).[50]

[50] The Court recognizes that not all transgender individuals receive hormone therapy. Although Dr. Adkins at times refers to individuals experiencing certain side effects as "transgender men" or "transgender women," her declaration indicates that she is referring specifically to individuals who do in fact receive hormone therapy.

Dr. Adkins' testimony is also consistent with the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. For example, the WPATH guidelines state that primary care physicians can mitigate against the risk of cardiovascular disease during hormone therapy by "providing a timely diagnosis and treatment of risk conditions and by tailoring their management in a way that supports ongoing gender-affirming interventions." (WPATH Guidelines at 150); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 24 ("Clinicians should manage cardiovascular risk factors as they emerge according to established guidelines.")).[51] The weight of the evidence, including the testimony of Defendants' own expert (Dr. Levine), supports the conclusion that any increased risk of cardiovascular disease in patients receiving treatment for gender dysphoria is either speculative or, to the extent that such risk exists, it can be mitigated by the treating physician.

Finally, the Court turns to Defendants' allegation that treatment for gender dysphoria increases the risk of cancer. In support of this allegation, Defendants cite relevant portions of Drs. Cantor, Hruz, and Laidlaw's declarations, all of whom aver that hormone treatment may lead to an increased risk of certain cancers. (Cantor Decl. at 102, Doc. No. 113-4 (Declaration of Dr. Hruz) at 41, Laidlaw Decl. at 31–32). Dr. Adkins, by contrast, testified that in her clinical experience,

[51] The WPATH guidelines' observation that these risks "can" and "should" be mitigated does not speak to how successful, or how often successful, mitigation measures are. But from the observation that risks "can" be mitigated, it is inferable that mitigation has been shown to be possible; the observation thus constitutes evidence (albeit underwhelming evidence standing alone) to the effect that mitigation is possible.

The Court acknowledges that the record at this stage does not support a conclusion regarding the degree of effectiveness of the mitigation techniques discussed in the guidelines and by Plaintiffs' experts in lessening the chance and severity of negative side effects caused by the treatments banned under SB1. Nonetheless, the fact that the Court cannot gauge how effective the mitigation strategies are at this juncture does not prevent it from reaching its conclusion that Defendants have not met their burden of showing that the state has an important interest in banning the procedures under SB1. The Court finds it sufficient at this stage (in which the Court's findings are preliminary) that the record reflects that mitigation techniques are available, and that they—by the virtue of being "mitigation" techniques—assist in addressing the risks posed by the procedures. As this litigation progresses, however, the Court urges the parties to provide evidence on the degree of effectiveness on mitigation techniques.

she has "rarely seen" the side effect of an increased risk of cancer in her patients. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 9). Dr. Adkins' observation based on clinical experience—which neither Dr. Cantor nor Dr. Hruz has—is consistent WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. For example, the WPATH guidelines note that "the risk of cancer in individuals seeking gender-affirming breast augmentation or mastectomy is similar to that in the general population (even in the setting of hormone use)" and therefore "existing screening guidelines need to be followed." (WPATH Guidelines at 134); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 25) (discussing the risk of cancer in transgender population and explaining that studies have not suggested an increased risk of breast cancer, prostate cancer, or endometrial cancer though acknowledging that some cases of ovarian cancer have been reported). Though a close question, ultimately the weight of the evidence of record does not support Defendants' allegation that the medical procedures banned by SB1 increase an individual's risk of certain cancers.

The Court is not of the mind that the medical procedures banned by SB1 pose no risk to the patients receiving them. Indeed, as with virtually all medical procedures, treatment for gender dysphoria carries with it the risk of negative side effects. The Court also acknowledges that evaluating and weighing the competing views of the parties' experts and conclusions in the guidelines is not a perfect science. As in many cases, the Court is forced to make a judgment call on what position is best supported by the record. In doing so, the Court has not turned a blind eye to the risks associated with the medical procedures banned by SB1. To the contrary, the Court has reviewed the relevant evidence on the record and has found that ultimately Defendants' allegations of these harms and their prevalence is not supported by the record.[52] Instead, the record reflects

[52] The Court notes that Defendants' allegations of harm focus solely on the *medical* risks associated with gender-affirming treatment. Defendants do not rely on other harms or risks to support their argument that the state has an important interest in banning the procedures under SB1. For example, Defendants do not

that there is at best conflicting evidence as to whether the relevant procedures increase a person's likelihood of experiencing certain illnesses, and that even if there is an increased risk, that it can be mitigated. [53]

The Court's analysis would also not be complete without evaluating the evidence suggesting that the medical procedures banned by SB1 confer certain benefits on the recipients (*i.e.* the patients). *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *12 ("that there are risks does not end the inquiry."). Certainly, whether a medical procedure is beneficial affects whether the state has an important interest in banning that procedure. Therefore, having evaluated the evidence regarding

---

make a policy argument that gender-affirming treatment is undesirable because gender-transitions are undesirable. Defendants also do not rely on any purported ability of SB1 to resolve various concerns expressed in the very text of the law itself, including but not limited to: (a) a concern that pharmaceutical companies are seeking to profiteer off of minors via the administration of drugs and devices that is banned by the law; and (b) a concern that healthcare providers are seeking to profiteer off of minors via the performance on minors of the surgeries that is banned by the law. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-101(i) & (j). The Court therefore has focused its analysis on the medical risks asserted by Defendants.

[53] Defendants' reliance on the practices of European countries regarding treatment for gender dysphoria in support of SB1 is also unpersuasive. As of the date of this opinion, the Southern District of Indiana is the most recent court to reject analogies to practices of European countries in support of laws that outright ban treatment for gender dysphoria. *See K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *11. As Judge Hanlon explained with respect to the defendants in *K.C.*, "[m]ost detrimental to [defendants'] position is that no European country that conducted a systematic review responded with a ban on the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones. . .." *See id.*; *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *14 ("the treatments are available in appropriate circumstances in all the countries cited by the defendants, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand"). The observations of Judge Hanlon and Judge Hinkle are directly applicable here. Indeed, the Court agrees that Defendants' reliance on the practices of European nations is not an apt analogy where none of these countries have gone so far as to ban hormone therapy entirely. The Court further notes that Defendants do not attempt to persuade the Court that the bases (clinical or otherwise) of certain European practices are highly persuasive. Defendants instead point merely to the practices themselves as evidence that the medical procedures under SB1 are unsafe.

Then there is the additional problem that the Court can put only so much weight on the practice of other nations. After all, the Court cannot outsource to European nations the task of preliminarily determining, for purposes of the instant Motion, the extent to which the treatments at issue are safe. Ultimately, the most the Court at present could properly say about the practices of European nations is that they reflect a caution that *might* ultimately prove prudent and *might* be supported by particular studies. But the Court lacks a basis to conclude anything from the mere existence of particular European practices that are purportedly supported by studies the Court cannot assess based on the limited information about them Defendants have put in the record.

Defendants' allegations of the risks associated with treatment for gender dysphoria, the Court now turns to the purported benefits of the procedures.

b) Benefits of the Medical Procedures Banned by SB1

Plaintiffs contend that the medical procedures banned by SB1 confer important benefits on patients. (Doc. No. 33 at 12). Based on its review of the record, the Court agrees. Dr. Adkins has testified that "[a]ll of [her] patients who have received medical treatment for gender dysphoria have benefitted from clinically appropriate treatment." (Adkins Decl.at 5). As explained by Adkins, "many individuals with gender dysphoria have high rates of anxiety, depression[,] and suicidal ideation. I have seen in my patients that without appropriate treatment this distress impacts every aspect of life." (*Id.* at 5). Dr. Adkins also noted in her testimony that "[f]or some individuals, this treatment can eliminate or reduce the need for surgical treatment." (*Id.* at 14–15).

Consistent with Dr. Adkins' observations based on her clinical experience, Dr. Antommaria has testified that "the available evidence indicates that gender-affirming care improves, rather than worsens, psychological outcomes." (Antommaria Decl. at 20–21). His conclusion is consistent with the findings contained in the WPATH and Endocrine Society guidelines. (WPATH Guidelines at 39) (explaining that recent longitudinal studies suggest that "mental health symptoms experienced by" transgender individuals "tend to improve following" receipt of gender-affirming treatment"); (Endocrine Society Guidelines at 15 (explaining that a study from the Netherlands showed a decrease in depression and an improvement in general mental health during pubertal suppression and a steady improvement in psychological function following cross-sex hormone treatment and gender reassignment surgery)). Furthermore, as pointed out by Dr. Adkins, with regard to suicidal ideations

> In a 2020 study published in Pediatrics, the official journal of the American Academy of Pediatrics, researchers concluded that "[t]reatment with pubertal

> suppression among those who wanted it was associated with lower odds of lifetime suicidal ideation when compared with those who wanted pubertal suppression but did not receive it. Suicidality is of particular concern for this population because the estimated lifetime prevalence of suicide attempts among transgender people is as high as 40%."

(Adkins Decl. at 16). Defendants' assertion that gender-affirming treatment does not improve mental health outcomes relies solely on the testimony of Dr. Cantor, who seems never to have treated an individual for gender dysphoria. But the weight of evidence in the record suggests the contrary—that treatment for gender dysphoria lowers rates of depression, suicide, and additional mental health issues faced by transgender individuals. And at the risk of sounding like a broken record, the Court notes that several courts, based on the respective records in those cases, have found the same. *See Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891 ("Every major expert medical association recognizes that gender-affirming care for transgender minors may be medically appropriate and necessary to improve the physical and mental health of transgender people."); *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *5 (crediting expert testimony that denial of gender-affirming treatment will "increase anxiety, depression, and risk of suicide."); *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 ("The record shows that, without transitioning medications, Minor Plaintiffs will suffer severe medical harm, including anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance abuse, self-harm, and suicidality."); *Fain*, 618 F. Supp. 3d at 330 (finding that "[t]he medical treatments for gender dysphoria have been studied extensively, and have been shown to improve "quality of life and measures of mental health" for patients. . ."). The Court therefore finds that the benefits of the medical procedures banned by SB1 are well-established by the existing record.

c) Defendants Have Not Met Their Burden of Demonstrating an Important State Interest

To summarize the Court's findings on the alleged harms and benefits of the medical procedures banned under SB1, the Court ultimately finds that the weight of the evidence at this

stage in the proceedings does not support Defendants' allegations that either puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones pose serious risks to the minors receiving these treatments for gender dysphoria. As discussed in detail above, the record suggests that either 1) the risks identified by Defendants are not more prevalent in transgender individuals receiving the procedures banned by SB1 than in individuals not receiving these procedures; 2) to the extent that individuals receiving these procedures experience the negative side effects raised by Defendants, that the prevalence of these effects is low, or 3) the risk of negative side effects resulting from the use of such medical procedures banned by SB1 can be mitigated. And the fact that some pediatric treatments may pose certain risks is not sufficient, in the Court's view, to support a finding that the state has an important interest in banning these treatments. *See Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *13 (finding that the risks attendant to gender-affirming treatment for minors did not satisfy intermediate scrutiny such that would warrant taking away the decision for treatment from patients, doctors, and parents and instead allowing the state to make the decision). *Cf. Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (finding that the fact that pediatric treatments involve risks does not justify transferring power or decision-making authority from parents to the state). Indeed, a conclusion to the contrary would leave several pediatric treatments targeting something other than gender dysphoria vulnerable to severe limitations on access.

The Court acknowledges that the state feels strongly that the medical procedures banned by SB1 are harmful to minors. The medical evidence on the record, however, indicates otherwise. It is undisputed that every major medical organization to take a position on the issue, which includes the AAP, American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological Association, and American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychiatry, agrees that puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapy are appropriate and medically necessary

treatments for adolescents when clinically indicated. (Janssen Decl. at 10). It is of little surprise, therefore, that all major medical organizations oppose outright bans on gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 32 ("Turban Decl.") at 4); *see also Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891 ("[e]very major expert medical association recognizes that gender-affirming care for transgender minors may be medically appropriate and necessary to improve the physical and mental health of transgender people."). The opinions of major medical organizations as they exist at any one time are not necessarily correct merely by the virtue of being the opinion of a major medical organization—which is why they have been known to change on a particular topic over time—and the Court does not herein find conclusively that the opinions here are correct. But they certainly are entitled to weight in a context like the present one.

As illustrated by the discussions above, the Court finds that at this juncture, SB1 is not supported by an important state interest. In other words, for the purposes of determining whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the preliminary relief they seek, the Court is not persuaded that Defendants have met their burden in showing that SB1 survives intermediate scrutiny. It follows that Plaintiffs have met their burden of showing that they are substantially likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim. Of course, the Court recognizes that at summary judgment or trial, Defendants potentially could provide additional evidence that suffices to meet their burden.

Though the Court has already found that Defendants have failed to demonstrate an important interest based on the current record, and therefore could end its analysis here, the Court finds it prudent to address whether SB1 is substantially related to the state's purported interest.

vi. Substantial Relation Requirement

Even where a law reflects an important state interest, the law survives intermediate scrutiny only if the law in question is substantially related to that interest. *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff's*

Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit has found that a law is "substantially related" to an important state interest where there is a "reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective." *See id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be narrowly tailored, intermediate scrutiny imposes the less burdensome requirement that the scope of the law in question be in proportion to the state's interest. *See id.* The Court is aware that the term "related to" is subjective and amorphous. *See, e.g.*, *Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.*, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1033–34 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring). *Cf. Dubin v. United States*, No. 22-10, 2023 WL 3872518, at *6 (June 8, 2023) (noting likewise with respect to term "in relation to"). The same can be said for "substantially" and "in proportion." The application of such terms often is in the eye of the beholder. But here, it has fallen to the undersigned to be the beholder, and therefore, he must call it like he sees it.

At this stage in the litigation, the Court finds that Defendants have not demonstrated that SB1 is substantially related to the state's asserted interest. Defendants' argument is that the state has an important interest in protecting minors from allegedly dangerous medical procedures. Yet, the medical procedures banned by SB1 because they are purportedly unsafe to treat gender dysphoria in minors (which, as discussed above, necessarily means treatment for transgender minors) are not banned when provided to treat other conditions. Indeed, SB1 explicitly permits the very medical procedures that it bans for treatment of gender dysphoria, if those procedures are being used to "treat a minor's congenital defect, precocious puberty, disease [excluding gender dysphoria], or physical injury." Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(A). The record reflects that the same treatments received by minors for gender dysphoria are received by minors also for different conditions. (Adkins Decl. at 17–18) (explaining that cisgender girls with delayed puberty

are treated with estrogen, and cisgender girls with polycystic ovarian syndrome ("PCOS") are treated with testosterone suppression).

True, all that is required under intermediate scrutiny is a "reasonable fit" between the state's interest and the challenged law. However, in the Court's view, the difference in treatment under SB1 between gender dysphoria and other conditions is not "reasonable"; it is instead in all likelihood arbitrary. Consider the following example involving a hypothetical minor who is diagnosed with precocious puberty at the age of eight years old (meaning that the minor has started puberty at eight years of age). The minor's parents agree with a doctor to place the minor on puberty blockers to delay puberty until the proper age. Under SB1, this treatment would be permissible. A few years pass by, and the minor realizes that he is in fact a transgender boy, and he exhibits symptoms of gender dysphoria. Around this time is when he would also stop receiving puberty blockers for precocious puberty. The minor and his parents make an appointment with a doctor who treats gender dysphoria. The doctor decides that the proper treatment for the minor's gender dysphoria for his age is the use of puberty blockers. Under SB1, although the minor was lawfully on puberty blockers for several years to treat precocious puberty and is slated to come off of them for this treatment, SB1 would not allow him to continue to take the *exact same* drugs for treatment of his gender dysphoria.

The only evidence in the record that Defendants identify to justify this disparate treatment (evidently in an attempt to meet the substantial-relationship requirement) is that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has approved the use of certain hormone therapies for precocious puberty but has not yet done the same for gender dysphoria. (Doc. No. 112 at 16). However, as explained by Dr. Turban, "[p]rescribing FDA approved medications without specific FDA indications for the condition being treated is common in medicine generally and particularly in pediatrics. It is

referred to as 'off-label' prescribing." (Turban Decl. at 5). Dr. Turban went on to clarify that as "[t]he American Academy of Pediatrics has explained, it is important to note that the term 'offlabel' does not imply an improper, illegal, contraindicated, or investigational use." (*Id.*) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the record reflects that off-label use of medications does not itself indicate that there are greater risks associated with those uses than when used for the purpose that is approved by the FDA—or that the FDA has even considered any such risks. Therefore, while understanding why Defendants would seek to score metaphorical points from the fact that the FDA has yet to approve certain hormone therapies for gender dysphoria, the Court declines to draw from that fact a negative inference regarding the risks of gender-affirming treatment.

In short, the Court agrees with Judge Hinkle's observation in finding "[t]hat the FDA has not approved these drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria says precisely nothing about whether the drugs are safe and effective when used for that purpose. Off-label use of drugs is commonplace and widely accepted across the medical profession. . . ." *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *15.[54] As Judge Hinkle went onto explain, [t]he FDA approval goes no further—it does not address one way or the other the question of whether using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is as safe and effective as on-label uses." *See id.* Although FDA approval of the mediations to treat gender dysphoria could have benefited Plaintiffs' argument that the medications are safe when used for this purpose, the fact that the FDA has not yet given this approval does not advance Defendants'

[54] Judge Hinkle's comments here relate to off-label prescribing as a general matter. Perhaps a specific instance of off-label prescribing would be problematic based on the particular circumstances involved—for example, hypothetically, if it resulted not from a wholly independent medical judgment of the prescribing physician, but rather from undue influence from a pharmaceutical sales representative. But Defendants point to nothing indicating any circumstances that indicate any such troubling circumstances associated with the off-label nature of the prescribing of drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria.

argument that use of the medications for this purpose is unsafe. Defendants do not even suggest that pharmaceutical companies have applied for FDA approval or are planning to do so. The Court is therefore not persuaded that the fact of the FDA's silence on the approval of the medical procedures banned under SB1 for treatment of gender dysphoria somehow indicates that these treatments are unsafe when used for that purpose.[55]

SB1 is not alone in suffering from the fatal defect of falling short on the substantial-relation requirement. The court in *Brandt* discussed essentially the same issue plaguing the defendants' defense of a very similar law in that case. In finding that the law in that case was not substantially related to protecting minors from the risks of gender transition procedures, the court observed that

> If the State's health concerns were genuine, the State would prohibit these procedures for all patients under 18 regardless of gender identity. The State's goal in passing Act 626 was not to ban a treatment. It was to ban an outcome that the State deems undesirable. In other words, Defendants' rationale that the Act protects children from experimental treatment and the long-term, irreversible effects of the treatment, is counterintuitive to the fact that it allows the same treatment for cisgender minors as long as the desired results conform with the stereotype of their biological sex.

See Brandt, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891. The Court breaks ranks with *Brandt* insofar as *Brandt* afforded significance to the state's sincerity (or lack thereof) in its expression of concerns for the health of minors. The Court declines to opine on the state's sincerity of such expression in this case, since what matters here is not the state's sincerity (a subjective matter) but rather the degree of reasonableness of the fit between such concerns and the ban imposed by SB1 (an objective matter). On the (objective matter) at issue here, the Court finds on the present record that SB1 is not

[55] Having been provided no scientific basis, or otherwise supported policy reason, for this disparate treatment, the Court is left to draw the conclusion that Defendants perceive gender dysphoria to be a condition less worthy of treatment than conditions like PCOS. Indeed, Defendants' assertion that these procedures are so dangerous that the state should be permitted to ban them entirely for treatment of gender dysphoria rings hollow when the state has no such qualms with minors receiving these procedures to treat other conditions.

proportionate to the state's interest of protecting children from allegedly dangerous medical treatments. Instead, SB1 objectively is severely underinclusive in terms of the minors it protects from the alleged medical risks of the banned procedures; it bans these procedures for a tiny fraction of minors, while leaving them available for all other minors (who would be subjected to the very risks that the state asserts SB1 is intended to eradicate). For these reasons, the Court finds that SB1 likely is not substantially related to the state's asserted interest. SB1 therefore likely fails intermediate scrutiny, even assuming arguendo (contrary to the Court's finding above) that the state interest was deemed likely to be an important interest.

In light of the evidence on the record, and the Court's discussion above, the Court finds that SB1 is unlikely to survive intermediate scrutiny. Specifically, the Court finds that the record does not support a finding that Defendants are likely to succeed on their position that SB1 is substantially related to an important state interest. It follows that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their claim that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause to the extent that it prohibits medical procedures other than surgery. The Court now turns to whether Plaintiffs have fulfilled the remaining requirements necessary to issue a preliminary injunction.[56]

3. IRREPARABLE HARM

To be successful in a request for a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must demonstrate irreparable harm. "A plaintiff's harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages." *Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov't*, 305 F.3d 56, 578 (6th Cir. 2002). To constitute irreparable harm (meaning, as just indicated, irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction), the harm must be "actual and

[56] Although Plaintiffs contend that SB1 also would fail under rational basis review, the Court need not reach this issue in light of its conclusion that intermediate scrutiny applies to Plaintiffs' equal protection claim.

imminent harm rather than harm that is speculative or unsubstantiated." *See Abney v. Amgen, Inc.*, 443 F.3d 540, 552 (6th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiffs in this case have demonstrated irreparable harm. As the Sixth Circuit has acknowledged, "a plaintiff can demonstrate that a denial of an injunction will cause irreparable harm if the claim is based upon a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights." *See Overstreet*, 305 F.3d at 578. The Court has found that Plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on their claims that SB1 violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Therefore, a denial of the requested injunction (and enforcement of SB1) would cause irreparable harm by infringing on Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

Looking beyond this basis for demonstrating irreparable harm, the Court also agrees that Minor Plaintiffs likely[57] will suffer actual and imminent injury in the form of emotional and psychological harm as well as unwanted physical changes if they are deprived access to treatment of their gender dysphoria under SB1.[58] Indeed, each Minor Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that details the negative consequences they expect to endure as a result of SB1 becoming effective.[59] (Doc. Nos. 22, 24, 26). These expectations are not mere conjecture but instead are

[57] Courts have not always been ideally clear (or consistent) about the degree of certainty required for the plaintiff-movant's mandatory showing of irreparable harm. However, the Supreme Court has stated that the plaintiff movant "'must establish [among other things] . . . that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary [injunctive] relief.'" *Ramirez v. Collier*, 142 S. Ct. 1264, 1268 (2022) (quoting *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).

[58] Because all Plaintiffs seek the same relief, the demonstration of irreparable harm on the part of just the Minor Plaintiffs (rather than all Plaintiffs) shows irreparable harm sufficient to support issuance in its entirety of the preliminary injunction requested collectively by all Plaintiffs. The Court also notes that irreparable harm in the form of infringement of constitutional rights affects all Plaintiffs.

[59] Contrary to Defendants' argument, the fact that Minor Plaintiffs merely *expect* to suffer (rather than have suffered, or are guaranteed to suffer) these negative effects does not render their harms speculative. There is substantial evidence on the record from Plaintiffs' experts that denial of treatment for gender dysphoria results in significant harms to patients. And Minor Plaintiffs themselves have provided declarations explaining the fear they have of the negative repercussions of enforcement of SB1. Although Minor

supported by the medical evidence on the record. (Adkins Decl. at 5) (explaining that leaving gender dysphoria untreated can result in severe anxiety, depression, self-harm, and suicidal ideation). Several courts have found similar imminent harms to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement. *See Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (finding suffering of anxiety, depression, and suicidality as a result of inability to access gender-affirming care constituted irreparable harm); *Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 892 (finding that plaintiffs met the irreparable harm requirement because denial of access to gender-affirming care will cause physical and psychological harm); *Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *16 (finding irreparable harm requirement met where denial of gender-affirming care will cause "unwanted and irreversible onset and progression of puberty in [the plaintiffs'] natal sex. . .").

Defendants' arguments that Plaintiffs have not met the irreparable-harm requirement are unavailing. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' harms are not irreparable because although SB1 becomes effective on July 1, 2023, Plaintiffs can continue to receive treatment until March 31, 2024 under the continuing-care exception, codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(1)(B). (Doc. No. 112 at 22). In doing so, Defendants ignore two key points. First, the continuing care exception comes with constraints. With respect to irreparable harm, the most significant constraint is that a minor receiving care under this exception cannot receive treatment that is different from

---

Plaintiffs do not themselves use terms like "anxiety" and "depression," they very clearly outline the physical and psychological consequences they expect to suffer as a result of SB1. Minor Plaintiffs are laypersons, not doctors, and the Court will not fault them for using laymen terms in their declarations rather than medical terminology.

On the other hand, the Court questions the relevance, to the irreparable-harm analysis, of what Minor Plaintiffs expect to endure, where (as here) there is medical evidence on the record that supports a finding of irreparable harm. After all, Minor Plaintiffs, though understandably concerned about the impact of SB1, are not as well-positioned as medical experts to comment on the risk of various harms (including physical changes) they face as a result of no longer being able to access their treatments for gender dysphoria. Of course, Minor Plaintiffs' testimony on the harms they face do not hurt their case. But in the Court's view, the testimony of the medical experts have more impact on the irreparable-harm issue than the expectations of Minor Plaintiffs.

that which was received prior to July 1 if the change in treatment is to treat gender dysphoria. *See* Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(b)(4). So for example, a minor who was receiving puberty blockers on July 1 could not proceed to receiving cross-sex hormones, even if that change was the safe and proper treatment plan for that minor. Without the ability to make appropriate adjustments, whatever those changes may be, Plaintiffs' treatment would be devoid of necessary flexibility and thus likely will be severely impacted even under the continuing-care exception.

Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the record demonstrates undisputedly that the continuing care exception will cause doctors to titrate down their minor patients' medications. (Doc. No. 113-1 at 111 (page from Declaration of Dr. Cassandra Brady); Doc. No. 140 (Rebuttal Declaration of Dr. Susan N. Lacy) at 1; Jane Doe Decl. at 1). Titrating down (meaning decreasing the dosages) the treatments for gender dysphoria will lead to physical changes that are consistent with the patients' sex at birth (*i.e.* inconsistent with their current gender identity), which will have the follow-on effect of worsening the patients' dysphoria. (Adkins Rebuttal Decl. at 14). And although SB1 does not explicitly refer to any requirement to "wean off" or "titrate down" in the lead up to March 31, 2024, the record reflects that the natural consequence of the continuing care exception is that physicians will be winding down care for patients beginning on July 1, 2023. And, of course, this was to be expected given that the exception explicitly forbids changes in treatment that would further combat gender dysphoria. Plaintiffs have therefore demonstrated that they likely would suffer actual and imminent harm beginning on July 1, 2023.

Defendants further contend that Vanderbilt University Medical Center ("VUMC") has announced that it will not provide care under the continuing care exception and will not resume any care, even if an injunction is granted, given a fear of civil liability under the private-cause-of-action provision (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-105) of SB1 (which Plaintiffs do not seek

to enjoin). (Doc. No. 112 at 23–24).[60] It is true that VUMC has decided that it will cease all care that is banned under SB1 after July 1, 2023. (Doc. No. 113-1 at 107 (page from Declaration of Dr. C. Wright Pinson)). However, Defendants' contention that VUMC will not change its decision regarding cessation of care *even in the event of a preliminary injunction* stands in direct contradiction to the record. Dr. Pinson, the Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Chief Health System Officer at VUMC, has testified that "[s]hould enforcement of [SB1's] provisions *prohibiting Hormone Therapy* be *deferred, delayed*, or enjoined, VUMC would continue to provide Hormone Therapy consistent with the prevailing standards of care for persons with gender dysphoria to those minor patients of VUMC. . . ." (Doc. No. 113-1 at 108) (emphasis added).

Dr. Pinson's declaration clearly indicates two related things. First, contrary to Defendants' argument that VUMC will not continue treatment following an injunction, Pinson plainly states that VUMC would continue treatment if there is a deferral or delay in the enforcement of SB1. A preliminary injunction would serve both to defer and to delay enforcement of SB1. Second, Pinson's declaration plainly states that VUMC will continue care as long as the provisions of SB1 prohibiting hormone therapies are enjoined. Contrary to Defendants' position, Pinson does not indicate that VUMC will abstain from providing care, due to fear of civil liability, even if a preliminary injunction has been entered and is in effect. A preliminary injunction therefore *will* (preliminarily) address Plaintiffs' harms because Plaintiffs will then be able to resume care at VUMC. For this reason, and those stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the irreparable harm requirement.[61]

---

[60] The record reflects that Minor Plaintiffs all receive treatment for their gender dysphoria at VUMC. (Doc. Nos. 22, 25, 26).

[61] The Court notes that it does *not* base its finding of irreparable harm in any way on the specific implication that some parents of transgender children will, absent relief, be forced "to flee the State." (Doc. No. 1 at

4. BALANCE OF EQUITIES & PUBLIC INTEREST

"The third and fourth [requirements] of the preliminary injunction analysis—harm to others and the public interest—merge when the Government is the opposing party."[62] *Does #1–9 v. Lee*, 574 F. Supp. 3d 558, 563 (M.D. Tenn. 2021). On the one hand, the Court recognizes that a state suffers harm when a statute that was passed using democratic processes is enjoined. *See Doe #11 v. Lee*, 609 F. Supp. 3d 578, 617 (M.D. Tenn. 2022). This principle, however, plainly does not extend to statutes that are substantially likely to be unconstitutional. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, "no cognizable harm results from stopping unconstitutional conduct, so it is always in the public interest to prevent violation of a party's constitutional rights." *Vitolo v. Guzman*, 999 F.3d 353, 360 (6th Cir. 2021). Given that the Court here has found it substantially likely that SB1 is unconstitutional, the Court is satisfied that the merged-third-and-fourth requirements for a preliminary injunction have been met.

¶ 6). This implication strikes the Court as hyperbolic, to the extent that it conjures up images of Plaintiffs having to make a run for the state border prior to July 1 to avoid persecution. But the notion that Plaintiffs, absent an injunction, would have to go outside Tennessee to obtain treatment is not hyperbolic and supports the finding of irreparable injury.

[62] The Court notes that there are different formulations even within the Sixth Circuit of the third requirement of a preliminary injunction. As illustrated, sometimes this requirement is referred to balancing equities, and sometimes it is referred to as the harm that a defendant will face if the requested injunction is issued. Whichever formulation is chosen, the job of the Court is essentially the same—to determine whether an injunction is equitable in light of harms that it may cause.

The Court also notes that the quoted text to which this footnote is appended uses the term "Government," which is typically used in federal judicial opinions to refer to the federal government. But the quoted text would be equally valid were "the Government" replaced by "a state official with relevant statutory enforcement authority."

5. SCOPE OF THE REMEDY

Having determined that all requirements for a preliminary injunction are met, the Court must determine the scope of the injunction warranted. As discussed at the outset of the opinion, any injunction will not affect the private right of action under SB1 or SB1's ban on surgeries.

"A preliminary injunction must be no more burdensome than necessary to provide a plaintiff complete relief, and a district court abuses its discretion in ordering an overly broad injunction." *Sony/ATV Publishing, LLC v. Marcos*, 651 Fed. App'x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2016). Even considering this demanding standing, the Court agrees that a state-wide injunction of SB1 is necessary to redress Plaintiffs' injuries. As Plaintiffs point out, it is far-fetched that healthcare providers in Tennessee would continue care specifically for Minor Plaintiffs when they cannot do so for any other individual to whom SB1 applies. (Doc. No. 146 at 18). Indeed, it seems highly unlikely that VUMC for example would continue treating Minor Plaintiffs in particular for gender dysphoria, while keeping the rest of the practice shuttered as to any other minors seeking treatment for gender dysphoria.

Moreover, Plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating that SB1 is most likely unconstitutional on its face—indeed, the Court has not had to defer to the individual facts of Plaintiffs in drawing its conclusions that SB1 likely fails intermediate scrutiny—and a state-wide injunction is typically an appropriate remedy in such circumstances. *See, e.g.*, *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1151 (granting state-wide preliminary injunction of Alabama's ban on gender-affirming care for minors due to the substantial likelihood that it is unconstitutional); *Brandt by and through Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 672 (finding that district court did not abuse discretion in granting state-wide injunction of Arkansas' ban on gender-affirming care for minors based on its conclusion that it likely failed intermediate scrutiny); *Hecox v. Little*, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930 at 988–989 (D.

Idaho 2020) (granting state-wide injunction of Idaho law excluding transgender women from participating in women's sports teams because the law was likely unconstitutional); *K.C.*, 2023 WL 4054086, at *14 (granting state-wide injunction based on finding that Indiana law banning procedures for gender transitioning were likely unconstitutional); *Friends of George's, Inc. v. Tenn.*, No. 2-23-cv-02176, 2023 WL 2755238 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 31, 2023) (granting state-wide temporary restraining order of enforcement of Tennessee law that likely violated the First Amendment).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not met the standard for showing that SB1 is unconstitutional on its face. (Doc. No. 112 at 29). As Defendants point out, in *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the Court explained that a plaintiff has made a successful facial challenge when the plaintiff has established that "no set of circumstances exists under which" the law would be valid. *Id.* at 746. Seemingly contrary to this guidance, however, the Supreme Court has also instructed that "[i]n determining whether a law is facially invalid, [a court] must be careful not to go beyond the statute's facial requirements and speculate about 'hypothetical' or 'imaginary' case." *See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party*, 552 U.S. 442 (2008). Yet, this is exactly what Defendants ask the Court to do here. Defendants provide hypotheticals in which they believe SB1 could be constitutionally applied. Though the Court concedes that the standard from *Salerno* would invite such an argument, more recent precedent clearly counsels against considering these hypotheticals. More importantly, the Supreme Court has explained in its jurisprudence since *Salerno*, that "[t]he proper focus of the constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant. . .." *See City of Los Angeles, Calif v. Patel*, 576 U.S. 409, 418 (2015). Defendants' examples raise the issue of hypothetical individuals to whom SB1 would be inapplicable because these individuals could not access the procedures

banned under SB1 for reasons entirely separate from the restrictions imposed by the law. SB1 would therefore have no application to these individuals. Given that the Supreme Court has stated that a court should not consider hypotheticals in its application of *Salerno* and that the proper focus for a facial challenge is the group of individuals affected by the given law, the Court does not agree with Defendants that their hypotheticals demonstrate that SB1 is constitutional in some circumstances.

Despite the Court's rejection of Defendants' hypotheticals as irrelevant, it is still incumbent on Plaintiffs to show why they have succeeded under *Salerno*'s standard. In other words, Defendants do not bear the burden under *Salerno*. But the Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried that burden here. The Court has concluded that SB1 is most likely unconstitutional. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied on the words of the law itself and did not have to turn to the individual circumstances of Plaintiffs. The Court has therefore found that SB1 is unconstitutional on its face, which necessarily means that it is unconstitutional in all of its applications.

The Court's finding is supported by the discussion provided by the Tenth Circuit in *Doe v. City of Albuquerque*, 667 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). In *Doe*, the Tenth Circuit found that *Salerno* does not provide an additional test for determining whether a statute is unconstitutional on its face. *Id.* at 1127. Instead, "where a statute fails the relevant constitutional test [], it can no longer be constitutionally applied to anyone—and thus there is no set of circumstances in which the statute would be valid. The relevant constitutional test, however, remains the proper inquiry." *See id.* Although the Sixth Circuit has not yet endorsed this approach to *Salerno*, the Court finds that it is the only logical application of the "no set of circumstances" standard when a court has found that a law fails the relevant constitutional test without reliance on the circumstances of individual plaintiffs. As noted, here, the Court has found that SB1 on its face likely fails intermediate scrutiny,

meaning that the Court relied on the text of SB1 to arrive at its conclusion rather than relying on the facts pertaining to Plaintiffs. It necessarily follows that SB1 is likely unconstitutional in all of its applications.

Defendants' reliance on *Salerno*, and in particular its "no set of circumstances" language, is understandable. After all, Defendants are invoking the actual words used by the Supreme Court. But Defendants' argument regarding *Salerno* raises the question of whether the "no set of circumstances" language of *Salerno* has been rendered a dead-letter by more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Supreme Court itself has criticized the case and has offered a significantly more lenient test for facial challenges. *See U.S. v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (explaining that a plaintiff can succeed on a facial challenge where he demonstrates that the statute lacks any "plainly legitimate sweep. . ."). Furthermore, as the Tenth Circuit has pointed out, "the [Supreme] Court has repeatedly considered facial challenges simply by applying the relevant constitutional test to the challenged statute without attempting to conjure up whether or not there is a hypothetical situation in which application of the statute might be valid[, though the latter practice would seem otherwise crucial to any *Salerno* analysis]." *See Doe*, 667 F.3d at 1124. Even assuming that *Salerno* remains the relevant precedent, however, the Court finds that for the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs have shown that there is likely no set of circumstances in which SB1 could be constitutionally applied because SB1 likely fails intermediate scrutiny based on the text of the statute and without regard to the individual circumstances of Plaintiffs. The Court therefore finds that a state-wide injunction of SB1 during the pendency of this litigation—subject to the exceptions delineated above—is warranted.

6. SECURITY

Plaintiffs request that the Court waive any bond requirement in this case on the grounds that Defendants are unlikely to sustain any costs or damages as a result of the preliminary injunction. (Doc. No. 21). Defendants do not appear to oppose this request, which in the Court's experience is routinely made and granted when a state statute is preliminarily enjoined. The Court therefore finds that a security bond under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is unnecessary in this case.

CONCLUSION

The Court realizes that today's decision will likely stoke the already controversial fire regarding the rights of transgender individuals in American society on the one hand, and the countervailing power of states to control certain activities within their borders and to use that power to protect minors.

The Court, however, does not stand alone in its decision. As repeatedly emphasized above, several federal courts across the country have been confronted with laws that mirror SB1 in material respects. To the Court's knowledge, every court to consider preliminarily enjoining a ban on gender-affirming care for minors has found that such a ban is likely unconstitutional. And at least one federal court has found such a ban to be unconstitutional at final judgment. Though the Court would not hesitate to be an outlier if it found such an outcome to be required, the Court finds it noteworthy that its resolution of the present Motion brings it into the ranks of courts that have (unanimously) come to the same conclusion when considering very similar laws.

The Court also acknowledges that it must tread carefully when enjoining from enforcement a law that was enacted through a democratic process. The Court does not take providing such relief lightly. The legislative process, however, is not without constraints. If Tennessee wishes to

regulate access to certain medical procedures, it must do so in a manner that does not infringe on the rights conferred by the United States Constitution, which is of course supreme to all other laws of the land. With regard to SB1, Tennessee has likely failed to do just this.

Even though the Court's findings are preliminary, the Court is aware that many will be disappointed by the ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion, and still, many others will be pleased. It borders on the obvious, however, to say that Defendants retain the right to seek to change the Court's mind about the constitutionality of SB1 and to receive a final judgment that is favorable to them. The Court's job is to evaluate the parties' arguments and evidence in light of precedent, relevant case law, and the then-existing record and make a proper determination on the matter immediately at hand. The Court is confident that it has done so in the resolution of the present Motion.

In light of the Court's findings provided herein, the Motion at Doc. No. 21 will be granted in part and denied in part. A corresponding order will be entered separately.

Eli Richardson

ELI RICHARDSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Exhibit B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
LOUISVILLE DIVISION

JANE DOE 1 et al.,[1] Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 3:23-cv-230-DJH

WILLIAM C. THORNBURY, JR., MD, in his official capacity as the President of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure et al., Defendants,

and

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, ex rel. Attorney General Daniel Cameron, Intervening Defendant.

* * * * *

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of Kentucky Senate Bill 150, which was enacted over the governor's veto on March 29, 2023. Plaintiffs—seven transgender minors and their parents—sued the state officials responsible for enforcing SB 150, alleging that the law's prohibition on the use of puberty-blockers and hormones violates the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Docket No. 2) They seek a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect on June 29, 2023. (D.N. 17) Defendants William C. Thornbury, Jr., MD (as President of the Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure); Audria Denker, RN (as President of the Kentucky Board of Nursing); and Eric Friedlander (as Secretary for the Cabinet of Health and Family Services) do not oppose the requested injunction; indeed, Denker and Thornbury note that "it would behoove KBML/KBN-licensees and their patients for the Court

[1] Plaintiffs move for leave to proceed pseudonymously. (Docket No. 1) The Commonwealth does not oppose the motion, subject to certain conditions more appropriately addressed in the discovery context. (*See* D.N. 48) The Court will therefore grant Plaintiffs' motion and refer the case to a magistrate judge for management of discovery and entry of any appropriate protective order.

to grant the injunction and maintain the status quo pending final ruling on the merits of the suit, to avoid potentially unnecessary cost, time, and harmful exposure should Plaintiffs be successful." (D.N. 41, PageID.478-79; *see* D.N. 42) Attorney General Daniel Cameron, who was permitted to intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky (D.N. 38), maintains that injunctive relief is not warranted. (D.N. 47)

The parties agree that the motion for preliminary injunction presents primarily legal questions, and thus no evidentiary hearing is necessary.[2] *See Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp.*, 511 F.3d 535, 552 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing that "[the Sixth Circuit's] Rule 65 jurisprudence indicates that a hearing is only required when there are disputed factual issues, and not when the issues are primarily questions of law" (collecting cases)). The Court will therefore decide the motion on the current record, which consists of the briefs submitted by the parties and various amici curiae, as well as the statement of the United States filed under 28 U.S.C. § 517.[3] (*See* D.N. 19-2; D.N. 37; D.N. 49-2; D.N. 51-1)

After careful consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional challenges to SB 150 and otherwise meet the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. The Court will therefore grant the motion for the reasons explained below.

