

HONORABLE JUDGE ROBERT J. BRYAN

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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA**

C. P., by and through his parents,  
Patricia Pritchard and Nolle Pritchard;  
and PATRICIA PRITCHARD,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF  
ILLINOIS,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:20-cv-06145-RJB

**RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO  
COMPEL**

**ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED**

**NOTED ON MOTION CALENDAR: June  
10, 2022**

**FILED UNDER SEAL**

## I. INTRODUCTION

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (“BCBSIL”) has produced all relevant discovery necessary for Plaintiffs to proceed with their claim. Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that BCBSIL administers ERISA self-funded health plans that contain an illegal exclusion. BCBSIL admits that it administers plans with the exclusion but denies that it is illegal, which is an issue of law. BCBSIL has produced all permutations of the exclusion that it administers at issue in this case, and it has disclosed how many plans there are and how many members have received denials under the exclusions. BCBSIL has further disclosed that some plans it administers are religious, and some are not. Plaintiffs have done ample discovery on all elements of their class definition, and BCBSIL has provided all relevant discovery.

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel fails to explain why Plaintiffs should be entitled to the irrelevant and burdensome additional discovery they seek from BCBSIL. Although Plaintiffs already have the number of health plans at issue, the relevant language from those plans, and the number of people impacted by the exclusion at issue, they claim they need the actual names of all the purported class-members’ employers who sponsor the plans, as well as legal agreements between BCBSIL and those employers. This would constitute hundreds of thousands of pages of irrelevant documents. The discovery sought is neither relevant to nor proportional to Plaintiffs’ needs.

The Court should deny Plaintiffs’ motion to compel in its entirety.

## II. BACKGROUND

### A. Plaintiffs’ Class Action Allegations.

Plaintiffs filed their individual complaint on November 23, 2020. Dkt. No. 1. Almost a year later, they amended the complaint on November 2, 2021 to add claims seeking only injunctive relief on behalf of a putative class of plaintiffs. Dkt. No. 38 (“Am. Compl.”). Plaintiffs define the alleged class as follows:

All individuals who have been, are, or will be participants or beneficiaries in an ERISA self-funded “group health plan” (as defined in 29 U.S.C. §1167(1)) administered by BCBSIL that contains a categorical exclusion denying or limiting coverage for gender affirming health care, like the “Transgender Reassignment Surgery” Exclusion contained in the CHI Plan, at any time on or

1 after November 23, 2014; and who were, are, or will be denied pre-authorization  
2 or coverage of otherwise covered services due to BCBSIL's administration of  
3 such an exclusion.

4 *Id.* at ¶ 91. Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court that the plans' "categorical exclusion[s]"  
5 for gender-affirming health care violate the Affordable Care Act and an injunction requiring  
6 BCBSIL to allow coverage for all medically necessary gender-affirming health care. *Id.* at pp.  
7 21-22.

8 **B. Plaintiffs' Discovery Requests and BCBSIL's Responses.**

9 On November 9, 2021, Plaintiffs served their second set of discovery requests. *See*  
10 Declaration of Gwendolyn Payton ("Payton Decl.") at ¶ 3. BCBSIL timely responded to those  
11 requests and has since supplemented its responses on three separate occasions as its investigation  
12 and discovery progressed. *Id.* at ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. A. Plaintiffs also conducted and will continue to  
13 conduct extensive examinations of multiple BCBSIL witnesses pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  
14 30(b)(6). *Id.* ¶ 6. The topics of these depositions include all aspects of BCBSIL's administration  
15 of the exclusion and the parameters of that administration. *Id.*

16 Plaintiffs' Motion takes issue with BCBSIL's responses to Interrogatories Nos. 3, 6, and 8  
17 and Requests for Production Nos. 12-14, all of which – in Plaintiffs' own words – seek the  
18 "identity" of the employers who sponsor specific plans for which BCBSIL administers any  
19 exclusion for transgender-related services similar to that found in the plan in which the named  
20 Plaintiffs are enrolled, a plan sponsored by CommonSpirit Health, f/k/a Catholic Health  
21 Initiatives ("CHI" and the "CHI Plan"). Motion at 2.