[2] Plaintiffs "d[id] not believe there should be any factual disputes" but nevertheless requested a hearing based on their "anticipat[ion]" that the Commonwealth's response to the motion "likely w[ould] present factual disputes" (D.N. 43, PageID.483); the Commonwealth, however, agreed that no hearing was necessary. (D.N. 44) Thornbury, Denker, and Friedlander likewise did not request a hearing. (D.N. 41; D.N. 42)

[3] Several organizations move for leave to file amicus briefs. (D.N. 19; D.N. 49; D.N. 51) The Court will grant these motions, which no party has opposed.

I.

The minor plaintiffs are three transgender boys and four transgender girls who live in Kentucky. (D.N. 2, PageID.25-29) Six are "currently receiving" treatments that would be banned under SB 150 (*id.*, PageID.13-15), while the seventh "anticipates needing to receive" those treatments when she begins puberty (*id.*, PageID.16), which could occur "at any time." (*Id.*, PageID.29) The parent plaintiffs also reside in Kentucky. (*See id.*, PageID.25-29)

Plaintiffs challenge § 4(2)(a) and (b) of SB 150. (*Id.*, PageID.12 n.2) Under those provisions,

> a health care provider shall not, for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor's perception of, the minor's sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex, knowingly:
> (a) Prescribe or administer any drug to delay or stop normal puberty;
> (b) Prescribe or administer testosterone, estrogen, or progesterone, in amounts greater than would normally be produced endogenously in a healthy person of the same age and sex[.]

S.B. 150 § 4(2), 2023 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2023). The use of puberty-blockers or hormones in minors for other purposes is not restricted. *See* § 4(3). The relevant licensing or certifying agency must "revoke the . . . licensure or certification" of any healthcare provider found to have violated subsection (2). § 4(4). SB 150 also permits a "civil action to recover damages for injury suffered as a result of a violation" of the treatment ban to be brought by age 30 or within three years of discovery "that the injury or damages were caused by the violation." § 4(5).

Plaintiffs allege that SB 150 violates the Equal Protection Clause by "singl[ing] out transgender minors and prohibit[ing] them from obtaining medically necessary treatment based on their sex and transgender status." (D.N. 2, PageID.31) The parent plaintiffs additionally allege that SB 150 violates their right "to make decisions 'concerning the care, custody, and control of their children'" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (*Id.*, PageID.30

(quoting *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000))) In briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction, each side submitted expert declarations, with Plaintiffs' experts generally opining that the drugs in question are safe, effective, and necessary, and the Commonwealth's experts raising various concerns as to their use.[4]

Based on the evidence submitted, the Court finds that the treatments barred by SB 150 are medically appropriate and necessary for some transgender children under the evidence-based standard of care accepted by all major medical organizations in the United States. (*See* D.N. 19-2 (amicus brief of more than twenty organizations including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, the American Medical Association, the Endocrine Society, the Pediatric Endocrine Society, the Society for Adolescent Health and Medicine, and the World Professional Association for Transgender Health)) These drugs have a long history of safe use in minors for various conditions. It is undisputed that puberty-blockers and hormones are not given to prepubertal children with gender dysphoria.

With these facts in mind, the Court turns to the preliminary-injunction inquiry.

II.

In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Court balances four factors: "(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuance of the injunction." *Foresight Coal Sales, LLC v. Chandler*, 60 F.4th 288, 294 (6th Cir.

[4] The Commonwealth seeks leave to file "rebuttal declarations" addressing the declarations attached to Plaintiffs' reply. (D.N. 54) In the interest of completeness, the Court will allow the rebuttal declarations. In granting the motion, the Court does not accept the Attorney General's position that Plaintiffs' attachment of new declarations to their reply was in any way improper. (*See* D.N. 60)

2023) (quoting *Union Home Mortg. Corp. v. Cromer*, 31 F.4th 356, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2022)). Of these, "the likelihood of success on the merits is often the determinative factor," particularly when a constitutional violation is alleged. *Id.* (citing *Dahl v. Bd. of Trs. of W. Mich. Univ.*, 15 F.4th 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)); *see Obama for Am. v. Husted*, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting *Jones v. Caruso*, 569 F.3d 258, 265 (6th Cir. 2009))). Here, as explained below, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success as to each of their claims.

A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

1. Equal Protection

The parties dispute what level of scrutiny applies to Plaintiffs' claims. As to their equal-protection claim, Plaintiffs maintain that SB 150 discriminates on the basis of sex and is therefore subject to heightened scrutiny. (D.N. 17, PageID.128-30) According to the Commonwealth, however, the Court need only apply rational-basis review. (D.N. 47, PageID.505) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs both that heightened scrutiny applies and that SB 150 cannot survive it.

SB 150 prohibits the use of puberty-blockers or hormones "for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of, or to validate a minor's perception of, the minor's sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex." § 4(2). It defines "sex" as "the biological indication of male and female as evidenced by sex chromosomes, naturally occurring sex hormones, gonads, and nonambiguous internal and external genitalia present at birth." § 4(1)(b). In other words, "the minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law." *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 669 (8th Cir. 2022). SB 150 therefore "discriminates on the basis of sex," and heightened scrutiny is required.[5] *Id.*; *see*

[5] In light of this conclusion, the Court need not address Plaintiffs' alternative argument that transgender individuals are a quasi-suspect class. (*See* D.N. 17, PageID.130-32)

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996); *see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) ("[I]t is impossible to discriminate against a person for being . . . transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex."); *Smith v. City of Salem*, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that discrimination based on transgender status "easily" constitutes sex discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause).

The Commonwealth offers a number of superficial arguments to the contrary, none of which are persuasive. First, the Commonwealth attempts to distinguish *Bostock*'s reasoning as limited to the Title VII context. (D.N. 47, PageID.500 (citing *Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc.*, 988 F.3d 318, 324 (6th Cir. 2021))) But the Sixth Circuit found nearly two decades ago that discrimination based on transgender status "easily" constitutes sex discrimination for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause, *see Smith*, 378 F.3d at 577, and in any event, the analysis under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause is the same. *Id.* The case the Commonwealth cites in support did not involve sex discrimination and does not undermine *Smith* in any way. *See Pelcha*, 988 F.3d at 324 (declining to extend *Bostock*'s interpretation of Title VII's "because of" language to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).

The Commonwealth's attempt to distinguish *Smith* on the ground that the challenged provisions "have nothing to do with sex 'stereotype[s]'" also fails. (D.N. 47, PageID.501 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)) SB 150 prohibits the use of puberty-blockers and hormones only to support an "appearance or perception" of sex that "is inconsistent with the minor's [natal] sex"—i.e., where the appearance or perception does not match the stereotype associated with the minor's natal sex. § 4(2). Regardless of its stated purpose, then, SB 150 would have the effect of enforcing gender conformity. *See Doe v. Ladapo*, No. 4:23cv114-RH-MAF, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99603, at *25 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (finding that similar law

discriminated on the basis of gender nonconformity where "the statute prohibit[ed] [puberty-blockers] only for transgender children, not for anyone else" (citing *Glenn v. Brumby*, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011))). And "[s]ex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-conforming behavior"—here, by barring access to certain medical treatment only to those for whom the treatment is intended to result in non-stereotypical appearance—"is impermissible discrimination" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause. *Smith*, 378 F.3d at 575; *see id.* at 577.

That SB 150 applies equally to boys and girls (*see* D.N. 47, PageID.499) does not change the fact that "[t]he biological sex of the minor patient is the basis on which the law distinguishes between those who may receive certain types of medical care and those who may not." *Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 670. The abortion and pregnancy cases cited by the Commonwealth (*see* D.N. 47, PageID.499-500, 502) are inapposite: in those cases, unlike this one, the law or policy at issue did not bar access to treatment for some patients but not others depending on the patient's sex. *See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2245-46 (2022) (citing *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U. S. 484, 496, n.20 (1974)). For all of these reasons, the Court concludes—as has every other federal court to consider this question—that heightened scrutiny applies to Plaintiffs' equal-protection claim. *See Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 670; *K.C. v. Individual Members of the Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind.*, No. 1:23-cv-00595-JPH-KMB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104870, at *20-*25 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023); *Ladapo*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99603, at *23-*25; *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2022).

To survive heightened scrutiny, "a party seeking to uphold government action based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for the classification." *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 524 (quoting *Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan*, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). Under this standard,

the Commonwealth "must show 'at least that the classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" *Id.* (quoting *Miss. Univ. for Women*, 458 U.S. at 724). "The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." *Id.* at 533.

As set out in the Commonwealth's response brief, the stated justifications for SB 150 are protecting children; "protecting vulnerable groups . . . from abuse, neglect, and mistakes"; and "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession." (D.N. 47, PageID.505 (citations omitted)) The Commonwealth fails to show that the ban imposed by SB 150 is "substantially related to the achievement of those objectives," however. *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 524 (quoting *Miss. Univ. for Women*, 458 U.S. at 724). First, there is no evidence of any "abuse, neglect, [or] mistakes" protected against by SB 150. (D.N. 47, PageID.505; *see generally id.*) Nor is the protection of children in general a sufficiently persuasive justification given that the statute allows the same treatments for cisgender minors. *See* § 4(3)(a)-(b); *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 893 (E.D. Ark. 2021) (finding stated justification for similar law to be "pretextual because [the law] allows the same treatments for cisgender minors that are banned for transgender minors as long as the desired results conform with the stereotype of the minor's biological sex").

The Commonwealth's purported concern for "the integrity and ethics of the medical profession" is likewise unpersuasive. (D.N. 47, PageID.505 (citations omitted)) Underpinning this argument is the Attorney General's characterization of puberty-blockers and hormones as "huge money makers" based on a news article from Tennessee containing that phrase. (*Id.*, PageID.491 (citing Kimberlee Kruesi, *Social media posts spark calls to investigate Tenn.'s VUMC*, Associated Press (Sept. 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/KV5A-MLL9.); *see also id.*, PageID.506 (arguing that alternative treatments "would mean those who reap the financial benefits

of prescribing puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones—'huge money makers'—would have to stop injecting them in children with gender dysphoria . . . . [a]nd that would mean no more lifelong patients who must continuously take these profitable drugs")) But the quote in question was from "a video of one [Vanderbilt University Medical Center] doctor in 2018 saying these 'types of *surgeries* bring in a lot of money' and later saying that female-to-male *bottom surgeries* are 'huge money makers.'" Kruesi, *supra* (emphasis added). As acknowledged in the final paragraph of the Commonwealth's response brief (in unnecessarily inflammatory language), surgical procedures are not at issue in this case. (D.N. 47, PageID.515; *see* D.N. 2, PageID.12 n.2) The Commonwealth offers no evidence that Kentucky healthcare providers prescribe puberty-blockers or hormones primarily for financial gain as opposed to patients' well-being, and the Court makes no such presumption.[6]

Nor do the quoted studies from "some European countries" questioning the efficacy of the drugs (D.N. 47, PageID.507), or anecdotes from a handful of "detransitioners" (*id.*, PageID.508), support banning the treatments entirely, as SB 150 would do. Doctors currently decide, based on the widely accepted standard of care, whether puberty-blockers or hormones are appropriate for a particular patient. Far from "protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession" (*id.*, PageID.505 (citation omitted)), SB 150 would prevent doctors from acting in accordance with the applicable standard of care. The Commonwealth's "goal of ensuring the ethics of [Kentucky]

[6] The Attorney General's reference to an assumed "ideological takeover" of the major medical organizations (D.N. 47, PageID.510) is similarly baseless. "The overwhelming majority of doctors are dedicated professionals whose first goal is the safe and effective treatment of their patients[, and t]here is no reason to believe [that] the doctors who adopted these standards were motivated by anything else." *Ladapo*, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99603, at *39 ("[I]t is fanciful to believe that all the many medical associations who have endorsed gender-affirming care, or who have spoken out or joined an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs in this litigation, have so readily sold their patients down the river.").

healthcare providers is not attained by interfering with the patient-physician relationship, unnecessarily regulating the evidence-based practice of medicine[,] and subjecting physicians who deliver safe, legal, and medically necessary care to civil liability and loss of licensing." *Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 891.

In sum, the Commonwealth has not shown that SB 150's discrimination on the basis of sex "serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 524 (citation omitted). The ban therefore fails heightened scrutiny, *see id.*, and Plaintiffs thus have a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their equal-protection claim.

2. Due Process

The parent plaintiffs allege that SB 150 violates their right "to make decisions 'concerning the care, custody, and control of their children'" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (D.N. 2, PageID.30 (quoting *Troxel*, 530 U.S. at 66)) This right "includes the right to direct their children's medical care," as the Commonwealth acknowledges. (D.N. 47, PageID.495 (quoting *Kanuszewski v. Mich. HHS*, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019)). The Commonwealth further acknowledges parents' fundamental right "to make the ultimate decision from a list of available medical treatments," "to make medical decisions for a child from a list of legally[]permissible treatments," or to "choos[e] [among] several available options"; however, it asserts that the right is limited when the desired treatments "are banned . . . for a particular purpose." (*Id.*, PageID.495-96; *see also id.*, PageID.497 ("Parents may have a general right to make, from a list of *legally available* options, a particular healthcare choice. But there is no fundamental right to obtain for their children particular drugs for a particular *prohibited* use." (citation omitted) (emphasis added))) But this argument presupposes that SB 150's prohibition is

lawful—the precise question at issue in this case. *Cf. U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius*, 705 F.3d 588, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (observing in dicta that "most federal courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment . . . if the government *has reasonably prohibited* that type of treatment" (emphasis added) (quoting *Mitchell v. Clayton*, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993))). Unless and until SB 150 goes into effect, puberty-blockers and hormones are available, legally permissible treatments for gender dysphoria; indeed, all but one of the minor plaintiffs are already receiving them. (D.N. 2, PageID.13-16) Thus, the Commonwealth effectively concedes that the parent plaintiffs have a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to choose those treatments for their children. (*See* D.N. 47, PageID.495-96)

The bulk of the Commonwealth's argument is directed at a claim Plaintiffs have not made, namely that parents have "a fundamental right to obtain whatever drugs they want for their children, without restriction." (*Id.*, PageID.495; *see also id.* ("There is no fundamental right of a parent to obtain for a child whatever drugs the parent—much less, the child—desires, no matter what.") ("There is no limitless right of a parent to obtain drugs for a child.") ("[T]h[e] general right to make the ultimate decision from a list of available medical treatments does not translate into some sort of affirmative, limitless right to obtain whatever drugs the parent wants for his or her child, carte blanche.")) Plaintiffs do not allege a "limitless right to obtain whatever drugs the parent wants for his or her child" (*id.*), but rather "the right to obtain established medical treatments to protect their children's health and well-being." (D.N. 2, PageID.30) And the evidence attached to Plaintiffs' motion and reply makes clear that the puberty-blockers and hormones barred by SB 150 are established medical treatments essential to the well-being of many transgender children: every major medical organization in the United States agrees that these treatments are safe, effective, and appropriate when used in accordance with clinical guidelines. (*See* D.N. 19-

2) This case is therefore distinguishable from those cited by the Commonwealth in which plaintiffs claimed a right to access treatment for themselves that was not already available or accepted. *See Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 725–26 (1997) (assisted suicide); *Pickup v. Brown*, 740 F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2014) (conversion therapy for homosexuality); *Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach*, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) ("experimental drugs that . . . ha[d] not been proven safe and effective"). Moreover, the Commonwealth's contention that "Plaintiffs frame their asserted right at too 'high [of a] level of generality'" (D.N. 47, PageID.497 (alteration in original) (quoting *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2258)), is puzzling given its acknowledgment of parents' "substantive due process right . . . to direct their children's medical care." (*Id.*, PageID.495 (quoting *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 419))

Because this right is fundamental, "[g]overnment actions that burden the exercise of [the right] are subject to strict scrutiny, and will be upheld only when they are narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest." *Kanuszewski*, 927 F.3d at 419 (alterations in original) (quoting *Seal v. Morgan*, 229 F.3d 567, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2000)). While "[t]his does not mean that parents' control over their children is without limit, *id.* (citing *Schall v. Martin*, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984)), and "limitations on parents' control over their children are particularly salient in the context of medical treatment," *id.* (citations omitted), "the fact that a pediatric treatment 'involves risks does not automatically transfer the power' to choose that treatment 'from the parents to some agency or officer of the state.'" *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1145 (quoting *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)). Here, the record shows that the puberty-blockers and hormones barred by SB 150 are "well-established, evidence-based treatments for gender dysphoria in minors." *Id.* And as discussed above, the restrictions imposed by SB 150 are not designed to serve the stated government interests. *See supra* part II.A.1. Nor does the Commonwealth even attempt to show

that SB 150 "employs the 'least restrictive means' necessary to achieve its purpose." *Eknes-Tucker*, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 1146 (quoting *Holt v. Hobbs*, 574 U.S. 352, 364 (2015)); *see also Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 893. Plaintiffs thus also have a strong likelihood of success on their due-process claim.

B. Irreparable Injury, Harm to Others, and Public Interest

"When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed." *Husted*, 697 F.3d at 436 (citing *ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary Cnty.*, 354 F.3d 438, 445 (6th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, Plaintiffs have submitted declarations stating that the treatments have significantly improved the minor plaintiffs' condition and that eliminating access to those treatments in Kentucky would cause serious consequences, including severe psychological distress and the need to move out of state. (D.N. 17-6, PageID.288; *see* D.N. 17-4; D.N. 17-5; D.N. 17-7)

The Commonwealth argues that the minor plaintiffs and other children who receive gender-affirming care will suffer as a result. (D.N. 47, PageID.514) As set out above, however, the evidence before the Court shows otherwise. If allowed to take effect, SB 150 would eliminate treatments that have already significantly benefited six of the seven minor plaintiffs and prevent other transgender children from accessing these beneficial treatments in the future. It should go without saying that enjoining enforcement of SB 150 will not result in any child being forced to take puberty-blockers or hormones; rather, the treatments will continue to be limited to those patients whose parents and healthcare providers decide, in accordance with the applicable standard of care, that such treatment is appropriate.

Finally, because "it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights," this factor also weighs in favor of injunctive relief. *Dahl*, 15 F.4th at 736

(quoting *G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Mich. Liquor Control Comm'n*, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir. 1994)).

C. Scope of Injunction

The Commonwealth suggests that any injunction should be limited in scope to cover only those plaintiffs who are already taking the drugs in question. (D.N. 47, PageID.514-15) But the fact "that some minors experiencing gender dysphoria may choose not to pursue the gender transition procedures covered by the Act and therefore would not be harmed by its enforcement" does not mean that a facial injunction would be overbroad. *Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 672; *see id.* ("The proper focus of the [facial] constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant." (alteration in original) (quoting *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, 576 U.S. 409, 418-19 (2015))). The Commonwealth notably "fail[s] to offer a more narrowly tailored injunction that would remedy Plaintiffs' injuries," *id.*, and as Plaintiffs point out, it would be virtually impossible to fashion one. (*See* D.N. 52, PageID.1678-79) A facial injunction is therefore appropriate.

III.

Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional challenges to SB 150, and the remaining factors likewise support preliminary injunctive relief. Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

(1) Plaintiffs' motion to proceed pseudonymously (D.N. 1) is **GRANTED**.

(2) The motions for leave to file amicus briefs (D.N. 19; D.N. 49; D.N. 51) are **GRANTED**. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to file the tendered briefs (D.N. 19-2; D.N. 49-2; D.N. 51-1) in the record of this matter.

(3) The Commonwealth's motion for leave to file rebuttal declarations (D.N. 54) is **GRANTED**.

(4) Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (D.N. 17) is **GRANTED**. Defendants and Intervening Defendant and their agents, employees, servants, attorneys, successors, and any other person in active concert or participation with them are **ENJOINED**, pending final judgment, from enforcing, threatening to enforce, or otherwise requiring compliance with SB 150 § 4(2)(a) and (b).

(5) Because the Commonwealth has not requested that Plaintiffs be required to post security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), and in light of the "strength of [Plaintiffs'] case and the strong public interest involved," the security requirement is **WAIVED**. *Moltan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus.*, 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir. 1995).

(6) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), this matter is hereby **REFERRED** to U.S. Magistrate Judge Regina S. Edwards for resolution of all litigation planning issues, entry of scheduling orders, consideration of amendments thereto, and resolution of all non-dispositive matters, including discovery issues.

June 28, 2023

David J. Hale, Judge
United States District Court

Exhibit C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

AUGUST DEKKER et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CASE NO. 4:22cv325-RH-MAF

JASON WEIDA et al.,

Defendants.

_____/

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

For many years, Florida's Medicaid system paid for medically necessary treatments for gender dysphoria. Recently, for political reasons, Florida adopted a rule and then a statute prohibiting payment for some of the treatments: puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgeries. This case presents a challenge to the rule and statute. The controversy is live only for puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones; no plaintiff currently seeks surgery. This order sets out the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law following a bench trial.

I. Background: the parties and claims

The plaintiffs are two transgender adults, August Dekker and Brit Rothstein, and two transgender minors who are proceeding under pseudonyms, Susan Doe and K.F. The minors are suing through their parents, Jane and John Doe for Susan Doe and Jade Ladue for K.F. "Susan Doe" is the same pseudonym, but the plaintiff here is not the same person, as the plaintiff identified by that pseudonym in *Doe v. Ladapo*, No. 4:23cv114-RH-MAF (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023).

The defendants are Jason Weida, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA"), and AHCA itself.

In count I of the first amended complaint, all the plaintiffs assert a claim against Mr. Weida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In count II, all the plaintiffs assert a claim against AHCA under the Affordable Care Act's prohibition of discrimination based on sex, 42 U.S.C. § 18116. In count III, the minor plaintiffs and Mr. Rothstein, who is over age 18 and thus an adult but under age 21, assert a claim against Mr. Weida under § 1983 and the Medicaid Act's requirement for early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services for beneficiaries under age 21, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396a(a)(43)(C), 1396d(a)(4)(B), and 1396d(r)(5). In count IV, all plaintiffs assert a claim against Mr. Weida under § 1983 and the Medicaid Act's comparability requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i), under which

assistance to an eligible individual cannot be less in "amount, duration, or scope" than assistance available to other Medicaid beneficiaries.

The order granting a preliminary injunction in *Doe* was based in large part on the record compiled in this case. The *Doe* parties had stipulated that this record would be considered there. Many of this order's findings and conclusions have been cut and pasted from the *Doe* order, with any appropriate modifications. Same record, same findings and conclusions.

II. Gender identity is real

With extraordinarily rare exceptions not at issue here, every person is born with external sex characteristics, male or female, and chromosomes that match. As the person goes through life, the person also has a gender identity—a deeply felt internal sense of being male or female.[1] For more than 99% of people, the external sex characteristics and chromosomes—the determinants of what this order calls the person's natal sex—match the person's gender identity.[2]

For less than 1%, the natal sex and gender identity are opposites: a natal male's gender identity is female, or vice versa.[3] This order refers to such a person who identifies as female as a transgender female and to such a person who

[1] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 23–24; Trial Tr., ECF No. 238 at 72–73.
[2] Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 222.
[3] *Id.*; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 23–24; Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 29–31.

identifies as male as a transgender male. This order refers to individuals whose gender identity matches their natal sex as cisgender.

The elephant in the room should be noted at the outset. Gender identity is real. The record makes this clear. The defendants, speaking through their attorney, have admitted it. At least one defense expert also has admitted it.[4] That expert is Dr. Stephen B. Levine, the only defense expert who has actually treated a significant number of transgender patients. He addressed the issues conscientiously, on the merits, rather than as a biased advocate.

Despite the defense admissions, there are those who believe that cisgender individuals properly adhere to their natal sex and that transgender individuals have inappropriately *chosen* a contrary gender identity, male or female, just as one might choose whether to read Shakespeare or Grisham. Many people with this view tend to disapprove all things transgender and so oppose medical care that supports a person's transgender existence.[5] In this litigation, the defendants have explicitly acknowledged that this view is wrong and that pushing individuals away from their transgender identity is not a legitimate state interest.[6]

Still, an unspoken suggestion running just below the surface in some of the proceedings that led to adoption of the rule and statute at issue—and just below the

[4] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 10–11, 31–32, 80–81.
[5] *See id.* at 129–31.
[6] Trial Tr., ECF No. 242 at 97–98.

surface in the testimony of some of the defense experts and AHCA consultants—is that transgender identity is not real, that it is made up.[7] And so, for example, one of the defendants' experts, Dr. Paul Hruz, joined an amicus brief in another proceeding asserting transgender individuals have only a "false belief" in their gender identity—that they are maintaining a "charade" or "delusion."[8] An AHCA consultant, Dr. Patrick Lappert—a surgeon who has never performed gender-affirming surgery—said in a radio interview that gender-affirming care is a "lie," a "moral violation," a "huge evil," and "diabolical."[9] State employees or consultants suggested treatment of transgender individuals is either a "woke idea" or profiteering by the pharmaceutical industry or doctors.[10]

Any proponent of the challenged rule and statute should put up or shut up: do you acknowledge that there are individuals with actual gender identities opposite their natal sex, or do you not? Dog whistles ought not be tolerated.

---

[7] *See, e.g.*, Pls.' Exs. 284 & 285, ECF Nos. 182-21 & 182-22; *see also* Pls.' Ex. 304, ECF No. 183-6.

[8] Trial Tr., ECF No. 238 at 194–95. Dr. Hruz fended and parried questions and generally testified as a deeply biased advocate, not as an expert sharing relevant evidence-based information and opinions. I do not credit his testimony. I credit other defense experts only to the extent consistent with this opinion.

[9] Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 129–31.

[10] Pls.' Ex. 304, ECF No. 183-6; Pls.' Exs. 284 & 285, ECF Nos. 182-21 & 182-22.

III. Medicaid

Medicaid is a jointly funded federal-state program that provides medical care for patients of limited economic means. *See Garrido v. Dudek*, 731 F.3d 1152, 1153–54 (11th Cir. 2013); *see also Harris v. James*, 127 F.3d 993, 996 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting *Silver v. Baggiano*, 804 F.2d 1211, 1215 (11th Cir. 1986)). Federal law makes some services mandatory but allows states to "place appropriate limits" based on "such criteria as medical necessity or on utilization control procedures." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d); *see also Garrido*, 731 F.3d at 1154; *Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese*, 637 F.3d 1220, 1232–33 (11th Cir. 2011); *Rush v. Parham*, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980). States may "set reasonable standards" for "medical necessity." *Garrido*, 731 F.3d at 1154.

Exercising this authority, Florida has long limited Medicaid coverage to services that are "medically necessary." *See* Fla. Stat. § 409.905. Florida provides coverage for, among other things, "services and procedures" rendered "by, or under the personal supervision of," a licensed physician, when "medically necessary for the treatment of an injury, illness, or disease." Fla. Stat. § 409.905(9). This does not, however, extend to services that are "clinically unproven, experimental, or for purely cosmetic purposes." *Id.*

For Medicaid beneficiaries under age 21, Florida also covers "all services determined by [AHCA] to be medically necessary for the treatment, correction, or

amelioration of" any "physical and mental problems and conditions." *Id*. § 409.905(2). This provision does not explicitly exclude clinically unproven, experimental, or purely cosmetic services, but as both sides apparently agree, they are excluded here, just as in § 409.905(9). *See Moore*, 637 F.3d at 1234. This coverage tracks with 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) and (r), which require states to cover "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" for Medicaid beneficiaries under age 21. *See Moore*, 637 F.3d at 1233–35.

By rule, AHCA has said that to be "medically necessary," a treatment must be, among other things, "consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards as determined by the Medicaid program, and not experimental or investigational."[11] The rule says a drug is "experimental" or "investigational" in four circumstances.[12] The first is when any required approval has not been given by the Food and Drug Administration. The second is when the drug is undergoing phase I, II, or III clinical trials or is under study to determine safety or efficacy "as compared to the standard means of treatment or diagnosis." The third is when the consensus among experts is that further studies are needed to determine the drug's safety or efficacy. The fourth is when the drug is used for a purpose not approved

[11] Fla. Admin. Code r. 59G-1.01(2.83); Pls.' Ex. 22, ECF No. 175-22 at 8.
[12] Fla. Admin. Code r. 59G-1.01(2.46); Pls.' Ex. 22, ECF No. 175-22 at 5.

by the FDA, meaning the use is not listed in one of three compendia of off-label uses or supported by peer-reviewed literature. *Id.* r. 59G-1.01(2.46).[13]

IV. The challenged rule and statute

When AHCA considers Medicaid coverage for a type of medical treatment for the first time, it sometimes prepares a report on whether the treatment is consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards—a "GAPMS report."[14]

In 2016, AHCA prepared a GAPMS report on puberty blockers for transgender adolescents. The report concluded Medicaid payment should be available when appropriate based on an individualized assessment of medical necessity for the specific patient. The report noted that "the risks of not treating" an adolescent with puberty blockers "may be worse than" treatment.[15]

In 2017, AHCA staff prepared a GAPMS report, never formally adopted, on treatment of transgender individuals with cross-sex hormones. The report concluded the treatment was "consistent with generally accepted professional medical standards" and met the requirements for Medicaid coverage.[16]

---

[13] *Id.* at 5; *see also* AHCA 30(b)(6) Dep., ECF No. 235-1 at 53–55.
[14] *See* Pls.' Ex. 238, ECF No. 181-2; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 165.
[15] Pls.' Ex. 240, ECF No. 181-4 at 9.
[16] Pls.' Ex. 243, ECF No. 181-7 at 1, 11.

Consistent with the 2016 and 2017 GAPMS reports, AHCA approved Medicaid payment for puberty blockers, including for Susan Doe and K.F., and cross-sex hormones, including for Mr. Dekker and Mr. Rothstein.[17]

In 2022, however, the Executive Office of the Governor directed AHCA to conduct a new analysis of Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming care.[18] AHCA's practice is to prepare a GAPMS report only when first considering a treatment, but here, apparently for the first time ever, AHCA elected to prepare another report for these already-approved treatments.[19] AHCA ordinarily prepares reports internally, without retaining consultants, but here, AHCA retained consultants.[20] AHCA retained only consultants known in advance for their staunch opposition to gender-affirming care.

The new GAPMS process was, from the outset, a biased effort to justify a predetermined outcome, not a fair analysis of the evidence.[21] The report concluded that gender-affirming medical care—puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and surgery—were not supported by generally accepted medical standards and were

[17] Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 106–08, 129, 161, 196–97.
[18] AHCA 30(b)(6) Dep., ECF No. 235-1 at 87.
[19] Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 171–74, 185–86; *see also* Pls.' Ex. 30, ECF No. 175-30.
[20] Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 178–79.
[21] The AHCA employee who drafted the report testified he did not know the preferred outcome. I do not credit the testimony.

instead experimental. The conclusion was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to generally accepted medical standards.

Based in part on the flawed GAPMS report, AHCA proposed a rule barring Medicaid payment for these procedures. AHCA conducted a well-choreographed public hearing that was an effort not to gather facts but to support the predetermined outcome. Afterward, AHCA adopted Florida Administrative Code rule 59G-1.050(7), barring Medicaid payment for gender-affirming puberty blockers, hormones, and surgery.

That was where things stood when the plaintiffs filed this action. Later, though, the Florida Legislature adopted Florida Statutes § 286.31(2). The statute prohibits expenditure of state funds—this includes Medicaid payments—for "sex reassignment prescriptions or procedures" as defined in Florida Statutes § 456.001(9). This includes "puberty blockers" to "stop or delay normal puberty," "hormones or hormone antagonists," and any "medical procedure, including a surgical procedure," "to affirm a person's perception of his or her sex if that perception is inconsistent with the person's [natal] sex." Fla. Stat. § 456.001(9)(a)1–3. There are narrow exceptions, but they do not apply here.

The plaintiffs amended their complaint to challenge the statute as well as the rule. The plaintiffs in *Doe* challenged another part of the same legislation—a part that made providing these services to minors a crime and grounds for terminating a

healthcare practitioner's license. *See id.* § 456.52(1) & (5). This followed the adoption of rules by the Florida Board of Medicine and the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine that prohibited the Boards' licensed practitioners from treating "gender dysphoria in minors" with "[p]uberty blocking, hormone, or hormone antagonist therapies." Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.019(1)(b); Fla. Admin Code r. 64B15-14.014(1)(b).

V. Standing

In *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992), the Supreme Court said the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." First, the plaintiff "must have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, "there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court." *Id.* (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). Third, "it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). A court must address standing even when not contested by the parties.

A. Puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones

The minor plaintiffs are currently treated with puberty blockers. They were on track to start cross-sex hormones soon. The adult plaintiffs are currently treated with cross-sex hormones.

The loss of Medicaid payment for the needed treatments is an injury in fact; it is concrete and particularized; and it is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. The injury is traceable to the challenged rule and statute, either of which, standing alone, would require the plaintiffs to forgo or pay out-of-pocket for the needed treatment, or move out of Florida. The injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

The plaintiffs thus have standing. This is so despite the statute and rules prohibiting physicians from providing these services to minors. First, the statute and rules do not apply to adults and thus do not affect the adult plaintiffs' standing. Second, at least as of now, Florida law allows minors to continue with treatments they are already receiving, so the statute and rules do not affect the minor plaintiffs' standing to challenge the ban on payment for puberty blockers.[22] Third, as *Doe* held, the statute and rules prohibiting the provision of these services to

[22] *See* Fla. Stat. § 456.52(1)(a); Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.019(2); Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B15-14.014(2).

minors are unconstitutional—the minor plaintiffs can receive the treatments, if only they can find a way to pay for them.

In sum, the minor plaintiffs have standing to challenge Florida's denial of Medicaid payment for puberty blockers, and all the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the denial of Medicaid payment for cross-sex hormones.

B. Surgery

The result is different for gender-affirming surgery. None of the plaintiffs are currently seeking surgery. The minor plaintiffs have never sought such surgery and are too young even to consider it. Each adult plaintiff has had a mastectomy, and neither seeks further surgery, at least at this time. No plaintiff faces an actual or imminent injury from the denial of Medicaid coverage for gender-affirming surgery.

This is so even though, when this action was filed, Mr. Rothstein was seeking a mastectomy. He had standing at that time to pursue the surgery claim. But he has since had the surgery, paid for through GoFundMe. Past exposure to illegal conduct, without more, does not give a plaintiff standing to pursue prospective relief against a repeat of the illegal conduct, absent a sufficient likelihood that the plaintiff will again be a victim of the illegal conduct. *See, e.g.*, *City of Los Angeles v. Lyons*, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 111 (1983) (holding that a person who had been subjected to a chokehold in the past had no standing to seek

injunctive relief against the city's practice of using chokeholds because there was not a "sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way"); *Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp.*, 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 1999).

To be sure, Mr. Rothstein asserts a claim for nominal damages based in part on the denial of Medicaid coverage for the surgery he now has had. A nominal-damages claim can be sufficient to establish standing. *See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski*, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021). But the Eleventh Amendment bars retrospective relief under § 1983 that would be payable from the state treasury. *See, e.g.*, *Edelman v. Jordan*, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). This principle applies to nominal as well as actual damages. *See Simmons v. Conger*, 86 F.3d 1080, 1086 (11th Cir. 1996). The nominal-damages claim thus does not present a live controversy over Medicaid coverage of gender-affirming surgery.

The surgery claim cannot go forward on the merits.

VI. The Law of the Circuit: *Rush v. Parham*

In *Rush v. Parham*, 625 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1980), a Medicaid beneficiary challenged Georgia's refusal to pay for gender-affirming surgery. The state said the surgery was experimental and thus not medically necessary. The district court ruled that the surgery was necessary because the plaintiff's physician said so—that the state was bound by the physician's opinion. Not surprisingly, the Fifth Circuit disagreed.

The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine two things: first, whether Georgia had a policy prohibiting payment for experimental services when it first rejected the plaintiff's application; and second, if it did, "whether its determination that transsexual surgery is experimental is reasonable." *Id*. at 1157. The court said this second question—whether the state's determination "is" reasonable, would be controlled on remand by "current medical opinion, regardless of the prevailing knowledge at the time of plaintiff's application." *Id*. at 1157 n.13; *see also Moore*, 637 F.3d at 1259 (stating that Congress could have but did not give the state the role of "final arbiter" over medical necessity).

Rush is binding authority in the Eleventh Circuit. *See Bonner v. City of Prichard*, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). The remand instructions were the Fifth Circuit's square holding. The case dealt only with surgery, not puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones, but the same principles apply. The decision thus sets out a roadmap for deciding the issue now before this court—the same roadmap the district court was required to follow in *Rush*.

The first issue *Rush* directed the district court to address on remand is easily answered here. The State of Florida prohibited Medicaid payment for experimental services when the plaintiffs submitted their applications. The second question thus is controlling: whether, based on current medical knowledge, the State's determination that these treatments are experimental is reasonable. It is not.

VII. The standards of care

Transgender individuals suffer higher rates of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, and suicide than the population at large.[23] Some suffer gender dysphoria, a mental-health condition recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition ("DSM-5"). The diagnosis applies when specific criteria are met. Among other things, there must be a marked incongruence between one's experienced gender identity and natal sex for at least six months, manifested in specified ways, and clinically significant distress or impairment.[24]

There are well-established standards of care for treatment of gender dysphoria. These are set out in two publications: first, the Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guidelines for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria; and second, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health ("WPATH") Standards of Care, version 8.[25] I credit the abundant testimony in this record that these standards are widely followed by well-trained clinicians.[26] The standards are used

[23] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 108.
[24] Pls.' Ex. 33, ECF No. 175-33 at 2–3; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 25–26; Trial Tr., ECF No. 238 at 71.
[25] Defs.' Exs. 16 & 24, ECF Nos. 193-16 & 193-24.
[26] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 31 (psychiatrist); *id.* at 198 (pediatric endocrinologist); Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 50–52 (surgeon); *id.* at 106, 112–14 (pediatrician, bioethicist, medical researcher); Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 15 (physician specializing in pediatrics and adolescent medicine).

by insurers[27] and have been endorsed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.[28]

Under the standards, gender-dysphoria treatment begins with a comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment.[29] In addition to any appropriate mental-health therapy, there are three types of possible medical intervention, all available only to adolescents or adults, never younger children.[30]

First, for patients at or near the onset of puberty, medications known as GnRH agonists can delay the onset or continuation of puberty and thus can reduce the development of secondary sex characteristics inconsistent with the patient's gender identity—breasts for transgender males, whiskers for transgender females, changes in body shape, and other physical effects.[31] GnRH agonists are colloquially known as puberty blockers.

Second, cross-sex hormones—testosterone for transgender males, estrogen for transgender females—can promote the development and maintenance of characteristics consistent with the patient's gender identity and can limit the development and maintenance of characteristics consistent with the patient's natal

[27] Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 243–44.
[28] *See* Defs.' Ex. 2, ECF No. 193-2.
[29] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 42–43.
[30] Trial Tr., ECF No. 238 at 72 & 74–75; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 14; Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 36 & 176.
[31] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 194–97; Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 27–28.

sex.[32] For patients treated with GnRH agonists, use of cross-sex hormones typically begins when use of GnRH agonists ends.[33] Cross-sex hormones also can be used later in life, regardless of whether a patient was treated with GnRH agonists.

Third, for some patients, surgery can align physical characteristics with gender identity, to some extent.[34] The most common example: mastectomy can remove a transgender male's breasts. Perhaps 98% of all such surgeries are performed on adults, not minors.[35]

VIII. General acceptance of the standards of care

The overwhelming weight of medical authority supports treatment of transgender patients with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones in appropriate circumstances. Organizations who have formally recognized this include the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Family Physicians, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, and at least a dozen

[32] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 217–26, 228.
[33] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 87–90.
[34] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 42.
[35] *See id.* at 43.

more.[36] The record also includes statements from hundreds of professionals supporting this care.[37] At least as shown by this record, not a single reputable medical association has taken a contrary position.