22 BCBSIL objected to producing the identity of other plans in its initial discovery responses  
23 and has consistently maintained those objections while responding to Plaintiffs' non-  
24 objectionable requests. Payton Decl., ¶ 7. BCBSIL provided the following evidence and  
25 information to Plaintiffs:

- 26 (1) BCBSIL disclosed that it administers other plans with gender-affirming health care  
27 exclusions—that "there are [REDACTED] ERISA self-funded group health plans for which  
28 BCBSIL administers a gender-affirming care exclusion." *Id.*, ¶ 4 and Ex. A.

1 (2) BCBSIL provided all variations of the existing exclusion language that is contained in  
2 self-funded ERISA plans administered by BCBSIL, along with the effective date of  
3 each representative plan and excerpts of each plan that demonstrate how the exclusion  
4 language sits within the plan. *Id.*, ¶ 4, Ex. A, Addendum A.

5 (3) BCBSIL disclosed that “of the ERISA self-funded group health plans BCBSIL  
6 administers, there are approximately [REDACTED] unique members of [REDACTED] plans who have  
7 received a denial based on the same or a similar exclusion, for a total claim count of  
8 [REDACTED] claims.” *Id.*, ¶ 4, Ex. A.

9 (4) BCBSIL disclosed that of the ERISA self-funded plans it administers, some plans  
10 have exclusions precluding benefits for gender-affirming care because of the plan  
11 sponsor’s religious affiliation, and other sponsors do not have a religious affiliation.  
12 *Id.* ¶ 8 and Ex. B (Deposition of Telisa Drake (“Drake Decl.”) at 58:25-59:15).

13 BCBSIL served its privilege log on Plaintiffs on May 10, 2022. *Id.* ¶ 12. Plaintiffs have  
14 yet to serve any privilege log on BCBSIL, nor have they represented to BCBSIL that there are no  
15 documents being withheld on the basis of any privilege. *Id.*

### 16 III. ARGUMENT

#### 17 A. Legal standard under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37.

18 Courts have broad discretion to control discovery. *Avila v. Willits Env'tl. Remediation*  
19 *Trust*, 633 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 26(b)(1) limits the scope of discovery to  
20 “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” *In re Williams-Sonoma,*  
21 *Inc.*, 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020). “[D]iscovery, like all matters of procedure, has ultimate  
22 and necessary boundaries,” and discovery of matters that are not relevant is “not within the scope  
23 of Rule 26(b)(1).” *Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders*, 437 U.S. 340, 353 (1978).

24 For a motion to compel, the movant must demonstrate that “the information it seeks is  
25 relevant and that the responding party’s objections lack merit.” *Hancock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.*,  
26 321 F.R.D. 383, 390 (W.D. Wash. 2017). However, courts must limit discovery that is not  
27 “proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the  
28

1 action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties'  
 2 resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or  
 3 expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." *Cedar Grove Composting, Inc.*  
 4 *v. Ironshore Specialty Ins. Co.*, No. C14-1443RAJ, 2015 WL 9315539, at \*1 (W.D. Wash. Dec.  
 5 23, 2015) (citation omitted).

6 **B. Plaintiffs do not seek evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' allegations or proportional to**  
 7 **the Plaintiffs' needs.**

8 Plaintiffs summarize the discovery they seek as follows: "The disputed ROGs seek the  
 9 identity of the specific plans for which BCBSIL administers any gender-affirming care exclusion  
 10 or a similar exclusion to that of the plan in which C.P. is enrolled," and "RFP Nos. 12–14 seek  
 11 copies of the BPAs and the plan contracts, such as the [Summary Plan Descriptions ("SPDs")],  
 12 for the plans identified in ROGs 3 and 6." Motion at 2.