These medications—GnRH agonists, testosterone, and estrogen—have been used for decades to treat other conditions. Their safety records and overall effects are well known. The Food and Drug Administration has approved their use, though not specifically to treat gender dysphoria.[38]

GnRH agonists are routinely used to treat patients with central precocious puberty—children who have begun puberty prematurely—as well as, in some circumstances, endometriosis and prostate cancer.[39] Central precocious puberty presents substantial health risks and ordinarily should be treated. GnRH agonists are an appropriate treatment, even though GnRH agonists have attendant risks.[40] So, too, gender dysphoria presents substantial health risks and ordinarily should be treated.[41] For some patients, GnRH agonists are an appropriate treatment, even

---

[36] *See* Pls.' Exs. 36–43, 45–48, ECF Nos. 175-36 through 176-8 (omitting ECF No. 176-4); *see also* Amicus Brief of American Academies and Health Organizations, ECF No. 192-1.
[37] *See* Amicus Brief of American Academies and Health Organizations, ECF No. 192-1; Bruggeman et al., *We 300 Florida health care professionals say the state gets transgender guidance wrong* (Apr. 27, 2022), ECF No. 11-1 at 11–32.
[38] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 183; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 54–56.
[39] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 183–84, 200–02.
[40] *Id.*
[41] *Id.*

though, just as with their use to treat central precocious puberty and other conditions, GnRH agonists have attendant risks.[42]

The defendants say the risks attendant to use of GnRH agonists to treat central precocious puberty or to treat gender dysphoria are not identical, and that may be so. But it is still true that for gender dysphoria, just as for central precocious puberty, GnRH agonists are an effective treatment whose benefits can outweigh the risks.

The same is true for cross-sex hormones. Testosterone and estrogen are routinely used to treat cisgender patients in appropriate circumstances.[43] The medications are an effective treatment for conditions that should be treated, even though the medications have attendant risks.[44] That is so for cisgender and transgender patients alike. For some transgender patients, cross-sex hormones are an appropriate treatment.

Even the defendants' expert Dr. Levine testified that treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones is sometimes appropriate.[45] He would demand appropriate safeguards, as discussed below, but he would not ban the treatments.[46] These plaintiffs qualify for treatment under Dr. Levine's proposed safeguards.

---

[42] *Id.* at 201–16.
[43] *Id.* at 216.
[44] *Id.* at 218–29.
[45] Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 81–83.
[46] *Id.* at 91–94.

IX. Clinical evidence supporting the standards of care

The record includes testimony of well-qualified doctors who have treated thousands of transgender patients with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones over their careers and have achieved excellent results. I credit the testimony of Dr. Dan Karasic (psychiatrist), Dr. Daniel Shumer (pediatric endocrinologist), Dr. Aron Janssen (child and adolescent psychiatrist), Dr. Johanna Olson-Kennedy (specialist in pediatrics and adolescent medicine), and Dr. Armand Antommaria (pediatrician and bioethicist). I credit their testimony that denial of this treatment will cause needless suffering for a substantial number of patients and will increase anxiety, depression, and the risk of suicide.

The clinical evidence would support, though certainly not mandate, a decision by a reasonable patient and parent, in consultation with properly trained practitioners, to use GnRH agonists at or near the onset of puberty and to use cross-sex hormones later, even when fully apprised of the current state of medical knowledge and all attendant risks. There is no rational basis for a state to categorically ban these treatments or to exclude them from the state's Medicaid coverage.

The record includes no evidence that these treatments have caused substantial adverse clinical results in properly screened and treated patients.

X. The plaintiffs' history and medical care

A. August Dekker

August Dekker is a Medicaid-eligible, 28-year-old transgender man.[47] He identified as male from a young age but suffered without disclosing the situation to his family or others. He repeatedly attempted suicide in high school.[48] He began cutting his hair short at age 18, began using a male name and pronouns at age 20, and came out to his family at age 22. He still experienced gender dysphoria. After eight months of therapy and evaluation by a multidisciplinary team, he began treatment with a cross-sex hormone, testosterone.[49] His mental health markedly improved.[50]

A romantic partner convinced him to discontinue testosterone. His mental health deteriorated. He resumed the treatment, and his mental health again improved.[51]

In 2022, with approval from his long-term treating psychiatrist, Mr. Dekker had a mastectomy at the University of Florida.[52] His mental health improved again.

---

[47] Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 142 & 145–46.
[48] *Id.* at 150.
[49] *Id.* at 154–55.
[50] *Id.* at 156–57.
[51] *Id.* at 159.
[52] *Id.* at 162. The defendants note that, after a single meeting, a mental-health intern wrote a letter supporting the surgery. Neither a single meeting nor an intern's opinion, standing alone, would support a decision to proceed with surgery.

Mr. Dekker believes that had he not received these treatments—cross-sex hormones and surgery—he would by now have died from suicide, substance abuse, or other self-destructive behavior.[53] Instead, he is thriving.

Medicaid paid for all his treatment, including the cross-sex hormones and surgery. But now, the challenged rule and statute, unless enjoined, will make it impossible for him to continue the hormone treatment, which is still medically necessary.

B. Brit Rothstein

Brit Rothstein is a Medicaid-eligible, 20-year-old transgender man. He is a full-time student at a major research university.[54] He began experiencing gender dysphoria as early as age 8 but did not begin to "put words to feelings" until about age 12.[55] He came out to his peers and family at age 13.

After extensive therapy and then evaluation by a pediatric endocrinologist at a major children's hospital, a recommendation was made for treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. Mr. Rothstein's mother objected. Mr. Rothstein's father obtained a court order giving him medical decisionmaking authority, and the

---

Here, though, the long-term treating psychiatrist recommended surgery, and the surgeon performed it. They were not interns. The surgery has been performed and is no longer at issue.

[53] *Id.* at 167.

[54] *Id.* at 113–15.

[55] *Id.* at 115.

treatments went forward.[56] Medicaid paid for the treatments. Mr. Rothstein's mental health improved.

Mr. Rothstein still bound his chest every day. He eventually consulted a surgeon at the University of Miami and decided to go forward with a mastectomy. The surgery was precleared for Medicaid payment, and a date was set.[57] But the challenged rule was adopted, Medicaid approval was withdrawn, and the surgery was canceled. While this lawsuit was pending, Mr. Rothstein obtained crowd funding through GoFundMe, and he had the surgery. He is very pleased with the results. He remains on cross-sex hormones, which are medically necessary.

C. Susan Doe

Susan Doe is a Medicaid-eligible 13-year-old transgender girl.[58] Her parents, John and Jane Doe, adopted her from medical foster care at age 2. Susan told her mother she was a girl at age 3, and she has consistently behaved that way. Her mother, who was previously unaware of transgender issues, attempted to react neutrally and sought professional advice on how best to care for Susan. Susan began seeing a therapist at age 6.[59] She has identified as a girl at school since second grade.[60]

---

[56] *Id.* at 122–23.
[57] *Id.* at 133–34.
[58] *Id.* at 94–96.
[59] *Id.* at 98.
[60] *Id.* at 100.

Susan began GnRH agonists three years ago at age 10.[61] She has had excellent results and is ready to begin hormone therapy. Her treatment has been paid for to this point by Medicaid, but that will stop unless the challenged rule and statute are enjoined.

D. K.F.

K.F. is a Medicaid-eligible 13-year-old transgender boy.[62] At age 7, he told his grandparents, and soon after his parents, that he was a boy.[63] This was consistent with how he had behaved.

K.F. received an extensive psychiatric evaluation followed by five years of therapy at Boston Children's Hospital.[64] He started on puberty blockers. He moved with his family to Florida and continued his treatment here. He had an appointment with a pediatric endocrinologist at the Johns Hopkins gender clinic in St. Petersburg to consider transition to cross-sex hormones, but the appointment was canceled when the State prohibited the treatment.[65]

He has achieved excellent results with his treatment to date. Medicaid paid for it, first in Massachusetts, then in Florida.

---

[61] *Id.* at 102.
[62] *Id.* at 174,176.
[63] *Id.* at 177.
[64] *See id.* at 184–91.
[65] *Id.* at 195–98.

E. Findings on appropriate treatment

I find, based on the record now before the court, that the plaintiffs have obtained appropriate medical care to this point, that qualified professionals have properly evaluated their medical conditions and needs in accordance with the well-established standards of care, and that the plaintiffs, in consultation with their treating professionals and, for the minors, their parents, have determined that the benefits of the treatment they seek—GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones—will outweigh the risks. I find that the ability of the adult plaintiffs to evaluate the benefits and risks of the treatment far exceeds the ability of the State of Florida to do so. I find that the ability of the minor plaintiffs and their parents to evaluate the benefits and risks of the treatment far exceeds the ability of the State of Florida to do so. I find that the adult plaintiffs' motivation is their desire to achieve the best possible medical treatment for their gender dysphoria. I find that the minor plaintiffs' parents' motivation is love for their children. I find that the motivation of the minor plaintiffs and their parents is the desire to achieve the best possible medical treatment for the minor plaintiffs' gender dysphoria. This is not the State's motivation.

XI. Equal Protection

The ban on treating minors with puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The only circuit

that has addressed the issue agrees. In *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against enforcement of an Arkansas statute identical in relevant respects to the Florida statute banning these treatments. The decision is on point, well-reasoned, and should be followed. But as an Eighth Circuit decision, it is not binding.

District court opinions also are not binding. But they have consistently reached the same result. *See Brandt v. Rutledge*, No. 4:21-cv-450, 2023 WL 4073727 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023) (holding after an eight-day bench trial that a state law banning gender-affirming care was unconstitutional); *K.C. v. Individual Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind.*, No. 1:23-cv-595, 2023 WL 4054086 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2023) (granting preliminary injunction against Indiana statute banning puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for minors); *Doe v. Ladapo*, No. 4:23-cv-114-RH-MAF, 2023 WL 3833848 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (granting preliminary injunction against Florida statute and rules banning puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for minors); *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (granting preliminary injunction against Alabama statute banning puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for minors).

Florida's denial of Medicaid coverage for GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones also violates the Equal Protection Clause. Other district courts have reached this same result. *See Fain v. Crouch*, 618 F. Supp. 3d 313 (S.D. W. Va.

2022) (holding state Medicaid plan's exclusion of gender-affirming care violated the Medicaid Act, Affordable Care Act, and Equal Protection Clause); *Flack v. Wis. Dep't of Health Servs.*, 395 F. Supp. 3d 1001 (W.D. Wis. 2019) (holding state Medicaid plan's exclusion of gender-affirming care violated the Medicaid Act, Affordable Care Act, and Equal Protection Clause); *see also Kadel v. Folwell*, 620 F. Supp. 3d 339 (M.D.N.C. 2022) (holding state employee insurance plan's categorical exclusion of gender-affirming care violated the Equal Protection Clause, Affordable Care Act, and Title VII); *Boyden v. Conlin*, 341 F. Supp. 3d 979 (W.D. Wis. 2018) (holding state employee insurance plan's exclusion of gender-affirming care violated Title VII, the Affordable Care Act, and the Equal Protection Clause).

A. Introduction to levels of scrutiny

Equal-protection analysis often starts with attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, or rational-basis.

There was a time when the Supreme Court seemed to treat strict scrutiny and rational basis as exhaustive categories of equal-protection review. A leading commentator said that in some situations the first category was "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" while the second called for "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gerald Gunther, *The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—*

Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).

But in the decades since, the Supreme Court has applied *intermediate* scrutiny in many circumstances. And rational-basis review no longer means virtually no review. *See, e.g.*, *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a state law restricting local ordinances protecting gays: "[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained."); *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, an ordinance requiring group-care facilities for the mentally handicapped, but not other facilities with multiple occupants, to obtain land-use permits); *Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor*, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a tax exemption for Vietnam War veterans limited to those who resided in the state on May 8, 1976); *United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a statute denying food stamps to members of a household with unrelated members).

In short, regardless of the level of scrutiny, there is no substitute for careful, unbiased, intellectually honest analysis. Still, the level of scrutiny matters, so this order addresses it.

B. Intermediate scrutiny applies here

The plaintiffs say the challenged rule and statute discriminate on the basis of sex and transgender status and that either alone would be sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny. The defendants say only rational-basis scrutiny applies. The plaintiffs have the better of it.

1. Sex

It is well established that drawing lines based on sex triggers intermediate scrutiny. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); *Adams v. St. Johns Cnty.*, 57 F.4th 791, 801 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). If one must know the sex of a person to know whether or how a provision applies to the person, the provision draws a line based on sex. *See, e.g.*, *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801. The defendants do not deny this; instead, they say the challenged statute does not draw a line based on sex.

But it does. Consider an adolescent Medicaid patient, perhaps age 16, that a physician wishes to treat with testosterone. Under the challenged rule and statute, is the treatment covered by Medicaid? To know the answer, one must know the adolescent's sex. If the adolescent is a natal male, the treatment is covered. If the

adolescent is a natal female, the treatment is not covered. This is a line drawn on the basis of sex, plain and simple. *See Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 669 ("Because the minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, [the law] discriminates on the basis of sex."); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a policy under which entry into a designated bathroom was legal or not depending on the entrant's natal sex).

In asserting the contrary, the defendants note that the reason for the treatment—the diagnosis—is different for the natal male and natal female. Indeed it is. But this does not change the fact that this is differential treatment based on sex. The *reason* for sex-based differential treatment is the purported *justification* for treating the natal male and natal female differently—the justification that must survive intermediate scrutiny. One can survive—but cannot avoid—intermediate scrutiny by saying there is a good reason for treating a male and female differently.

2. Gender nonconformity

Drawing a line based on gender nonconformity—this includes transgender status—also triggers intermediate scrutiny. *See Glenn v. Brumby*, 663 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). Although the defendants deny it, the rule and statute at issue draw lines based on transgender status. *See Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (citing *Glenn*, 663 F.3d at 1317).

To confirm this, consider a Medicaid-eligible child that a physician wishes to treat with GnRH agonists to delay the onset of puberty. Is the treatment covered? To know the answer, one must know whether the child is cisgender or transgender. The treatment is covered if the child is cisgender but not if the child is transgender, because the rule and statute exclude coverage of GnRH agonists only for transgender children, not for anyone else. The theoretical but remote-to-the-point-of-nonexistent possibility that a child will be identified as transgender before needing GnRH agonists for the treatment of central precocious puberty does not change the essential nature of the distinction.

Adverse treatment of transgender individuals should trigger intermediate scrutiny for another reason, too. In *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), the Court suggested heightened scrutiny might be appropriate for statutes showing "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." Courts have continued to apply the discrete-and-insular-minority construct. *See, e.g.*, *Foley v. Connelie*, 435 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1978) (citing *Carolene Products* and noting that "close scrutiny" applies to equal-protection claims of resident aliens, who lack access to the political process); *Estrada v. Becker*, 917 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing *Carolene Products*; recognizing that, under *Foley*, heightened scrutiny applies to resident aliens; but declining to afford the same

treatment to illegal immigrants). Transgender individuals are a discrete and insular minority.

The Supreme Court further explained this basis for heightened scrutiny in *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). There the Court declined to extend strict or even intermediate scrutiny to intellectually disabled individuals—those with very limited mental ability. But the Court gave two explanations that support a different result for transgender individuals.

First, *City of Cleburne* noted that strict scrutiny applies when the characteristic at issue is almost never a legitimate reason for governmental action. Race is the paradigm—leaving aside affirmative action as a remedy for prior discrimination, it is almost never appropriate to parcel out government benefits or burdens based on race. Transgender status is much the same. Transgender status is rarely an appropriate basis on which to parcel out government benefits or burdens.

Second, *Carolene Products* and *Foley* both referred to a minority's lack of political voice as a basis for heightened scrutiny. *City of Cleburne* noted that the class of intellectually disabled individuals had garnered considerable public and political support—that this was not a class lacking political access. The same is not true of transgender individuals, who continue to suffer widespread private opprobrium and governmental discrimination, notably in the rule and statute now under review. This is precisely the kind of government action, targeted at a discrete

and insular minority, for which heightened scrutiny is appropriate. *See Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding transgenders are a quasi-suspect class); *Karnoski v. Trump*, 926 F.3d 1180, 1201 (9th Cir. 2019) (same). *But see Adams*, 57 F.4th at 803 n.5 (noting that whether transgender status is a quasi-suspect class was not at issue there but, in dictum, expressing "grave doubt").

In any event, *City of Cleburne* is important for another reason, too. The Court applied rational-basis scrutiny, but it was *meaningful* rational-basis scrutiny. The Court did not blindly accept a proffered reason for the city's action that did not withstand meaningful analysis. The defendants' proffered reasons here, like those in *City of Cleburne*, do not withstand meaningful analysis. *See Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming a preliminary injunction and holding the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their equal-protection challenge to an Arkansas statute banning gender-affirming care for minors).

3. Cases involving identical, not different, treatment of classes

In opposing heightened scrutiny, the defendants cite *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), for the proposition that heightened scrutiny does not apply when there are members of the allegedly disfavored class on both sides of the challenged classification. *Geduldig* held that exclusion of pregnancy from state employees' health coverage was not sex discrimination. Some women become pregnant, some

do not. The defendants say this is why the challenged provision did not discriminate based on sex—there were women on both sides. Note, though, that men and women were treated the same: nobody had health coverage for pregnancy. When men and women are treated the same, the Court reasoned, it is not intentional sex discrimination, even if the challenged provision has a disparate impact.

The situation is different here. Transgender and cisgender individuals are not treated the same. Cisgender individuals can be and routinely are treated with GnRH agonists, testosterone, or estrogen, when they and their doctors deem it appropriate, and the treatments are covered by Medicaid. Not so for transgender individuals—the challenged rule and statute prohibit it. To know whether treatment with any of these medications is covered, one must know whether the patient is transgender. And to know whether treatment with testosterone or estrogen is covered, one must know the patient's natal sex.

The defendants also invoke *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022). There the Court rejected a due-process challenge to an abortion statute, but the Court also said that the statute did not deny equal protection: "The regulation of a medical procedure that only one sex can undergo does not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny unless the regulation is a 'mere pretex[t] designed to effect an invidious discrimination against members of

one sex or the other.'" *Id*. at 2245–46 (quoting *Geduldig*, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20). The Court said abortion laws thus "are governed by the same standard of review as other health and safety measures." *Dobbs*, 142 S. Ct. at 2246.

The case at bar, in contrast, does not involve a medical treatment that only one sex can undergo, or that only cisgender or transgender patients can undergo. Instead, the case involves treatments that all individuals can undergo; the state has simply chosen to make the treatment legal for some and illegal for others, depending on sex or transgender status. The *Dobbs* statement about procedures only one sex can undergo is simply inapplicable—and would not help the defendants anyway, because this case involves invidious discrimination against transgenders.

In short, the challenged rule and statute impose differential treatment based on sex and transgender status. *Geduldig* and *Dobbs* are not to the contrary. Intermediate scrutiny applies.

C. Applying the proper level of scrutiny

To survive intermediate scrutiny, a state must show that its classification is substantially related to a sufficiently important interest. *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (cleaned up); *see also Glenn*, 663 F.3d at 1316. To survive rational-basis scrutiny, a state must show a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. *Romer*, 517 U.S. at 631. The challenged rule and statute survive neither level of scrutiny.

The record establishes that for some minors, including Susan Doe and K.F., a treatment regimen of mental-health therapy followed by GnRH agonists and eventually by cross-sex hormones is the best available treatment. They and their parents, in consultation with their doctors and multidisciplinary teams, have rationally chosen this treatment. The State of Florida's decision to ban payment for GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones for transgender individuals is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Dissuading a person from conforming to the person's gender identity rather than to the person's natal sex is not a legitimate state interest. The defendants apparently acknowledge this.[66] But the State's disapproval of transgender status—of a person's gender identity when it does not match the person's natal sex—was a substantial motivating factor in enactment of the challenged rule and statute.

Discouraging individuals from pursuing their gender identities, when different from their natal sex, was also a substantial motivating factor. In a "fact sheet," the Florida Department of Health asserted social transitioning, which involves no medical intervention at all, should not be a treatment option for children or adolescents.[67] Nothing could have motivated this remarkable intrusion into parental prerogatives other than opposition to transgender status itself.

---

[66] Trial Tr., ECF No. 242 at 97–98.
[67] Defs.' Ex. 5, ECF No. 193-5 at 1; *see also* Pls.' Ex. 19, ECF No. 175-19 at 2.

State action motivated by purposeful discrimination, even if otherwise lawful, violates the Equal Protection Clause. *See Adams*, 57 F.4th at 810 (recognizing that an otherwise neutral law still violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is "motivated by 'purposeful discrimination'") (citing *Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)); *see also Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State for Ala.*, 992 F.3d 1299, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2021). The rule and statute at issue were motivated in substantial part by the plainly illegitimate purposes of disapproving transgender status and discouraging individuals from pursuing their honest gender identities. This was purposeful discrimination against transgenders.

XII. The pretextual justifications for the rule and statute

In support of their position, the defendants have proffered a laundry list of purported justifications for the rule and statute. The purported justifications are largely pretextual and, in any event, do not call for a different result.

A. "Low quality" evidence

A methodology often used for evaluating medical studies—for evaluating research-generated evidence on the safety and efficacy of any given course of treatment—is known as Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation ("GRADE"). The defendants stridently assert that the evidence supporting the treatments at issue is "low" or "very low" quality as those terms are

used in the GRADE system. But the evidence on the other side—the evidence purportedly showing these treatments are ineffective or unsafe—is far weaker, not just of "low" or "very low" quality. Indeed, evidence suggesting these treatments are ineffective is nonexistent.

The choice these plaintiffs face is binary: to use GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones, or not. It is no answer to say the evidence on the yes side is weak when the evidence on the no side is weaker or nonexistent. There is substantial and persuasive, though not conclusive, research showing favorable results from these treatments.[68] A decision for the patients at issue cannot wait for further or better research; the treatment decision must be made now.

Moreover, the fact that research-generated evidence supporting these treatments gets classified as "low" or "very low" quality on the GRADE scale does not mean the evidence is not persuasive, or that it is not the best available research-generated evidence on the question of how to treat gender dysphoria, or that medical treatments should not be provided consistent with the research results and clinical evidence.

It is commonplace for medical treatments to be provided even when supported only by research producing evidence classified as "low" or "very low"

[68] *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 41–42.

on this scale.[69] The record includes unrebutted testimony that only about 13.5% of accepted medical treatments across all disciplines are supported by "high" quality evidence on the GRADE scale.[70] The defendants' assertion that treatment should be banned based on the supporting research's GRADE score is a misuse of the GRADE system.

We put band-aids on cuts to keep dirt out not because there is "high" quality research-generated evidence supporting the practice but because we know, from clinical experience, that cuts come with a risk of infection and band-aids can reduce the risk.

Gender dysphoria is far more complicated, and one cannot know, with the same level of confidence, how to treat it. But there is now extensive clinical experience showing excellent results from treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. If these treatments are prohibited or Medicaid payment is unavailable, many patients will suffer needlessly.[71] The extensive clinical evidence is important and indeed persuasive evidence, even if the supporting research has produced only "low" or "very low" quality evidence on the GRADE scale.

When facing a binary decision to use or not use GnRH agonists or hormones, a reasonable decisionmaker would consider the evidence on the yes

[69] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 98–101.
[70] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 68–69.
[71] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 64; Trial Tr., ECF No. 238 at 97–98.

side, as well as the weaker evidence on the no side. Calling the evidence on the yes side "low" or "very low" quality would not rationally control the decision.

B. Risks attendant to treatment

The defendants assert there are risks attendant to treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. Indeed there are. There are legitimate concerns about the effect on bone density; this calls for appropriate monitoring. There are legitimate concerns about fertility and sexuality that a child entering puberty is not well-equipped to evaluate and for which parents may be less-than-perfect decisionmakers. There is a risk of misdiagnosis, though the requirement in the standards of care for careful analysis by a multidisciplinary team should minimize the risk. There is a risk that a child later confronted with the bias that is part of our world will come to believe it would have been better to try to pass as cisgender.

There also are studies suggesting not that there *are* but that there *may be* additional medical risks. An unreplicated study found that sheep who took GnRH agonists became worse at negotiating a maze, at least for a time. Another study showed a not-statistically-significant but nonetheless-concerning decrease in IQ among cisgender children treated for central precocious puberty with GnRH agonists. These and other studies cited by the defendants would surely be rated low or very-low quality on the GRADE scale and, more importantly, are not very persuasive. The latter study has not led to a ban on the use of GnRH agonists to

treat central precocious puberty. One cannot know from these studies whether treating transgender adolescents with GnRH agonists will cause comparable adverse results in some patients. But the risk that they will is a risk a decisionmaker should reasonably consider.

That there are risks does not end the inquiry. There are also substantial benefits for the overwhelming majority of patients treated with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. And there are risks attendant to *not* using these treatments, including the risk—in some instances, the near certainty—of anxiety and depression and even suicidal ideation. The challenged rule and statute ignore the benefits that many patients realize from these treatments and the substantial risk posed by foregoing the treatments—the risk from failing to pursue what is, for many, the most effective available treatment of gender dysphoria. Mr. Dekker attempted suicide four times before beginning successful treatment with cross-sex hormones; he is now thriving.[72]

If the plaintiffs do not continue appropriate treatments, the likelihood is very high that they will suffer attendant adverse mental-health consequences. If, on the other hand, they *do* continue appropriate treatments, they will avoid some of the adverse consequences. They also will face attendant risks.

[72] Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 150 & 166–67.

Risks attend many kinds of medical treatment, perhaps most. Ordinarily it is the patient, in consultation with the doctor, who weighs the risks and benefits and chooses a course of treatment. Florida's Medicaid program routinely covers treatments with greater risks than those involved here. What is remarkable about the challenged rule and statute is not that they address medical treatments with both risks and benefits but that they arrogate to the State the right to make the decision. And worse, the rule and statute make the same decision for everybody, without considering any patient's individual circumstances. The rule and statute do this in contravention of widely accepted standards of care.

That there are risks of the kind presented here is not a rational basis for denying patients the option to choose this treatment and to have Medicaid cover the cost.

C. Bias in medical organizations

The defendants say the many professional organizations that have endorsed treatment of gender dysphoria with GnRH agonists and hormones all have it wrong. The defendants say, in effect, that the organizations were dominated by individuals who pursued good politics, not good medicine.

If ever a pot called a kettle black, it is here. The statute and the rule were an exercise in politics, not good medicine.

This is a politically fraught area. There has long been, and still is, substantial bigotry directed at transgender individuals. Common experience confirms this, as does a Florida legislator's remarkable reference to transgender witnesses at a committee hearing as "mutants" and "demons."[73] And even when not based on bigotry, there are those who incorrectly but sincerely believe that gender identity is not real but instead just a choice. This is, as noted above, the elephant in the room.

Where there is bigotry, there are usually—one hopes, always—opponents of bigotry. It is hardly surprising that doctors who understand that transgender identity can be real, not made up—doctors who are willing to provide supportive medical care—oppose anti-transgender bigotry.

It sometimes happens that opponents of bigotry deem opposing viewpoints bigoted even when they are not. And it sometimes happens that those with opposing viewpoints are slow to speak up, lest they be accused of bigotry. These dynamics could affect a medical association's consideration of transgender

---

[73] *Hearing on Facility Requirements Based on Sex*, CS/HB 1521 2023 Session (Fla. Apr. 10, 2023), https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=8804 (time stamp 2:30:35 to 2:34:10). Representative Webster Barnaby said to transgender Florida citizens who spoke at the hearing that they were "mutants living among us on Planet Earth." He raised his voice and said, "[T]his is Planet Earth, where God created men, male and women, female!" He continued: "[T]he Lord rebuke you Satan and all of your demons and imps that come parade before us. That's right I called you demons and imps who come and parade before us and pretend that you are part of this world." Finally, he said, you can "take [him] on" but he "promises [he] will win every time."

treatment. The record suggests these dynamics *have* affected the tone and quality of debate within WPATH. It is entirely possible that the same dynamics could have affected the tone and quality of debate within other associations.

Even so, it is fanciful to believe that all the many medical associations who have endorsed gender-affirming care, or who have spoken out or joined an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs in this litigation, have so readily sold their patients down the river. The great weight of medical authority supports these treatments. The widely accepted standards of care require competent therapy and careful evaluation by a multidisciplinary team before use of GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones for treatment of gender dysphoria. But the widely accepted standards of care support their use in appropriate circumstances. The standards have been unanimously endorsed by reputable medical associations, even though not unanimously endorsed by all the members of the associations.

The overwhelming majority of doctors are dedicated professionals whose first goal is the safe and effective treatment of their patients. There is no reason to believe the doctors who adopted these standards were motivated by anything else.

D. International views

The defendants have asserted time and again that Florida now treats GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones the same as European countries. The assertion is false. And no matter how many times the defendants say it, it will still be false. No

country in Europe—or so far as shown by this record, anywhere in the world—entirely bans these treatments or refuses to pay for them. *See also Brandt v. Rutledge*, No. 4:21-cv-450, 2023 WL 4073727, at *30 (E.D. Ark. June 20, 2023) (rejecting the apparently identical assertion that a ban on gender-affirming care for minors was consistent with "nations around the world" and finding the evidence showed no other identified nation took that position).

To be sure, there are countries that ban gays and lesbians and probably transgender individuals, too. One doubts these treatments are available in Iran or other similarly repressive regimes. But the treatments are available in appropriate circumstances in all the countries cited by the defendants, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand.[74] Some or all of these insist on appropriate preconditions and allow care only in approved facilities—just as the Endocrine Society and WPATH standards insist on appropriate preconditions, and just as care in the United States is ordinarily provided through capable facilities. Had Florida truly joined the international consensus—making these treatments available in appropriate circumstances or in approved facilities—these plaintiffs would qualify, and this lawsuit would not be necessary.

[74] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 78–79; *see also* Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 134; Trial Tr., ECF No. 228 at 61–62.

E. Malpractice

The defendants assert, with no real evidentiary support, that GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones have sometimes been provided in Florida without the appropriate mental-health therapy and evaluation by a multidisciplinary team.

If that were true, the solution would be to appropriately regulate these treatments, not to ban them. And there are, of course, remedies already in place in Florida for deficient medical care. AHCA is entitled to review any individual Medicaid claim and to pay only for medically necessary treatment. There is no evidence that this kind of care is routinely provided so badly that it should be banned outright.

Along the same lines, the defendants say gender dysphoria is difficult to diagnose accurately—that gender identity can be fluid, that there is no objective test to confirm gender identity or gender dysphoria, and that patients treated with GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones have sometimes come to regret it. But the defendants ignore facts that do not support their narrative. Fluidity is common prior to puberty but not thereafter. Regret is rare; indeed, the defendants have offered no evidence of any Florida resident who regrets being treated with GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones. And the absence of objective tests to confirm gender dysphoria does not set it apart from many other Medicaid-covered mental-

health conditions that are routinely diagnosed without objective tests and treated with powerful medications.

The difficulty diagnosing a patient calls for caution. It does not call for a one-size-fits-all refusal to cover widely accepted medical treatment.[75] It does not call for the State to make a binary decision not to cover the treatment even for a properly diagnosed patient.

F. Continuation of treatment

The defendants note that 98% or more of adolescents treated with GnRH agonists progress to cross-sex hormones. That is hardly an indictment of the treatment; it is instead consistent with the view that in 98% or more of the cases, the patient's gender identity did not align with natal sex, this was accurately determined, and the patient was appropriately treated first with GnRH agonists and later with cross-sex hormones. An advocate who denies the existence of genuine transgender identity or who wishes to make everyone cisgender might well fear progression to cross-sex hormones, but the defendants have denied that this is a basis for their current reference to this progression.

The defendants say, instead, that the high rate of progression rebuts an argument in support of GnRH agonists: that GnRH agonists give a patient time to

[75] *See* Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 91–94 (defense expert Dr. Levine explaining that medical intervention such as puberty blockers and hormones should be carefully prescribed and monitored but not banned).

reflect on the patient's gender identity and, if still convinced of a gender identity opposite the natal sex, to reflect on whether to go forward socially in the gender identity or natal sex. But if that is a goal of treatment with GnRH agonists, it is certainly not the treatment's *primary* goal. The primary goal is to delay and eventually avoid development of secondary sex characteristics inconsistent with the patient's gender identity—and thus to avoid or reduce the attendant anxiety, depression, and possible suicidal ideation.

The high rate of progression from GnRH agonists to cross-sex hormones is not a reason to ban or refuse to cover the treatments.

G. Off-label use of FDA-approved drugs

The defendants note that while the Food and Drug Administration has approved GnRH agonists and the hormones at issue as safe and effective, the agency has not addressed their use to treat gender dysphoria. Quite so. Use of these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is "off label."

That the FDA has not approved these drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria says precisely nothing about whether the drugs are safe and effective when used for that purpose. Off-label use of drugs is commonplace and widely

accepted across the medical profession.[76] Florida Medicaid routinely covers such use.[77] The defendants' contrary implication is divorced from reality.

Obtaining FDA approval of a drug is a burdensome, expensive process.[78] A pharmaceutical provider who wishes to market a new drug must incur the burden and expense because the drug cannot be distributed without FDA approval. Once a drug has been approved, however, the drug can be distributed not just for the approved use but for any other use as well. There ordinarily is little reason to incur the burden and expense of seeking additional FDA approval.

That the FDA approved these drugs at all confirms that, at least for one use, they are safe and effective.[79] This provides some support for the view that they are safe when properly administered and that they effectively produce the intended results—that GnRH agonists delay puberty and that testosterone and estrogen have masculinizing or feminizing effects as expected. The FDA approval goes no further—it does not address one way or the other the question whether using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is as safe and effective as on-label uses.

---

[76] Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 121–23.
[77] *See* AHCA 30(b)(6) Dep., ECF No. 235-1 at 35, 53–56.
[78] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 182–84; Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 120–23; Trial Tr., ECF No. 239 at 54–55.
[79] Trial Tr., ECF No. 226 at 182–84; Trial Tr., ECF No. 227 at 120–23.

That use of GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria is "off-label" is not a reason to ban or refuse to cover their use for that purpose.

XIII. Ruling on the claims

What remains is to match the findings of fact and conclusions of law as set out above to the specific claims asserted in the first amended complaint.

Count I asserts a claim against Mr. Weida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs are entitled to prevail because the denial of Medicaid coverage for transgender patients for the same drugs covered for others survives neither intermediate nor rational-basis scrutiny.

Count II asserts a claim against AHCA under the Affordable Care Act's prohibition of discrimination based on sex, 42 U.S.C. § 18116. The plaintiffs are entitled to prevail on this claim, just as on the Equal Protection claim.

Count III asserts a § 1983 claim for Mr. Rothstein, Susan Doe, and K.F. against Mr. Weida based on the Medicaid Act's requirement for early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services for beneficiaries under age 21, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396a(a)(43)(C),1396d(a)(4)(B), and 1396d(r)(5). The plaintiffs are entitled to prevail because the treatments at issue comport with the

standards of care for their medical conditions and there are no alternative, equally effective treatments.

Count IV asserts a § 1983 claim against Mr. Weida based on the Medicaid Act's comparability requirement, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i), under which assistance to an eligible individual cannot be less in "amount, duration, or scope" than assistance available to other Medicaid beneficiaries. The plaintiffs are entitled to prevail because cisgender Medicaid beneficiaries are covered for the same puberty blockers and hormones at issue. That cisgender patients receive the drugs for a different diagnosis does not make the different treatment permissible. Quite the contrary: federal law prohibits a state from denying or reducing a Medicaid-eligible patient's required services "solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or condition." 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(c); *see also Rush*, 625 F.2d at 1156 n.12. Indeed, denying coverage for an illness suffered only or primarily by a disfavored group is the very paradigm of prohibited discrimination based on diagnosis.

XIV. Conclusion

Gender identity is real. Those whose gender identity does not match their natal sex often suffer gender dysphoria. The widely accepted standard of care calls for evaluation and treatment by a multidisciplinary team. Proper treatment begins with mental-health therapy and is followed in appropriate cases by GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. Florida has adopted a rule and statute that prohibit

Medicaid payment for these treatments even when medically appropriate. The rule and statute violate the federal Medicaid statute, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Affordable Care Act's prohibition of sex discrimination.

These plaintiffs are Medicaid beneficiaries who are entitled to payment, as a matter of medical necessity, for puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones as appropriately determined by their multidisciplinary teams of providers.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. It is declared that Florida Statutes § 286.31(2) and Florida Administrative Code rule 59G-1.050(7) are invalid to the extent they categorically ban Medicaid payment for puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones for the treatment of gender dysphoria.

2. The defendants Jason Weida, in his official capacity, and the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (a) must approve Medicaid payment for services rendered from this date forward for the evaluation, diagnosis, and treatment of the plaintiffs August Dekker, Brit Rothstein, Susan Doe, and K.F. for gender dysphoria, including with puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones, as recommended by their multidisciplinary teams, and (b) must not take any steps to prevent the administration of cross-sex hormones to August Dekker or Brit Rothstein or to prevent the administration of puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones to Susan Doe or K.F. But this injunction does not preclude the

defendants from applying the professional standards that would apply to use of the same substances to treat patients with other medical conditions.

3. This injunction binds the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—and others in active concert or participation with any of them—who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise.

4. The clerk must enter judgment and close the file.

5. Jurisdiction is retained to award costs and attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED on June 21, 2023.

s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge

Exhibit D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
CENTRAL DIVISION

DYLAN BRANDT, et al., **PLAINTIFFS**

V. **4:21CV00450 JM**

LESLIE RUTLEDGE,[1] et al., **DEFENDANTS**

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs bring their claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Court makes the following specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Act 626 is unconstitutional. The Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment in their favor on all claims. The State is permanently enjoined from enforcing Act 626.

I. Procedural History

On April 6, 2021, the Arkansas Legislature passed House Bill 1570, Act 626 of the 93rd General Assembly of Arkansas, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-9-1501 to 20-9-1504 and 23-79-164 ("Act 626").[2] Act 626 prohibits a physician or other healthcare professional from providing "gender transition procedures" to any individual under eighteen years of age and from referring any individual under eighteen years of age to any healthcare professional for "gender transition procedures."

> "Gender transition procedures" means the process in which a person goes from identifying with and living as a gender that corresponds to his or her biological sex to identifying with and living as a gender different from his or her biological sex, and may involve social, legal, or physical changes;

[1] Tim Griffin succeeded Leslie Rutledge as Arkansas Attorney General.
[2] The Arkansas Legislature titled the Act as "Arkansas Save Adolescents from Experimentation (Safe) Act." Because the title is misleading, the Court will refer to the Act as "Act 626" in this order.

> (6)(A) "Gender transition procedures" means any medical or surgical service, including without limitation physician's services, inpatient and outpatient hospital services, or prescribed drugs related to gender transition that seeks to:
>
> (i) Alter or remove physical or anatomical characteristics or features that are typical for the individual's biological sex; or
>
> (ii) Instill or create physiological or anatomical characteristics that resemble a sex different from the individual's biological sex, including without limitation medical services that provide puberty-blocking drugs, cross-sex hormones, or other mechanisms to promote the development of feminizing or masculinizing features in the opposite biological sex, or genital or nongenital gender reassignment surgery performed for the purpose of assisting an individual with a gender transition.

AR LEGIS 626 (2021), 2021 Arkansas Laws Act 626 (H.B. 1570). The Act creates a private right of action for an "actual or threatened" violation. The Act does not define a "threatened violation." The statute of limitations for bringing an administrative or judicial proceeding under the Act is two years. However, an individual under eighteen years of age may bring an action throughout their minority through a parent and may bring an action in their own name for twenty years after reaching majority. A party who prevails under the Act must be awarded attorneys' fees.

Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson vetoed HB1570 because he believed it created "new standards of legislative interference with physicians and parents as they deal with some of the most complex and sensitive matters concerning our young people." He explained his concern that HB1570 "put[] the state as the definitive oracle of medical care, overriding parents, patients and health-care experts" and described the bill as a "vast government overreach." The Governor added that "The leading Arkansas medical associations, the American Academy of Pediatrics and medical experts across the country

all" opposed the bill, voicing concerns that "denying best practice medical care to transgender youth can lead to significant harm to the young person." He also noted that HB1570 "does not grandfather in those young people who are currently under hormone treatment," and that those adolescents would "be left without treatment" when Act 626 went into effect. (Pls.' Ex. 17).

HB1570 was enacted into law as Act 626 on April 6, 2021, following the Legislature's override of Governor Hutchinson's veto. *See* Pls.' Ex. 16, at 10; Pls.' Ex. 26; Pls.' Ex. 27. A simple majority of the Arkansas General Assembly overrode the Governor's veto.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that Act 626 violates the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment on each claim and a permanent injunction of enforcement of Act 626. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, the Court granted the motion for preliminary injunction on the record and filed a written order supplementing the ruling on August 2, 2021. The State appealed the Court's Order to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On August 25, 2022, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, *see Brandt by & through Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022).

The Court held an eight-day bench trial on this matter. At trial, the Court heard testimony from: Plaintiffs' fact witnesses—Plaintiffs Joanna Brandt, Dylan Brandt, Aaron Jennen, Donnie Ray Saxton, Amanda Dennis, and Dr. Kathryn Stambough; and Dr. Michele Hutchison;[3] Plaintiffs' expert witnesses—Dr. Dan Karasic, Dr. Deanna Adkins, Dr. Jack Turban, and Dr. Armand Antommaria; the State's fact witnesses—Dr.

[3] During the trial, the Court dismissed Plaintiff Hutchison as a party because she no longer practices medicine in the State of Arkansas.