13 Plaintiffs claim that they require the discovery at issue: (i) "to properly define the  
 14 proposed class"; (ii) "to demonstrate commonality and typicality"; (iii) because "the identities of  
 15 the [REDACTED] plans found by BCBSIL to contain a gender-affirming care exclusion" allegedly will  
 16 enable them to "determine whether and to what extent the plans are sponsored by what type of  
 17 organizations, including religious organizations"; (iv) to identify any indemnity clauses between  
 18 BCBSIL and plans contained in the Benefit Program Applications ("BPAs")<sup>2</sup> filled out by each  
 19 individual employer; and (v) to determine whether their alleged class satisfies the numerosity  
 20 requirement.

21 **1. Discovery is not necessary to enable Plaintiffs to determine a "proper class**  
 22 **definition."**

23 Plaintiffs do not require the discovery they seek "to properly define the proposed class."  
 24 Plaintiffs are required to plead a class definition in their complaint, and they are bound by the  
 25 definition they have pled. *See, e.g., Costello v. Chertoff*, 258 F.R.D. 600, 604–05 (C.D. Cal.

26 <sup>1</sup> BCBSIL has since updated this number to state that it administers [REDACTED] ERISA self-funded  
 27 group plans containing gender-affirming care exclusions.

28 <sup>2</sup> Benefit Program Applications are forms filled out by employer groups directing certain  
 selections for their plan design and containing legal language. This is a standard form, which  
 BCBSIL has produced and which Plaintiffs have in their possession. Payton Decl. ¶ 12.

1 2009) (“The court is bound to class definitions provided in the complaint and, absent an amended  
2 complaint, should not consider certification beyond it.”); *Berlowitz v. Nob Hill Masonic Mgmt.,*  
3 *Inc.*, No. C-96-01241 MHP, 1996 WL 724776, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1996) (rejecting  
4 plaintiff’s attempt to certify a class different from that alleged in the complaint because the “court  
5 is bound by the class definition provided in the complaint” and “will not consider certification of  
6 the class beyond the definition provided in the complaint unless plaintiffs choose to amend it”).

7 Plaintiffs’ Motion implies they seek this discovery to potentially amend their class  
8 definition, but they offer no argument in support of any modification or explain what that  
9 modification would be. But regardless, this effort is improper. Plaintiffs are not entitled to class  
10 certification discovery that is not relevant to certification. Even if Plaintiffs were seeking the  
11 identities of absent class members (and they are not), it is well established that named plaintiffs  
12 may not obtain the identities of absent class members before a class is certified. *In re Williams-*  
13 *Sonoma, Inc.*, 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020). Given that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the  
14 names of the actual purported class members, discovery of the names of their employers is even  
15 more remote and irrelevant.

16 “The allegations of the complaint logically shape the scope of discovery.” *Scherer v.*  
17 *FCA US, LLC*, 538 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (citation omitted). Thus, in  
18 determining the “the scope of permissible discovery,” the proper inquiry is “whether the  
19 information sought is relevant to the parties’ claims and defenses and proportional to the needs of  
20 the case.” *Id.* The class definition is established by the Amended Complaint, and Plaintiffs do  
21 not require any discovery to determine the definition.

22 **2. Plaintiffs do not require the additional discovery they seek to establish any**  
23 **element of their claims.**

24 Plaintiffs likewise do not need the identities of employers who sponsor health plans  
25 containing an exclusion, or their entire SPDs. BCBSIL has already produced all the information  
26 Plaintiffs need to support their claims. BCBSIL has produced all the exclusions from self-funded  
27 ERISA plans administered by BCBSIL. Payton Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A, Addendum A. Contrary to  
28 Plaintiffs’ claims, they have all the information necessary “to review the variations of the

1 language within the actual plans.” Motion. at 7. BCBSIL has also responded to discovery  
2 disclosing that “there are [REDACTED] ERISA self-funded group health plans for which BCBSIL  
3 administers a gender-affirming care exclusion.” Payton Decl., ¶ 4 and Ex. A. BCBSIL has  
4 further disclosed that “of the ERISA self-funded group health plans BCBSIL administers, there  
5 are approximately [REDACTED] unique members of [REDACTED] plans who have received a denial based on the  
6 same or a similar exclusion, for a total claim count of [REDACTED] claims.” *Id.* Plaintiffs have not  
7 shown, and cannot show, that they require additional discovery in order to pursue class  
8 certification.

9 Plaintiffs do not need additional discovery to determine how many plans administered by  
10 BCBSIL are sponsored by religious organizations. BCBSIL has disclosed under oath that some  
11 plans are sponsored by religious organizations and other sponsors do not have a religious  
12 affiliation. *See* 5 Decl. at 58:25-59:15 (Q: “Do you know if the [REDACTED] identified group health plans  
13 for which Blue Cross Blue Shield administers a gender-affirming care exclusion . . . includes  
14 employers that are not religious? A: “Yes, it does.”). By comparison, CHI (the employer group  
15 of the named Plaintiffs) is one of the ERISA self-funded plans BCBSIL administers with a  
16 religious-based exclusion. Plaintiffs also have failed to explain why the precise number of plans  
17 sponsored by religious organizations is relevant to class certification. Plaintiffs’ proposed class  
18 definition, Am. Compl. at ¶ 91, makes no mention of whether the proposed class does or does not  
19 include members of plans sponsored by religious organizations.

20 Plaintiffs themselves have argued that the individual employers do not need to be  
21 involved in this case and the individual plans’ characteristics and identities are irrelevant to this  
22 case—including those plans who claim that they may exclude coverage for gender affirming care  
23 because the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) exempts them from Title IX’s or the  
24 ACA’s requirements. In support of their Motion to Amend, Dkt. 35, Plaintiffs argued that “[t]he  
25 Amended Complaint is proper because no additional party is needed for the Court to enter the  
26 relief sought by Plaintiffs.” *Id.* at 6. Plaintiffs further argued, “The injunctive relief sought by  
27 Plaintiffs would bind *only* BCBSIL – it does not impact the plans’ rights under RFRA.” *Id.* at 7

1 (emphasis in original). In response, this Court has held that the plans are not necessary and  
2 therefore are not indispensable parties. Dkt. 37 at 4-5.

3 The names of the individual employers would not provide information on which of the  
4 plans has a possible RFRA defense. Secular, for-profit corporations are entitled to assert  
5 religious exemptions under RFRA. *See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 682,  
6 736 (2014); *Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius*, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1146 (10th Cir. 2013),  
7 *cert. granted*, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013), *aff'd sub nom, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.*, 573  
8 U.S. 682, 736 (2014).

9 Thus, Plaintiffs do not need discovery establishing whether the plans containing  
10 exclusions are religious or not. This additional discovery would not help Plaintiffs win class  
11 certification, and its absence will not detract from their ability to do so. This discovery certainly  
12 is not proportional to Plaintiffs' needs. There is no reason for BCBSIL to incur additional  
13 expense producing the additional discovery that Plaintiffs seek.

14 **3. Plaintiffs are not entitled to indemnity agreements between BCBSIL and its**  
15 **employer groups.**

16 Plaintiffs also assert they should be entitled to “various indemnity clauses contained in the  
17 [Benefit Program Applications (“BPAs”)] for each plan to understand BCBSIL’s standard  
18 practice.” Motion at 7. This assertion is offered without any support or explanation whatsoever.  
19 Plaintiffs’ proposed class definition, Am. Compl. at ¶ 91, does not purport to define any class  
20 based on the indemnification language contained in any BPA, and in fact the words “indemnity”  
21 and “indemnification” appear nowhere in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Nor is any  
22 indemnification agreement relevant to any issue in the case. Plaintiffs’ bare assertion that they  
23 are nonetheless entitled to this information is not supported by law or fact. Moreover, BCBSIL  
24 produced the BPA for CHI, and BPAs are standard forms filled out by all employers. *See Payton*  
25 *Decl.* ¶ 13. Plaintiffs had the opportunity to question one of BCBSIL’s witnesses about the  
26 indemnity provision in that BPA. *Id.* ¶ 9 and Ex. C (Drake Decl. at 132:3-133:3).