Stephanie Ho, Dr. Janet Cathey, Cathy Campbell, Dr. Roger Hiatt, Laura Smalts, and Clifton Francis "Billy" Burleigh Jr.; and the State's expert witnesses—Dr. Stephen Levine, Prof. Mark Regnerus, Dr. Patrick Lappert, and Dr. Paul Hruz.

The Court also received exhibits from both parties, as well as testimony from Defendant Amy Embry (the Rule 30(b)(6) designee of Defendant Arkansas State Medical Board), Dr. Rhys Branman and non-party Representative Robin Lundstrom by deposition designations.

The parties filed post-trial briefs (ECF Nos. 265, 266) and proposed findings of fact (ECF Nos. 257, 259) for the Court's consideration.

Plaintiffs contend that Act 626 categorically prohibits transgender adolescents[4] with gender dysphoria from treatment that the patient, their parents, and their medical providers agree is medically necessary and in the adolescent's best interest. They allege that the Act singles out individuals in need of medically necessary gender-affirming care solely because the individual's gender identity does not conform to their assigned sex at birth. The State asserts that Arkansas has a compelling government interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens, particularly "vulnerable" children who are gender nonconforming or who experience distress at identifying with their biological sex. AR LEGIS 626 (2021). The State also contends that it has a compelling government interest in ensuring the ethical standards of the healthcare profession.

[4] Under Arkansas law, a minor is a person under the age of eighteen (18) years old. The term "adolescent" is used to describe a person from the time they begin puberty until they reach adulthood on their eighteenth birthday. For purposes of this opinion, the Court will use the terms "adolescent" and "minor" interchangeably.

II. Findings of Fact[5]

A. Gender Identity, Gender Incongruence and Gender Dysphoria

1. "Gender identity" refers to a person's deeply felt internal sense of belonging to a particular gender. (Tr. 24:11-15, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)). It is a "core part of who you are." (Tr. 266:6-11, 267:11-15, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

2. Most people are "cisgender" and have a gender identity that aligns with their sex assigned at birth—the sex placed on their birth certificate at birth based on their external genitalia. (Tr. 24:16-20, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

3. Transgender people have a gender identity that does not align with their birth-assigned sex. (Tr. 24:21-23, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

4. "Gender incongruence" is a condition where a person's gender identity does not align with their birth-assigned sex.

5. There is no evidence that gender incongruence is the result of a dysfunctional family life, and many transgender people come from healthy, supportive families. (Tr. 100:4-16, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

6. Gender identity is not something that an individual can control or voluntarily change. *Id.* at 29:13-15 (Karasic); 267:11-15 (Adkins).

7. Efforts to change a person's gender identity to become congruent with their birth-assigned sex have been attempted in the past without success and with harmful effects. *Id.* at 29:16-20, 30:3-24 (Karasic).

[5] These facts are accurate as of the date of trial.

8. Efforts to change an individual's gender identity can harm individuals by increasing feelings of shame and creating an expectation that change is possible when it is not, which can increase a sense of failure. *Id.* at 30:12-19 (Karasic).

9. Because efforts to change an individual's gender identity through therapy are ineffective, such efforts are now considered unethical by many mental health organizations including the American Psychological Association. *Id.* at 30:3-11 (Karasic); Tr. 325:18-326:4, ECF No. 220 (Turban).

10. Although people cannot voluntarily change their gender identity, a person's understanding of their gender identity can change over time. (Tr. 30:25-31:9, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 266:12-267:15, 270:24-271:1 (Adkins); Tr. 331:9-15, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

11. Research and clinical experience show that when gender incongruence continues after the onset of puberty, it is very unlikely that the individual will come to identify with their sex assigned at birth later in life. *Id.* at 310:16-25 (Turban); Tr. 267:25-268:7, 271:2-15, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); 98:7-25, 173:2-9 (Karasic).

12. The term "transgender male" refers to a person who was assigned female at birth who has a male gender identity. "Transgender female" refers to a person who was assigned male at birth who has a female gender identity.

13. The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 ("DSM") is a list of mental health disorders put out by the American Psychiatric Association and updated periodically. (Tr. 25:16-20, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)). It compiles criteria for psychiatric diagnoses that are generally relied on by practitioners in the psychiatric profession. *Id.* at 142:10-15 (Karasic).

14. The lack of alignment between one's gender identity and their sex assigned at birth (gender incongruence) can cause significant distress. The medical term for this distress is gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 24:7-10 (Karasic).

15. Gender dysphoria can increase with the onset of puberty and the development of secondary sex characteristics that do not align with one's gender identity. *Id.* at 37:14-22 (Karasic).

16. The diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria in adolescents and adults include incongruence between an individual's experienced or expressed gender and their sex assigned at birth lasting for at least six months and accompanied by clinically significant distress or impairment in social or occupational function. *Id.* at 26:20-27:3 (Karasic).

17. The diagnosis of gender dysphoria is made by a clinician who assesses whether a patient meets criteria based on a clinical interview, the clinician's observations of the patient, and the reports of the minor's parents. *Id.* at 27:7-28:1 (Karasic). This is how diagnoses of other mental health conditions are generally made. *Id.* at 28:2-5 (Karasic); Tr. 894:23-895:6, ECF No. 246 (Levine).

18. Gender dysphoria is a serious condition that, if left untreated, can result in other psychological conditions including depression, anxiety, self-harm, suicidality, and impairment in functioning. (Tr. 28:17-21, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 236:11-19 (Adkins)).

19. It is widely recognized in the medical and mental health fields that, for many people with gender dysphoria, the clinically significant distress caused by the condition can be relieved only by living in accordance with their gender identity, which is referred to as gender transition. This can include social transition—e.g., dressing, grooming, and using a name and pronouns consistent with one's gender identity—and, for adolescents and

adults, may also include gender-affirming medical care—i.e., medical treatments to align the body with one's gender identity. (Tr. 111:1-18, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 197:16-20, 232:23-233:5 (Adkins); Tr. 324:18-325:3, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

20. There is evidence of a rise in referrals to gender clinics in the United States in recent years. The increase in gender clinic patients is not surprising given the undisputed testimony that there is an increase in awareness of gender dysphoria and an increase in the number of gender clinics and insurance coverage for treatment, making such care available when it previously was not. (Tr. 77:17-78:15, 79:3-79:10, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

21. If any adolescents are seeking care at gender clinics because of social influence, they would not meet the criteria of gender dysphoria or be considered for gender-affirming medical treatment unless they had a longstanding incongruent gender identity and clinically significant distress. *Id.* at 87:6-88:1 (Karasic).

B. <u>The Science and Resulting Guidelines</u>

22. The Arkansas chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Arkansas Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of OB/GYN, the American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychologists, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the Arkansas Psychological Association, and other scientific and medical organizations all recognized the effectiveness and safety of gender-affirming medical care. (Pls.' Ex. 24 at 30:20-31:17, 32:4-19; Pls.' Ex. 25 at 40:19-42:16).

23. Two professional associations, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) and the Endocrine Society,[6] have published widely-accepted clinical

[6] Both associations joined in an Amici Curiae brief in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 30).

practice guidelines for the treatment of gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 31:11- 22, 33:22-34:1 (Karasic).

24. WPATH is a professional association that develops treatment recommendations through a committee of renowned experts in transgender health. *Id.* at 31:23-25, 32:13-18 (Karasic). WPATH has been publishing guidelines for the treatment of gender dysphoria and prior diagnoses related to gender incongruence since 1979. Its current version—the WPATH Standards of Care for the Treatment of Transgender and Gender Diverse People, Version 8—was published in 2022. *Id.* at 31:17-22 (Karasic).

25. The Endocrine Society is a professional society of over 15,000 endocrinologists and endocrinology researchers. (Tr. 383:11-14, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

26. The Endocrine Society first published guidelines for the treatment of gender dysphoria in 2011 with a second edition in 2017. They are called Endocrine Treatment of Gender-Dysphoric/Gender-Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine Society Guideline. (Tr. 31:17-22, 33:12-17, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

27. The Endocrine Society Guideline for treatment of gender dysphoria is similar to other clinical practice guidelines published by the Endocrine Society concerning other medical treatments. *Id.* at 198:10-16 (Adkins).

28. Like other clinical practice guidelines, the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines were developed by experts in the field, including clinicians and researchers, who used systematic processes for collecting and reviewing scientific evidence. *Id.* at 32:13-18, 102:14-103:2 (Karasic).

29. Both WPATH and the Endocrine Society, like other large medical and mental health associations such as the American Psychiatric Association, develop guidelines for

treatment as well as advocate for policies relevant to their patient populations. *Id.* at 104:25-105:21 (Karasic).

30. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines for the treatment of gender dysphoria are recognized as best practices by the major medical and mental health professional associations in the United States, including the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the American Medical Association, and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychology. *Id.* at 34:2-12 (Karasic).

31. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines are widely followed by clinicians. *Id.* at 34:13-19 (Karasic); 197:24-198:20, 273:5-8 (Adkins).

32. Transgender care is not experimental care.

33. Providing treatment for gender dysphoria does not cause a person to be or remain transgender and there is no treatment that can change a person's gender identity. *Id.* at 29:13-20, 98:7-99:21 (Karasic).

34. Under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines, treatment for gender dysphoria differs depending on whether the patient is a prepubertal child, an adolescent, or an adult. *Id.* at 35:20-37:13 (Karasic).

35. Under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines, before puberty, treatment is focused on support for the child and family. Some prepubertal children may socially transition. No medical interventions are indicated or provided for the treatment of gender dysphoria in prepubertal children. *Id.* at 36:5-10 (Karasic); 198:21-199:2 (Adkins).

36. In addition to social transition, medical interventions such as medications to delay puberty ("puberty blockers" or "pubertal suppression"), hormone therapy, and in some more rare instances, surgery, may become medically indicated for youth who experience distress after the onset of puberty (i.e., during adolescence) under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines. *Id.* at 36:11-37:13; 38:19- 39:1 (Karasic); 199:3-12 (Adkins).

37. Under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines, treatment decisions for adolescents with gender dysphoria are individualized based on the needs of the patient, and gender-affirming medical treatments are not indicated or appropriate for all adolescents with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 43:9-12 (Karasic); 200:18-24 (Adkins).

38. As with clinical practice guidelines in other areas of medicine, the WPATH Standards of Care recognize that it may be appropriate for doctors to deviate from the guidelines in individual cases where, in the clinician's judgment, such deviation is appropriate. (Tr., 35:11-19, 187:5-188:15, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

C. <u>Informed consent</u>

39. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines have provisions for informed consent for treatment that are consistent with principles of informed consent used throughout the field of medicine. (Tr. 401:4-15, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

40. In general, before any medical treatment is provided to a patient, the health care provider must obtain informed consent. Informed consent means patients—and in the case of minors, their parents or guardians—are informed of the potential risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment so they can weigh them and decide whether to pursue treatment. (Tr. 53:7-13, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); Tr. 380:10-19, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

41. In general, adolescents are able to understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to a medical intervention. *Id.* at 381:1-8, 381:18-22 (Antommaria). The assent of adolescents—meaning their agreement with the proposed course of treatment— should be obtained. *Id.* at 380:20-381:8 (Antommaria).

42. Even when adolescents are able to understand the risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment and assent to treatment, their parents or guardians must still provide informed consent. *Id.* at 380:1-9 (Antommaria).

43. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines provide that, before gender-affirming medical treatments are provided to adolescent patients, the patient and their parents or guardians must be informed of the potential risks, benefits and alternatives to treatment and consent must be provided by the parents or guardians. *Id.* at 400:11-401:3 (Antommaria); Tr. 274:7-275:19, ECF No. 219 (Adkins).

44. For hormonal therapy, the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines specifically provide that patients and their parents or guardians must be informed of the potential impact of treatment on fertility and counseled on options for preserving fertility. (Tr. 400:11-21, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria); Tr. 53:25-54:12, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

45. The WPATH Standards of Care also provide that clinicians should inform families about the nature and limits of the evidence base regarding gender-affirming medical treatment for adolescents as part of the informed consent process. *Id.* at 55:7- 16 (Karasic).

46. The WPATH Standards of Care provide that, before any potentially irreversible medical treatments, families should be informed that some individuals may come to feel gender-affirming medical care is not a good fit for them as their feelings about their gender identity could change. *Id.* at 54:13-55:6 (Karasic).

47. In some cases, a mental health diagnosis may impair an individual's medical decision-making capacity, in which case treatment would be delayed. (Tr. 382:7-11, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria); 321:12-322:3 (Turban)). Having a mental health diagnosis does not necessarily mean that an individual lacks medical decision- making capacity. *Id.* at 382:12-14 (Antommaria). If a patient suffers from depression or anxiety, that does not mean they cannot consent to treatment. *Id.* at 414:2-11 (Antommaria); Tr. 1056:3-22; ECF No. 248 (Lappert)).

48. The informed consent process is adequate to enable minor patients and their parents to make decisions about gender-affirming medical care for adolescents.

D. Medical Interventions

Step One: Psychotherapy

49. The WPATH Standards of Care spell out that the comprehensive mental health assessment prior to medical treatments for adolescents should include a thorough history of the person's gender identity and the stability of that identity; an assessment of other conditions that could affect presentation like a co-occurring psychiatric disorder; and the adolescent's cognitive maturity to make decisions and understand the future consequences of those decisions and their capacity to participate in care. (Tr. 43:13-45:2, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

50. The WPATH Standards of Care provide that any co-occurring mental health conditions should be addressed. *Id.* at 48:17-21 (Karasic); Tr. 199:21-24, ECF No. 219 (Adkins).

51. The WPATH Standards of Care recognize that autism spectrum disorder is present in higher rates among youth with gender dysphoria and that this needs to be considered when diagnosing and assessing a patient for treatment. WPATH Standards of Care

recommend that when assessing patients who have autism spectrum disorder, more time may be needed and differences in communication should be taken into account. *Id.* 48:6-16 (Karasic).

52. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines recommend that mental health professionals should be involved in decisions about whether medical treatments are indicated and appropriate for a given adolescent. *Id.* at 45:23-46:9; 47:1-7 (Karasic); Tr. 307:13-22, ECF No. 220 (Turban). WPATH Standards of Care specifically recommend that "health care professionals involve relevant disciplines, including mental health and medical professionals, to reach a decision about whether [medical interventions] are appropriate and remain indicated throughout the course of treatment until the transition is made to adult care."[7] (Tr. 45:23-46:9, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

53. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines provide for a comprehensive mental health assessment and diagnosis before an adolescent is provided gender-affirming medical treatment. *Id.* at 43:13-44:13,155:17-22 (Karasic); Tr. 322:10-19, ECF No. 220 (Turban).

54. Psychotherapy can be important for individuals with gender dysphoria to address and alleviate other conditions such as depression and anxiety, but it does not alleviate the underlying distress due to the incongruence between a person's gender identity and birth-assigned sex. (Tr. 29:16-20, 64:1-7, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)). There are no psychotherapeutic interventions that have been demonstrated to be effective at alleviating the gender dysphoria itself. *Id.* at 99:22-100:3 (Karasic).

[7] Quotes from the WPATH Standards of Care refer to the current edition, version 8.

55. Not all individuals experiencing gender incongruence decide to seek treatment beyond psychotherapy.

Step Two: Puberty Blockers

56. The purpose of puberty blockers is to alleviate or prevent the worsening of the distress of gender dysphoria by pausing the physical changes that come with puberty. This treatment also provides the patient time to further understand their gender identity before initiating any irreversible medical treatments. *Id.* at 233:9-22 (Adkins); Tr. 318:7-22, ECF No. 220 (Turban).

57. Gonadotropin hormone-releasing hormone, or GnRH agonists (often referred to as puberty blockers), pause puberty at the stage it was in when treatment started. (Tr. 202:23-203:16; 233:6-14, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

58. Under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines, puberty blockers may be indicated as treatment for gender dysphoria for youth who have been confirmed to have started puberty, which is referred to as Tanner Stage 2. *Id.* at 205:3-15 (Adkins). Tanner Stage 2 begins at the first sign of puberty. (Tr. 205:5-7, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)). The age at which youth begin puberty varies significantly but typically starts between the ages of eight and fourteen for those assigned female at birth and between the ages of nine and fourteen for those assigned male at birth. *Id.* at 211:8-21 (Adkins).

Step Three: Hormone Therapy

59. The purpose of hormone therapy is to alleviate the distress of gender dysphoria by aligning the body to be more congruent with the individual's gender identity. *Id.* at 37:23-38:2 (Karasic); 234:3-8 (Adkins); Tr. 417:21-418:9, ECF NO. 220 (Antommaria).

60. Under the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines, hormone therapy—estrogen and anti-androgens for transgender girls, and testosterone for transgender boys— may be indicated for some adolescents with gender dysphoria. (Tr. 36:11-21, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

61. Transgender females treated with estrogen and anti-androgens will go through hormonal puberty like their cisgender female counterparts. They will develop typically female secondary sex characteristics such as breasts, softened skin, and fat distribution typical of females. *Id.* at 215:11-18 (Adkins).

62. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines do not recommend hormone therapy for adolescents with gender dysphoria unless the patient's articulation of their gender identity has been long-lasting and stable. The WPATH Standards of Care specifically provide that hormone therapy should be recommended to adolescents only if the experience of gender incongruence has lasted for years. (Tr. 50:20- 51:4, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

63. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines also require that, before providing hormone therapy, adolescents should demonstrate the emotional and cognitive maturity to understand the risks and be able to think into the future and appreciate the long-term consequences. *Id.* at 52:19-53:6 (Karasic); Tr. 400:22-401:15, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria).

64. The WPATH Standards of Care provide detailed guidance to clinicians about how to assess adolescents' maturity. (Tr. 58:17-59:8, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

Step Four: Surgery

65. The Arkansas Children's Hospital Gender Clinic does not provide surgical treatment to patients. (Tr., ECF No. 275 at 605:8-11 (Stambough); 520:14-18 (Hutchison)).

66. Genital surgeries for adolescents are extremely rare. (Tr. 36:11-21, 55:10-16; ECF No. 219 (Karasic); Tr. 820:23-24, ECF No. 246 (Levine)). In their many years of treating adolescents with gender dysphoria, neither Dr. Karasic nor Dr. Adkins has ever referred a minor patient for genital surgery. (Tr. 186:23-25, 189:21-190:5, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 231:17-19 (Adkins)).

67. With respect to genital surgeries for minors, the Endocrine Society Guideline does not recommend any such surgeries until after age 18. *Id.* at 38:19-39:9 (Karasic). The WPATH Standards of Care do not have an age threshold for vaginoplasty but recommends that it should be offered only to patients under 18 with great caution after a thorough assessment of the patient's maturity. It does not recommend phalloplasty for anyone under 18. *Id.* at 36:22-37:7, 38:8-18 (Karasic).

68. In the rare instance that an adolescent has gender-affirming surgery, the overwhelming majority of surgeries are chest surgeries for adolescent transgender males. *Id.* at 36:18-20 (Karasic).

69. The WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines provide that chest masculinization surgery may be appropriate for some transgender male adolescents prior to age 18 to help align the body with the individual's gender identity to alleviate gender dysphoria. There are no specific age requirements but, like the requirements for hormone therapy, the gender incongruence must be long-standing, and the patient must be deemed

to have the cognitive maturity to understand the risks and effects of this treatment. *Id.* at 158:11-23 (Karasic).

E. Gender-Affirming Medical Care for Adolescents in Arkansas

70. The Arkansas Children's Hospital ("ACH") Gender Clinic is the primary provider of gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria in Arkansas. It has seen more than 300 patients since it opened in 2018. (Tr. 516:13-517:1, 520:19-21, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison)).

71. The ACH Gender Clinic's protocols[8] are aligned with the WPATH Standards of Care and Endocrine Society Guidelines. *Id.* at 518:20-23 (Hutchison); 602:21-604:20 (Stambough).

72. In February 2022, leadership at ACH changed the protocols of the Gender Clinic to stop initiating gender-affirming medical care for patients under 18 who were not already receiving such treatment, while continuing such treatment for patients who were already receiving such care. *Id.* at 551:13-552:4 (Hutchison). The Hospital sent a letter to patients' families informing them that the change was due to concern that Act 626 might go into effect in the near future and disrupt patients' care. *Id.* at 552:5-17 (Hutchison); 602:10-20 (Stambough). The Clinic continues to provide hormone therapy to 81 patients under age 18. *Id.* at 602:21-603:4 (Stambough). Because the change in protocol was based on Act 626, Dr. Stambough expects that, if the law is permanently enjoined, the Gender Clinic will resume providing gender-affirming medical care for new patients. *Id.* at 603:5-10 (Stambough).

[8] References to ACH Gender Clinic protocols throughout these findings of fact refer to the protocols in place prior to February 2022, unless otherwise specified.

73. Gender-affirming medical treatments that may be provided to adolescents at the ACH Gender Clinic include puberty blockers, estrogen, testosterone blockers, and testosterone. *Id.* at 518:24-519:15 (Hutchison).

74. The ACH Gender Clinic creates individualized treatment plans tailored to the particular needs of each patient. *Id.* at 521:1-9 (Hutchison); 604:2-6 (Stambough).

75. Not every adolescent patient seen at the ACH Gender Clinic requests or receives gender-affirming medical interventions. *Id.* at 522:4-11 (Hutchison); 604:21-606:19 (Stambough).

76. ACH Gender Clinic patients work with Clinic staff and their therapists to assess their gender identity. Some patients who have come to the Clinic with issues related to their gender identity eventually came to identify with their birth-assigned sex. Those patients did not receive medical interventions. *Id.* at 548:10-20 (Hutchison); 605:18-606:19 (Stambough).

77. Sometimes, ACH Gender Clinic staff do not feel some adolescent patients are ready for gender-affirming medical interventions and treatment will not be provided. *Id.* at 522:16-25, 539:18-22 (Hutchison).

78. Only four ACH Gender Clinic patients have been treated with puberty blockers. That is because most patients come to the Clinic at older ages when such treatment would not be indicated. (Tr. 519:12-15; 521:10-19, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison)). Patients who have already progressed significantly into puberty are not appropriate candidates for puberty blockers. *Id*. at 521:22-522:3.

79. The ACH Gender Clinic protocols provide that the following criteria must be met before initiating hormone therapy (estrogen and testosterone blockers for transgender girls, or testosterone for transgender boys) for adolescents:

a. the patient must be assessed by the Clinic's psychologist;

b. the patient must meet the DSM-5 criteria for gender dysphoria;

c. the patient must have a consistent and persistent gender identity;

d. the patient must be in counseling with a therapist;

e. the patient's therapist must be consulted and must not identify any concerns about starting treatment;

f. the patient must have the cognitive maturity to understand and weigh the risks and benefits of treatment;

g. the patient's parent must provide informed consent;

h. the patient must receive a medical assessment including baseline lab work; and

i. the patient must be 14 years of age or older.

Id. at 524:16-526:9, 529:25-530:14, 531:7-9 (Hutchison).

80. The psychological evaluation conducted by the ACH Gender Clinic psychologist is comprehensive and includes an assessment for gender dysphoria, the patient's degree of dysphoria and the specific sources of distress, and other psychological assessments (e.g., for depression or anxiety) tailored to the patient's mental health needs. *Id.* at 526:18-527:12 (Hutchison).

81. The ACH Gender Clinic determines whether a patient's gender identity is persistent and consistent through information collected from the patient, the patient's parents, the

patient's therapist, the Clinic psychologist, and the Clinic physician. *Id.* at 528:5-19 (Hutchison).

82. At the ACH Gender Clinic, it is common for Clinic patients to have a long-standing transgender identity by the time they come to the Clinic. The average length of time between when Clinic patients first identify as transgender and when they first tell a parent is 6.5 years. *Id.* at 528:20-25 (Hutchison).

83. The ACH Gender Clinic has very rarely had patients who only recently discovered their gender incongruence. In those cases, the patient would not be considered for hormone therapy for some time because there would be a need to see if the patient's gender identity remained consistent and persistent over time. *Id.* at 529:1-13 (Hutchison).

84. At the ACH Gender Clinic, the assessment of the patient's maturity is based on information from the parents, the Clinic psychologist, the Clinic physician, and the patient's therapist. *Id.* at 539:4-17 (Hutchison).

85. Where patients do not demonstrate the maturity to understand the potential risks and benefits of treatment, the ACH Gender Clinic will defer medical treatment. *Id.* at 539:18-540:1 (Hutchison).

86. In cases in which an ACH Gender Clinic patient's therapist has expressed concerns about beginning hormone therapy, e.g., if they had concerns about the patient's maturity or mood stability, treatment was delayed. *Id.* at 530:15-531:6 (Hutchison).

87. At the ACH Gender Clinic, no minor is provided hormone therapy unless the patient, their parents, their doctor, the Clinic psychologist, and the patient's therapist all approve treatment. *Id.* at 522:16-25, 530:15-531:14 (Hutchison).

88. At the ACH Gender Clinic, for those patients who are treated with hormone therapy, the average length of time between a patient's first visit to the Clinic and the start of hormone therapy is about 10.5 months. *Id.* 529:18-24 (Hutchison).

89. The average age of beginning hormone therapy for ACH Gender Clinic patients is 16. *Id.* at 526:10-17 (Hutchison).

90. In the ACH Gender Clinic's informed consent process, the information provided to patients and their parents includes information about the possible risks and side effects of treatment, including potential risks to fertility related to hormone therapy and discussion of fertility preservation options. *Id.* at 531:15-532:18, 537:21- 538:14 (Hutchison); 613:20-614:3 (Stambough).

91. The ACH Gender Clinic's informed consent process includes informing families about the limitations on what is known about the effects and risks of treatments. *Id.* at 533:3-11 (Hutchison); 604:12-19 (Stambough).

92. Drs. Hutchison and Stambough similarly observed great distress in their gender dysphoric adolescent patients at the ACH gender clinic. Suicidal ideation and self-harm were common; some patients had attempted suicide, sometimes multiple times. *Id.* at 542:6-543:2 (Hutchison); 609:5-17 (Stambough).

F. The Parent and Minor Plaintiffs[9]

The Brandt Family

93. Plaintiff Dylan Brandt is 17 years old. (Tr. 658:8-12, ECF No. 275 (Joanna Brandt); 688:14-15 (Dylan Brandt)).

[9] Dylan Brandt, Sabrina Jennen, Brooke Dennis, and Parker Saxton are referred to collectively as the "Minor Plaintiffs." Joanna Brandt, Lacey and Aaron Jennen, Amanda and Shayne Dennis, and Donnie Saxton are referred to collectively as the Parent Plaintiffs. Kathryn Stambough is referred to as the Physician Plaintiff.

94. Plaintiff Joanna Brandt is Dylan's mother. *Id.* at 658:6-9 (J. Brandt).

95. The Brandts live in Greenwood, Arkansas. *Id.* at 658:4-5 (J. Brandt); 688:10-11 (D. Brandt).

96. Dylan was assigned female at birth, but his gender identity is male. *Id.* at 659:10-15 (J. Brandt); 688:16-20 (D. Brandt).

97. Dylan's distress around his gender began before puberty. *Id.* at 689:13-24 (D. Brandt).

98. Dylan informed his mother of his gender dysphoria through a letter he gave her in June 2019, when he was 13 years old. *Id.* at 659:16-18 (J. Brandt).

99. Dylan has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 665:9-10 (J. Brandt).

100. After informing his mother, Dylan started socially transitioning—using he/him pronouns and the name Dylan. *Id.* at 691:4-10 (D. Brandt); 662:14- 19 (J. Brandt). He already had short hair but cut his hair shorter and in more typically masculine ways. *Id.* at 663:10-19 (J. Brandt). He also began to shop in the boys' section of stores. *Id.* at 663:20-664:4 (J. Brandt). Through these steps, Dylan began to be recognized as a boy more in public. *Id.* at 664:5-7 (J. Brandt).

101. Dylan's mood improved after he started to be recognized as a boy. *Id.* at 663:22-664:23 (J. Brandt).

102. Dylan was referred to the ACH Gender Clinic by his pediatrician. *Id.* at 665:11-16 (J. Brandt).

103. Dylan's first visit to the ACH Gender Clinic was in January 2020. *Id.* at 666:22- 25 (J. Brandt). At that visit, he and his mother met with Dr. Michele Hutchison— the director of the Gender Clinic at the time—and the Clinic's social worker. (Tr. 514:25-515:4, 517:14, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison); 667:1-7 (J. Brandt). Dr. Hutchison explained the

possible treatment options for adolescents with gender dysphoria and the risks and benefits of those treatments. *Id.* at 667:8-18, 668:6-11 (J. Brandt).

104. During his first visit to the ACH Gender Clinic, Dylan and his mother and Dr. Hutchison discussed mental health therapy. Dylan had been in therapy prior to that visit, but he was between therapists at the time and the Gender Clinic referred him to a therapist near where he lived. *Id.* at 667:19-668:3 (J. Brandt).

105. Menstrual cycles were causing Dylan great distress, Dr. Hutchison prescribed menstrual suppression medication at that January 2020 visit. *Id.* at 668:16-669:5 (J. Brandt).

106. Menstrual suppression did not alleviate Dylan's gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 669:8- 10 (J. Brandt).

107. Eventually, Dylan began testosterone therapy in August 2020. This decision was made by his mother, a Clinic psychologist who evaluated him, his therapist, Dr. Hutchison, and Dylan. Everyone agreed it was appropriate for him.[10] *Id.* at 670:22-672:8 (J. Brandt)).

108. Dr. Hutchison had informed Dylan and his mother of the potential risks of treatment more than once. Joanna asked a lot of questions at the Clinic and had done research to make sure she was making the best medical decision for her child. *Id.* at 661:14-23, 662:20-663:7, 667:8-18, 668:6-15, 669:11-25, 670:1-21, 671:7-19 (J. Brandt).

109. As a parent, Joanna routinely makes medical decisions for her minor children. *Id.* at 658:13-21 (J. Brandt).

110. Dylan has now been on cross-sex hormone therapy for over two and a half years. *Id.* at 672:9-10 (J. Brandt).

[10] The trial transcript contains a typographical error. The visit at the ACH Gender Clinic was in August 2020, not August 2002 the date included in the trial transcript.

111. Testosterone treatment has significantly alleviated Dylan's gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 673:3-25 (J. Brandt)).

112. Dylan has not experienced any negative side effects from testosterone therapy. *Id.* at 672:11-12 (J. Brandt); 694:14-19 (D. Brandt).

113. Dylan has continued regular therapy with a counselor. (Tr. 695:6-7, ECF No. 275 (D. Brandt).

114. If Act 626 were to go into effect, medically detransitioning is not an option for Dylan. *Id.* at 696:3-10 (D. Brandt). His mother Joanna fears that stopping treatment would negatively affect his mental health and he would "lose all" of "who he has become." *Id.* at 675:4-14 (J. Brandt).

115. Dylan and Joanna have discussed moving out of state or traveling out of state regularly for treatment if he cannot continue receiving treatment in Arkansas because of Act 626. *Id.* at 675:15-676:9 (J. Brandt); 696:11-12 (D. Brandt).

The Jennen Family

116. Plaintiff Sabrina Jennen is 17 years old. (Tr. 447:18-20, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

117. Plaintiffs Lacey and Aaron Jennen are her parents. *Id.* at 447:8-21 (Jennen).

118. Sabrina has two younger sisters. *Id.* at 447:18-21 (Jennen).

119. The Jennens live in Fayetteville, Arkansas. *Id.* at 459:25-460:1 (Jennen).

120. Sabrina was assigned male at birth, but her gender identity is female. *Id.* at 448:15-20 (Jennen).

121. Sabrina informed her parents of her gender dysphoria in July 2020, when she was 15. *Id.* at 448:21-449:23

122. After informing her parents, Sabrina started to see a counselor, Cathy Campbell. *Id.* at 452:3-10, 454:1-2 (Jennen); Tr. 72:16-18, ECF No. 282 (Campbell). Sabrina continues to see Ms. Campbell regularly. (Tr. 454:3-8, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

123. Ms. Campbell diagnosed Sabrina with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 453:15-25(Jennen); Tr. 77:12-78:2, ECF No. 282 (Campbell).

124. In the Summer of 2020, Sabrina started socially transitioning— she began to go by the name Sabrina and use she/her pronouns while at home. At the time, she and her family had just moved to Fayetteville, so she prepared to start the new school year as Sabrina. (Tr. 452:3-13, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

125. Sabrina and Ms. Campbell first discussed hormone therapy in September 2020 when Sabrina described her intense distress. (Tr. 75:15-76:7, ECF No. 282 (Campbell). After that session, Sabrina discussed hormone therapy with her parents, who were initially hesitant. *Id.* at 76:20-24 (Campbell); Tr. 454:11-18, ECF No. 220 (Jennen).

126. Because Ms. Campbell does not counsel patients about the medical risks of hormone therapy, she gave the Jennens Dr. Stephanie Ho's name and contact information so that they could speak with a medical doctor in Fayetteville who could best answer their questions. *Id.* at 76:25-77:8 (Campbell); Tr. 454:11-20, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

127. Sabrina's parents wanted to do more research and better understand the potential risks and benefits of hormone therapy before consenting to Sabrina beginning treatment. *Id.* at 454:21-455:17, 456:10-17 (Jennen).

128. Sabrina and her parents visited Dr. Ho's office in December 2020. *Id.* at 455:18-22 (Jennen). They met with a certified nurse practitioner who independently diagnosed Sabrina with gender dysphoria. (Tr. 82:18-83:1, ECF No. 282 (Ho). Dr. Ho's staff also

provided verbal and written information to the Jennens about hormone therapy, including the risks and benefits and information related to fertility preservation, and answered the Jennens' questions. (Tr. 455:23-456:7, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

129. Before starting hormone therapy, Sabrina had therapy sessions with Ms. Campbell every other week for several months. *Id.* at 454:5-18 (Jennen); (Tr. 75:1-4, ECF No. 282 (Campbell)). During that time, Sabrina's parents participated in some joint family sessions with Ms. Campbell. *Id*. at 75:5-14 (Campbell); Tr. 453:18-23, ECF No. 220 (Jennen).

130. Sabrina and her parents discussed and researched hormone therapy. They "took a lot of time, thought and prayer" about whether Sabrina should undergo hormone treatment for her gender dysphoria, and they made the decision as a family to move forward with exploring hormone treatment. (Tr. 456:10-17, 457:15-19, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

131. Dr. Ho did her own assessment and diagnosed Sabrina with gender dysphoria. (Tr. 749:14- 16, ECF No. 224 (Ho)). She also reviewed with the family how hormone therapy works and the potential risks and benefits of the treatment. (Tr. 456:25-457:11, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)). Sabrina and her parents consented to Sabrina receiving hormone therapy, and Dr. Ho prescribed a testosterone blocker and estrogen. *Id.* at 457:15-19, 458:1-5 (Jennen).

132. Aaron and Lacey Jennen routinely make medical decisions for their children. *Id.* at 457:12-14 (Jennen).

133. Ms. Campbell had no concerns about Sabrina's ability to assent to hormone therapy. (Tr. 77:25-78:2, ECF No. 282 (Campbell)).

134. Sabrina has regularly visited Dr. Ho for monitoring and treatment since January 2021. Approximately every three months, Dr. Ho reviews lab tests to monitor Sabrina's hormone levels and check in about Sabrina's dysphoria. (Tr. 458:6- 16, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)).

135. Sabrina's therapist and doctor agree that hormone therapy is benefitting Sabrina. (Tr. 78:24-79:9, ECF No. 282 (Campbell); Tr. 749:20-21, ECF No. 224 (Ho)).

136. Ms. Campbell could readily see the change in Sabrina's mental health after starting hormone therapy; she was happier and more outgoing than Ms. Campbell had ever seen her. (Tr. 78:3-16, ECF No. 282 (Campbell).

137. For Aaron Jennen, Sabrina not receiving gender-affirming medical care is "not an option." Tr. 462:5-8, 462:20- 463:11, ECF No. 220 (Jennen)). He testified that he would "worry about her withdrawing back into the person that she was before she started it, a person that was unhappy, that said things to her mother and I like, what's the point of life. Saying things like, I don't see a future for myself, which is difficult because how amazing she is." *Id.* at 463:12-20 (Jennen). Aaron testified that if Act 626 went into effect, they would either move or travel out of state to get treatment for Sabrina. *Id.* at 462:5-19 (Jennen).

The Saxton Family

138. Parker Saxton was 17 years old at the start of trial. (Tr. 430:14-15, ECF No. 220 (Saxton)).

139. Donnie Ray Saxton is Parker's father. *Id.* at 430:9-19 (Saxton).

140. The Saxtons live in Vilonia, Arkansas. *Id.* at 444:15-16 (Saxton).

141. Parker was assigned female at birth, but his gender identity is male. *Id.* at 431:15-20 (Saxton).

142. Puberty caused significant distress for Parker. He suffered from anxiety and depression and would not socialize or answer his phone even with his closest friends. *Id.* at 432:12-15, 433:2-20 (Saxton). It was "troubling" for Donnie to watch. *Id.* at 433:2-7 (Saxton).

143. Donnie took Parker to see a therapist and psychiatrist who treated him for anxiety and depression. *Id.* at 434:7-18 (Saxton).

144. Parker was aware of his gender identity since around age 9. (Tr. 557:21-22, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison). He informed his father in a letter in 2019 when he was approximately 14 years old. (Tr. 431:24-432:4, 434:7-10; ECF No. 220 (Saxton)).

145. At the time Donnie read Parker's letter, he "didn't have a clue what transgender meant outside of what we see in the news and everything." *Id.* at 434:19-435:2 (Saxton).

146. If someone were to stereotype the most unlikely parent of a transgender child, it would be Donnie Ray Sexton. Donnie is a good and loving father.

147. In June 2020, when Parker was 15, Parker's psychiatrist referred him to the Gender Clinic at ACH. *Id.* at 435:11-14, 25 (Saxton).

148. At the ACH Gender Clinic, Parker initially was prescribed Depo-Provera as a menstrual suppressant to alleviate the distress caused by his period. *Id.* at 437:20-21 (Saxton).

149. The menstrual suppression helped alleviate some of Parker's gender dysphoria but did not fully address it. Parker still had depression, social anxiety, compulsive bathing, and an aversion to his reflection. *Id.* at 437:22-438:9 (Saxton).

150. Parker went to follow-up visits at the ACH Gender Clinic regularly. *Id.* at 438:14, 439:8 (Saxton).

151. About three or four months after his first visit, Parker expressed that he thought testosterone might be helpful for him. *Id.* at 439:9-12 (Saxton).

152. On May 27, 2021, Parker began testosterone therapy. *Id.* at 442:21-25 (Saxton). Before starting treatment, Parker was evaluated by an ACH psychologist who confirmed the gender dysphoria diagnosis and conducted a psychological evaluation of Parker. *Id.* at 440:4-19 (Saxton). At the May 27th appointment, Parker, Donnie, and Dr. Hutchison extensively discussed the risks and benefits of treatment—including the potential impact on Parker's fertility—and they ultimately decided to move forward. *Id.* at 439:11-441:3, 442:25-443:15 (Saxton).

153. As a parent, Donnie routinely makes medical decisions for his children. *Id.* at 430:21-25 (Saxton).

154. Testosterone therapy has significantly alleviated Parker's gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 443:18-20 (Saxton).

155. Parker's doctors also observed the positive impact of testosterone therapy on Parker's gender dysphoria. (Tr. 559:9-23, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison); Tr. 619:13-15, EF No. 275 (Stambough).

156. Before Parker turned 18 in November 2022, the Saxton family talked about what they would do if Act 626 were to take effect and Parker could no longer receive testosterone therapy in Arkansas. It was a "hard talk," and they concluded that they'd "have to pick up and leave." (Tr. 445:21-446:17, ECF No. 220 (Saxton)).

157. After HB 1570 was introduced, the possibility of care being prohibited resulted in Parker Saxton going to such a "dark place" that his father started sleeping near him because of concern he might hurt himself. *Id.* at 441:15-24, 442:2-14 (Saxton).

The Dennis Family

158. Plaintiff Brooke Dennis is 10 years old and is in fifth grade. (Tr. 638:18-21, ECF No. 275 (Dennis).

159. Plaintiffs Amanda and Shayne Dennis are her parents. *Id.* at 638:5-12 (Dennis).

160. Brooke has an older brother and a younger sister. *Id.* at 638:17-18 (Dennis).

161. The Dennises live in Bentonville, Arkansas. *Id.* at 650:3-10 (Dennis).

162. Brooke was assigned male at birth, but her gender identity is female. *Id.* at 639:11-15 (Dennis).

163. Brooke started identifying as a girl in second grade. *Id.* at 639:16-19 (Dennis).

164. Brooke continues to have fear, anxiety, and distress about the fact she could go through a typically male puberty. *Id.* at 620:21-621:6 (Stambough); 648:17-649:2 (Dennis).

165. Shortly after Brooke expressed her female gender identity to her mother in April 2020, the Dennises made an appointment for Brooke to see a therapist. *Id.* at 644:3-10 (Dennis). The Dennises wanted to have "as much information as possible to be able to make a good decision" on "how to move forward." *Id.* at 643:22- 24, 649:24-650:2 (Dennis).

166. After Brooke saw the therapist for a while, the therapist diagnosed Brooke with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 644:13-17 (Dennis).

167. After the Dennises discussed Brooke's gender with her pediatrician, the pediatrician referred them to the ACH Gender Clinic. *Id.* at 644:18-645:6 (Dennis).

168. In October 2020, the Dennises had their first visit at the ACH Gender Clinic and met with Dr. Hutchison and other staff. *Id.* at 645:7-12 (Dennis). The purpose of the first visit was to help the family learn about the Clinic and the care they provided and get information about gender dysphoria and what they should be learning more about. *Id.* at 645:7-646:15

(Dennis). They discussed Brooke's history and childhood. *Id.* at 645:22-25 (Dennis). No medical treatments for gender dysphoria were indicated for Brooke because she has not yet started puberty. *Id.* at 645:7-648:16 (Dennis); 620:18-20 (Stambough).

169. Brooke continues to express "a lot" of distress about her body related to her gender. She is specifically anxious about going through puberty. *Id.* at 620:18-621:6 (Stambough); 647:9-23, 648:7-649:11 (Dennis).

170. Brooke is still receiving counseling related to her gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 649:12-14 (Dennis).

171. As parents, Amanda and Shayne routinely make medical decisions for their three children. *Id.* at 649:15-17 (Dennis).

172. Act 626 is causing great anxiety for the Dennis family. Amanda and Shayne have discussed what they would do if Act 626 takes effect and Brooke is not able to get gender-affirming medical treatment in Arkansas. They would need to regularly travel out of state or move out of state to get Brooke care, and either scenario would be logistically, financially, and emotionally difficult. *Id.* at 652:11-22 (Dennis).

173. If the family were to move away, Amanda might have to give up her job as head of business operations for the digital ad platform at Sam's Club within the Walmart Enterprise, which would cause financial hardship for the family. *Id.* at 650:11- 14, 651:17-652:1, 654:3-656:18, 653:2-655:22 (Dennis).

174. Amanda Dennis testified about the financial impact on the family, as well as the impact on the care of her other two children and an aging relative, her job, and Brooke's attendance at school if she and Brooke had to regularly travel out of state for medical care. *Id.* at 652:11-657:11 (Dennis).

G. Studies and Findings on Treatments Prohibited by Act 626

175. Decades of clinical experience have shown that adolescents with gender dysphoria experience significant positive benefits to their health and well-being from gender-affirming medical care. (Tr. 67:8-12, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 233:15-22 (Adkins); Tr. 298:7-18, 305:2-19, ECF No. 220 (Turban); Tr. 543:3-544:11, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison); Tr. 606:20-608:6, 609:22-610:1, ECF No. 275 (Stambough)).

176. Clinical experience shows the long-term effectiveness of gender-affirming medical care as some adolescents with gender dysphoria are able to discontinue antidepressants and anti-anxiety medications after receiving gender-affirming medical care. (Tr. 231:23-232:7, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr. 64:8-65:19, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

177. There are 16 scientific studies assessing the use of puberty blockers and hormone therapy to treat adolescents with gender dysphoria, and this body of research has found these treatments are effective at alleviating gender dysphoria and improving a variety of mental health outcomes including anxiety, depression, and suicidality. (Tr. 295:16-18, 298:7-18, 300:24-301:2, 301:5-17, 302:20-303:8, 303:22-305:1, ECF No. 220 (Turban); Tr. 68:15-69:14, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

178. The studies evaluating the use of puberty blockers to treat gender dysphoria saw improvements in mental health or that patients did not experience worsening of mental health as is typically the case when children with gender dysphoria go through puberty. (Tr. 299:5-301:2, 318:5-22, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

179. The studies evaluating the use of hormone therapy to treat adolescents with gender dysphoria had findings similar to the results of dozens of studies of gender-

affirming hormones for adults—both sets of studies found significant improvements in mental health. *Id.* at 302:20-303:21 (Turban).

180. Conclusions cannot be drawn from any single study (in any area of medical research), but the body of medical research as a whole shows that gender-affirming medical treatments are effective at improving mental health outcomes for adolescents with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 300:21-301:2 (Turban).

181. The evidence base supporting gender-affirming medical care for adolescents is comparable to the evidence base supporting other medical treatments for minors. *Id.* at 389:25-390:3; 409:9-15 (Antommaria).

182. The evidence supporting gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria includes scientific studies, that are cross-sectional and longitudinal, and clinical experience. *Id.* at 295:22-296:8, 299:5-14, 305:2-19 (Turban). Longitudinal studies follow mental health before and after treatment. *Id.* at 296:24-2951 (Turban). Cross-sectional studies compare people who receive treatment and do not receive treatment at one point in time. *Id.* at 296:3-6 (Turban).

183. There are no randomized controlled clinical trials evaluating the efficacy of gender-affirming medical care for adolescents. *Id.* at 296:9-13 (Turban). Such research is not possible because it would not be ethical or feasible to have a study in which a control group is not provided treatment that is known from clinical experience and research to benefit patients. *Id.* at 296:14-297:3 (Turban); 363:13-364:5, 385:23-386:7 (Antommaria). Additionally, it would not be possible to blind the studies to researchers and participants given the obvious physical effects of the treatments. *Id.* at 365:1-24,

387:16-388:2 (Antommaria); 296:14-297:11 (Turban); Tr. 67:19-68:14, ECF No. 219 (Karasic).

184. It is common for clinical practice guidelines in medicine to make recommendations based on low or very low-quality evidence such as cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. (Tr. 377:24-378:2, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria); Tr. 1269:12-17, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)).

185. The treatments banned by Act 626 are widely recognized in the medical community, including by the major professional medical associations, as effective treatments for adolescents suffering from gender dysphoria, based on the clinical experience and scientific research. (Tr. 34:2-12, 102:3-103:12, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

186. There are no other evidence-based treatments besides those prohibited by Act 626 that are known to alleviate gender dysphoria. (Tr. 326:16-327:5, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

H. Potential Risks and Side Effects of the Gender-Affirming Care

187. As with other medical treatments, gender-affirming medical treatments can have potential risks and side effects that must be weighed by patients and their parents after being informed of those risks and side effects by their doctors. (Tr. 390:4-392:4, 394:24-395:3, 400:11-21, 401:4-15, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

188. The risks of gender-affirming medical care are not categorically different than the types of risks that other types of pediatric healthcare pose. *Id.* at 390:24-391:6 (Antommaria).

189. For many adolescents the benefits of treatment greatly outweigh the risks.

190. For many adolescents, gender-affirming medical care significantly alleviates the distress of gender dysphoria, improves their mental health, and enables them to engage in school and social activities.

191. Adverse health effects from gender-affirming medical care are rare when treatment is provided under the supervision of a doctor. (Tr. 220:25-221:9, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

192. The evidence showed that the risks associated with the treatments prohibited by Act 626 are comparable to the risks associated with many other medical treatments that parents are free to choose for their adolescent children after weighing the risks and benefits. (Tr. 930:17, ECF No. 246 (Levine); Tr. 1319:2-4, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). Off-label use of drugs is both permitted and common in Arkansas. (Pl.'s Ex. 9, at 137:21-25 (Embry)).

193. There is nothing unique about the risks of gender-affirming medical care for adolescents that warrants taking this medical decision out of the hands of adolescent patients, their parents, and their doctors.

194. It is common for adolescents to undergo medical treatments that carry comparable or greater risks than gender-affirming medical care. (Tr. 389:25- 390:3, 394:20-395:3, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

195. There are treatments for conditions other than gender dysphoria that can impair a minor's fertility, e.g., treatments for certain rheumatologic conditions, kidney diseases, and cancers. *Id.* at 391:6-9; 417:8-12 (Antommaria); Tr. 222:23:19-24, ECF No. 219 (Adkins). Some of these treatments are provided at ACH, when appropriate for the particular patient. (Tr. 615:10-12, ECF No. 275 (Stambough)). Patients and families are similarly informed of the risk and weigh it in deciding whether to undergo the medical treatment. (Tr. 222:19-24, 227:2-5, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr. 615:13-25, ECF No. 275 (Stambough)).

196. Except for the potential risk to fertility, the risks associated with puberty blockers, testosterone, estrogen and anti-androgens are the same regardless of the condition for

which they are being used and whether they are used to treat birth- assigned males or birth-assigned females. (Tr. 206:18-21, 217:4-25, 219:13-220:2, ECF No. 275 (Adkins)).

197. Puberty blockers that are used to delay puberty as treatment for gender dysphoria are also used to treat other conditions, including central precocious puberty. Central precocious puberty is puberty that starts earlier than the typical age for the start of puberty. (Tr. 204:11-18, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr. 1223:6-10, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). Precocious puberty can occur when a child is as young as two. (Tr. 211:3-5, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

198. Decades of clinical experience and research on the use of puberty blockers, both for treatment of central precocious puberty and gender dysphoria, have shown this treatment to be safe. (Tr. 212:25-213:2, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

199. Patients on puberty blockers for precocious puberty are, on average, treated for a longer period of time than gender dysphoria patients. (Tr. 210:19-211:7, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)). For precocious puberty, pubertal suppression treatment can last as long as nine years. For gender dysphoria, pubertal suppression treatment typically does not last for more than three or four years. This is the case at the ACH Gender Clinic. (Tr. 210:19-211:7, ECF No. 220 (Adkins); Tr. 540:2-542:5, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison)).

200. An expected effect of puberty blockers is the delay of rapid accrual of bone mineralization that occurs during puberty. (Tr. 205:16-207:12, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr. 390:8-16, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)). While patients are on puberty blockers, they continue to accrue bone mineralization at prepubertal rate. (Tr., 209:2-13, ECF NO. 219 (Adkins)). Once puberty blockers are stopped and puberty resumes—either the person's endogenous puberty or an exogenous puberty prompted by hormone therapy—the accrual of bone mineralization increases at the usual pubertal rate. *Id.* at 209:2-210:1 (Adkins)).

201. Generally, a patient will reach the normal range of bone density within "two to three years after [a patient is] on either gender-affirming hormones or go[es] through [endogenous] puberty." *Id.* at 210:2-7 (Adkins).

202. There have been some patients who do not achieve full bone density after treatment with puberty blockers. These patients tend to have had low bone density and risk factors for low bone density to begin with. Such risk factors include a family history of osteoporosis, low Vitamin D status, low physical activity, poor nutritional status, or low weight. *Id.* at 210:8-18 (Adkins).

203. Puberty blockers are fully reversible. If an adolescent discontinues such treatment, endogenous puberty will resume. *Id.* at 206:13-17, 208:21- 209:1 (Adkins).

204. If a patient treated with puberty blockers stops treatment and resumes their endogenous puberty, the medication has no impact on fertility. *Id.* at 208:21- 209:1, 222:25-223:1 (Adkins).

Masculinizing Hormone Therapy

205. Testosterone is used to treat cisgender adolescent male patients for a number of conditions including delayed puberty, hypogonadism (where the brain does not tell the body to go through puberty), and micropenis. *Id.* at 213:11-19 (Adkins); Tr. 1248:19-1249:2, ECF No. 249 (Hruz).

206. Risks associated with taking testosterone, regardless of the condition for which it is used or the birth-assigned sex of the patient, include changes in cholesterol profile and blood thickness (hematocrit) to the typical male range. *Id.* at 215:19-216:20, 217:4-9, 221:10-222:2, 278:8-12 (Adkins); Tr. 390:20-23, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria); Tr. 1249:23-1250:8, ECF No. 249 (Hruz).

207. When treatment is monitored by a doctor to ensure appropriate therapeutic levels, adverse health effects are rare. (Tr. 220:25-221:9, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

208. When birth-assigned females are treated with testosterone, it can impact fertility. *Id.* at 216:21-217:3 (Adkins).

209. If testosterone therapy follows treatment with puberty blockers at Tanner 2 such that the ovaries never develop, it can cause infertility. This is discussed with patients and parents prior to initiating treatment. If maintaining fertility is important to the family, there are ways to manage treatment to preserve fertility, for example, by delaying the start of puberty blockers until a later stage of puberty or temporarily stopping blockers to allow ovaries to develop. *Id.* at 225:12-226:4; 226:5-22. (Adkins).

Feminizing Hormone Therapy

210. Hormone treatments used to treat transgender females with gender dysphoria— estrogen and anti-androgens—are used to treat many other conditions. (Tr. 203:1-25, ECF No. 219 (Adkins).

211. Estrogen is used to treat cisgender adolescent girls for a number of conditions including delayed puberty, ovarian failure, and Turner Syndrome (a congenital condition that prevents puberty from occurring). *Id.* at 214:3-11 (Adkins); Tr. 632:10-13, ECF No. 275 (Stambough); Tr. 1257:22-1258:10, ECF No. 249 (Hruz).

212. Anti-androgens are used to treat cisgender adolescent girls and women with polycystic ovarian syndrome and hirsutism. (Tr. 213:20-214:2, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr. 1245:10-25, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)).

213. The risks of estrogen, regardless of the condition it is being used for and whether used on birth-assigned females or birth-assigned males, include blood clots (increasing stroke

risk), lower hemoglobin levels, and increase in prolactin. (Tr. 218:1-219:16, ECF No. 219 (Adkins); Tr.1259:15-24, 1261:18-21, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). Adverse health effects of feminizing hormone therapy present primarily among those who use excessive and unmonitored amounts of estrogen. (Tr. 278:13-279:8, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

214. The risks and side effects of anti-androgens, regardless of the condition it is being used for and whether used to treat birth-assigned females or birth-assigned males, include an increase in potassium levels. *Id.* at 217:10-25 (Adkins).

215. When treatment with estrogen or anti-androgens is monitored by a doctor to ensure appropriate therapeutic levels, adverse health effects are rare. *Id.* at 218:1-219:16; 220:6-21 (Adkins).

216. When estrogen is used to treat birth-assigned males, it can impact fertility. This is therefore discussed with patients and parents prior to initiating treatment and fertility preservation options are discussed. *Id.* at 219:17-220:12 (Adkins).

217. If feminizing treatment follows treatment with puberty blockers at Tanner 2 such that the testicles never developed, it can cause infertility. *Id.* at 225:17-226:4 (Adkins).

Chest Masculinization Surgery

218. The surgical risks of chest masculinization surgery are comparable to the risks related to other chest surgeries adolescents may undergo, including mastectomy or breast reduction for cisgender girls and gynecomastia surgery for cisgender boys. (Tr. 391:10-392:16, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria).

I. <u>Desistance, Detransitioning and Regret</u>

219. There are some individuals who undergo gender-affirming medical treatment who later come to regret that treatment and, for some, it was because they came to identify with

their birth-assigned sex (sometimes referred to as detransitioning). This can happen with individuals who medically transitioned as adolescents or as adults. Regret over a medical procedure is not unique to gender-affirming medical care and is common in medicine. (Tr. 77:1-16, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

220. In Dr. Karasic's clinical experience treating thousands of patients with gender dysphoria over 30 years, none of his patients came to identify with their sex assigned at birth after medically transitioning. *Id.* at 72:11-18 (Karasic). Some of Dr. Karasic's patients have halted their medical transition for other reasons such as lack of insurance coverage or fear of losing family support. Some of these patients later resumed their medical transition. None of his patients who stopped or paused medical transition did so because they came to identify with their sex assigned at birth. *Id.* at 72:19-73:17 (Karasic).

221. Detransition is taken seriously by WPATH and medical providers. Parents and patients are advised of the potential that patients may ultimately come to a different understanding about their gender later in life. *Id.* at 75:13-24 (Karasic). The desistance studies relied on by the State to assert that gender incongruence will naturally desist for most youth were focused on prepubertal children and say nothing about the likelihood of gender incongruence desisting among adolescents, the group affected by Act 626. (Tr. 311:1-11, ECF No. 220 (Turban); Tr. 88:2-89:6, 93:2-17, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

222. "Watchful waiting" is an approach used by some health care providers with pre- pubertal children with gender dysphoria. It entails following prepubertal children with gender dysphoria and not encouraging social transition prior to puberty. It is not a recognized approach for adolescents with gender dysphoria because it is understood that, at that point, gender incongruence is unlikely to desist. Even gender clinics using the "watchful

waiting" approach for prepubertal children provide gender-affirming medical care to patients whose gender dysphoria persisted past the onset of puberty. *Id.* at 96:21-98:6 (Karasic).

223. Providing gender-affirming medical care does not cause youth to persist rather than desist in their gender incongruence. Adolescents with gender dysphoria are unlikely to desist whether or not they receive gender-affirming medical care. And youth do not receive medical treatment unless their gender incongruence has persisted into adolescence. *Id.* at 96:16-20, 99:4-25 (Karasic).

224. Billy Burleigh and Laura Smalts testified about their experiences transitioning as adults and subsequently detransitioning. They stated they feel regret about their medical transitions. The Court finds these anecdotal experiences credible but also irrelevant to the issues to be decided. These witnesses' experiences are irrelevant to this case given that (i) neither sought nor received gender-affirming care as a minor (ii) both transitioned as adults (Tr. 1156:13-21, ECF No. 247 (Smalts); 1199:3-17, 1200:9-14 (Burleigh)); (iii) neither was treated in Arkansas *Id.* at 1157:2-11 (Smalts); 1210:15-23 (Burleigh)); (iv) they both detransitioned as a result of a religious experience and (v) continued to struggle with living consistently with their birth-assigned sex after deciding to detransition *Id.* at 1158:2-13, 1159:2-1160:2 (Smalts); 1203:10-1206:3, 1206:16-1207:1, 1207:8-13, 1207:22-25 (Burleigh)).

J. Regulation of Medicine in Arkansas

The Arkansas State Medical Board Regulates the Practice of Medicine in Arkansas

225. All states have medical boards that safeguard the practice of medicine by evaluating accusations of unprofessional conduct and taking disciplinary action against providers,

which may include withdrawal of a medical professional's license. (Tr. 402:17-20, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

226. The Arkansas State Medical Board (the "Board") is the state entity charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Arkansas. (Pl, Ex. 9 at p. 42:7-11 (Embry)). The Board's structure and functions are governed by the Arkansas Medical Practices Act ("AMPA"). (Pls.' Ex. 11, at Subchapter 3, p. 21-25).

227. The Board's mission is "to protect the public and act as their advocate by effectively regulating the practices of medical doctors. . .." (Pls.' Ex. 12; Pls.' Ex. 9 at 45:9-25 (Embry)). The Board regulates all the roughly 19,000-20,000 healthcare professionals whom it licenses. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 42:20- 22, 43:19-25 (Embry)).

228. The Board is authorized "to promulgate and put into effect such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of the Arkansas Medical Practices Act." (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 46:2-6 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 Section 17-95-303(2) at 23). While the Board typically enacts regulations pursuant to explicit statutory requirements or requests made by legislators, if the Board has a concern about how medical care is being provided in a particular field, it can also draft a rule regarding that subject and submit it to the legislature for approval. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 46:15-47:21, 49:4-10, 49:20-505, 54:15-20, 62:25-63:19 (Embry).)

229. The Board tries to enact regulations that are consistent with best practices in a particular field. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 60:22-61:3 (Embry)). The Board has worked with professional associations such as the Arkansas Medical Society in drafting rules, reviewing their best practice guidelines, and soliciting their expertise as professionals within their field. (Pls.'

Ex. 9 at 59:8-60:21 (Embry)). The Board may also look to national groups like the American Medical Association for information. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 63:20-64:10 (Embry)).

The Board Investigates and Disciplines Medical Providers for Unprofessional Conduct

230. The Board is authorized to investigate and discipline the medical practitioners whom it licenses for unprofessional conduct, including ethical violations as determined by the Board. (Pls.' Ex. 9, at 93:22-24, 96:6-976, 101:9-102:5 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 Section 17-95-409(a)(1) -(a)(2) at 28-29). Investigations are often based on complaints filed with the Board. Sometimes issues come to the Board's attention through other means, such as the news. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 43:9-18, 44:8-9, 72:21-74:18 (Embry)).

231. The Board may, and does, investigate whether doctors are practicing their profession in a way that could endanger the public health or welfare. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 72:6- 18 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 at 17-80-106(c)(2) at 2).

232. Failure to follow accepted medical practice can be a reason for investigation, and the Board considers accepted standards in a field of medicine when assessing whether there has been a violation of the AMPA. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 81:16-19, 83:17-23 (Embry)).

233. The penalties that the Board may impose for unprofessional conduct include revoking or suspending licenses, issuing reprimands, imposing probation, and levying fines. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 109:17-113:6, 114:3-115:3 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 17-95-410(e)(3) at 29).

234. When issues concerning particular medical care arise, the Legislature and the Board pass laws and regulations to address how care is provided; they do not prohibit medical treatments. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 137:11-20 (Embry)).

235. When over-prescription of opioids resulted in the opioid epidemic and caused harm to the public in Arkansas, the Legislature passed the Chronic Intractable Pain Treatment Act.

(Pls.' Ex. 9 at 126:8-127:11 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 Section 17-95-701 at 34-35). Rather than categorically banning opioids, the law provides a system of incremental sanctions for doctors who overprescribe opioids, beginning with monitoring prescribing habits, then voluntarily surrendering a DEA license for a period of time, then suspending the physician's license, and finally revoking the license. (Pls.' Ex. 11 Section 704(c)(1) at 35). Doctors have faced discipline for improper prescription of opioids under this section, including monitoring and the surrender of their DEA licenses. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 130:5-8, 130:20-131:18 (Embry)). This system of incremental sanctions for improper prescription of opioids serves to effectively protect the public from harmful conduct. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 131:19-22 (Embry)).

236. Because of serious risks related to gastric bypass surgery, the Legislature and Board established informed consent requirements before a doctor can perform gastric bypass surgery. (Pls.' Ex. at 132:13-133:2 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 11 Subsections A through M of Rule 27 mandate a lengthy list of various complications and information that the informed consent process must address; Pls.' Ex. 9 at 133:23-134:6 (Embry)). This includes 33 potential surgical complications, nutritional complications, psychiatric complications, eight pregnancy complications, and 22 additional complications. *Id.* at 134:7-135:20 (Embry)). The rule further requires that licensees inform patients that there is no guarantee of weight loss or long-term weight management as a result of getting surgery, and that a lifetime of follow-up medical care is required. *Id.* at 135:4-20 (Embry)). The informed consent provisions in the Board's regulation related to gastric bypass surgery effectively protect the public from harm. *Id.* at 136:6-14 (Embry).

237. After the FDA concluded that it was "no longer reasonable to believe that oral formulations of [hydroxychloroquine] and [chloroquine] may be effective in treating COVID-19, nor [was] it reasonable to believe that the known and potential benefits of these products outweigh their known and potential risks," (Pls.' Ex. 15). The Arkansas Department of Health updated its guidance to indicate that this use "should be avoided" in hospital and outpatient settings. But the guidance noted that "Unapproved use (i.e., 'off label use') of these medications is left to the discretion of individual clinicians and their patients." *Id.* The Board has not considered passing a regulation prohibiting the use of hydroxychloroquine to treat COVID. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 143:21-24 (Embry)). The Board has received several complaints about a doctor inappropriately prescribing ivermectin to treat incarcerated people with COVID at a county jail. *Id.* at 78:8-79:14, 144:14-23 (Embry). The Board has not considered passing a rule prohibiting the use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19. *Id.* at 148:13-16 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 18 at 81:21-82:21 (Branman).

238. Arkansas does not ban medical treatments for lack of randomized controlled clinical trials supporting their use. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 206:23-207:4 (Embry)).

239. Arkansas does not ban medical treatments with a limited evidence base. *Id.* at 205:9-206:6 (Embry).

240. Even where there are known risks of a treatment and no evidence of effectiveness, the Board leaves treatment decisions to patients, parents, and their physicians. *Id.* at 208:10-16 (Embry).

241. Arkansas does not ban medical treatments for minors on the rationale that minors cannot provide informed assent. In Arkansas, parents usually are required consent to medical

treatment for their minor children, and the decision about whether to undergo care is between the physician and the parent and the minor patient. *Id.* at 174:2-15 (Embry).

242. The Board is not aware of any minors in Arkansas who have been harmed by gender-affirming care. *Id.* at 227:17-22 (Embry).

243. The Board has never received a complaint regarding gender-affirming medical care for minors or adults. *Id.* at 152:3-16 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 18 at 103:7-10 (Branman).

244. Since Embry became Executive Director in 2018, there has not been discussion about gender-affirming medical care for adults or minors at any Board meeting. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 152:25-153:25, 217:2-6 (Embry)).

245. Since Embry has been director, the Board has not considered passing a regulation concerning gender-affirming medical care. *Id.* at 154:2-6 (Embry). No one at the Board ever suggested to Embry that they saw a need for a regulation concerning gender-affirming medical care. *Id.* at 154:7-11 (Embry).

246. If there is an issue regarding the over-prescription of gender-affirming medical treatment, the Board can propose a regulation to address that, as it did for the over-prescription of opioids. *Id.* at 210:25-211:11, 211:25-212:10 (Embry).

247. If there are doctors providing gender-affirming medical treatments to adolescents without adequately informing them of the risks of those treatments, the Board could propose an informed consent regulation, as it did for gastric bypass surgeries. *Id.* at 212:11-21, 213:20-25 (Embry).

248. The Board is the licensing entity for physicians who are providing procedures prohibited by Act 626. *Id.* at 179:25-180:6, 180:11-14 (Embry). The Board is ready to field any complaints alleging violations of Act 626 as those arise. *Id.* at 182:13-19 (Embry).

249. If the Board receives a complaint that a doctor was providing gender-affirming medical care to an adolescent, the Board will follow the same general process that it uses for other complaints to determine whether the Act was violated. *Id.* at 182:4-12, 182:20-183:14 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 18 at 108:3-110:3 (Branman).

250. Under the Act, the referral for or provision of gender transition procedures to a minor constitutes unprofessional conduct. (Pls.' Ex. 9 at 178:20-179:6 (Embry)). If a doctor provided gender-affirming care prohibited by Act 626, the Board would have to make a finding of unprofessional conduct under the statute. *Id.* at 184:25-185:6 (Embry). The doctor would then be subject to discipline by the Board, including the potential revocation of their license to practice. *Id.* at 185:7-9, 185:22-186:2 (Embry).

K. Policy Concerns Expressed at Trial

251. The Arkansas chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the Arkansas Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of OB/GYN, the American Academy of Child Adolescent Psychologists, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the Arkansas Psychological Association opined that HB1570 would penalize medical providers for "simply following best medical practices to provide or even refer for appropriate effective care that is based in science and evidence," cause immediate and irreversible harm to adolescents receiving care in-state, and limit physicians' ability to refer youth to care supported by medical experts. (Pls.' Ex. 23 at 25:25-27:10, 27:11-21).

L. The Harm to Plaintiffs and Others Should Act 626 Take Effect

252. If Act 626 takes effect, adolescents whose parents and doctors agree that gender-affirming medical care is appropriate treatment for their gender dysphoria will be unable to receive that care in their home state and unable to get referrals from their doctors to

receive care in other states. This will cause irreparable harm to the Plaintiff adolescents, Plaintiff parents and Plaintiff doctor.

253. The harms are severe and irreparable for adolescents with gender dysphoria who need but are unable to access gender-affirming medical care.

254. The fact that transgender adults face elevated rates of physical and mental health issues due to stigma, discrimination, and having lived with gender dysphoria is not a reason to deny treatment to adolescents with gender dysphoria; if anything, it supports the need for access to treatment. (Tr. 47:16-25, ECF No. 219 (Karasic))

255. Denying gender-affirming medical care to adolescents with gender dysphoria until they reach age 18 means their bodies would go through irreversible pubertal changes inconsistent with their gender identity. *Id.* at 234:18-235:7 (Adkins).

256. Delaying gender-affirming medical care when indicated puts patients at risk of worsening anxiety, depression, hospitalization, and suicidality. *Id.* at 236:11- 19, 237:1-5 (Adkins); 111:19-112:3 (Karasic)

257. Act 626 will impact Arkansas adolescents with gender dysphoria who need but are unable to access care. After ACH changed its policy in February 2022 to stop initiating gender-affirming medical care for new patients given the possibility of Act 626 taking effect, many patients for whom puberty blockers or hormone therapy are indicated have been unable to access care elsewhere. (Tr. 611:10-20, ECF No. 275 (Stambough)). These patients are experiencing anxiety and distress. *Id.* at 611:21-612:6 (Stambough).

258. Not all adolescents with gender dysphoria will live to age 18 if they are unable to get gender-affirming medical treatment. (Tr. 28:22-25, ECF No. 219 (Karasic) (testifying about adolescent patients with gender dysphoria who made suicide attempts); 236:14-25

(Adkins) (testifying about losing a patient to suicide); Tr. 612:20-613:15, ECF No. 275 (Stambough) ("I am not hyperbolic when I say that I have concerns that not every patient would be able to make it to 18."); 549:12-18 (Hutchison) (testifying that she is "worried that we're going to lose some kids" if the law takes effect)).

259. For those adolescents who are already being treated with puberty blockers or hormone therapy and who would be forced to discontinue treatment, experts on both sides agree that the harms are severe.

260. The State's expert, Dr. Levine, described the psychological impact of cutting off gender-affirming medical care for those currently receiving it as "shocking" and "devastating." He testified he would expect doctors to "find a way" to help those patients, even providing treatment in violation of the law. (Tr. 913:6-914:4, 914:24-915:12, ECF No. 246 (Levine) (suggesting doctors would provide care "privately . . . that you don't know about," "under the radar")).

261. Discontinuing testosterone in transgender males would cause a decrease in facial and body hair growth, a return to a more typically feminine body shape, and lower muscle mass, resulting in the body not being well-aligned with their gender identity. (Tr. 235:8-17, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

262. Discontinuing testosterone suppression and estrogen in transgender females would result in the patient's beard coming back and shifts in body fat—less hips and chest—that do not align with their gender identity. *Id.* at 235:20-236:10 (Adkins).

263. Accessing care out of state is a considerable challenge with significant financial costs, and it is not something all families have the resources to do. Having to regularly travel out of state to take a child to doctor visits can be a great financial and logistical challenge

to families. (Tr. 675:15-677:5, 696:13-24, ECF No. 275 (J. Brandt); 652:11-657:11 (Dennis); Tr. 462:20-463:11, ECF No. 220 (Jennen); 445:21-446:17 (Saxton).

264. Pursuant to Act 626, doctors who provide gender-affirming medical care to minor patients are engaging in unprofessional conduct and are subject to losing their medical license. (Pls.' Ex. 16 at 20-9-1504(a)).

265. Dr. Levine, the State's expert, expressed concern about the possibility of doctors losing their licenses for continuing to provide gender-affirming medical care. He testified that would be "[d]raconian" and a loss of a community resource. (Tr. 915:13-916:7, 917:16-918:11, ECF No. 246 (Levine)).

266. Requiring doctors to discontinue gender-affirming medical care that they are currently providing to adolescent patients—and prohibiting them from referring those patients to obtain care elsewhere—conflicts with their ethical obligation not to abandon patients under the AMPA. (Pls.' Ex. 14 at 20-6-202(a)(2); Pls.' Ex. 9 at 244:2, 19-22; 244:23-24; 236:17-237:4 (Embry)).

267. The AMPA provides that "healthcare providers are prohibited legally and ethically from abandoning a patient before treatment has been concluded." (Pls.' Ex. 14 at 20-6-202(a)(2); Pls.' Ex. 9 at 244:2, 19-22; 244:23-24; 236:17-237:4 (Embry)). Under this provision, if a doctor who is treating a patient is required to stop care before treatment is concluded, the doctor has an ethical obligation to help the patient find care from another doctor. *Id.* at 199:13-20 (Embry).

268. Doctors can be disciplined by the Board for abandoning a patient in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 20-6-202. *Id.* at 201:5-9 (Embry). "Healthcare providers are prohibited legally and ethically from abandoning a patient before treatment has been concluded."

Ark. Code Ann. § 202(a)(2). The Board recognizes the harms of abandoning patients prior to the completion of treatment. *Id.* at 237:23-238:3, 283:13-17 (Embry); Pls.' Ex. 18 at 130:18-19 (Branman).

M. Plaintiffs' Experts

Dan H. Karasic, M.D.

269. Dr. Dan Karasic is a psychiatrist with over 30 years of experience treating thousands of patients with gender dysphoria, including hundreds of adolescents. He is a professor emeritus of psychiatry at the University of California-San Francisco, where he has been on the faculty since 1991. Dr. Karasic received his medical degree from Yale School of Medicine and completed his residency at UCLA.

270. Dr. Karasic was a co-author of the current and previous versions of the WPATH Standards of Care and was on the committee to revise the categories of gender identity disorders for DSM-V. He has trained over 1,000 health care providers in transgender health care, served as an expert consultant to organizations including the United Nations Development Programme, and given invited presentations around the world. Dr. Karasic has also published several books and scholarly articles on transgender health. In 2006, Dr. Karasic was given the honor of being named a Distinguished Fellow of the American Psychiatric Association. (Pls.' Ex. 2; Tr. 23:11-20, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

271. Many of Dr. Karasic's patients, including adolescents, were profoundly impaired by gender dysphoria. He has had patients who were withdrawn from school or social interaction, patients who were suicidal or made suicide attempts, and patients who engaged in other forms of self-harm such as cutting their breasts or genitals, prior to getting treatment. *Id.* at 28:6-16, 29:9- 12 (Karasic).

Deanna Adkins, M.D.

272. Dr. Deanna Adkins is a pediatric endocrinologist with 22 years of experience since completing medical school at the Medical College of Georgia and her residency at the University of North Carolina Hospitals. Dr. Adkins is an associate professor of pediatrics at Duke University, where she has been on the faculty since 2004. She is the director of the Duke University Child and Adolescent Gender Care Clinic.

273. She has treated approximately 600 adolescent patients with gender dysphoria.

274. Dr. Adkins also treats patients for a variety of other conditions requiring hormonal therapies, including differences of sexual development. (Pls.' Ex. 3; Tr. 195:25-196:21, 213:3-214:17, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)).

Jack Turban III, M.D.

275. Dr. Jack Turban is a child and adolescent psychiatrist whose work has focused on the treatment of patients with gender dysphoria. After completing medical school at Yale and his residency at Massachusetts General Hospital and McLean Hospital in Boston, Dr. Turban completed a fellowship in Child and Adolescent Psychiatry at Stanford University School of Medicine. Dr. Turban is an associate professor of child and adolescent psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine where he treats adolescents and children with gender dysphoria. He also conducts scientific research on the mental health and treatment of adolescents with gender dysphoria and has published over 20 peer reviewed articles on the subject. (Pls.' Ex. 1; Tr. 292:10-293:6, 293:13-294:1, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

Armand H. Matheny Antommaria, M.D, Ph.D.

276. Dr. Armand Antommaria is a pediatrician, pediatric hospitalist, and bioethicist. He completed medical school at the Washington University School of Medicine and his residency at the University of Utah. He is currently the director of the Ethics Center at Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center and a professor at the University of Cincinnati School of Medicine. As director of the Ethics Center, Dr. Antommaria provides clinical ethics consultation and works with a variety of medical teams to address ethical issues that arise in the care that they provide, including the transgender clinic and the differences of sex development clinic. He has also published numerous scholarly articles about medical ethics. (Pls.' Ex. 4; Tr. 357:19-359:11, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

Kathryn Stambough, M.D.

277. Plaintiff Dr. Kathryn Stambough earned her medical degree from Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis and completed a fellowship in Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology at Baylor College of Medicine Texas Children's Hospital in Houston. (Tr. 598:2-9, ECF No. 275 (Stambough)).

278. Dr. Stambough is an assistant professor at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences ("UAMS") and a member of the Division of Pediatric and Adolescent Gynecology. *Id.* at 598:20-599:3 (Stambough).

279. Dr. Stambough has a clinical appointment at ACH where she practices in multiple clinics: the Gender Clinic; the Gynecology Clinic; the In-STEP Clinic, which cares for patients with differences of sexual development; and the Spinal Cord Disorders Clinic. She also

has a clinical appointment and serves as a member of the team at UAMS in the Adult Gender Clinic. *Id.* at 599:14-600:22 (Stambough).

280. Dr. Stambough has been practicing in the ACH Gender Clinic since August 2020. She has been the Clinic's medical director since July 2022. *Id.* at 601:10-24 (Stambough).

281. Currently, 248 patients are being actively seen in the ACH Gender Clinic. *Id.* at 601:25-602:6 (Stambough).

282. The Clinic currently is providing hormone therapy to 81 patients. *Id.* at 602:21-603:4 (Stambough).

283. Dr. Stambough treats patients in the Gender Clinic, including with puberty blockers and hormone therapy. *Id.* at 604:2-20, 619:7-12 (Stambough).

284. Dr. Stambough has seen the distress of gender dysphoria experienced by her adolescent patients and how gender-affirming medical care alleviates that distress and improves her patients' health. *Id.* at 606:23-607:22 (Stambough).

285. If Act 626 takes effect, Dr. Stambough would be unable to provide medically necessary care to patients and would be forced to leave them to needlessly suffer. *Id.* at 610:2-21, 612:3-613:15 (Stambough).

286. In the course of her practice, Dr. Stambough sometimes refers patients to another healthcare provider which involves discussions with the patients and their families. *Id.* at 615:13-17 (Stambough). In making a referral, Dr. Stambough's discussion with her patients includes options for where to obtain the care. *Id.* at 615:18-25 (Stambough).

287. If Act 626 were to go into effect, Dr. Stambough would be unable to make all the referrals necessary to care appropriately for her Gender Clinic patients. *Id.* at 616:1-5 (Stambough).

288. Some of Dr. Stambough's gender dysphoria patients would not be able to bring a lawsuit on their own behalf to challenge Act 626 for various reasons, including not being out to members of their extended family or keeping their gender identity private in certain other contexts. *Id.* at 618:20-25 (Stambough).

Plaintiffs' Expert Opinions Generally

289. Plaintiffs' experts' extensive experience, their testimony in court, and their demeanor and responsiveness to questions asked by both sides and the Court, show that all four of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses have deep knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony and were fully qualified to provide the opinion testimony they offered. They have provided credible and reliable testimony relevant to core issues in this case.

N. The State's Experts

Stephen B. Levine, M.D.

290. Dr. Stephen Levine is a licensed physician and Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine where he attended medical school. He co-created the first gender identity clinic in Ohio in 1974 and has been seeing patients since that time. He has authored five books on sexual health, is the Senior Editor of the first three editions of the Handbook of Clinical Sexuality for Mental Health Professions. He has authored numerous invited papers, commentaries, chapters, and book reviews and was awarded a lifetime achievement award from the Society for Sex Therapy and Research in March 2005. (Def. Tr. Ex. 1).

291. Dr. Levine was the State's only expert witness who has experience treating patients with gender dysphoria. In his practice, he has enabled minor patients with gender dysphoria to access hormone therapy on a case-by-case basis. (Tr. 785:3-6, ECF No. 246 (Levine)).

Dr. Levine does not support banning gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria. He has concerns about Act 626's impact on youth who are currently receiving gender-affirming hormones.

292. Dr. Levine testified that doctors who provide gender-affirming medical care to adolescents with gender dysphoria encourage patients to identify as transgender and provide hormones immediately without assessing patients and addressing other mental health conditions or informing patients and their parents of the risks and the limitations of the evidence regarding treatments. *Id.* at 809:18- 810:4; 811:21-812:10; 824:5-14 (Levine). He offered no evidence that treatment was being provided this way in Arkansas or anywhere in the United States. Dr. Levine conceded he has no knowledge of how most gender clinics provide care and, thus, does not know how common it is for care to be provided in the way he described. *Id.* at 887:19-888:25 (Levine). He further does not know how care is provided by doctors in Arkansas. *Id.* at 888:24-891:16 (Levine).

293. The Court found Dr. Levine a very credible witness who struggles with the conflict between his scientific understanding for the need for transgender care and his faith.

Mark Regnerus, Ph.D.

294. Professor Mark Regnerus testified that all the major professional medical groups' support for gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria is grounded in ideology rather than science. (Tr. 994:22-996:10, 1000:17-1001:1, ECF No. 248 (Regnerus)). Professor Regnerus' testimony did not offer any support for his conclusion, and the Court finds that there is no evidence to support this assertion.

295. Professor Regnerus, a sociologist whose work has focused on sexual relationship behavior and religion, has no training or experience related to the fields of medicine or

mental health care, or the treatment of gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 974:5-977:22 (Regnerus). He has never worked in a medical or mental health clinical setting. *Id.* at 977:1-22 (Regnerus).

296. The Court does not credit the testimony of Professor Regnerus and gives it no weight because the Court finds that he lacks the qualifications to offer his opinions and failed to support them.[11]

Patrick W. Lappert, M.D.

297. Dr. Patrick Lappert is Board-Certified in Surgery and Plastic Surgery. He is the Founding Director of both the Pediatric Cleft Palate and Craniofacial Deformities Clinic and the Wound Care Center at Naval Hospital Portsmouth, Virginia. He served the Office of the Surgeon General-U.S. Navy as a Specialty Leader in Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery.

[11] This is not the first time that Professor Regnerus's testimony as an expert witness has been questioned by a court. The district court in *DeBoer v. Snyder* found that Regnerus's research and testimony that gay parenting caused adverse outcomes in children was "entirely unbelievable and not worthy of serious consideration" and a "fringe viewpoint that is rejected by the vast majority of [the studies' authors'] colleagues across a variety of social science fields." *DeBoer v. Snyder*, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766-68 (E.D. Mich.), rev'd on other grounds, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), rev'd sub nom. *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 576 U.S. 644, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 192 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2015); *see e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert*, 755 F.3d 1193, 1225 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Rule 28(j) Letter at 2, No. 13–4178 (10th Cir., filed Apr. 9, 2014) (acknowledging that appellants' main scientific authority [Regnerus's research] on this issue "cannot be viewed as conclusively establishing that raising a child in a same-sex household produces outcomes that are inferior to those produced by man-woman parenting arrangements"); Ian Farrell & Nancy Leong, Gender Diversity and Same-Sex Marriage, 114 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 97, 101 (2014) (noting the "now-discredited study by Mark Regnerus" which was "suspect from creation--it was funded by conservative think tanks" and "suspect in methodology[.] . . . Moreover, Regnerus's department at the University of Texas publicly stated that it did not sanction his work. Social Science Research, in which the study originally appeared, later performed an audit and announced that the study should not have been published[.]"); Nathaniel Frank, What Does Mark Regnerus Want?, Slate (July 10, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2014/07/10/mark_regnerus_is_back_with_more_anti_gay_family_science.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Philip N. Cohen, 200 Researchers Respond to Regnerus Paper, Family Inequality (June 29, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://familyinequality.wordpress.com/2012/06/29/200-researchers-respond-to-regnerus-paper/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding peer-review process abnormally short and questioning reviewers' expertise and impartiality); Dep't of Sociology, Statement from the Chair Regarding Professor Regnerus, Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Apr. 12, 2014), http:// www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/sociology/news/7572 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Dr. Regnerus' opinions ... do not reflect the views of the Sociology Department of The University of Texas at Austin."); Darren E. Sherkat, The Editorial Process and Politicized Scholarship: Monday Morning Editorial Quarterbacking and a Call for Scientific Vigilance, 41 Soc. Sci. Res. 1346, 1347-49 (2012) (finding "serious flaws and distortions" in Regnerus's paper)).

298. Dr. Lappert has no training or professional experience in mental health or gender dysphoria and has never provided gender-affirming surgery. He acknowledges that he is not an expert in the treatment of gender dysphoria. (Tr. 1040:16-1042:18, ECF No. 248 (Lappert)).

299. Like Professor Mark Regnerus and Dr. Paul Hruz, Dr. Lappert was recruited by the Alliance Defending Freedom ("ADF") at a seminar held in Arizona. The meeting was held to gather witnesses trained in various fields that would be willing to testify in favor of laws passed that limit transgender care. The ADF is an organization committed to protecting God's design for marriage and family. (Tr. 1029:16-1031:24, ECF No. 248 (Regnerus)). The ADF is not a scientific organization, but a Christian-based legal advocacy group. *Id.* at 1080:21-25 (Lappert). While there is nothing nefarious about an organization recruiting witnesses to testify for their cause, it is clear from listening to the testimony that Professor Mark Regnerus, Dr. Paul Hruz, and Dr. Lappert were testifying more from a religious doctrinal standpoint rather than that required of experts by *Daubert*.

300. Dr. Lappert offered opinions regarding the circumstances under which he believes cosmetic or aesthetic surgeries are ethically appropriate in adults and minors and the potential risks of various surgeries outside of the context of gender transition. The relevance of Dr. Lappert's testimony was unclear. The Court finds that he is not qualified to offer relevant opinions given his lack of experience related to gender dysphoria.

301. Dr. Lappert does not meet the requirements under *Daubert* to give opinions relevant to this case.

302. Dr. Lappert acknowledged that his opinions were his own and were inconsistent with his peers and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons. *Id.* at 1080:5-9, 1081:16-21 (Lappert).

Paul W. Hruz, M.D., Ph.D.

303. Dr. Paul Hruz is a Pediatric Endocrinologist. He is currently the Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Endocrinology and Diabetes and the Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Cell Biology & Physiology at Washington University of St. Louis School of Medicine. He received his M.D. and Ph.D. in Biochemistry from the Medical College of Wisconsin. He received certification in Healthcare Ethics from the National Catholic Bioethics Center in 2017. In addition to teaching and authorship of many articles and papers, Dr. Hruz practices Pediatric Endocrinology at St. Louis Children's Hospital.

304. Dr. Hruz has never treated a patient for gender dysphoria. (Tr. 1317:21-23, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)).

305. The legislative findings in Act 626 assert that there is insufficient evidence of the efficacy of gender-affirming medical care for minors. Some of the state's expert witnesses—Dr. Levine and Dr. Hruz—offered opinions to that effect. (Tr. 833:12-16, ECF No. 246 (Levine); Tr. 1274:15-25, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). The Court does not credit these opinions because it finds that the evidence showed that decades of clinical experience in addition to a body of scientific research demonstrate the effectiveness of these treatments. For the same reason, the Court finds that the treatments banned by Act 626 are not "experimentation" on youth, as suggested by the Act's title. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-1501 (2021) ("Arkansas Save Adolescents from Experimentation (SAFE) Act"); Tr. 382:25-383:4, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

306. Dr. Hruz suggested that the Court should disregard the body of research showing benefits of gender-affirming medical care for adolescents because it is low-quality research, and the studies have methodological limitations such as lack of a control group or cross-sectional design. (Tr. 1275:20-1277:4, 1277:18-1278:21, 1279:7-1280:22, 1291:14-1292:8, ECF No. 249 (Hruz)). The Court declines to do that. The Court finds that the quality of the evidence supporting gender-affirming medical interventions for adolescents with gender dysphoria is comparable to the quality of evidence supporting many other medical treatments minors and their families may pursue. And while the Court recognizes that the studies on gender-affirming medical care for adolescents, like studies in all areas of medical research, have strengths and weaknesses, it does not credit Dr. Hruz's assessment that the entire body of research is, therefore, meaningless. The body of research, taken as a whole, shows these treatments provide significant benefits to adolescents with gender dysphoria.

307. Dr. Hruz also testified about risks of puberty blockers, testosterone, anti-androgens, and estrogen, suggesting this is a basis to prohibit gender-affirming medical care for adolescents. *Id.* at 1247:4-10; 1257:11-20, 1261:18-25; 1262:1-1263:13 (Hruz). The weight of evidence speaks to the contrary.

308. Like Plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Hruz recognized that apart from the potential impact on fertility, the risks of these treatments also exist when these medications are provided to treat other conditions in cisgender patients. *Compare Id. with* 1229:24- 1230:22, 1249:14-1250:8, 1259:15-1260:3 (Hruz). These risks have not prevented Dr. Hruz from providing these medications to cisgender patients in his pediatric endocrine practice. *Id.* at 1222:22-24, 1244:11-17, 1248:16-18, 1257:21-24 (Hruz).

Defendant's Expert Opinions Generally

309. The State suggests that Act 626 is consistent with medical guidelines issued by "nations around the world." *See* Def. Tr. Br. at 21. Their experts referenced guidelines issued by government health authorities in Sweden, Finland, and the United Kingdom. But the Court finds that the evidence showed that none of these guidelines have prohibited gender-affirming medical care for minors. (Tr. 405:19-406:6, 406:20-407:24, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

310. In Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom, gender-affirming medical care is provided to adolescents with gender dysphoria when indicated under their guidelines. For example, in Finland, the guidelines provide that hormone therapy can be provided to minors based on a thorough case-by-case consideration if it can be ascertained that the adolescent's identity as the other sex is of a permanent nature and causes severe dysphoria. (Tr. 938:23-939:3, ECF No. 246 (Levine)). In the United Kingdom, the National Health Service has expanded care from one central clinic to regional clinics to broaden access to care. (Tr. 406:20-407:19, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)).

311. Most of the State's expert witnesses, Professor Mark Regnerus, Dr. Stephen Lappert, and Dr. Paul Hruz, were unqualified to offer relevant expert testimony and offered unreliable testimony. Their opinions regarding gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria are grounded in ideology rather than science. *See also Doe v. Ladapo*, 2023 WL 3833848, at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 6, 2023) (comments on expert testimony of Lappert and Hruz); *Kadel v. Folwell*, 620 F. Supp. 3d 339, 368 (M.D.N.C. 2022) (same).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Standing

Constitutional standing requires that at least one plaintiff demonstrate they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a court ruling in the plaintiff's favor. *See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). "To show standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) injury in fact, (2) a causal connection between that injury and the challenged conduct, and (3) the likelihood that a favorable decision by the court will redress the alleged injury." *Iowa League of Cities v. EPA*, 711 F.3d 844, 869 (8th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). The undisputed evidence at trial established that, if the Act were to go into effect, (i) three of the Minor Plaintiffs—Parker Saxton, Dylan Brandt, and Sabrina Jennen—would have to discontinue treatment that they, their parents, and their doctors all agree is medically indicated for them and benefitting their health and well-being, and Minor Plaintiff Brooke Dennis would be unable to obtain treatment she will imminently need; (ii) the Parent Plaintiffs would have to watch their children suffer the loss of care or endure severe personal and financial hardship to access care for their children in other states, and (iii) the Physician Plaintiff, Dr. Kathryn Stambough, would be unable to treat her patients who need care, leaving them to suffer, and unable to refer them to other doctors to provide care when necessary. As the Court has held, those injuries are directly traceable to the Act and would be redressed by a permanent injunction barring its enforcement. The evidence presented at trial confirms that Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.

B. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing *Plyler v. Doe*, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). "Put another way, state action is unconstitutional when it creates 'arbitrary or irrational' distinctions between classes of people out of 'a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group.'" *Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir. 2020), as amended (Aug. 28, 2020) (quoting *Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 446–47). It protects against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. *See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech*, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). State action is generally presumed to be lawful and will be upheld if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. *City of Cleburne*, 473 U.S. at 440.

The rational basis test, however, does not apply when a classification is based upon sex. Rather, a sex-based classification is subject to heightened scrutiny, as sex "frequently bears no relation to the ability to perform or contribute to society." *Id.* at 440–41 (quoting *Frontiero v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)). Act 626 discriminates on the basis of sex because a minor's sex at birth determines whether the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law. *Brandt by & through Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 669 (8th Cir. 2022). The evidence presented at trial supports this conclusion. A minor assigned male at birth is not prohibited under Act 626 from receiving testosterone or surgical procedures "such as subcutaneous mastectomy, voice surgery, liposuction, lipofilling, pectoral implants, or various aesthetic procedures" for the purpose of aligning himself with his biological sex. Act 626 does not prohibit a minor

assigned female at birth from receiving estrogen or surgical procedures "such as augmentation mammoplasty, facial feminization surgery, liposuction, lipofilling, voice surgery, thyroid cartilage reduction, gluteal augmentation, hair reconstruction or other aesthetic procedures" to enhance her appearance as long as the enhancements align with her biological sex. "The biological sex of the minor patient is the basis on which the law distinguishes between those who may receive certain types of medical care and those who may not. The Act is therefore subject to heightened scrutiny." *Id.* at 670 (citing *Heckler v. Mathews*, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984)).

The Act also discriminates against transgender people. The law prohibits medical care that only transgender people choose to undergo, i.e, medical or surgical procedures related to gender transition.[12] "[T]ransgender people constitute at least a quasi-suspect class." *Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir. 2020); *accord Bostock v. Clayton County*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (discrimination for being transgender is discrimination "on the basis of sex"). Transgender people satisfy all indicia of a suspect class: (1) they have historically been subject to discrimination; (2) they have a defining characteristic that bears no relation to their ability to contribute to society; (3) they may be defined as a discrete group by obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics; and (4) they are a minority group lacking political power. *See Grimm*, 972 F.3d at 610-613.

"[A]ll gender-based classifications today warrant heightened scrutiny." *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (citing *J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.*, 511 U.S. 127,136 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)); *see also Harrison v.*

[12] The State argues that people who are not transgender may seek gender transition procedures. There is no evidence in the record to support this argument.

Kernan, 971 F.3d 1069, 1077 (2020); *Flack v. Wis. Dept. of Health Servs.*, 328 F. Supp. 3d 931, 952 (W.D. Wisc. 2018) (recognizing that "heightened scrutiny may be appropriate either on the basis of sex discrimination or through recognizing of transgender as a suspect or quasi-suspect class.")).

"Statutes that discriminate based on sex must be supported by an 'exceedingly persuasive justification.' The government meets this burden if it can show that the statute is substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest." *Brandt by & through Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661, 670 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 531-33 (1996)). Heightened or intermediate scrutiny imposes a burden "rest[ing] entirely on the State" to demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive" justification for the differential treatment. *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 533. A state "must show at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And "[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation." *Id.*

The State claims that by banning gender-affirming care the Act advances the State's important governmental interest of protecting children from experimental medical treatment and safeguarding medical ethics. Throughout this litigation, the State has attempted to meet their heavy burden by offering the following assertions in support of banning gender-affirming medical care for adolescents: (i) that there is a lack of evidence of efficacy of the banned care; (ii) that the banned treatment has risks and side effects; (iii) that many patients will desist in their gender incongruence; (iv) that some patients

will later come to regret having received irreversible treatments; and (v) that treatment is being provided without appropriate evaluation and informed consent. The evidence presented at trial does not support these assertions.

a. Efficacy

The evidence at trial showed that the prohibited medical care improves the health and well-being of many adolescents with gender dysphoria. Three of Plaintiffs' experts and two Arkansas doctors detailed the significant mental health benefits of gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria which they have observed clinically. Drs. Karasic, Turban, and Adkins have collectively treated thousands of patients with gender dysphoria and testified about their own clinical experiences witnessing the positive, life-changing impact of gender-affirming medical interventions on their adolescent patients as well as the comparable experiences of their colleagues around the country. (Tr. 67:8-12, ECF No. 219 (Karasic); 233:15-22 (Adkins); Tr. 298:7-18, 305:2-19, ECF No. 220 (Turban); Tr. 543:3-544:11, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison), 606:20-610:1 (Stambough). Drs. Stambough and Hutchison similarly testified about the many positive impacts of gender-affirming medical interventions on the health and well-being of their adolescent patients in Arkansas. (Tr. 543:3-544:11, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison), 606:20-610:1 (Stambough)). The testimony showed that the benefit of this care is long lasting. *Id.*

The State put forth no evidence contesting the extensive clinical experience of Plaintiffs' witnesses. In fact, the State's only expert witness to have ever treated patients for gender dysphoria, Dr. Levine, testified that he felt a decision about whether an adolescent should pursue hormone therapy should be made by a "team of well-informed

doctor[s], scientifically well-informed, parents that have a respect for the doctor and have met with the doctor numerous times, and the doctor who has a relationship with the patient." (Tr. 909:7:25, ECF No. 246 (Levine)). He went on the say that "after that patient has had a process of psychotherapy where these matters, their ambivalence, the uncertainty, their eating disorders, and their self-harm episodes, et. cetera, have been thoroughly explored—if that team of doctors, patient, and parent want to do that [hormone therapy] that's what doctors do. We do that for cancer as well, you know." *Id.*

Plaintiffs' experts testified about the body of research demonstrating that the banned medical interventions improve patient health. (Tr. 295:16-18, 298:7-18, 300:24-301:17, 302:20-303:8, 303:22-305:1, ECF No. 220 (Turban); 219:68:15-69:14 (Karasic)). Dr. Turban testified about the sixteen studies conducted in multiple countries over the past twenty years that collectively show that use of pubertal suppression and gender-affirming hormones to treat adolescents with gender dysphoria improves patient health and prevents the worsening of distress upon the onset of puberty. *Id.* at 295:16-18 (Turban). He testified as well that the studies about the efficacy of hormone therapy show positive outcomes consistent with dozens of studies about the efficacy of such therapy to treat gender dysphoria in adults. *Id.* at 302:20-303:21 (Turban).

This expert testimony about positive research and clinical evidence was bolstered by the unrebutted testimony of the Parent Plaintiffs who explained how gender-affirming medical care positively transformed the lives of their adolescent children with gender dysphoria. For adolescents, like Minor Plaintiffs Parker Saxton, Dylan Brandt, and Sabrina Jennen, this care allowed them to grow from depressed, anxious, and withdrawn young people into happy and healthy teenagers who looked forward to their futures.

The State offered no evidence to refute the decades of clinical experience demonstrating the efficacy of gender-affirming medical care. Additionally, the State's experts offered no evidence-based treatment alternatives. When asked at trial what would happen if a law like Act 626 were to go into effect, Dr. Turban explained:

> It would be emotional to think about. Because the reality is that we frequently in clinic have families that are coming to us with these young people who are really struggling with severe anxiety, depression, sometimes suicidal thoughts, sometimes their mental health is declining so dramatically that they can't go to school, and it's my job to tell families what the evidence-based approaches are to help their child. So if these treatments were not an option, I'd be left without any evidence-based approaches to treat this young person's gender dysphoria.

(Tr. 326:16-327:5, ECF No. 220 (Turban)).

The evidence showed that based on the decades of clinical experience and scientific research, it is widely recognized in both the medical and mental health fields—including by major medical and mental health professional associations—that gender-affirming medical care can relieve the clinically significant distress associated with gender dysphoria in adolescents.[13] The State failed to provide sufficient evidence that the banned treatments are ineffective or experimental.

b. <u>Risks and Side Effects</u>

It is undisputed that puberty blocking hormones delay the rapid accrual of bone mineralization that occurs during puberty. (Tr. 205:16-201:12, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)); Tr. 390:8-16, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria)). This is a risk for cisgender and transgender

[13] The State urges the Court to disregard the major medical organizations' views about gender-affirming medical care for adolescents with gender dysphoria, claiming they are based on ideology rather than science. To support this claim, they offered the testimony of Professor Mark Regnerus, but his testimony did not offer any support for this assertion. *See* Pls.' Proposed FOF ¶ 383. To accept this claim would require the Court to both credit Professor Regnerus' testimony and the notion that every major medical association in the United States is driven by ideology rather than science and patient well-being. There is no basis and no evidence supporting such a conspiratorial assessment of all the major medical associations.

adolescents. Puberty blocking hormones do not stop bone mineralization. Instead, adolescents on these hormones continue to accrue bone mineralization at a prepubertal rate. (Tr. 209:2-13, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)). Once puberty blockers are stopped and puberty resumes, either the person's endogenous puberty or an exogenous puberty prompted by hormone therapy, the accrual of bone mineralization increases at the usual pubertal rate. *Id.* at 209:2-210:1 (Adkins).

It is undisputed that when adolescent birth-assigned females with gender dysphoria are treated with testosterone, their fertility can sometimes be impaired. If testosterone follows puberty blockers at certain stages of the adolescent's development, the adolescent can become infertile. These risks are discussed with patients and parents and fertility options are discussed. There are also risks associated with testosterone therapy given to cisgender adolescent males including changes in cholesterol profile and blood thickness. However, Dr. Adkins testified that when a doctor monitors treatment to ensure appropriate therapeutic levels, adverse health effects are rare. *Id.* at 220:25-221:9 (Adkins).

Estrogen and anti-androgens are used to treat birth-assigned males with gender dysphoria. It is undisputed that when estrogen is used to treat birth-assigned males, it can sometimes impair their fertility. If estrogen treatment follows puberty blockers at certain stages of the adolescent's development, the adolescent can become infertile. When estrogen or anti-androgens are given to birth-assigned males, the hormones can limit the patient's sexual arousal or ability to orgasm. *Id.* at 229:17-230:2 (Adkins). These risks are discussed with patients and parents. The risks can be managed by the doctor to preserve fertility or treatment can be provided to address a decrease in sexual satisfaction in most

cases. There are also risks for cisgender females from treatment with estrogen or anti-androgens. Again, when a doctor monitors treatment to ensure appropriate therapeutic levels, adverse health effects are rare.

The State failed to provide sufficient evidence that Act 626's ban on transgender care is justified by the risks of the treatment. As stated, the evidence at trial showed the risks associated with gender-affirming care for adolescents are no greater than the risks associated with many other medical treatments that are not prohibited by Act 626. (Tr. 390, ECF No. 220 (Antommaria); Tr. 212:11-12, ECF No. 219 (Adkins)). The evidence showed that the banned treatments are effective to treat gender dysphoria and the benefits of the treatments greatly outweigh the risks. The State failed to meet their burden to show that the risks of gender-affirming care banned by Act 626 substantially outweigh the benefits.

c. Desistance and Regret

The State argues that minors with gender dysphoria will desist with age. They contend that there is a significant risk of harm to a minor who elects to undergo gender hormone therapy or surgery because they will eventually identify with their sex assigned at birth and regret the treatment they sought as a minor. The State offered the testimony of Dr. Levine to support this argument. The Court found Dr. Levine's testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable in this area. To the contrary, the evidence proved that there is broad consensus in the field that once adolescents reach the early stages of puberty and experience gender dysphoria, it is very unlikely they will subsequently identify as cisgender or desist. (Tr. 310:13-25, ECF No. 220 (Turban)). The testimony confirmed

that for most people gender identity is stable over their lifetime. (Tr. 31, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)).

d. Proper Evaluation and Informed Consent

The State spent a great deal of time at trial arguing that the number of children identifying as transgender has increased in the last decade and researchers theorize that the increase could be due to mental illness, social encouragement, or abuse. The State argues that the "affirmative" model of treating gender dysphoria which utilizes puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones and surgeries allows doctors to "throw caution out the window." (Post-Tr. Br., ECF No. 265 at 4). However, there was no evidence that doctors in Arkansas negligently prescribe puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones to minors.

The State argues that many doctors do not require mental health counseling before treatment and will let children get hormone therapy and permanently altering surgeries upon demand. The evidence at trial did not support the State's argument. The State's experts admitted that they have had no contact with any Arkansas doctors or information about how doctors in Arkansas treat minors with gender dysphoria. (Tr. 113:1-12, ECF No. 246 (Levine)). There was no evidence presented that surgeons in Arkansas are performing gender transforming surgeries on minors much less performing surgeries on demand. In fact, the evidence confirmed that doctors in Arkansas do not perform gender transition surgeries on any person under the age of 18, the age which Act 626 targets.

There was testimony that WPATH Standards of Care, which are aligned with the ACH Gender Clinic protocols, recommend a comprehensive bio-psychosocial assessment of adolescent patients who present with gender identity related concerns and seek gender transition care. (Tr. 43:13-47:7, ECF No. 219 (Karasic)). The Standards of Care

"recommend healthcare professionals involve relevant disciplines including mental health and medical professionals to reach a decision about whether puberty suppression, hormone initiation, or gender-related surgery for gender diverse and transgender adolescents are appropriate and remain indicated throughout the course of treatment until transition is made to adult care." *Id.* Before initiating gender-affirming medical treatment to adolescents, the WPATH Standards of Care state that the patient should have a history of gender diversity lasting years and meet the criteria for a gender dysphoria diagnosis. *Id.* at 50-51. The diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria includes six months of clinically significant distress or social or occupational impairment. *Id.* This six-month period is in addition to the years of gender diversity history that the Standards of Care require. *Id.*

Dr. Hutchinson testified that while she was the medical director at the Arkansas Children's Hospital Gender Clinic she always did a full assessment of an adolescent seeking care for gender dysphoria. (Tr. 523:10-528:19, ECF No. 275 (Hutchison)). Her assessment included family history, physical history, and psychosocial evaluations. *Id.* Before cross-sex hormone therapy could be prescribed in the Clinic, the adolescent had to meet the criteria for a gender dysphoria diagnosis, meet with a clinical psychologist, have ongoing therapy with a therapist, show consistent and persistent gender identity in their affirmed gender and show mood stability. *Id.* Dr. Cathey, an Arkansas doctor, testified that she requires a diagnosis of gender dysphoria before prescribing feminizing or masculinizing hormone therapy to minors (Tr. 754-759, 54-59, ECF No. 224 (Cathey)). After a diagnosis, she will prescribe hormones to minors aged 16 and older but only with parental consent. *Id.*

Rather than protecting children or safeguarding medical ethics, the evidence showed that the prohibited medical care improves the mental health and well-being of patients and that, by prohibiting it, the State undermined the interests it claims to be advancing. Further, the various claims underlying the State's arguments that the Act protects children and safeguards medical ethics do not explain why only gender-affirming medical care—and all gender-affirming medical care—is singled out for prohibition. The testimony of well-credentialed experts, doctors who provide gender-affirming medical care in Arkansas, and families that rely on that care directly refutes any claim by the State that the Act advances an interest in protecting children.

Based on the record, the Court concludes that Act 626 prohibits medical care on the basis of sex and the State has failed to meet its demanding burden of proving the Act advances its articulated interests. The Court finds that Act 626 violates Plaintiffs' rights to equal protection.

C. Due Process

Even if the Court found that Act 626 passed constitutional muster under the Equal Protection Clause, it fails under due process analysis. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests." *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997). "The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." *Troxel v. Granville*,

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); *see also Kanuszewski v. Mich. Dep't of Health and Human Serv's*, 927 F.3d 396, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) ("[P]arents' substantive due process right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children includes the right to direct their children's medical care."). Parents are presumed to be acting in the best interest of their children. *Parham v. J.R.,* 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).

As the Court has previously found, the Parent Plaintiffs have a fundamental right to seek medical care for their children and, in conjunction with their adolescent child's consent and their doctor's recommendation, make a judgment that medical care is necessary. "[T]the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the government to infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.'" *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting *Reno v. Flores*, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review for infringement of a fundamental parental right. However, even under the heightened scrutiny standard, Act 626 fails.

The State has a compelling interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor. . .." *Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct. for Norfolk Cnty*., 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). As explained, the State has failed to present evidence that the gender-affirming procedures banned by Act 626 jeopardize the physical or psychological well-being of a minor with gender dysphoria. There is no evidence that the Arkansas healthcare community is throwing caution to the wind when treating minors with gender dysphoria.

Moreover, the evidence shows that the Arkansas Medical Board has successfully navigated the regulation of the healthcare community in controversial areas such as the

opioid crisis and gastric bypass surgery. The Arkansas Medical Board is the best option for regulating the ethical considerations as well as the duties of the healthcare community in circumstances like the treatment of gender dysphoria. Plaintiff Parents' testimony at trial confirmed that they have made the decision to get gender-affirming care for their children after discussions with and observations of their child, thorough research, counseling, and consultation with a doctor. They are acting in the best interest of their children. Act 626 would take away these parents' fundamental right to provide healthcare for their children and give that right to the Arkansas Legislature.

Further, Act 626's ban of all gender transition procedures "including without limitation physician's services, inpatient and outpatient hospital services, or prescribed drugs related to gender transition" is not narrowly tailored to achieve the State's articulated interests. Though the State applauds the efforts of European countries to restrict gender-affirming care for minors with gender dysphoria, the State's expert testified that no other country in the world has taken Arkansas's broad stance. None of these countries have imposed a ban on all gender-affirming care.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Act 626 violates the Parent Plaintiffs' rights to substantive due process.

D. First Amendment

Act 626 provides that "[a] physician, or other healthcare professional shall not refer any individual under eighteen (18) years of age to any healthcare professional for gender transition procedures." Ark. Code Ann. § 20-9-1502(b). Dr. Stambough claims that Act 626 restricts her freedom of speech by barring her from referring her patients to other healthcare professionals for gender transition treatment in violation of the First

Amendment. The State argues that the Act targets conduct, not communication, by healthcare professionals. In support, the State cites to the definition of "referral" on Healthcare.gov. (Defs.' Post-Tr. Br., ECF 265 at 25.). The website defines referral as follows:

> A written order from your primary care doctor or you to see a specialist or get certain medical services. In many Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs), you need to get a referral before you can get medical care from anyone except your primary care doctor. If you don't get a referral first, the plan may not pay for the services.

https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/referral (last visited May 24, 2023).

The State argues that writing an order, or "referring," a patient to another physician for gender transition procedures amounts to a treatment order. A treatment order is professional conduct subject to regulation by the State, even if it incidentally involves speech. The State argues that the Act's purpose is to encourage speech in the form of psychotherapy for treatment of gender dysphoria.

The Court is not persuaded by these arguments. The Act does not define the word "refer." Prosecutors and the Arkansas State Medical Board are unlikely to rely on the Health Insurance Marketplace's website when determining whether a healthcare professional has violated Act 626. Had the Arkansas Legislature intended to bar physicians from writing an order directing a patient to seek gender transition procedures from another provider it could have included that statement in the Act. *See* S.B. 184, ALA. 2022 Reg. Sess. (2022); *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1149 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (Alabama's transgender healthcare ban legislation prohibits the "prescribing or administering" of gender transition treatment which is conduct not speech.).

As written, Act 626 clearly regulates speech and not conduct as argued by the State. It prevents doctors from informing their patients where gender transition treatment may be available. It effectively bans their ability to speak to patients about these treatments because the physician is not allowed to tell their patient where it is available. "[A] State may not, under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct, ignore constitutional rights." *Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); *see also Nat'l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra*, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371–72 (2018) ("[T]his Court has not recognized 'professional speech' as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by 'professionals.'").

Act 626 is a content and viewpoint-based regulation of speech because it restricts healthcare professionals from making referrals for "gender transition procedures" only, not for other purposes. As a content and viewpoint-based regulation, it is "presumptively unconstitutional" and is subject to strict scrutiny. *Reed v. Town of Gilbert*, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).

Again, the State explains that it has a compelling interest in keeping children away from gender transition procedures because their efficacy and safety are doubtful. The problem with this argument is that the State has failed to prove that gender-affirming care for minors with gender dysphoria is ineffective or riskier than other medical care provided to minors. The State also contends it has a compelling interest in regulating the ethics of the medical profession. There was no evidence presented that an Arkansas physician or healthcare provider has been ethically compromised in their treatment of adolescents with gender dysphoria or their communication with patients regarding gender

transitioning procedures. As stated, the Arkansas Medical Board has proven to be an effective regulator of Arkansas healthcare professionals in controversial areas of medicine.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the State has failed to prove that its interests in the safety of Arkansas adolescents from gender transitioning procedures or the medical community's ethical decline are compelling, genuine, or even rational. Act 626 violates Dr. Stambough's rights under the First Amendment.

E. Permanent Injunction

Plaintiffs seek permanent injunctive relief. To obtain a permanent injunction, Plaintiffs were required to "show actual success on the merits." *Miller v.* Thurston, 967 F.3d 727, 735 (8th Cir. 2020). Substantial evidence at trial demonstrated that Act 626 violates Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Testimony from the Minor Plaintiffs, their parents, Dr. Stambough and the experts proved that they would suffer immediate and irreparable harm from Act 626 if it were to go into effect. This harm to Plaintiffs and the public interest is outweighed by any potential harm to the State of Arkansas caused by the entry of a permanent injunction.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court hereby orders that Defendant Tim Griffin, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Arkansas, and all those acting in concert with him, including employees, agents, successors in office, and the members of the Arkansas State Medical Board are permanently enjoined from enforcing House Bill

1570, Act 626 of the 93rd General Assembly of Arkansas, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 20-9-1501 to 20-9-1504 and 23-79-164. The Clerk is directed to close the case. [14]

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of June, 2023.

James M. Moody Jr.
United States District Judge

[14] The Court retains jurisdiction to consider motions for attorneys' fees.

Exhibit E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

K. C., *et al.*	)	
	)	
Plaintiffs,	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 1:23-cv-00595-JPH-KMB
	)	
THE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE MEDICAL LICENSING BOARD OF INDIANA in their official capacities, *et al.*	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Recently enacted by the Indiana General Assembly, Senate Enrolled Act 480 is scheduled to become effective July 1, 2023. If it takes effect, S.E.A. 480 will prohibit physicians and other practitioners from knowingly providing gender transition procedures to a minor, and from aiding or abetting another physician or practitioner in the provision of gender transition procedures to a minor. Gender transition procedures banned by S.E.A. 480 include the use of puberty-blocking drugs, cross-sex hormone therapy, and gender reassignment surgery. Plaintiffs are four minor children, many of their parents, and a doctor and her family medical practice. Alleging that S.E.A. 480 violates the United States Constitution and other federal laws, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enter a preliminary injunction that would prohibit Defendants—who are various State officials—from enforcing S.E.A. 480.

The State has a strong interest in enforcing democratically enacted laws. And Defendants have shown that there are important reasons underlying the

State's regulation of gender transition procedures for minors. Still, Plaintiffs have carried their burden of showing some likelihood of success on their claims that S.E.A. 480 would violate their equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and free speech rights under the First Amendment. Under the evidence available at this preliminary stage, there is not a "close means–end fit" between the State's important reasons for regulating the provision of gender transition procedures to minors and S.E.A. 480's broad ban of those procedures. So, when the State's interests are weighed against the likelihood that Plaintiffs will be able to show that S.E.A. 480 would violate their constitutional rights and the risk of irreparable harm, Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is therefore **GRANTED in part** to the extent that, while this case is pending, Defendants may not enforce S.E.A. 480's prohibitions on (1) providing gender transition procedures for minors except gender reassignment surgery and (2) speech that would aid or abet gender transition procedures for minors. Dkt. [9]. Plaintiffs motion is **DENIED in part** as to the ban on gender reassignment surgeries. Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge that ban because gender reassignment surgeries are not provided to minors in Indiana.

I.
Facts & Background

The parties have submitted joint stipulated facts, dkt. 51, and more than 3,000 pages of evidence. Dkt. 26; dkt. 48; dkt. 49; dkt. 58. They also jointly recommended to the Court that there was no need for an evidentiary hearing,

see dkt. 22 at 3; dkt. 56, so the Court's recitation of the relevant facts is based on the written materials submitted with the parties' briefing.

A. Sex, gender, and gender dysphoria

A person's sex is generally identified at birth based on external genitalia. Dkt. 51 at 1 (parties' stipulated facts). Gender or gender identity, by contrast, commonly refer to a person's psychological and/or cultural sense of their sex or gender. Dkt. 26-1 at 7 (Karasic decl.); dkt. 48-2 at 12–13 (Hruz report). Most people's sex and gender identity match, but "[f]or transgender people, their assigned sex does not align with their gender identity." Dkt. 26-1 at 7 (Karasic decl.).

Gender dysphoria is a mental-health diagnosis recognized in the Fifth Edition of the American Psychological Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-5"), and can be diagnosed in pre-pubertal children, adolescents, or adults. Dkt. 51 at 2–3. The DSM-5 defines gender dysphoria as "[a] marked incongruence between one's experienced/expressed gender and assigned gender, of at least 6 months' duration, as manifested by" certain diagnostic criteria. *Id.* Gender dysphoria in adolescents or adults "is associated with clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning." *Id.* at 3.

"There is no medical or surgical treatment indicated for children with gender dysphoria pre-puberty." *Id.* at 4. However, once puberty begins, "[a]dolescents diagnosed with gender dysphoria . . . may be prescribed puberty-delaying medications." Dkt. 26-2 at 13 (Shumer decl.). Then, in mid-

adolescence, patients may be prescribed hormones—testosterone, or estrogen with a testosterone suppressant. *Id.* at 16. Gender-transition surgeries may also be considered, *see* dkt. 26-3 at 7 n.11 (Turban decl.), but in Indiana no "provider performs gender-transition surgery on persons under the age of 18." Dkt. 51 at 4.

B. Senate Enrolled Act 480

In early 2023, the Indiana General Assembly passed S.E.A. 480 and Governor Holcomb signed it into law. S.E.A. 480 (to be codified at Ind. Code §§ 25-1-22-1 *et seq.* (eff. July 1, 2023)).

S.E.A. 480 would prohibit physicians and other medical practitioners from "knowingly provid[ing] gender transition procedures to a minor." S.E.A. 480 § 13(a). The statute defines "gender transition" as "the process in which an individual shifts from identifying with and living as a gender that corresponds to his or her sex to identifying with and living as a gender different from his or her sex." *Id.* § 3. It defines "sex" as "the biological state of being male or female, based on the individual's sex organs, chromosomes, and endogenous hormone profiles." *Id.* § 12. And "gender" as "the psychological, behavioral, social, and cultural aspects of being male or female." *Id.* § 1.

Under S.E.A. 480, the prohibited "gender transition procedures" include "any medical or surgical service . . . that seeks to:

> (1) alter or remove physical or anatomical characteristics or features that are typical for the individual's sex; or

> (2) instill or create physiological or anatomical characteristics that are different from the individual's sex."

Id. § 5(a). The statute then excludes:

> (1) Medical or surgical services to an individual born with a medically verifiable disorder of sex development, including an individual with:
>
> (A) external sex characteristics that are irresolvably ambiguous;
>
> (B) forty-six (46) XX chromosomes with virilization;
>
> (C) forty-six (46) XY chromosomes with undervirilization; or
>
> (D) both ovarian and testicular tissue.
>
> (2) Medical or surgical services provided when a physician or practitioner has diagnosed a disorder or condition of sexual development that the physician or practitioner has determined through genetic or biochemical testing that the individual does not have normal sex chromosome structure, sex steroid hormone production, or sex steroid hormone action.
>
> (3) The treatment of any infection, injury, disease, or disorder that has been caused by or exacerbated by the performance of gender transition procedures.
>
> (4) Any medical or surgical service undertaken because the individual suffers from a physical disorder, physical injury, or physical illness that would, as certified by the physician or practitioner, place the individual in imminent danger of death or impairment of major bodily function unless the medical or surgical service is performed.
>
> (5) Mental health or social services other than gender transition procedures as defined in subsection (a).
>
> (6) Services for a disorder or condition of sexual development that is unrelated to a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder.

Id. § 5(b), *see* § 13(c).

Medical services prohibited under S.E.A. 480 can thus include "medical services that provide puberty blocking drugs, gender transition hormone therapy, or genital . . . or nongenital gender reassignment surgery." *Id.* § 5(a)(2).[1] Physicians and other medical practitioners are further prohibited from "aid[ing] or abet[ting] another physician or practitioner in the provision of" prohibited gender transition procedures to a minor. *Id.* § 13(b).

Physicians or medical practitioners who violate S.E.A. 480 are subject to discipline by their regulating licensing boards. *Id.* § 15; Ind. Code § 25-1-9-4(a)(3) (providing for discipline for licensed medical providers who "knowingly violate[ ] any state statute . . . regulating the profession in question"). Private individuals may also bring lawsuits alleging violations of S.E.A. 480. S.E.A. 480 § 17.

C. Plaintiffs

K.C. is the ten-year-old child of Nathaniel and Beth Clawson. *See* dkt. 51 at 5. "K.C. was identified male at birth," but before the age of 4 "grabbed a pair of scissors, and asked to cut off K.C.'s penis, asserting that it should not be there." *Id.* An IU Health pediatrician diagnosed K.C. with gender dysphoria. *Id.* K.C. "socially transitioned [to female] before K.C. was 4 years old and uses female pronouns." *Id.* In 2017, K.C. first visited the Riley Gender

[1] S.E.A. 480 provides a limited extension to its July 1, 2023 effective date: physicians or medical practitioners may "continue to prescribe . . . until December 31, 2023," gender transition hormone therapy to individuals who were taking that therapy "on June 30, 2023, as part of a gender transition procedure." S.E.A. 480 § 13(d).

Health Clinic, which "again diagnosed [K.C.] with gender dysphoria." *Id.* at 6. K.C. began taking a puberty blocker in 2023. *Id.*

M.W. is the 16-year-old child of Ryan and Lisa Welch. *Id.* "M.W. was identified female at birth" and "was diagnosed with gender dysphoria in adolescence." *Id.* at 6–7. At the age of 12, M.W. "declared that M.W. is a transgender male" and now "uses a stereotypically male first name and male pronouns." *Id.* at 7. "M.W. was prescribed testosterone" in July 2022, and continues to receive testosterone. *Id.* at 7.

A.M. is the 11-year-old child of Emily Morris. *Id.* at 8. "At birth, A.M. was identified as male," but "[b]efore A.M. was 4 years of age, A.M. stated to family members that A.M. was a girl and was thinking about trying to cut off A.M.'s penis." *Id.* "A.M. socially transitioned before the age of 4" and since then "has used a stereotypically female first name and female pronouns." *Id.* A.M. has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and receives a puberty blocker. *Id.* at 9-10.

M.R. is the 15-year-old child of Maria Rivera. *Id.* at 10. "M.R. was identified as female at birth" and in December 2021 "declared . . . that M.R. is a transgender male." *Id.* "M.R. now consistently uses a stereotypically male first name and male pronouns." *Id.* M.R. has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria and receives testosterone under a prescription from Dr. Catherine Bast at Mosaic Health and Healing Arts ("Mosaic"). *Id.* at 11.

Dr. Bast is a board-certified family-practice physician at Mosaic in Goshen, Indiana. *Id.* at 11–12. Mosaic currently treats 72 minor patients who

are diagnosed with gender dysphoria and are prescribed either puberty blockers or hormones. *Id.* at 12.

D. Defendants

The individual members of the Medical Licensing Board of Indiana serve as members of the board that is responsible for the licensing and discipline of medical providers, and that grants and revokes licenses to Indiana medical practitioners. *See* dkt. 1 at 5; Ind. Code §§ 25-1-9-1 *et seq.*

The Executive Director of the Indiana Professional Licensing Agency oversees the Medical Licensing Board. Ind. Code §§ 25-0.5-3-1 *et seq*; 25-1-6-3.

The Attorney General of Indiana investigates complaints against licensed medical providers and can pursue discipline from the Medical Licensing Board. Ind. Code § 25-1-7-2.

The Secretary of Indiana Family and Social Services Administration is the director of the FSSA, which administers Medicaid in Indiana. Ind. Code § 12-15-1-1.

E. Procedural history and preliminary-injunction evidence

Plaintiffs brought this action in April 2023, alleging that S.E.A. 480's restrictions violate (1) the minor plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights; (2) the parent plaintiffs' "fundamental rights protected by due process" under the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) the medical-provider plaintiffs' First Amendment speech rights; and (4) Medicaid provisions in 42 U.S.C. §§ 18116 and 1396d(a). Dkt. 1 at 42–45. Plaintiffs have filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, requesting that the Court "prohibit[ ] the enforcement of" S.E.A. 480. Dkt. 9.

The parties have agreed that there should not be an evidentiary hearing. *See* dkt. 22 at 3; dkt. 56. To develop the preliminary-injunction record, the parties have conducted substantial discovery, filed a statement of stipulated facts, and designated extensive evidence. *See* dkt. 26; dkt. 48; dkt. 49; dkt. 51. In total, excluding citations and supporting exhibits, Plaintiffs have designated more than 100 pages of expert opinions, dkt. 26; dkt. 58, and Defendants have designated more than more than 300 pages of expert opinions, dkt. 48. The parties' complete evidentiary filings span more than 3,000 pages. Dkt. 26; dkt. 48; dkt. 49; dkt. 58.

Despite the volume of designated evidence and the contradicting expert opinions, the parties have designated only a small portion of the evidentiary filings in their briefs, generally relying on summaries of evidence in their experts' reports. *See* dkt. 54; dkt. 59.

1. Plaintiffs' experts

Plaintiffs have designated three experts, who have provided reports of their opinions.

Dr. Dan Karasic, a Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine, has "provided care for thousands of transgender patients" over thirty years. Dkt. 26-1 at 3. He's worked with the World Professional Association for Transgender Health ("WPATH") and co-authored the *WPATH Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual,*

Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People. *Id.* at 4. Dr. Karasic's expert report details his opinions on gender identity, gender dysphoria, appropriate medical treatments, and harms of denying gender-affirming care. *Id.* at 6–18.

Dr. Daniel Shumer is a pediatric endocrinologist, an Associated Professor of Pediatrics at Mott Children's Hospital at Michigan Medicine, and the Medical Director of the Comprehensive Gender Services Program at Michigan Medicine, University of Michigan. Dkt. 26-2 at 1. He has extensively researched "gender identity in pediatrics and the treatment of gender dysphoria" and has "been treating patients with gender dysphoria as a pediatric endocrinologist since 2015." *Id.* at 2. Dr. Shumer's expert report addresses evidence-based treatments for gender dysphoria in minors, including their safety and efficacy. *Id.* at 6–23.

Dr. Jack Turban is an Assistant Professor of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco School of Medicine and the director of the Gender Psychiatry Program in the Division of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry. Dkt. 26-3 at 2. His expert report includes opinions about the effects of gender-dysphoria treatment on mental health. *Id.* at 4–18.

Plaintiffs' experts have each filed supplemental reports addressing the opinions of Defendants' experts. Dkt. 58. Defendants have filed a motion to exclude many of the opinions from Plaintiffs' experts, arguing that they are unreliable. *See* dkt. 62; dkt. 63.[2]

[2] Plaintiffs have orally moved to strike that motion because it violates the parties' stipulation regarding the admissibility of evidence discussed at the June 5, 2023 status conference, *see* dkt. 56, and was filed too late in the preliminary-injunction

2. Defendants' experts

Defendants have designated five experts, who have provided reports detailing their opinions.

Dr. James Cantor is the Director of the Toronto Sexuality Centre. Dkt. 48-1 at 9. He is trained as a clinical psychologist and neuroscientist and has researched "the development of sexual orientation, gender identity, hypersexuality, and atypical sexualities." *Id.* at 8. His expert report opines on the strength of the medical evidence regarding gender-dysphoria treatments as well as the safety and effectiveness of those treatments. *Id.* at 11–131.

Dr. Paul Hruz, an Associate Professor of Pediatrics in the Division of Pediatric Endocrinology and Diabetes at Washington University School of Medicine, has "participated in the care of hundreds of infants and children, including adolescents, with disorders of sexual development." Dkt. 48-2 at 2. Dr. Hruz's opinions address the use of puberty blockers and hormone therapy to treat endocrine disorders and gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 9–52.

Dr. Dianna Kenny was a Professor of Psychology at the University of Sydney for thirteen years and is now "a psychodynamic psychotherapist" and "child, marriage, and family therapist." Dkt. 48-3 at 3-4. For the past five years, she has "engaged in exploratory psychotherapy with children,

---

proceedings. Many of the points raised in support of Defendants' motion to exclude could and should have been made in their response brief. Dkt. 54. This case's preliminary-injunction proceedings have been carefully scheduled to ensure thorough and fair review before S.E.A. 480's July 1, 2023 effective date, and none of those orders anticipated a motion to exclude filed after preliminary-injunction briefing was complete. *See* dkt. 21; dkt. 25; dkt. 56. However, for the reasons below, it's unnecessary to strike Defendants' motion to exclude.

adolescents, and their families who are struggling with gender dysphoria." *Id.* at 4. Dr. Kenney's report addresses social aspects of gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 10–126.

Dr. Daniel Weiss, a practicing endocrinologist, has provided care for adults and children, and has completed extensive medical research. Dkt. 48-4 at 3. He opines on the history and safety of treatments for gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 5–30.

Dr. Kristopher Kaliebe is an Associate Professor in the University of South Florida Medical School's Department of Psychiatry. Dkt. 48-5 at 3. He supervises a child and adolescent psychiatry clinic and treats pediatric patients with gender dysphoria. *Id.* at 7. His expert report opines on the history of gender dysphoria diagnoses and the strength of the evidence regarding gender-dysphoria treatments. *Id.* at 10–71.

The Court held oral argument on June 14, 2023. Dkt. 66.

II.
Preliminary Injunction Standard

Injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is "an exercise of very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it." *Cassell v. Snyders*, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021). To obtain such extraordinary relief, the party seeking the preliminary injunction carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. *See id.*; *Mazurek v. Armstrong*, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

Determining whether a plaintiff "is entitled to a preliminary injunction involves a multi-step inquiry." *Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of E.*

Chi., 56 F.4th 437, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). "As a threshold matter, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) some likelihood of succeeding on the merits, and (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied." *Id.* "If these threshold factors are met, the court proceeds to a balancing phase, where it must then consider: (3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is granted, balancing that harm against the irreparable harm to the moving party if relief is denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of granting or denying the injunction to non-parties." *Cassell*, 990 F.3d at 545. This "involves a 'sliding scale' approach: the more likely the plaintiff is to win on the merits, the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in his favor, and vice versa." *Mays v. Dart*, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). "In the final analysis, the district court equitably weighs these factors together, seeking at all times to minimize the costs of being mistaken." *Cassell*, 990 F.3d at 545.

III.
Analysis

A. Standing to challenge S.E.A. 480's prohibition on gender reassignment surgery

Gender reassignment surgery is one of the "gender transition procedures" that S.E.A. 480 prohibits for minors. S.E.A. 480 §§ 5(a); 13(a). The statute defines "gender reassignment surgery" as "any medical or surgical service that seeks to surgically alter or remove healthy physical or anatomical characteristics or features that are typical for the individual's sex, in order to instill or create physiological or anatomical characteristics that resemble a sex

different from the individual's sex . . . knowingly performed for the purpose of assisting an individual with a gender transition." *Id.* § 2.

The parties have stipulated that "[n]o Indiana provider performs gender-transition surgery on persons under the age of 18." Dkt. 51 at 4. Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a preliminary injunction against S.E.A. 480's prohibition on gender-transition surgery. Dkt. 54 at 30. Plaintiffs contend that they have standing because they are challenging the prohibition on "'gender transition procedures' generally." Dkt. 59 at 22.

Standing is a constitutional doctrine "rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy" and "ensure[s] that federal courts do not exceed their authority as it has been traditionally understood." *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016); U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2. To have standing, a plaintiff "must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision." *Spokeo*, 578 U.S. at 338. Here, Plaintiffs must have standing as to each piece of their claim. *See Johnson v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt.*, 783 F.3d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 2015) ("The fact that a plaintiff has suffered an injury that is traceable to one kind of conduct does not grant that plaintiff standing to challenge other, even related, conduct; standing is not dispensed in gross."); *Mueller v. Raemisch*, 740 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the requirement to continually update sex-offender registry information, but not to challenge the prohibition on changing their names, since they had no intention

of doing so). "To have standing for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must face a 'real and immediate' threat of future injury as opposed to a threat that is merely 'conjectural or hypothetical.'" *Simic v. City of Chicago*, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017); *see Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen*, 968 F.3d 628, 638 (7th Cir. 2020) (recognizing a plaintiff's "burden to demonstrate standing in the context of a preliminary injunction motion"). Put simply, a preliminary injunction can be appropriate only if there are "continuing, present adverse effects." *Simic*, 851 F.3d at 738.

Here, the stipulated facts show that no minor could receive gender-transition surgery from a physician or other practitioner in Indiana, regardless of S.E.A. 480. Dkt. 51 at 4. Plaintiffs therefore cannot show that S.E.A. 480's prohibition on gender-transition surgery would cause any minor in Indiana an injury that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Plaintiffs therefore lack standing to seek a preliminary injunction against S.E.A. 480's prohibition on gender-transition surgery for minors. *See Speech First*, 968 F.3d at 644.

B. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims

"The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause guarantees that 'No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'" *Hope v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Corr.*, 9 F.4th 513, 528–29 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1). This "is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." *Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1050 (7th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiffs argue that S.E.A. 480 "violates the equal protection rights of the plaintiff youth" because it impermissibly "discriminates on the basis of both sex and transgender status." Dkt. 27 at 26–27. Defendants respond that S.E.A. 480 instead makes reasonable classifications "based on age, procedure, and condition—not sex or transgender status." Dkt. 54 at 40.

1. Sex-based classifications and heightened scrutiny

"Generally, state action is presumed to be lawful [under the Equal Protection Clause] and will be upheld if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." *Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1050. That "rational basis test, however, does not apply when a classification is based upon sex." *Id.* Sex-based classifications are instead "subject to heightened scrutiny," requiring "the state to demonstrate that its proffered justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.'" *Id.*; *accord Sessions v. Morales–Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 59 (2017) (recognizing "the heightened scrutiny that now attends 'all gender-based classifications'"). "This requires the state to show that the 'classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.'" *Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1050 (quoting *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996)).

Plaintiffs argue that heightened scrutiny applies here because, under S.E.A. 480, sex is the determining factor as to whether a treatment is prohibited. Dkt. 27 at 27–30. Defendants respond that S.E.A. 480 draws

distinctions based on other factors, such as medical condition and procedure, rather than based on sex. Dkt. 54 at 40.

S.E.A. 480 defines "sex" as "the biological state of being male or female, based on the individual's sex organs, chromosomes, and endogenous hormone profiles." S.E.A. 480 § 12. And it prohibits "a physician or other practitioner" from "knowingly provid[ing] gender transition procedures to a minor." *Id.* § 13(a). "[G]ender transition" is defined as "the process in which an individual shifts from identifying with and living as a gender that corresponds to his or her sex to identifying with and living as a gender different from his or her sex." *Id.* § 3. And a "gender transition procedure" is defined as:

> any medical or surgical service . . . that seeks to:
> (1) alter or remove physical or anatomical characteristics or features that are typical for the individual's sex; or
> (2) instill or create physiological or anatomical characteristics that resemble a sex different from the individual's sex, including medical services that provide puberty blocking drugs, gender transition hormone therapy, or genital gender reassignment surgery or nongenital gender reassignment surgery knowingly performed for the purpose of assisting an individual with a gender transition.

Id. § 5(a).

Sex-based classifications are therefore central to S.E.A. 480's prohibitions. Section 5(a)(1), for example, prohibits procedures seeking to "alter or remove physical or anatomical characteristics or features that are typical for the individual's sex." But it does not prohibit a person from seeking to "alter or remove" a characteristic or feature typical of the opposite sex, under

S.E.A. 480's definition of sex. Similarly, section 5(a)(2) prohibits the creation of physiological or anatomical characteristics or features "that resemble a sex different from the individual's sex." But it does not prohibit a medical provider from creating physiological or anatomical characteristics or features that resemble that individual's sex. In other words, the statute allows physicians and other practitioners to "instill or create" characteristics "resembl[ing]" female anatomical characteristics for females but not for males, and male anatomical characteristics for males but not for females. It's therefore impossible for a medical provider to know whether a treatment is prohibited without knowing the patient's sex. S.E.A. 480's prohibitions therefore "cannot be stated without referencing sex." *Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1051.

Despite that statutory language, Defendants argue that S.E.A. 480's classifications are instead "based on age, procedure, and medical condition" and "encompass both sexes and all gender identities." Dkt. 54 at 40. Defendants therefore contend that because S.E.A. 480 prohibits all gender-transition procedures, for both males and females, there's no sex-based classification. *See id.* at 40–41 (relying on *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). But *Geduldig* was about pregnancy, which doesn't always trigger heightened scrutiny since it's an "objectively identifiable physical condition" and not necessarily a proxy for sex, even though "only women can become pregnant." 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. S.E.A. 480's prohibitions, by contrast, do not prohibit certain medical procedures in all circumstances, but only when used for gender transition, which in turn requires sex-based classifications.

Indeed, under S.E.A. 480's plain language, a medical provider can't know whether a gender *transition* is involved without knowing the patient's sex and the gender associated with the goal of the treatment. S.E.A. 480 §§ 3, 5(a).

In short, without sex-based classifications, it would be impossible for S.E.A. 480 to define whether a puberty-blocking or hormone treatment involved transition from one's sex (prohibited) or was in accordance with one's sex (permitted). That's certainly why S.E.A. 480's plain text defines "sex," *id.* § 12; defines "gender transition" in sex-based terms, *id.* § 3; and then phrases its prohibitions in terms that repeatedly rely on those definitions, *id.* §§ 5(a), 13(a) (prohibitions centering on what is "typical for the individual's sex" and "characteristics that resemble a sex different from the individual's sex"). At bottom, sex-based classifications are not just present in S.E.A. 480's prohibitions; they're determinative.

Defendants further argue that the rationale for heightened scrutiny doesn't apply to S.E.A. 480. Dkt. 54 at 31–33 (arguing that when "medical procedures take account of basic, immutable biological differences" between males and females, that does not trigger heightened scrutiny and does not rely on "stereotypes"). The Supreme Court has indeed applied heightened scrutiny while recognizing that "[p]hysical differences between men and women are enduring" and that "[t]he two sexes are not fungible." *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). It has therefore explained that the purpose of heightened scrutiny is not to "make sex a proscribed classification" but to ensure that sex-based classifications do not "create or perpetuate the legal,

social, and economic inferiority of women" or men. *Id.*; *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 72.

While S.E.A. 480 prohibits both male and female minors from using puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapy for gender transition, it nonetheless draws sex-based classifications under current Seventh Circuit precedent. *See Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1050. For the reasons argued by Defendants, perhaps the Seventh Circuit or the Supreme Court will hold that a legislative sex-based classification like that made in S.E.A. 480 is presumed lawful and subject to only rational basis review. But *Whitaker* holds that rational basis review "does not apply when a classification is based upon sex." 858 F.3d at 1050. Instead, a sex-based classification triggers heightened scrutiny that requires the state to show that the "classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." *Id.*

The Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a case involving a substantially similar statute. *Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022). There, the court held that heightened scrutiny applied to the challenged Arkansas statute because "[t]he biological sex of the minor patient is the basis on which the law distinguishes between those who may receive certain types of medical care and those who may not." *Id.* at 670. The same is true here.

Because S.E.A. 480's prohibitions are "inherently based upon" sex classifications, "heightened review applies." *Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1051.[3]

2. Heightened scrutiny applied to S.E.A. 480

"Successful defense of legislation that differentiates on the basis of gender . . . requires an 'exceedingly persuasive justification." *Sessions v. Morales–Santana*, 582 U.S. 47, 58 (2017). "For a gender-based classification to withstand such scrutiny, it must 'serve important governmental objectives,' and 'the discriminatory means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." *Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs*, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003) (quoting *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 533). In other words, there must be a "close means–end fit." *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 68.

Plaintiffs argue that S.E.A. 480 does not survive heightened scrutiny because there's no important government interest to justify prohibiting "safe, effective, and medically necessary treatment for the health and well-being of adolescents suffering from gender dysphoria." Dkt. 27 at 30. Defendants contend that the prohibited treatments are unsafe and their effectiveness is unproven, so S.E.A. 480 is justified by the State's interests in protecting the wellbeing of minors and regulating the medical profession. Dkt. 54 at 33–40.

Certainly, the proffered state interests are legitimate. "[I]t is clear that a legislature may pass valid laws to protect children." *Packingham v. North Carolina*, 582 U.S. 98, 106 (2017). And it's similarly "clear [that] the State has

[3] Because S.E.A. 480's sex-based classification triggers heightened scrutiny, the Court does not address what level of scrutiny a transgender-based classification alone might warrant.

a significant role to play in regulating the medical profession." *Gonzales v. Carhart*, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007). But heightened scrutiny requires a "close means–end fit," so it's not enough for the State's interests to justify *some* regulation of gender transition procedures for minors. Instead, the State's interests must justify S.E.A. 480's *prohibition* of gender transition procedures for minors. *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 68; *cf. Packingham*, 582 U.S. at 106 (explaining, in the First Amendment context, that "the assertion of a valid governmental interest cannot, in every context, be insulated from all constitutional protections").

S.E.A. 480's scope is broad. As Defendants acknowledge, the statute "generally prohibits licensed medical providers from knowingly providing, or aiding and abetting another practitioner in providing, gender transition procedures to a minor." Dkt. 54 at 27–28. Indiana thus opted to ban—rather than otherwise regulate—gender transition procedures for minors. Defendants argue that this ban is justified because gender transition procedures "subject vulnerable minors to unproven, harmful, and irreversible procedures." Dkt. 54 at 33. In support, they have designated medical evidence supported by expert reports. *See generally* dkt. 48.

There is thus designated evidence in the record that puberty blockers carry risks of increased brain pressure and reductions in bone density and "may cause hot flashes, weight gain, fatigue and mood alterations." Dkt. 48-4 at 20 (Weiss decl.); dkt. 48-2 at 25 (Hruz decl.). And while puberty blockers are prescribed when puberty starts far too soon, high-quality medical research on

their use to delay puberty past a typical age is exceptionally limited. *See* dkt. 48-2 at 46 (Hruz decl.); dkt. 48-4 at 21–22 (Weiss decl.). Indeed, the consensus from all sides is that more research is needed to explore these risks. *See* dkt. 48-4 at 21–23 (Weiss decl.) (identifying statements from healthcare organizations including The Endocrine Society); dkt. 48-1 (Cantor decl.) (summarizing WPATH's calls for further research).

There's also evidence that the cross-sex hormone therapies prohibited by S.E.A. 480 have risks as well. Those include fertility impairment, lower bone density, disfiguring acne, high blood pressure, weight gain, abnormal glucose tolerance, breast cancer, liver disease, thrombosis (blood clots in veins or arteries), and cardiovascular disease. Dkt. 48-2 at 44–46 (Hruz decl.). Hormone therapy is used to treat medical conditions other than gender dysphoria, but—similar to puberty blockers used for gender transition—the "long term effect[s]" of using of cross-sex hormones for gender transition are "currently unknown." *Id.* at 44.

This designated evidence thus provides support for Defendants' view that the safety and effectiveness of puberty blockers and hormone therapy is uncertain and unsettled. It also supports Defendants' position that the State has good reasons for regulating gender transition procedures for minors. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue that these "concerns are based on mischaracterizations and distortions about the diagnosis and treatment of gender dysphoria." Dkt. 59 at 2. Maybe Plaintiffs will be able to prove that's true at a trial where Defendants' experts are subject to cross-examination on

the strength of their opinions. *See Lapsley v. Xtek, Inc.*, 689 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that admissible expert evidence "is to be tested . . . with the familiar tools of 'vigorous cross-examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence'"). But based on the paper record available here, the Court finds that Defendants have designated some evidence in support of their position.

Even so, heightened scrutiny requires more—the regulation must have an "exceedingly persuasive justification" and a "close means–end fit." *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 59, 68. In other words, the State's specific "means" (S.E.A. 480's broad ban) must fit its "ends" (protecting minors and regulating the medical profession). *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 68; *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Parties who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' *for that action*." (emphasis added)).

So, for example, when the Supreme Court considered the male-only education offered at the Virginia Military Institute, it recognized that sex-based classifications can serve legitimate interests yet not survive heightened scrutiny. *Virginia*, 518 U.S. at 535–36. Therefore, in that case, while "[s]ingle-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to at least some students," and "diversity among public educational institutions can serve the public good," those "benign justifications" were not enough to justify VMI's "categorical exclusions." *Id.*

Here, S.E.A. 480 categorically bans the use of puberty blockers and hormone therapy for gender transition for minors. And Plaintiffs have designated evidence of risks to minors' health and wellbeing from gender

dysphoria if those treatments can no longer be provided to minors—prolonging of their dysphoria, and causing additional distress and health risks, such as depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and suicidality. *See* dkt. 26-1 at 16–17 (Karasic decl.).[4] Those treatments could no longer be used if S.E.A. 480 goes into effect. So, while the State has identified legitimate reasons for regulation in this area, the designated evidence does not demonstrate, at least at this stage, that the extent of its regulation was closely tailored to uphold those interests. Plaintiffs therefore have shown some likelihood of success on the merits of their equal protection claim. *See Mays v. Dart*, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020).

Nor does "the normal rule that courts defer to the judgments of legislatures in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties" settle the issue here. *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org.*, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 2268 (2022). Defendants argue that S.E.A. 480 fits comfortably within this vast zone of legislative discretion, but they have not cited any authority making that

[4] In their motion to exclude expert testimony, Defendants argue that Dr. Karasic's opinion is unreliable and therefore inadmissible. Dkt. 62; dkt. 63 at 26–27. But Dr. Karasic bases his opinion on his experience "provid[ing] care for thousands of transgender patients," including "patients over the years who were unable to access gender-affirming care when it was clinically indicated." Dkt. 26-1 at 3, 17. That includes minors, "many" of whom then had "increased depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation and self-harm, increased substance use, and a deterioration in school performance." *Id.* at 17. Defendants argue that this experience is "unspecified" and unsupported, dkt. 63 at 26–27, but it is enough to pass *Daubert* gatekeeping. *See Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co.*, 208 F.3d 581, 586–87 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that "experience in treating patients" can qualify a medical expert and "[m]edical professionals reasonably may be expected to rely on self-reported patient histories"). Other than this ruling, Defendant's motion to exclude expert testimony is **DENIED without prejudice** as unnecessary at this stage because this order does not rely on the challenged opinions in concluding that Plaintiffs have carried their preliminary-injunction burden. Dkt. [62].

principle controlling here, when heightened scrutiny applies to an equal protection claim. *See id.* at 2245–46 (*Dobbs* explaining that it did not involve "heightened constitutional scrutiny" but instead "the same standard of review" that applied to "other health and safety measures").

Nevertheless, Defendants argue that "the State has no less restrictive means" than S.E.A. 480 "to advance its interests." Dkt. 54 at 36. They reason that there's "no test for gender dysphoria and no reliable way to know whether it will resolve without lifechanging medical interventions." *Id.*

Defendants don't explain, however, why uncertainty about a gender-dysphoria diagnosis or about how long gender dysphoria may persist leaves the State without more tailored alternatives to S.E.A. 480. At the hearing on Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants emphasized that regardless of any expert testimony, the risks and uncertainties identified in systematic reviews conducted by certain European countries justified S.E.A. 480's ban on gender transition procedures for minors. But reliance on those reviews also does not achieve the "close means–end fit" required.

Most detrimental to Defendants' position is that no European country that has conducted a systematic review responded with a ban on the use of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapy as S.E.A. 480 would. Instead, Defendants' designated evidence is that (1) the English National Health Service has proposed that puberty blockers be used only "in the context of a formal research protocol," (2) Finland's health service has restricted puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapies to when gender dysphoria is

severe and other psychiatric symptoms have ceased, (3) the "leading Swedish pediatric gender clinic" has limited puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones to those sixteen and older in monitored clinical trials[5], (4) the Académie Nationale de Médecine of France has advised providers "to extend as much as possible the psychological support stage" before turning to hormone treatments, and (5) the "Dutch Protocol" developed in the Netherlands involves age restrictions on certain treatments and requires "resolution of mental health issues before any transition." Dkt. 48-1 at 16–21, 110–11 (Cantor decl.).

In short, these European countries all chose less-restrictive means of regulation. In Defendants' view, however, the data from the systematic reviews gives the State unfettered discretion to choose how to regulate gender transition procedures for minors—up to and including a broad prohibition. But that does not take into account the "close means–end fit" that heightened scrutiny requires of sex-based classifications. *Sessions*, 582 U.S. at 59, 68.

Plaintiffs therefore have shown some likelihood of success on their claim that S.E.A. 480's prohibitions on puberty blockers and hormone therapy for minors violate the Equal Protection Clause. *See id.* at 68.

C. First Amendment speech claims

In addition to its treatment prohibitions, S.E.A. 480 prohibits physicians and other medical practitioners from "aid[ing] or abet[ting] another physician or practitioner in the provision of" prohibited gender transition procedures to a

[5] The Swedish National Board of Health, however, has not imposed those restrictions but "recommends restraint." Dkt. 48-1 at 20.

minor. S.E.A. 480 § 13(b). It's uncontested that § 13(b) would prohibit any action that aids or abets a gender transition procedure. *See* dkt. 54 at 52. It therefore sweeps up both speech—such as medical referrals and discussing a shared patient's care—and conduct—such as driving a minor to receive prohibited care or assisting a surgery. *See id.*

Plaintiffs Dr. Bast and Mosaic therefore challenge this provision as applied to its regulation of speech, arguing that it violates medical providers' First Amendment free speech rights because it prohibits making referrals for or providing information about gender transition procedures. Dkt. 27 at 49; dkt. 59 at 35. Defendants respond that § 13(b) regulates speech only incidentally and is valid as part of a broader regulatory statute. Dkt. 54 at 52–53.

It is "true that the First Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from imposing incidental burdens on speech." *Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.*, 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011). But burdens on speech are "incidental" only when they flow indirectly from the core purpose of the regulation—like an employment anti-discrimination ordinance requiring the removal of a "White Applicants Only" sign, or an ordinance against outdoor fires preventing flag burning. *Id.*; *see also Morgan v. White*, 964 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that it's an incidental burden on speech when a COVID-related social distancing order makes it harder for a campaign to "round up signatures"). Here, the speech that section 13(b) would prohibit would itself be "aiding and abetting," rather than being incidental to separate, prohibited conduct. *See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman*, 581 U.S.

37, 47 (2017) (holding that a ban on surcharges for using a credit card regulated speech directly rather than incidentally because it dictated how stores communicated prices); *Hurley v. Irish–American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston*, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding that a ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the First Amendment as applied to a parade).[6]

S.E.A. 480 § 13(b) therefore appears to burden speech "on its face and in its practical operation" because "aiding and abetting" directly prohibits referrals and collaboration among medical providers. *Sorrell*, 564 U.S. at 567. Moreover, the regulation triggers heightened scrutiny because it's "directed at certain content and is aimed at particular speakers." *Id.* at 567, 571. Section 13(b) singles out medical providers and only one category of medical treatment—gender transition procedures.

Plaintiffs therefore have some likelihood of success on their First Amendment challenge to S.E.A. 480's aiding and abetting provision, as applied to the speech they have shown to be regulated by that provision. *Cf. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882, 892 (E.D. Ark. 2021) (finding likelihood of success on a First Amendment challenge to a ban on referrals as part of a similar statute), *aff'd*, 471 F.4th 661, 671–72 (8th Cir. 2022).[7]

---

[6] Defendants also argue that S.E.A. 480 § 13(b) is permissible as "an integral part . . . of a valid . . . statute." Dkt. 54 at 52. But for the reasons explained above, Plaintiffs have some likelihood of success on challenges to other portions of S.E.A. 480 as well.

[7] Because Plaintiffs have shown some likelihood of success for these reasons as to the portions of S.E.A. 480 that they have standing to challenge, the Court does not address Plaintiffs' arguments that S.E.A. 480 (1) denies parents the fundamental right

D. Remaining preliminary injunction factors

1. Irreparable harm

Plaintiffs must also show that they would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. *See Cassell v. Snyders*, 990 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 2021). "Harm is irreparable if legal remedies are inadequate to cure it." *Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc.*, 8 F.4th 531, 545 (7th Cir. 2021). "Inadequate 'does not mean wholly ineffectual; rather, the remedy must be seriously deficient as compared to the harm suffered.'" *Id.*

Minor Plaintiffs argue that they would suffer irreparable harm if S.E.A. 480 took effect because they would have to stop receiving puberty blockers or hormone therapy to treat the severe condition of gender dysphoria. Dkt. 27 at 52–53. Defendants respond that psychotherapy is available as an alternative treatment. Dkt. 54 at 54–55.

Medical harms, including to mental health, can constitute irreparable harm, *Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1*, 858 F.3d 1034, 1044–46 (7th Cir. 2017), and Defendants do not contest that gender dysphoria is a psychiatric diagnosis that requires "clinically significant distress" to diagnose, dkt. 54 at 14. *Accord Brandt*, 551 F. Supp. 3d at 892 (finding irreparable harm on a similar record), *aff'd*, 471 F.4th at 671–72. And—again—there's evidence that puberty blockers and cross-sex hormone therapy reduces distress for some minors diagnosed with gender dysphoria. *See* dkt. 26-1 at 3, 16–17

---

to dictate their children's medical care, (2) violates federal Medicaid law, and (3) violates the Affordable Care Act. Dkt. 27 at 33–49.

(Karasic decl.); dkt. 48-12 at 18, 20 (B. Clawson Dep.) (explaining the effects of treatment on K.C.); dkt. 48-14 at 13–14 (Morris Dep.) (same for A.M.); dkt. 48-15 at 19 (R. Welch Dep.) (same for M.W.); dkt. 48-17 at 20 (Rivera Dep.) (same for M.R.). The risk of irreparable harm therefore supports a preliminary injunction. *See Whitaker*, 858 F.3d at 1045 (The irreparable harm requirement does not "require that the harm be certain to occur before a court may grant relief on the merits. Rather, harm is considered irreparable if it cannot be prevented or fully rectified by the final judgment after trial.").

Plaintiffs have also satisfied the irreparable-harm requirement on their First Amendment speech claim. *See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker*, 453 F.3d 853, 867 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[V]iolations of First Amendment rights are presumed to constitute irreparable injuries.").

2. Balancing

Because Plaintiffs have some likelihood of success on the merits of constitutional claims, a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. *See Whole Woman's Health All. v. Hill*, 937 F.3d 864, 875 (7th Cir. 2019) ("Enforcing a constitutional right is in the public interest."). While the State has a strong interest in enforcing democratically enacted laws, that interest decreases as Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits of their constitutional claims increases. *See Higher Soc'y of Ind. v. Tippecanoe Cty.*, 858 F.3d 1113, 1116 (7th Cir. 2017). And for the reasons above, Plaintiffs risk suffering irreparable harm absent an injunction. As a result, the balance of harms favors granting a preliminary injunction against the portions of S.E.A. 480 that Plaintiffs have

some likelihood of success in challenging. *See Mays v. Dart*, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020).

3. Bond Requirement

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)'s bond requirement is waived. *See BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Cap. Premium Fin., Inc.*, 912 F.3d 1054, 1058 (7th Cir. 2019). "There is no reason to require a bond" in a case in which "the court is satisfied that there's no danger that the opposing party will incur any damages from the injunction." *Habitat Educ. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 607 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, Defendants have not argued a likelihood of money damages or requested a bond. Any party may request an injunction bond while this case remains pending.

E. Scope of the injunction

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to a partial injunction preventing the enforcement of S.E.A. 480's prohibitions on:

(1) gender transition procedures, except gender reassignment surgery, S.E.A. 480 § 13(a); and

(2) "aid[ing] or abet[ting] another physician or practitioner in the provision of" prohibited gender transition procedures to a minor, as applied to speech, *id.* § 13(b). The injunction will run against the regulated speech Plaintiffs have identified—providing patients with information, making referrals to other medical providers, and providing medical records or other information to other medical providers.

Defendants briefly argue that any injunction must be limited to the named plaintiffs. Dkt. 54 at 55–56. They rely on *Doe v. Rokita*, which identified "a problem with the remedy" when a court provides final relief enjoining a statute's application to non-parties without certifying a class action. *Id.* (citing 54 F.4th 518, 519 (7th Cir. 2022)). *Doe*, however, does not apply here because Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction while their motion for class certification remains pending. *See* dkt. 10; *Kartman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 634 F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2011). Therefore, for the reasons in the Court's order regarding a stay of class-certification briefing, the Court can use its equitable power to issue an injunction prohibiting Defendants from enforcing the enjoined portions of S.E.A. 480 against any provider, as to any minor. *See* dkt. 41 ("[A] court may issue a classwide preliminary injunction in a putative class action suit prior to a ruling on the class certification motion . . . .").[8]

[8] Indeed, briefing on class-certification was stayed at Defendants' request. And Defendants' submissions in support of that request did not mention their view that a stay would later preclude preliminary relief beyond the named plaintiffs. Dkt. 29. Defendants' counsel do not explain why it's appropriate to file such a motion to stay and then raise their view of the scope of available relief for the first time more than a month later in their preliminary-injunction response brief. *See* dkt. 54.

IV.
Conclusion

Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is **GRANTED in part**. Dkt. [9].[9] A separate injunction shall issue contemporaneously with this order. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d).

The assigned magistrate judge is asked to enter a case management plan for resolving this case. The Court will then set a trial date.

SO ORDERED.

Date: 6/16/2023

James Patrick Hanlon
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All electronically registered counsel

[9] The motion for leave to file brief as *amici curiae* of Arkansas, Alabama, and 14 other states is **GRANTED**. Dkt. [53].

Exhibit F

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

JANE DOE et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. CASE NO. 4:23cv114-RH-MAF

JOSEPH A. LADAPO et al.,

Defendants.
_____/

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

This action presents a constitutional challenge to a Florida statute and rules that (1) prohibit transgender minors from receiving specific kinds of widely accepted medical care and (2) prohibit doctors from providing it. The treatments at issue are GnRH agonists, colloquially known as "puberty blockers," and cross-sex hormones. This order grants a preliminary injunction.

I. Background: the parties, record, and motions

Each of the seven plaintiffs is the parent of a transgender child on whose behalf this action is brought. Three have moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. One child's doctors say she needs GnRH agonists now, without delay; doctors for the other two say they will need GnRH agonists soon.

The needs of the other plaintiffs' children are less immediate, so they have not joined the emergency motions.

The defendants are the Florida Surgeon General, the Florida Board of Medicine and its members, the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine and its members, the Florida Attorney General, and each of Florida's 20 State Attorneys. The individuals are defendants only in their official capacities. This order refers to the Surgeon General, the Boards, and their members as the "medical defendants." The order refers to the Attorney General and State Attorneys as the "law-enforcement defendants."

The parties have stipulated to submission of the pending motions based on the written filings in this case and the record compiled in a separate case in this court with overlapping issues, *Dekker v. Weida*, No. 4:22cv325-RH-MAF.[1] A complete bench trial has been conducted in that case.

The plaintiffs and the medical defendants have fully briefed the issues in this case and have presented oral argument. The law-enforcement defendants have chosen to rely on the medical defendants and not to present their own briefs or oral argument. The Attorney General has moved to dismiss on procedural grounds applicable only to her; that motion will be addressed in a separate order.

[1] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker v. Weida*, No. 4:22cv325, ECF No. 239 at 174–75. Citations including "*Dekker*" refer to the docket in that case.

The motion for a preliminary injunction is ripe for a decision. This moots any need for separate consideration of a temporary restraining order.

II. Preliminary-injunction standards

As a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction does not issue, that the threatened injury outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause a defendant, and that the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. *See, e.g.*, *Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox*, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005); *Siegel v. LePore*, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

III. Gender identity is real

With extraordinarily rare exceptions not at issue here, every person is born with external sex characteristics, male or female, and chromosomes that match. As the person goes through life, the person also has a gender identity—a deeply felt internal sense of being male or female.[2] For more than 99% of people, the external sex characteristics and chromosomes—the determinants of what this order calls the person's natal sex—match the person's gender identity.[3]

[2] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 23–24; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 238 at 72–73.

[3] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 222.

For less than 1%, the natal sex and gender identity are opposites: a natal male's gender identity is female, or vice versa.[4] This order refers to such a person who identifies as female as a transgender female and to such a person who identifies as male as a transgender male. This order refers to individuals whose gender identity matches their natal sex as cisgender.

The elephant in the room should be noted at the outset. Gender identity is real. The record makes this clear. The medical defendants, speaking through their attorneys, have admitted it. At least one defense expert also has admitted it.[5] That expert is Dr. Stephen B. Levine, the only defense expert who has actually treated a significant number of transgender patients. He addressed the issues conscientiously, on the merits, rather than as a biased advocate.

Despite the defense admissions, there are those who believe that cisgender individuals properly adhere to their natal sex and that transgender individuals have inappropriately *chosen* a contrary gender identity, male or female, just as one might choose whether to read Shakespeare or Grisham. Many people with this view tend to disapprove all things transgender and so oppose medical care that supports a person's transgender existence.[6] In this litigation, the medical

[4] *Id.*; *see also* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 23–24; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 29–31.
[5] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 10–11, 31–32, 80–81.
[6] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 129–31.

defendants have explicitly acknowledged that this view is wrong and that pushing individuals away from their transgender identity is not a legitimate state interest.

Still, an unspoken suggestion running just below the surface in some of the proceedings that led to adoption of the statute and rules at issue—and just below the surface in the testimony of some of the defense experts—is that transgender identity is not real, that it is made up.[7] And so, for example, one of the defendants' experts, Dr. Paul Hruz, joined an amicus brief in another proceeding asserting transgender individuals have only a "false belief" in their gender identity—that they are maintaining a "charade" or "delusion."[8] Another defense expert, Dr. Patrick Lappert—a surgeon who has never performed gender-affirming surgery—said in a radio interview that gender-affirming care is a "lie," a "moral violation," a "huge evil," and "diabolical."[9] State employees or consultants suggested treatment of transgender individuals is either a "woke idea" or profiteering by the pharmaceutical industry or doctors.[10]

---

[7] *See, e.g.*, Pls.' Exs. 284 & 285 in *Dekker*, ECF Nos. 182-21 & 182-22; *see also* Pls.' Ex. 304 in *Dekker*, ECF No. 183-6.

[8] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 238 at 194–95. Dr. Hruz fended and parried questions and generally testified as a deeply biased advocate, not as an expert sharing relevant evidence-based information and opinions. I do not credit his testimony. I credit other defense experts only to the extent consistent with this opinion.

[9] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 129–31.

[10] Pls.' Ex. 304 in *Dekker*, ECF No. 183-6; Pls.' Exs. 284 & 285 in *Dekker*, ECF Nos. 182-21 & 182-22.

Any proponent of the challenged statute and rules should put up or shut up: do you acknowledge that there are individuals with actual gender identities opposite their natal sex, or do you not? Dog whistles ought not be tolerated.

IV. The challenged statute and rules

The challenged parts of the statute and rules apply to patients under age 18.

The statute prohibits the use of "puberty blockers" to "stop or delay normal puberty in order to affirm a person's perception of his or her sex if that perception is inconsistent with the person's [natal] sex." Fla. Stat. § 456.001(9)(a)1.; *see id.* § 456.52. And the statute prohibits the use of "hormones or hormone antagonists to affirm a person's perception of his or her sex if that perception is inconsistent with the person's [natal] sex." *Id.* § 456.001(9)(a)2. The statute makes violation of these provisions a crime and grounds for terminating a healthcare practitioner's license. *See id.* § 456.52(1) & (5).

The statute has exceptions, including, for example, for use of these products during a transition away from them, but the exceptions are not relevant here. And the statute has other provisions, including a prohibition on transgender surgeries, but those provisions, too, are not at issue here.

The challenged rules were adopted by the Florida Board of Medicine and the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine. In identical language, the rules prohibit the Boards' licensed practitioners from treating "gender dysphoria in minors" with

"[p]uberty blocking, hormone, or hormone antagonist therapies." Fla. Admin. Code r. 64B8-9.019(1)(b); Fla. Admin Code r. 64B15-14.014(1)(b).

V. The standards of care

Transgender individuals suffer higher rates of anxiety, depression, suicidal ideation, and suicide than the population at large.[11] Some suffer gender dysphoria, a mental-health condition recognized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition ("DSM-5"). The diagnosis applies when specific criteria are met. Among other things, there must be a marked incongruence between one's experienced gender identity and natal sex for at least six months, manifested in specified ways, and clinically significant distress or impairment.[12]

There are well-established standards of care for treatment of gender dysphoria. These are set out in two publications: first, the Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guidelines for the Treatment of Gender Dysphoria; and second, the World Professional Association for Transgender Health ("WPATH") Standards of Care, version 8.[13] I credit the abundant testimony in this record that these standards are widely followed by well-trained clinicians.[14] The standards are used

[11] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 108.
[12] Pls.' Ex. 33 in *Dekker*, ECF No. 175-33 at 2–3; *see also* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 25–26; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 238 at 71.
[13] Defs.' Exs. 16 & 24 in *Dekker*, ECF Nos. 193-16 & 193-24.
[14] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 31 (psychiatrist); *id.* at 198 (pediatric endocrinologist); Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 50–52 (surgeon); *id.* at 106,

by insurers[15] and have been endorsed by the United States Department of Health and Human Services.[16]

Under the standards, gender-dysphoria treatment begins with a comprehensive biopsychosocial assessment.[17] In addition to any appropriate mental-health therapy, there are three types of possible medical intervention, all available only to adolescents or adults, never younger children.[18]

First, for patients at or near the onset of puberty, medications known as GnRH agonists can delay the onset or continuation of puberty and thus can reduce the development of secondary sex characteristics inconsistent with the patient's gender identity—breasts for transgender males, whiskers for transgender females, changes in body shape, and other physical effects.[19]

Second, cross-sex hormones—testosterone for transgender males, estrogen for transgender females—can promote the development and maintenance of characteristics consistent with the patient's gender identity and can limit the development and maintenance of characteristics consistent with the patient's natal

---

112–14 (pediatrician, bioethicist, medical researcher); Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 15 (physician specializing in pediatrics and adolescent medicine).

[15] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 243–44.

[16] *See* Defs.' Ex. 2 in *Dekker*, ECF No. 193-2.

[17] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 42–43.

[18] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 238 at 72 & 74–75; *see also* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 14; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 36 & 176.

[19] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 194–97; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 27–28.

sex.[20] For patients treated with GnRH agonists, use of cross-sex hormones typically begins when use of GnRH agonists ends.[21] Cross-sex hormones also can be used later in life, regardless of whether a patient was treated with GnRH agonists.

Third, for some patients, surgery can align physical characteristics with gender identity, to some extent.[22] The most common example: mastectomy can remove a transgender male's breasts. Perhaps 98% of all such surgeries are performed on adults, not minors.[23]

The motions now before the court deal directly only with GnRH agonists. The motions deal indirectly with cross-sex hormones, because to achieve their intended result, GnRH agonists are ordinarily followed by cross-sex hormones. The motions do not present any issue related to surgeries.

VI. General acceptance of the standards of care

The overwhelming weight of medical authority supports treatment of transgender patients with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones in appropriate circumstances. Organizations who have formally recognized this include the American Academy of Pediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent

[20] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 217–26, 228.
[21] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 87–90.
[22] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 42.
[23] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 43.

Psychiatry, American Academy of Family Physicians, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, American Psychiatric Association, and at least a dozen more.[24] The record also includes statements from hundreds of professionals supporting this care.[25] At least as shown by this record, not a single reputable medical association has taken a contrary position.

These medications—GnRH agonists, testosterone, and estrogen—have been used for decades to treat other conditions. Their safety records and overall effects are well known. The Food and Drug Administration has approved their use, though not specifically to treat gender dysphoria.[26]

GnRH agonists are routinely used to treat patients with central precocious puberty—children who have begun puberty prematurely—as well as, in some circumstances, endometriosis and prostate cancer.[27] Central precocious puberty presents substantial health risks and ordinarily should be treated. GnRH agonists are an appropriate treatment, even though GnRH agonists have attendant risks.[28]

---

[24] *See* Pls.' Exs. 36–43, 45–48 in *Dekker*, ECF Nos. 175-36 through 176-8 (omitting ECF No. 176-4).
[25] *See* Amicus Brief of American Academies and Health Organizations, ECF No. 36-1; Bruggeman et al., *We 300 Florida health care professionals say the state gets transgender guidance wrong* (Apr. 27, 2022), *Dekker* ECF No. 11-1 at 11–32.
[26] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 183; *see also* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 54–56.
[27] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 183–84, 200–02.
[28] *Id.*

So, too, gender dysphoria presents substantial health risks and ordinarily should be treated.[29] For some patients, GnRH agonists are an appropriate treatment, even though, just as with their use to treat central precocious puberty and other conditions, GnRH agonists have attendant risks.[30]

The medical defendants say the risks attendant to use of GnRH agonists to treat central precocious puberty or to treat gender dysphoria are not identical, and that may be so. But it is still true that for gender dysphoria, just as for central precocious puberty, GnRH agonists are an effective treatment whose benefits can outweigh the risks.

The same is true for cross-sex hormones. Testosterone and estrogen are routinely used to treat cisgender patients in appropriate circumstances.[31] The medications are an effective treatment for conditions that should be treated, even though the medications have attendant risks.[32] That is so for cisgender and transgender patients alike. For some transgender patients, cross-sex hormones are an appropriate treatment.

Even the defendants' expert Dr. Levine testified that treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones is sometimes appropriate.[33] He would demand

---

[29] *Id.*
[30] *Id.* at 201–16.
[31] *Id.* at 216.
[32] *Id.* at 218–29.
[33] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 81–83.

appropriate safeguards, as discussed below, but he would not ban the treatments.[34] Nothing in this record suggests these plaintiffs do not qualify for treatment under Dr. Levine's proposed safeguards.

VII. Clinical evidence supporting the standards of care

The record includes testimony of well-qualified doctors who have treated thousands of transgender patients with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones over their careers and have achieved excellent results. I credit the testimony of Dr. Dan Karasic (psychiatrist), Dr. Daniel Shumer (pediatric endocrinologist), Dr. Aron Janssen (child and adolescent psychiatrist), Dr. Johanna Olson-Kennedy (specialist in pediatrics and adolescent medicine), and Dr. Armand Antommaria (pediatrician and bioethicist). I credit their testimony that denial of this treatment will cause needless suffering for a substantial number of patients and will increase anxiety, depression, and the risk of suicide.

The clinical evidence would support, though certainly not mandate, a decision by a reasonable patient and parent, in consultation with properly trained practitioners, to use GnRH agonists at or near the onset of puberty and to use cross-sex hormones later, even when fully apprised of the current state of medical knowledge and all attendant risks. There is no rational basis for a state to categorically ban these treatments.

---

[34] *Id.* at 91–94.

The record includes no evidence that these treatments have caused substantial adverse clinical results in properly screened and treated patients.

VIII. The plaintiffs

The plaintiffs and their children are proceeding under pseudonyms. The plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction are Jane Doe on behalf of Susan Doe, Gloria Goe on behalf of Gavin Goe, and Linda Loe on behalf of Lisa Loe.

A. Susan Doe

Susan Doe is an 11-year-old transgender girl. From a young age, she consistently told her mother she was a girl. She experienced extreme anxiety and distress about wearing boys' clothing.[35] Her mother sought help from a pediatrician, who said Susan should be allowed to dress and play as made her comfortable. Despite fears, her mother allowed her to wear girls' clothes and socially transition. This made Susan a "different child" who was "happy, glowing, [and] secure."[36]

Susan's school peers know her as a girl.[37] They do not know she is transgender. Her legal documentation and government-issued identification say she is female.[38]

---

[35] Jane Doe Decl., ECF No. 30-1 at 2–3 ¶ 8.
[36] *Id.* at 3 ¶ 12.
[37] *Id.* at 4 ¶ 14.
[38] *Id.* ¶ 16.

Susan's treating professionals have included the physician at the Pentagon who oversees the United States military's transgender health program[39] and a multidisciplinary team at the University of Florida Health Youth Gender Program.[40] All of Susan's providers have determined GnRH agonists will be medically necessary when she begins puberty—that is, when she reaches the puberty classification denominated Tanner stage II. This could happen any day.[41]

The statute and rules at issue, unless enjoined, will force Susan to go through male puberty. This will "out" her as transgender to her peers and will have devasting physical, emotional, and psychological effects.

B. Gavin Goe

Gloria Goe is the mother of Gavin Goe, an eight-year-old transgender boy. From a very young age, Gavin wanted short hair, masculine clothing, and a boy's name. He experienced distress and asked his mother why no one believed he was a boy.[42] His mother came to understand Gavin was transgender, and she sought to learn how best to support and love her child. She allowed Gavin to socially

[39] *Id.* at 4–5 ¶ 17.
[40] *Id.* at 5 ¶¶ 18–19.
[41] *Id.* at 6 ¶ 20.
[42] Gloria Goe Decl., ECF No. 30-3 at 3 ¶ 10.

transition, including by using a boy's name and wearing boy's clothing.[43] Gavin's teacher, counselor, and principal know Gavin is transgender, but his peers do not.[44]

Gavin's pediatrician referred him to a psychologist for treatment of gender dysphoria, anxiety, and depression.[45] Now, at age eight, Gavin is younger than the average age of puberty onset, but his sister began puberty at age nine, so Gavin, too, may begin puberty early.[46] The pediatrician has referred Gavin to a pediatric endocrinologist at the Johns Hopkins Children's Hospital gender clinic in St. Petersburg, Florida, to assess possible treatment with GnRH agonists.[47] Gavin had an appointment, but it was canceled when the Board of Medicine adopted the rule prohibiting doctors from providing this kind of care.[48]

C. Lisa Loe

Linda Loe is the mother of Lisa Loe, an 11-year-old transgender girl. Lisa has always gravitated toward interests and activities more stereotypically associated with girls. At age 9, Lisa told her mother she was a girl.

Lisa suffered gender dysphoria.[49] Her family sought the care of a psychologist. Lisa was allowed to socially transition, and her happiness and well-

---

[43] *Id.* ¶ 11.
[44] *Id.* at 3–4 ¶ 14.
[45] *See* ECF No. 86 at 9.
[46] Gloria Goe Decl., ECF No. 30-3 at 4 ¶ 15; *see id.* at 8.
[47] Gloria Goe Decl., ECF No. 30-3 at 4 ¶ 17; *see also* ECF No. 86 at 9.
[48] Gloria Goe Decl., ECF No. 30-3 at 4 ¶ 17.
[49] Linda Loe Decl., ECF No. 30-2 at 3 ¶ 7.

being improved.[50] But her classmates and teachers continued to treat her as a boy, causing more distress. Her mother eventually decided to move Lisa to a more supportive and inclusive school.

Lisa's pediatrician referred her to a pediatric endocrinologist who specializes in the treatment of gender dysphoria.[51] The endocrinologist in turn referred Lisa to a gender clinic.[52] She has begun puberty and needs GnRH agonists without further delay.[53]

Lisa has become extremely anxious as her puberty progresses.[54]

D. Findings on appropriate treatment

I find, based on the record now before the court, that the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that they have obtained appropriate medical care for their children to this point, that qualified professionals have properly evaluated the children's medical conditions and needs in accordance with the well-established standards of care, and that the plaintiffs and their children, in consultation with their treating professionals, have determined that the benefits of treatment with GnRH agonists, and eventually with cross-sex hormones, will outweigh the risks. I find that the plaintiffs' ability to evaluate the benefits and risks of treating their

---

[50] *Id.*
[51] *Id.* at 4 ¶ 10.
[52] ECF No. 86 at 1–2.
[53] Linda Loe Decl., ECF No. 30-2 at 4 ¶ 11; *see also* ECF No. 86 at 2.
[54] Linda Loe Decl., ECF No. 30-2 at 5 ¶ 12.

individual children this way far exceeds the ability of the State of Florida to do so. I find that the plaintiffs' motivation is love for their children and the desire to achieve the best possible treatment for them. This is not the State's motivation.

IX. Equal protection

The plaintiffs assert banning treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The only circuit that has addressed the issue agrees. In *Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022), the Eighth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against enforcement of an Arkansas statute identical in relevant respects to the statute at issue here. The decision is on point, well reasoned, and should be followed. But as an Eighth Circuit decision, it is not binding.

A. Introduction to levels of scrutiny

Equal-protection analysis often starts with attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny: strict, intermediate, or rational-basis.

There was a time when the Supreme Court seemed to treat strict scrutiny and rational basis as exhaustive categories of equal-protection review. A leading commentator said that in some situations the first category was "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" while the second called for "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact." Gerald Gunther, *The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—*

Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).

But in the decades since, the Supreme Court has applied *intermediate* scrutiny in many circumstances. And rational-basis review no longer means virtually no review. *See, e.g.*, *Romer v. Evans*, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a state law restricting local ordinances protecting gays: "[E]ven in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation between the classification adopted and the object to be attained."); *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, an ordinance requiring group-care facilities for the mentally handicapped, but not other facilities with multiple occupants, to obtain land-use permits); *Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor*, 472 U.S. 612, 623 (1985) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a tax exemption for Vietnam War veterans limited to those who resided in the state on May 8, 1976); *United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno*, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down, for lack of a legitimate rational basis, a statute denying food stamps to members of a household with unrelated members).

In short, regardless of the level of scrutiny, there is no substitute for careful, unbiased, intellectually honest analysis. Still, the level of scrutiny matters, so this order addresses it.

B. Intermediate scrutiny applies here

The plaintiffs say the challenged statute and rules discriminate on the basis of sex and transgender status and that either alone would be sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny. The defendants say only rational-basis scrutiny applies. The plaintiffs have the better of it.

1. Sex

It is well established that drawing lines based on sex triggers intermediate scrutiny. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); *Adams v. St. Johns Cnty.*, 57 F.4th 791 801 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). If one must know the sex of a person to know whether or how a provision applies to the person, the provision draws a line based on sex. *See, e.g.*, *Bostock v. Clayton Cnty.*, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801. The defendants do not deny this; instead, they say the challenged statute does not draw a line based on sex.

But it does. Consider an adolescent, perhaps age 16, that a physician wishes to treat with testosterone. Under the challenged statute, is the treatment legal or illegal? To know the answer, one must know the adolescent's sex. If the adolescent is a natal male, the treatment is legal. If the adolescent is a natal female, the

treatment is illegal. This is a line drawn on the basis of sex, plain and simple. *See Brandt*, 47 F.4th at 669 ("Because the minor's sex at birth determines whether or not the minor can receive certain types of medical care under the law, [the law] discriminates on the basis of sex."); *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (applying intermediate scrutiny to a policy under which entry into a designated bathroom was legal or not depending on the entrant's natal sex).

In asserting the contrary, the defendants note that the reason for the treatment—the diagnosis—is different for the natal male and natal female. Indeed it is. But this does not change the fact that this is differential treatment based on sex. The *reason* for sex-based differential treatment is the purported *justification* for treating the natal male and natal female differently—the justification that must survive intermediate scrutiny. One can survive—but cannot avoid—intermediate scrutiny by saying there is a good reason for treating a male and female differently.

2. Gender nonconformity

Drawing a line based on gender nonconformity—this includes transgender status—also triggers intermediate scrutiny. *See Glenn v. Brumby*, 663 F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011). Although the defendants deny it, the statute and rules at issue draw lines based on transgender status. *See Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131, 1147 (M.D. Ala. 2022) (citing *Glenn*, 663 F.3d at 1317).

To confirm this, consider a child that a physician wishes to treat with GnRH agonists to delay the onset of puberty. Is the treatment legal or illegal? To know the answer, one must know whether the child is cisgender or transgender. The treatment is legal if the child is cisgender but illegal if the child is transgender, because the statute prohibits GnRH agonists only for transgender children, not for anyone else. The theoretical but remote-to-the-point-of-nonexistent possibility that a child will be identified as transgender before needing GnRH agonists for the treatment of central precocious puberty does not change the essential nature of the distinction.

Adverse treatment of transgender individuals should trigger intermediate scrutiny for another reason, too. In *United States v. Carolene Products Co.*, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), the Court suggested heightened scrutiny might be appropriate for statutes showing "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." Courts have continued to apply the discrete-and-insular-minority construct. *See, e.g.*, *Foley v. Connelie*, 435 U.S. 291, 294–95 (1978) (citing *Carolene Products* and noting that "close scrutiny" applies to equal-protection claims of resident aliens, who lack access to the political process); *Estrada v. Becker*, 917 F.3d 1298, 1310 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing *Carolene Products*; recognizing that, under *Foley*, heightened scrutiny applies to resident aliens; but declining to afford the same

treatment to illegal immigrants). Transgender individuals are a discrete and insular minority.

The Supreme Court further explained this basis for heightened scrutiny in *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center*, 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985). There the Court declined to extend strict or even intermediate scrutiny to intellectually disabled individuals—those with very limited mental ability. But the Court gave two explanations that support a different result for transgender individuals.

First, *City of Cleburne* noted that strict scrutiny applies when the characteristic at issue is almost never a legitimate reason for governmental action. Race is the paradigm—leaving aside affirmative action as a remedy for prior discrimination, it is almost never appropriate to parcel out government benefits or burdens based on race. Transgender status is much the same. Transgender status is rarely an appropriate basis on which to parcel out government benefits or burdens.

Second, *Carolene Products* and *Foley* both referred to a minority's lack of political voice as a basis for heightened scrutiny. *City of Cleburne* noted that the class of intellectually disabled individuals had garnered considerable public and political support—that this was not a class lacking political access. The same is not true of transgender individuals, who continue to suffer widespread private opprobrium and governmental discrimination, notably in the statute and rules now under review. This is precisely the kind of government action, targeted at a discrete

and insular minority, for which heightened scrutiny is appropriate. *See Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd.*, 972 F.3d 586, 607 (4th Cir. 2020) (holding transgenders are a quasi-suspect class); *Karnoski v. Trump*, 926 F.3d 1180, 1201 (9th Cir. 2019) (same). *But see Adams*, 57 F.4th at 803 n.5 (noting that whether transgender status is a quasi-suspect class was not at issue there but, in dictum, expressing "grave doubt").

In any event, *City of Cleburne* is important for another reason, too. The Court applied rational-basis scrutiny, but it was *meaningful* rational-basis scrutiny. The Court did not blindly accept a proffered reason for the city's action that did not withstand meaningful analysis. The defendants' proffered reasons here, like those in *City of Cleburne*, do not withstand meaningful analysis. *See Brandt ex rel. Brandt v. Rutledge*, 47 F.4th 661 (8th Cir. 2022) (affirming a preliminary injunction and holding the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their equal-protection challenge to an Arkansas statute banning gender-affirming care for minors); *Eknes-Tucker v. Marshall*, 603 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (M.D. Ala. May 13, 2022) (granting a preliminary injunction and holding plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their equal-protection and parental-rights challenge to Alabama's ban on puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones).

3. Cases involving identical, not different, treatment of classes

In opposing heightened scrutiny, the defendants cite *Geduldig v. Aiello*, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), for the proposition that heightened scrutiny does not apply when there are members of the allegedly disfavored class on both sides of the challenged classification. *Geduldig* held that exclusion of pregnancy from state employees' health coverage was not sex discrimination. Some women become pregnant, some do not. The defendants say this is why the challenged provision did not discriminate based on sex—there were women on both sides. Note, though, that men and women were treated the same: nobody had health coverage for pregnancy. When men and women are treated the same, the Court reasoned, it is not intentional sex discrimination, even if the challenged provision has a disparate impact.

The situation is different here. Transgender and cisgender individuals are not treated the same. Cisgender individuals can be and routinely are treated with GnRH agonists, testosterone, or estrogen, when they and their doctors deem it appropriate. Not so for transgender individuals—the challenged statute and rules prohibit it. To know whether treatment with any of these medications is legal, one must know whether the patient is transgender. And to know whether treatment with testosterone or estrogen is legal, one must know the patient's natal sex.

This is differential treatment based on sex and transgender status. *Geduldig* is not to the contrary. Intermediate scrutiny applies.

C. Applying the proper level of scrutiny

To survive intermediate scrutiny, a state must show that its classification is substantially related to a sufficiently important interest. *Adams*, 57 F.4th at 801 (cleaned up); *see also Glenn*, 663 F.3d at 1316. To survive rational-basis scrutiny, a state must show a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. *Romer*, 517 U.S. at 631. The challenged statute and rules survive neither level of scrutiny.

The record establishes that for some patients, including the three now at issue, a treatment regimen of mental-health therapy followed by GnRH agonists and eventually by cross-sex hormones is the best available treatment. These patients and their parents, in consultation with their doctors and multidisciplinary teams, have rationally chosen this treatment. The State of Florida's decision to ban the treatment is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Dissuading a person from conforming to the person's gender identity rather than to the person's natal sex is not a legitimate state interest. The medical defendants have acknowledged this.[55] But the state's disapproval of transgender status—of a person's gender identity when it does not match the person's natal

[55] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 242 at 97–98.

sex—was a substantial motivating factor in enactment of the challenged statute and rules.

Discouraging individuals from pursuing their gender identities, when different from their natal sex, was also a substantial motivating factor. In a "fact sheet," the Florida Department of Health asserted social transitioning, which involves no medical intervention at all, should not be a treatment option for children or adolescents.[56] Nothing could have motivated this remarkable intrusion into parental prerogatives other than opposition to transgender status itself.

State action motivated by purposeful discrimination, even if otherwise lawful, violates the Equal Protection Clause. *See Adams*, 57 F.4th at 810 (recognizing that an otherwise neutral law still violates the Equal Protection Clause when it is "motivated by 'purposeful discrimination'") (citing *Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979)); *see also Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State for Ala.*, 992 F.3d 1299, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2021). The statute and rules at issue were motivated in substantial part by the plainly illegitimate purposes of disapproving transgender status and discouraging individuals from pursuing their honest gender identities. This was purposeful discrimination against transgenders.

The plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their equal-protection claim.

---

[56] Defs.' Ex. 5 in *Dekker*, ECF No. 193-5 at 1.

X. Parental rights

The plaintiffs also assert a claim under the Due Process Clause, which protects a parent's right to control a child's medical treatment. *See, e.g.*, *Troxel v. Granville*, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality); *Parham v. J.R.*, 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979); *Maddox v. Stephens*, 727 F.3d 1109, 1118–19 (11th Cir. 2013); *Bendiburg v. Dempsey*, 909 F.2d 463, 470 (11th Cir. 1990).

The defendants say a parent's right to control a child's medical treatment does not give the parent a right to insist on treatment that is properly prohibited on other grounds. Quite so. If the state could properly prohibit the treatments at issue as unsafe, parents would have no right to override the state's decision. But as set out above, there is no rational basis, let alone a basis that would survive heightened scrutiny, for prohibiting these treatments in appropriate circumstances.

The plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their parental-rights claim.

XI. The pretextual justifications for the statute and rules

In support of their position, the defendants have proffered a laundry list of purported justifications for the statute and rules. The purported justifications are largely pretextual and, in any event, do not call for a different result.

A. "Low quality" evidence

A methodology often used for evaluating medical studies—for evaluating research-generated evidence on the safety and efficacy of any given course of

treatment—is known as Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation ("GRADE"). The defendants stridently assert that the evidence supporting the treatments at issue is "low" or "very low" quality as those terms are used in the GRADE system. But the evidence on the other side—the evidence purportedly showing these treatments are ineffective or unsafe—is far weaker, not just of "low" or "very low" quality. Indeed, evidence suggesting these treatments are ineffective is nonexistent.

The choice these plaintiffs face is binary: to use GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones, or not. It is no answer to say the evidence on the yes side is weak when the evidence on the no side is weaker or nonexistent. There is substantial and persuasive, though not conclusive, research showing favorable results from these treatments.[57] A decision for the three patients at issue cannot wait for further or better research; the treatment decision must be made now.

Moreover, the fact that research-generated evidence supporting these treatments gets classified as "low" or "very low" quality on the GRADE scale does not mean the evidence is not persuasive, or that it is not the best available research-generated evidence on the question of how to treat gender dysphoria, or that medical treatments should not be provided consistent with the research results and clinical evidence.

[57] *See, e.g.*, Trial Tr. in Dekker, ECF No. 228 at 41–42.

It is commonplace for medical treatments to be provided even when supported only by research producing evidence classified as "low" or "very low" on this scale.[58] The record includes unrebutted testimony that only about 13.5% of accepted medical treatments across all disciplines are supported by "high" quality evidence on the GRADE scale.[59] The defendants' assertion that treatment should be banned based on the supporting research's GRADE score is a misuse of the GRADE system.

We put band-aids on cuts to keep dirt out not because there is "high" quality research-generated evidence supporting the practice but because we know, from clinical experience, that cuts come with a risk of infection and band-aids can reduce the risk.

Gender dysphoria is far more complicated, and one cannot know, with the same level of confidence, how to treat it. But there is now extensive clinical experience showing excellent results from treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. If these treatments are prohibited, many patients will suffer needlessly.[60] The extensive clinical evidence is important and indeed persuasive

[58] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 98–101.
[59] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 68–69.
[60] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 64; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 238 at 97–98.

evidence, even if the supporting research has produced only "low" or "very low" quality evidence on the GRADE scale.

When facing a binary decision to use or not use GnRH agonists or hormones, a reasonable decisionmaker would consider the evidence on the yes side, as well as the weaker evidence on the no side. Calling the evidence on the yes side "low" or "very low" quality would not rationally control the decision.

B. Risks attendant to treatment

The defendants assert there are risks attendant to treatment with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. Indeed there are. There are legitimate concerns about fertility and sexuality that a child entering puberty is not well-equipped to evaluate and for which parents may be less-than-perfect decisionmakers. There is a risk of misdiagnosis, though the requirement in the standards of care for careful analysis by a multidisciplinary team should minimize the risk. There is a risk that a child later confronted with the bias that is part of our world will come to believe it would have been better to try to pass as cisgender.

There also are studies suggesting not that there *are* but that there *may be* additional medical risks. An unreplicated study found that sheep who took GnRH agonists became worse at negotiating a maze, at least for a time. Another study showed a not-statistically-significant but nonetheless-concerning decrease in IQ among cisgender children treated for central precocious puberty with GnRH

agonists. These and other studies cited by the defendants would surely be rated low or very-low quality on the GRADE scale and, more importantly, are not very persuasive. The latter study has not led to a ban on the use of GnRH agonists to treat central precocious puberty. One cannot know from these studies whether treating transgender adolescents with GnRH agonists will cause comparable adverse results in some patients. But the risk that they will is a risk a decisionmaker should reasonably consider.

That there are risks does not end the inquiry. There are also substantial benefits for the overwhelming majority of patients treated with GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. And there are risks attendant to *not* using these treatments, including the risk—in some instances, the near certainty—of anxiety and depression and even suicidal ideation. The challenged statute ignores the benefits that many patients realize from these treatments and the substantial risk posed by foregoing the treatments—the risk from failing to pursue what is, for many, the most effective available treatment of gender dysphoria. One of the *Dekker* plaintiffs attempted suicide four times before beginning successful treatment with cross-sex hormones; he is now thriving.[61]

If the three plaintiffs at issue here do not start GnRH agonists soon, they will go through puberty consistent with their natal sex. They will live with the

[61] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 150 & 166–67.

consequences for the rest of their lives. The likelihood is very high that they will suffer attendant adverse mental-health consequences. If, on the other hand, they *do* get GnRH agonists, they will avoid some of the adverse consequences. They also will face attendant risks.

Risks attend many kinds of medical treatment, perhaps most. Ordinarily it is the patient, in consultation with the doctor, who weighs the risks and benefits and chooses a course of treatment. What is remarkable about the challenged statute and rules is not that they address medical treatments with both risks and benefits but that they arrogate to the state the right to make the decision. And worse, the statute and rules make the same decision for everybody, without considering any patient's individual circumstances. The statute and rules do this in contravention of widely accepted standards of care.

That there are risks of the kind presented here is not a rational basis for denying patients the option to choose this treatment.

C. Bias in medical organizations

The defendants say the many professional organizations that have endorsed treatment of gender dysphoria with GnRH agonists and hormones all have it wrong. The defendants say, in effect, that the organizations were dominated by individuals who pursued good politics, not good medicine.

If ever a pot called a kettle black, it is here. The statute and the rules were an exercise in politics, not good medicine.

This is a politically fraught area. There has long been, and still is, substantial bigotry directed at transgender individuals. Common experience confirms this, as does a Florida legislator's remarkable reference to transgender witnesses at a committee hearing as "mutants" and "demons."[62] And even when not based on bigotry, there are those who incorrectly but sincerely believe that gender identity is not real but instead just a choice. This is, as noted above, the elephant in the room.

Where there is bigotry, there are usually—one hopes, always—opponents of bigotry. It is hardly surprising that doctors who understand that transgender identity can be real, not made up—doctors who are willing to provide supportive medical care—oppose anti-transgender bigotry.

It sometimes happens that opponents of bigotry deem opposing viewpoints bigoted even when they are not. And it sometimes happens that those with

---

[62] *Hearing on Facility Requirements Based on Sex*, CS/HB 1521 2023 Session (Fla. Apr. 10, 2023), https://www.myfloridahouse.gov/VideoPlayer.aspx?eventID=8804 (time stamp 2:30:35 to 2:34:10). Representative Webster Barnaby said to transgender Florida citizens who spoke at the hearing that they were "mutants living among us on Planet Earth." He raised his voice and said, "[T]his is Planet Earth, where God created men, male and women, female!" He continued: "[T]he Lord rebuke you Satan and all of your demons and imps that come parade before us. That's right I called you demons and imps who come and parade before us and pretend that you are part of this world." Finally, he said, you can "take [him] on" but he "promises [he] will win every time."

opposing viewpoints are slow to speak up, lest they be accused of bigotry. These dynamics could affect a medical association's consideration of transgender treatment. The record suggests these dynamics *have* affected the tone and quality of debate within WPATH. It is entirely possible that the same dynamics could have affected the tone and quality of debate within other associations.

Even so, it is fanciful to believe that all the many medical associations who have endorsed gender-affirming care, or who have spoken out or joined an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs in this litigation, have so readily sold their patients down the river. The great weight of medical authority supports these treatments. The widely accepted standards of care require competent therapy and careful evaluation by a multidisciplinary team before use of GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones for treatment of gender dysphoria. But the widely accepted standards of care support their use in appropriate circumstances. The standards have been unanimously endorsed by reputable medical associations, even though not unanimously endorsed by all the members of the associations.

The overwhelming majority of doctors are dedicated professionals whose first goal is the safe and effective treatment of their patients. There is no reason to believe the doctors who adopted these standards were motivated by anything else.

D. International views

The defendants have asserted time and again that Florida now treats GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones the same as European countries. A heading in the defendants' response to the current motions is typical: "Florida Joins the International Consensus." The assertion is false. And no matter how many times the defendants say it, it will still be false. No country in Europe—or so far as shown by this record, anywhere in the world—entirely bans these treatments.

To be sure, there are countries that ban gays and lesbians and probably transgender individuals, too. One doubts these treatments are available in Iran or other similarly repressive regimes. But the treatments are available in appropriate circumstances in all the countries cited by the defendants, including Finland, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand.[63] Some or all of these insist on appropriate preconditions and allow care only in approved facilities—just as the Endocrine Society and WPATH standards insist on appropriate preconditions, and just as care in the United States is ordinarily provided through capable facilities. Had Florida truly joined the international consensus—making these treatments available in appropriate circumstances or in

[63] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 226 at 78–79; *see also* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 227 at 134; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 228 at 61–62.

approved facilities—these plaintiffs would qualify, and the instant motions would not be necessary.

E. Malpractice

The defendants assert, with no real evidentiary support, that GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones have sometimes been provided in Florida without the appropriate mental-health therapy and evaluation by a multidisciplinary team.

If that were true, the solution would be to appropriately regulate these treatments, not to ban them. And there are, of course, remedies already in place in Florida for deficient medical care. There is no evidence that this kind of care is routinely provided so badly that it should be banned outright.

Along the same lines, the defendants say gender dysphoria is difficult to diagnose accurately—that gender identity can be fluid, that there is no objective test to confirm gender identity or gender dysphoria, and that patients treated with GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones have sometimes come to regret it. But the defendants ignore facts that do not support their narrative. Fluidity is common prior to puberty but not thereafter. Regret is rare; indeed, the defendants have offered no evidence of any Florida resident who regrets being treated with GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones. And the absence of objective tests to confirm gender dysphoria does not set it apart from many other mental-health conditions

that are routinely diagnosed without objective tests and treated with powerful medications.

The difficulty diagnosing a patient calls for caution. It does not call for a one-size-fits-all refusal to provide widely accepted medical treatment.[64] It does not call for the state to make a binary decision not to provide the treatment even for a properly diagnosed patient.

F. Continuation of treatment

The defendants note that 98% or more of adolescents treated with GnRH agonists progress to cross-sex hormones. That is hardly an indictment of the treatment; it is instead consistent with the view that in 98% or more of the cases, the patient's gender identity did not align with natal sex, this was accurately determined, and the patient was appropriately treated first with GnRH agonists and later with cross-sex hormones. An advocate who denies the existence of genuine transgender identity or who wishes to make everyone cisgender might well fear progression to cross-sex hormones, but the defendants have denied that this is a basis for their current reference to this progression.

The defendants say, instead, that the high rate of progression rebuts an argument in support of GnRH agonists: that GnRH agonists give a patient time to

[64] *See* Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 91–94 (defense expert Dr. Levine explaining that medical intervention such as puberty blockers and hormones should be carefully prescribed and monitored but not banned).

reflect on the patient's gender identity and, if still convinced of a gender identity opposite the natal sex, to reflect on whether to go forward socially in the gender identity or natal sex. But if that is a goal of treatment with GnRH agonists, it is certainly not the treatment's *primary* goal. The primary goal is to delay and eventually avoid development of secondary sex characteristics inconsistent with the patient's gender identity—and thus to avoid or reduce the attendant anxiety, depression, and possible suicidal ideation.

The high rate of progression from GnRH agonists to cross-sex hormones is not a reason to ban the treatments.

G. Off-label use of FDA-approved drugs

The defendants note that while the Food and Drug Administration has approved GnRH agonists and the hormones at issue as safe and effective, the agency has not addressed their use to treat gender dysphoria. Quite so. Use of these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is "off label."

That the FDA has not approved these drugs for treatment of gender dysphoria says precisely nothing about whether the drugs are safe and effective when used for that purpose. Off-label use of drugs is commonplace and widely accepted across the medical profession. The defendants' contrary implication is divorced from reality.

Obtaining FDA approval of a drug is a burdensome, expensive process.[65] A pharmaceutical provider who wishes to market a new drug must incur the burden and expense because the drug cannot be distributed without FDA approval. Once a drug has been approved, however, the drug can be distributed not just for the approved use but for any other use as well. There ordinarily is little reason to incur the burden and expense of seeking additional FDA approval.

That the FDA approved these drugs at all confirms that, at least for one use, they are safe and effective.[66] This provides some support for the view that they are safe when properly administered and that they effectively produce the intended results—that GnRH agonists delay puberty and that testosterone and estrogen have masculinizing or feminizing effects as expected. The FDA approval goes no further—it does not address one way or the other the question whether using these drugs to treat gender dysphoria is as safe and effective as on-label uses.

That use of GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones to treat gender dysphoria is "off-label" is not a reason to ban their use for that purpose.

XII. Other prerequisites to a preliminary injunction

The plaintiffs have met the other prerequisites for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs' adolescent children will suffer irreparable harm—the unwanted and

[65] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, No. 226 at 182–84; Trial Tr. in *Dekker* No. 227 at 120–23; Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, ECF No. 239 at 54–55.
[66] Trial Tr. in *Dekker*, No. 226 at 182–84; Trial Tr. in *Dekker* No. 227 at 120–23.

irreversible onset and progression of puberty in their natal sex—if they do not promptly begin treatment with GnRH agonists. The treatment will affect the patients themselves, nobody else, and will cause the defendants no harm. The preliminary injunction will be consistent with, not adverse to, the public interest. Adherence to the Constitution is always in the public interest.

XIII. Improper defendants

The plaintiffs seek prospective relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They are entitled to such relief against appropriate state officials in their official capacity. *See Ex parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

The Attorney General's motion asserts she is not an appropriate defendant—that she has no authority to enforce, and no other involvement with, the challenged statute and rules. That may be correct. The preliminary injunction will not run against the Attorney General, at least pending a ruling on her motion to dismiss.

A state itself is not a "person" who may be held liable under § 1983, and in any event a state has Eleventh Amendment immunity from a § 1983 claim in federal court. *See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (holding that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of § 1983); *Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida*, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that a state sued in its own name has Eleventh Amendment immunity, regardless of the relief sought, unless

the immunity has been waived or validly abrogated by Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment).

The defendants Florida Board of Medicine and Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine are agencies of the state—the jurisdictional equivalent of the state itself. Their presence in the case may be, in any event, merely redundant to that of their individual members, acting in their official capacities. *Cf. Busby v. City of Orlando*, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (approving the dismissal of official-capacity defendants whose presence was merely redundant to the naming of an institutional defendant).

This order does not resolve the question whether the Boards will stay in the case. But the preliminary injunction will run against the Board members, not the Boards themselves. A broader preliminary injunction is not needed.

XIV. Conclusion

Gender identity is real. Those whose gender identity does not match their natal sex often suffer gender dysphoria. The widely accepted standard of care calls for evaluation and treatment by a multidisciplinary team. Proper treatment begins with mental-health therapy and is followed in appropriate cases by GnRH agonists and cross-sex hormones. Florida has adopted a statute and rules that prohibit these treatments even when medically appropriate. The plaintiffs are likely to prevail on

their claim that the prohibition is unconstitutional. And they have met the other prerequisites to a preliminary injunction.

The plaintiffs thus are entitled to a preliminary injunction of appropriate scope. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) requires a party who obtains a preliminary injunction to "give[] security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined." This order requires the plaintiffs to give security for costs in a modest amount. Any party may move at any time to adjust the amount of security.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The motion for a preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 30 and 57, is granted in part.

2. The motion for a temporary restraining order, ECF No. 57, is denied as moot.

3. A preliminary injunction is entered against these defendants: Joseph Ladapo, in his capacity as the Surgeon General of the Florida Department of Health; Scot Ackerman, Nicholas W. Romanello, Wael Barsoum, Matthew R. Benson, Gregory Coffman, Amy Derick, David Diamond, Patrick Hunter, Luz Marina Pages, Eleonor Pimentel, Hector Vila, Michael Wasylik, Zachariah P. Zachariah, Maria Garcia, and Nicole Justice, in their official capacities as members

of the Florida Board of Medicine; Watson Ducatel, Tiffany Sizemore Di Pietro, Gregory Williams, Monica Mortensen, Valerie Jackson, Chris Creegan, and William D. Kirsh, in their official capacities as members of the Florida Board of Osteopathic Medicine; and State Attorneys Ginger Bowen Madden, Jack Campbell, John Durrett, Melissa Nelson, William Gladson, Bruce Bartlett, R.J. Larizza, Brian S. Kramer, Monique H. Worrell, Brian Haas, Kathern Fernandez Rundle, Ed Brodsky, Susan S. Lopez, Larry Basford, Dave Aronberg, Dennis Ward, Harold F. Pryor, Phil Archer, Thomas Bakkedahl, and Amira D. Fox, in their official capacities.

4. The preliminarily enjoined parties must not take any steps to prevent the administration of GnRH agonists or cross-sex hormones to Susan Doe, Gavin Goe, or Lisa Loe in accordance with professional standards that would apply to use of the same substances to treat patients with other medical conditions.

5. The preliminarily enjoined parties must not take any steps to enforce against Susan Doe, Gavin Goe, or Lisa Loe, or their parents or healthcare providers, Florida Statutes § 456.52(1) & (5) or Florida Administrative Code rules 64B8-9.019(1)(b) or 64B15-14.014(1)(b).

6. This preliminary injunction will take effect upon the posting of security in the amount of $100 for costs and damages sustained by a defendant found to have

been wrongfully enjoined. Security may be posted by a cash deposit with the Clerk of Court.

7. This preliminary injunction will terminate upon entry of a final judgment or when otherwise ordered.

8. This preliminary injunction binds the defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys—and others in active concert or participation with any of them—who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise.

SO ORDERED on June 6, 2023.

s/Robert L. Hinkle
United States District Judge