27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(iv) allows discovery of only a narrow, specialized type of  
28 indemnity agreement: “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable

1 to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for  
2 payments made to satisfy the judgment.” If the Federal Rules intended for indemnity agreements  
3 to be more broadly discoverable, they would not have limited the permissible scope of discovery  
4 to liability insurance policies. *See, e.g., Transocean Grp. Holdings PTY Ltd. v. S. Dakota*  
5 *Soybean Processors, LLC.*, No. CV 07-652 (JRT/FLN), 2008 WL 11383667, at \*1 (D. Minn.  
6 Nov. 19, 2008) (denying motion to compel an indemnity agreement because “[u]nder Rule  
7 26(a)(1)(A)(iv), parties are not required to produce indemnity agreements; they are only required  
8 to produce insurance contracts.”).

9 **4. Plaintiffs are not entitled to discover “the total number of people enrolled in**  
10 **each identified plan” because the total number of enrollees in each plan is**  
11 **irrelevant and because BCBSIL does not contest numerosity.**

12 Plaintiffs contend that they should be entitled to discover “the total number of people  
13 enrolled in each identified plan (as requested, which would allow Plaintiffs to confirm the  
14 approximate size of the proposed class).” Motion at 4. The total number of members in each  
15 plan is irrelevant because the class definition only includes members who were *denied* claims for  
16 gender affirming care based on an exclusion. *See* Am. Compl. at ¶ 91. BCBSIL has disclosed  
17 this number. Payton Decl., ¶ 4 and Ex. A.

18 Even if this number were relevant, Plaintiffs have been aware for a number of months that  
19 BCBSIL does not contest numerosity. In response to Request for Admission No. 1, which seeks  
20 the admission that there are at least 40 persons who fit the proposed class definition, BCBSIL  
21 stated that “there are at least 40 persons who may fit the class definition.” *Id.* Because it is  
22 undisputed that numerosity has been met, discovery to support the numerosity element of class  
23 certification is not relevant.

24 **C. The information Plaintiffs seek would be unduly burdensome to produce and is not**  
25 **proportional to the needs of this litigation.**

26 The discovery Plaintiffs seek would be unduly burdensome for BCBSIL to collect,  
27 review, and produce and is not proportional to Plaintiffs’ needs in relation to the proposed class  
28 definition. BCBSIL’s review of ERISA self-funded plans has been a manual and laborious

1 process comprised of a review of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents. Payton Decl.,  
2 ¶ 10 (the production of the SPDs alone would be an approximately [REDACTED] page production).  
3 Plaintiffs' request for the BPAs for each of those plans would be an equally manual and arduous  
4 process, particularly given that Plaintiffs demand discovery from 2016 to the present, that would  
5 require BCBSIL to redouble its efforts and produce tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of  
6 additional and irrelevant pages. *Id.*

7 Nonetheless, BCBSIL has met and conferred with Plaintiffs and has agreed, without  
8 waiver of its arguments that the BPAs Plaintiffs seek are irrelevant, burdensome, and beyond the  
9 permissible scope of discovery, to produce the BPAs for all of the BCBSIL-administered ERISA  
10 self-funded plans containing unique versions of an exclusion for gender-affirming health care, as  
11 demonstrated in Addendum A to BCBSIL's interrogatory responses. Payton Decl. ¶ 4 and Ex. A,  
12 Addendum A.

13 **D. The terms of the Joint Defense Agreement between BCBSIL and CHI are protected**  
14 **by privilege.**

15 Plaintiffs also claim, without any legal support, that they should be entitled to the Joint  
16 Defense Agreement ("JDA") between BCBSIL and CHI. Motion at 10. This is incorrect.  
17 Courts routinely deny discovery of joint defense agreements and recognize that joint defense  
18 agreements are privileged. *See, e.g., Bedivere Insurance Company v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield*  
19 *of Kansas, Inc.*, No. 18-2515, 2021 WL 843235 (D. Kan. 2021) (recognizing that joint defense  
20 agreements are privileged); *Generac Power Systems, Inc. v. Kohler Co.*, 2012 WL 5463913, \*2  
21 (E.D. Wis. 2012) (denying discovery of joint defense agreement); *R.F.M.A.S., Inc. v. So*, 2008  
22 WL 465113, \*1 (S.D. N.Y. 2008); *Broessel v. Triad Guar. Ins. Corp.*, 238 F.R.D. 215, 218 (W.D.  
23 Ky. 2006).

24 This is particularly true given that the JDA at issue contains more than just the  
25 identification of a privileged relationship – it also contains legal strategies between BCBSIL and  
26 CHI related to motion practice and testimony during interviews, depositions, and examinations.  
27 Payton Decl. at ¶ 11. Thus, the JDA is attorney-client privileged and is not discoverable.

1 **E. Plaintiffs’ privilege log is no longer at issue.**

2 In order to conserve judicial resources, BCBSIL has produced the vast majority of the  
3 documents on its privilege log to Plaintiffs, with the understanding that Plaintiffs will not claim  
4 waiver of the privilege as a result.<sup>3</sup> As a result, BCBSIL understands that BCBSIL’s privilege  
5 log is no longer at issue.

6 **CONCLUSION**

7 For these reasons, BCBSIL respectfully urges this Court to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to  
8 compel in its entirety.

9 Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of June, 2022.

10 KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

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26 <sup>3</sup> BCBSIL still maintains that these communications are privileged, but given their tangential  
27 relationship to the relevant issues in this case – namely, whether BCBSIL can administer plans  
28 containing an exclusion – BCBSIL wishes to avoid the additional cost of litigating this  
unnecessary dispute.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I certify that on the date indicated below I caused a copy of the foregoing document, DEFENDANT BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF ILLINOIS’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL, to be filed with the Clerk of the Court via the CM/ECF system. In accordance with their ECF registration agreement and the Court’s rules, the Clerk of the Court will send e-mail notification of such filing to the following attorneys of record:

<p><b>Eleanor Hamburger</b>                  SIRIANNI YOUTZ SPOONEMORE                  HAMBURGER                  3101 WESTERN AVENUE STE 350                  SEATTLE, WA 98121                  206-223-0303                  Fax: 206-223-0246                  Email: ehamburger@sylaw.com</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by CM/ECF  <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission  <input type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery  <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery</p>
<p><b>Jennifer C Pizer</b>                  LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND                  EDUCATION FUND, INC.                  4221 WILSHIRE BLVD., STE 280                  LOS ANGELES, CA 90010                  213-382-7600                  Email: jpizer@lambdalegal.org</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by CM/ECF  <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission  <input type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery  <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery</p>
<p><b>Omar Gonzalez-Pagan</b>                  LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND                  EDUCATION FUND, INC. (NY)                  120 WALL STREET                  19TH FLOOR                  NEW YORK, NY 10005                  212-809-8585                  Email: ogonzalez-pagan@lambdalegal.org</p>	<p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by CM/ECF  <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission  <input type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail  <input type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery  <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery</p>

DATED this 6<sup>th</sup> day of June, 2022.

KILPATRICK TOWNSEND & STOCKTON LLP

By: /s/ Gwendolyn C. Payton  
 Gwendolyn C. Payton, WSBA #26752

*Counsel for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois*