

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALEX M. AZAR II, in his official capacity as
the Secretary of Health and Human Services;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01672 (GLR)

**UNOPPOSED MOTION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY
FOR LEAVE TO FILE *AMICUS CURIAE* BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

The Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law (“Policy Integrity”) hereby moves the Court for leave to file the accompanying *amicus curiae* brief in the above-captioned case in support of Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Policy Integrity has conferred with counsel for the parties concerning the filing of this motion, and counsel for all parties have indicated that they consent. As explained below, Policy Integrity’s motion satisfies the relevant legal standard for leave to file as an *amicus curiae*.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“The decision to grant leave to proceed as *amici* at the trial court level is discretionary,” and a motion may be granted when the applicant has “a special interest in the subject matter of the suit” or “provide[s] helpful analysis of the law.” *Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau*, 923 F. Supp. 720, 728 (D. Md. 1996); *see also Am. Humanist Ass’n v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning*

Comm'n, 303 F.R.D. 266, 269 (D. Md. 2014) (courts should accept *amicus curiae* briefing so long as the “proffered information [is] timely and useful” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

II. INTEREST OF *AMICUS CURIAE*

Policy Integrity has a strong interest in this case. Policy Integrity is a nonpartisan, not-for-profit think tank dedicated to improving the quality of government decisionmaking through advocacy and scholarship in the fields of administrative law, economics, and public policy. Policy Integrity’s legal and economic experts have produced extensive scholarship on the best practices for regulatory impact analysis and the proper valuation of regulatory costs and benefits. Most notably, our director, Richard L. Revesz, has published more than eighty articles and books on administrative law, including works on the legal and economic principles that inform rational regulatory decisions. *See, e.g.*, Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, *Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health* (2008).¹

In furtherance of its mission to promote rational decisionmaking, Policy Integrity has filed *amicus curiae* briefs addressing agency analysis of costs and benefits in many recent cases. *See, e.g.*, Br. for Inst. for Policy Integrity as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, *California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 17-cv-3804-EDL) (arguing that agency’s failure to consider forgone benefits that would result from a delay in implementation of methane standards was arbitrary); Br. for Inst. for Policy Integrity as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, *California v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 17-cv-5948-SBA) (arguing that repeal of procedural reforms for mineral valuation was unreasonable due to agency’s inaccurate assessment of repeal’s economic impact). In those cases, courts have agreed

¹ A full list of publications can be found in Revesz’s online faculty profile, available at <https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=20228>.

that the agency analyses—and, in turn, the rules issued in reliance on those analyses—were arbitrary and capricious. *California v. BLM*, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 1123 (holding failure to consider forgone benefits arbitrary); *California v. Interior*, 381 F. Supp. 3d at 1170 (finding repeal arbitrary due in part to agency’s flawed economic impact assessment).

Policy Integrity has particular expertise on the regulatory impact analysis that the United States Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) conducted in support of the rule at issue in this case, Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (May 21, 2019) (“Final Rule”). In 2008, we submitted an expert report on the defective analysis HHS prepared to support a previous effort to expand statutory conscience rights through rulemaking. *See* Inst. for the Study of Regulation, Comments on Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support Coercive or Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law (Sept. 16, 2008).² That 2008 rule was repealed in 2011, but the Final Rule is similar in many respects and has similar fundamental deficiencies in its cost-benefit analysis, as Policy Integrity pointed out in a March 2018 comment letter to HHS. Inst. for Policy Integrity, Comment Letter on Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care (Mar. 27, 2018).³ We also presented these critiques to the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in an April 2019 teleconference.

Policy Integrity seeks to provide this court with information about the legal and economic standards for good regulatory impact analysis, which HHS failed to satisfy in its assessment of the Final Rule’s costs and benefits. Policy Integrity’s general interest in this case is to ensure that

² Available at <https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HHS-OS-2008-0011-4969>. The Institute for Policy Integrity was formerly called the Institute for the Study of Regulation.

³ Available at <https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=HHS-OCR-2018-0002-72071>.

agencies comply with their obligation to accurately assess the positive and negative impacts of regulatory decisions.

III. POLICY INTEGRITY'S EXPERTISE WILL BENEFIT THE COURT

Policy Integrity's proposed *amicus* brief is also useful to the Court. As noted above, Policy Integrity has experience with the Final Rule at issue in this case, having submitted comments on the proposed version of the Final Rule and having prepared an expert report on the defective analysis HHS prepared to support a similar regulatory expansion of statutory conscience rights in 2008. Policy Integrity has made use of that experience, as well as its expertise in cost-benefit analysis, to explain why HHS's regulatory impact analysis is badly flawed and its Final Rule arbitrary and capricious. While Plaintiff has made a variety of arguments regarding HHS's failure to provide a reasoned explanation for the Final Rule, Policy Integrity's brief is uniquely focused on the agency's economic analysis. The brief can serve as a resource for the Court as it analyzes Plaintiff's claims that the Final Rule does not satisfy the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. In particular, Policy Integrity's discussion of the shortcomings in HHS's regulatory impact analysis can help the Court as it engages with the question of whether the agency's decisionmaking was arbitrary and capricious.

IV. MEET AND CONFER AND TIMELINESS

Policy Integrity has conferred with the parties concerning the filing of this motion. All parties consent to this motion.

This motion is timely. The Court's scheduling order of August 21 set a deadline of September 19 for the Plaintiff to file its cross-motion for summary judgment, Doc. No. 40, and under the rules of the Court, any *amicus curiae* briefing in support of that motion is due seven days later (i.e., September 26), *see* Standing Order 2018-07 (Dec. 12, 2018).

CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, Policy Integrity respectfully requests that the Court grant this motion and accept for filing the accompanying *amicus curiae* brief.

Dated: September 19, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Max Sarinsky

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**BRIEF OF THE INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY AS *AMICUS CURIAE* IN
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Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law (“Policy Integrity”)¹ submits this brief as *amicus curiae* in support of Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) final rule, Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care; Delegations of Authority, 84 Fed. Reg. 23,170 (May 21, 2019) (“Final Rule”).

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

Policy Integrity is a nonpartisan, not-for-profit think tank dedicated to improving the quality of government decisionmaking through advocacy and scholarship in the fields of administrative law, economics, and public policy. Our legal and economic experts, led by Richard L. Revesz, have produced extensive scholarship on the best practices for regulatory impact analysis and the proper valuation of regulatory costs and benefits.

In furtherance of its mission to promote rational decisionmaking, Policy Integrity has filed *amicus curiae* briefs addressing agency analysis of costs and benefits in many recent cases. Courts have agreed in a number of those cases that the agency analyses—and, in turn, the rules issued in reliance on those analyses—were arbitrary and capricious. *See, e.g., California v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding failure to consider forgone benefits arbitrary); *California v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior*, 381 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (finding rule repeal arbitrary due in part to agency’s flawed economic impact assessment).

Policy Integrity has particular expertise on the regulatory impact analysis that HHS conducted in support of the Final Rule. In 2008, we submitted an expert report on the defective analysis HHS prepared to support a previous effort to expand statutory conscience rights through rulemaking. That 2008 rule was repealed in 2011, but the Final Rule is similar in many respects

¹ This brief does not purport to represent the views of New York University School of Law, if any. Policy Integrity states that no party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, and no party or party’s counsel contributed money intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person—other than the *amicus curiae*, its members, or its counsel—contributed money intended to fund the preparation of this brief.

and has similar fundamental deficiencies in its cost-benefit analysis, as Policy Integrity pointed out in a March 2018 comment letter. Inst. for Policy Integrity, Comment Letter on Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care (Mar. 27, 2018) (“Policy Integrity Comments”).

Plaintiff argues that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious in part because HHS relied on a flawed cost-benefit analysis. Compl. at 44. Policy Integrity’s expertise in cost-benefit analysis and experience with the Final Rule give it a unique perspective from which to evaluate this claim.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

When an agency relies on a cost-benefit analysis to support its rulemaking, “a serious flaw undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA*, 682 F.3d 1032, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2012). HHS has prepared a regulatory impact analysis for the Final Rule in which it concludes that “the benefits of this rule, although not always quantifiable or monetized, justify the burdens.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,228. But the analysis underlying that assertion is fundamentally flawed in at least two respects.

First, although HHS acknowledges that the Final Rule will increase the frequency with which conscience rights are invoked for refusing to provide healthcare, it does not meaningfully assess—qualitatively or quantitatively—the costs of such refusals. Specifically, it fails to consider the financial, physical, and psychological harms that increased refusals will impose on women in need of reproductive services; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (“LGBT”) patients; and patients living with HIV or seeking HIV-preventive services. HHS also ignores staffing costs that provider organizations will incur to accommodate increased refusals of care by their employees.

Second, the alleged benefits of the Final Rule are entirely speculative. HHS claims that the rule will increase the ranks of healthcare professionals and reduce “moral distress” among such professionals. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,246. But these findings are unsupported by—and in some

instances contradicted by—record evidence.

By dismissing reasonably foreseeable costs and touting wholly speculative benefits, HHS “inconsistently and opportunistically frame[s]” the Final Rule’s effects, *Bus. Roundtable v. SEC*, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and “put[s] a thumb on the scale” in favor of its adoption, *Ctr. for Biol. Diversity v. Nat’l Hw’y Traffic Saf. Admin.*, 538 F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). HHS’s reliance on this one-sided analysis renders the Final Rule arbitrary and capricious.

ARGUMENT

Final agency actions are arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2), if the agency fails to “examine the relevant data,” “consider an important aspect of the problem,” or “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the justification includes a cost-benefit analysis, “a serious flaw undermining that analysis can render the rule unreasonable.” *Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders*, 682 F.3d at 1040. This is true even when the agency was not statutorily obligated to conduct the analysis. *Id.* at 1039–40. Finally, if an action represents a change in policy, the agency must provide a “reasoned explanation . . . for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay . . . the prior policy.” *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009); *see also Organized Vill. of Kake v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 795 F.3d 956, 968 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[E]ven when reversing a policy after an election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual findings without a reasoned explanation.”).

Here, in assessing the likely impacts of the Final Rule, HHS failed to consider relevant information regarding the harms that more frequent conscience-related denials of healthcare would impose on patients and providers, failed to give a reasoned explanation for disregarding its prior

conclusions regarding these harms, and failed to offer credible evidence in support of its determination that the Final Rule would generate sufficient benefits to offset its negative effects.

As a result, the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious under the APA and should be vacated.

I. HHS Does Not Adequately Assess the Final Rule’s Significant Indirect Costs to Patients and Provider Organizations

HHS’s analysis of the Final Rule’s “economic implications,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,228, fails to account for many of the Final Rule’s likely costs. While this analysis tallies the Final Rule’s direct compliance costs for providers, in the form of familiarization and paperwork-related expenses, *see* 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,240, tbl.6, it fails to assess the new policy’s *indirect* costs, in the form of harms to patients who are refused care on conscience grounds and additional staffing burdens for medical employers who must accommodate such refusals. Indeed, these effects are not even listed in HHS’s summary of unquantified costs. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,227, tbl.1.

HHS’s failure to assess indirect costs is, first, flatly contrary to the requirements of Executive Order 12,866, which instructs agencies to consider not just “direct cost . . . to businesses and others in complying with the regulation,” but also “any adverse effects” the rule might have on “the efficient functioning of the economy, private markets . . . health, safety, and the natural environment.” Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Longstanding guidance from the Office of Management and Budget similarly directs agencies to “look beyond the direct benefits and direct costs of [their] rulemaking and consider any important ancillary [i.e., indirect] benefits and countervailing risks.” Office of Mgmt. & Budget, *Circular A-4 on Regulatory Analysis* 26 (2003) [hereinafter *Circular A-4*].

More importantly, ignoring indirect costs violates HHS’s duties under the APA. Agency decisions must be “based on consideration of the relevant factors,” *see State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 42, and “[a]gencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding whether to

regulate,” *Michigan v. EPA*, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015). Relevant costs “include[] more than the expense of complying with regulations” and encompass “any disadvantage.” *Id.* at 2707. Accordingly, courts have repeatedly struck down rules that fail to consider potentially significant indirect costs. *See, e.g., Compet. Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Hw’y Traffic Saf. Admin.*, 956 F.2d 321, 326–27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding fuel-efficiency rule due to agency’s failure to consider indirect safety costs); *Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA*, 947 F.2d 1201, 1225 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down rule for failure to consider indirect safety effects of substituting asbestos-free car brakes).

HHS’s failure to consider indirect costs to patients would be impermissible in any rulemaking but is particularly arbitrary here, because HHS previously recognized the significance of those costs. In 2011, HHS cited indirect costs to justify repealing a 2008 conscience rule that purported to implement many of the same statutory provisions as the Final Rule, in very similar ways. *See* 76 Fed. Reg. 9968, 9974 (Feb. 23, 2011) (“2011 Rescission”) (finding that 2008 rule “could limit access to reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and could impact a wide range of medical services, including care for sexual assault victims, provision of HIV/AIDS treatment, and emergency services”); *see also* 73 Fed. Reg. 78,072 (Dec. 19, 2008) (“2008 Rule”). The APA obligates HHS to provide a “reasoned explanation” for disregarding the findings underlying the 2011 Rescission, *Kake*, 795 F.3d at 968, and HHS has not done so.

A. HHS Does Not Adequately Consider Costs to Patients Denied Care as a Result of the Final Rule

HHS expects that, as a result of the Final Rule, “more individuals, having been apprised of [conscience] rights, will assert them.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,250. Put another way, the Final Rule will lead more healthcare workers to decline to provide services (or information about services). It follows that patient populations already experiencing costs associated with conscience-related refusals of care—like women in need of reproductive health services; LGBT patients; and patients

living with HIV or seeking HIV-preventive services—will see those costs increase under the Final Rule. But HHS refuses to assess these costs appropriately, either quantitatively or qualitatively.

1. Conscience-Based Refusals of Care Impose Costs on Patients

As Policy Integrity emphasized in its comments on the proposed version of the Final Rule, conscience-related refusals of care can impose financial, physical, and psychological costs on patients. Policy Integrity Comments at 5. At minimum, a patient denied care must seek out an alternative provider. Furthermore, some patients denied care may be too discouraged to seek out alternatives and decide to forgo treatment altogether, leading to negative health consequences. Or, if care is denied in an urgent or emergency situation, there may not be adequate time to find an alternative, potentially leading to catastrophic consequences.

Numerous commenters bolstered Policy Integrity's argument with evidence of denials of care on conscience grounds and the resulting harms. Record evidence shows that women, for example, already suffer significant physical, psychological, and financial harms from conscience-related denials of reproductive health services. Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., *Refusals to Provide Health Care Threaten the Health and Lives of Patients Nationwide* 1 (Aug. 30, 2017). LGBT people and individuals living with HIV also contend with denials of health services, including those unrelated to their sexual orientation, gender identity, and HIV status. *Id.* A rigorously conducted, nationwide survey found in 2010 that nearly 8 percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual respondents and almost 27 percent of transgender respondents reported being refused necessary healthcare because of their sexual orientation and gender identity, respectively. Lambda Legal, *When Health Care Isn't Caring: Lambda Legal's Survey on Discrimination Against LGBT People and People Living with HIV* 10 (2010). Such denials can carry substantial costs for affected LGBT and HIV-positive patients. Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. at 2. For example, nearly 20 percent of transgender respondents to a Massachusetts-based survey indicated that prior mistreatment by

healthcare providers had led them to postpone or forgo treatment when sick or injured. Sari L. Reisner et al., *Legal Protections in Public Accommodations Settings: A Critical Public Health Issue for Transgender and Gender-Nonconforming People*, 93 *Milbank Q.* 484, 494 (2015).

2. The Final Rule Will Lead to an Increase in Refusals of Care

HHS recognizes that refusals of care can carry costs for patients. 84 *Fed. Reg.* at 23,251. But HHS will not concede that such refusals will increase under the Final Rule. Instead, it argues that commenters claiming “that the rule would result in harm” failed to “establish[] a causal relationship between this rule and how it would affect health care access.” *Id.* at 23,250. This professed uncertainty is inconsistent with HHS’s claims about the Final Rule’s benefits, findings HHS made in the 2011 Rescission, and studies that HHS relies upon in the current proceeding.

As noted earlier, in its description of the Final Rule’s *benefits*, HHS claims that “as a result of this rule, more individuals, having been apprised of [their conscience] rights, will assert them.” *Id.* It is difficult to imagine how a rule could cause more workers to assert a right to deny care without *also* causing an increase in denials of care. HHS cannot have it both ways. If the Final Rule affects providers’ behavior it will also affect patients’ experiences. HHS’s logical inconsistency on this point renders the Final Rule arbitrary and capricious. *See Gen. Chem. Corp. v. United States*, 817 F.2d 844, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (deeming agency conclusion arbitrary and capricious where supporting analysis was “internally inconsistent”).

HHS’s unwillingness to concede that the Final Rule will result in increased refusals of care is particularly unreasonable in light of its contrary findings in the 2011 Rescission. There, HHS agreed with commenters that the 2008 Rule “could limit access to reproductive health services and information, including contraception, and could impact a wide range of medical services, including care for sexual assault victims, provision of HIV/AIDS treatment, and emergency services.” 76 *Fed. Reg.* at 9974. Because the Final Rule “generally reinstates the structure of the 2008 Rule,” 84

Fed. Reg. at 23,179, it presumably also threatens access to care for sexual assault victims and those living with HIV. If HHS disagrees, it must provide a “reasoned explanation” for reaching a different conclusion than it did in 2011. *Fox*, 556 U.S. at 515–16.

HHS does cite two studies that it claims found “insufficient evidence to conclude that conscience protections have negative effects on access to care.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,251.² But those studies actually show that conscience-based refusals *are* a material barrier to care and that the only open empirical question is the extent to which such refusals negatively affect patient health. *See* Chavkin at S42 (characterizing conscientious objection as “one of many barriers to reproductive healthcare”); Morrell & Chavkin at 334 (“Conscientious objection . . . appears to constitute a barrier to care, especially for certain subgroups. . . .”). Thus, HHS’s conclusion that the Final Rule will not negatively affect access to care “runs counter to the evidence before the agency” and is therefore arbitrary and capricious. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 43.

3. Uncertainty Does Not Excuse HHS’s Failure to Estimate the Final Rule’s Effects on the Rate and Nature of Conscience-Related Refusals of Care

In addition to suggesting that the Final Rule may have *no* negative effects on patients’ access to care, HHS claims that estimating the size of such effects is simply too difficult. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,252. But uncertainty about the size of a regulatory effect does not justify assigning it no value. *Ctr. for Biological Diversity*, 538 F.3d at 1190 (finding rule arbitrary and capricious where agency argued certain benefits were “too uncertain to support their explicit valuation and inclusion” in cost-benefit analysis). There may be “a range of values” for the Final Rule’s costs to patients, but that value “is certainly not zero.” *Id.* at 1200. Thus, the costs must be “accounted for

² Citing W. Chavkin et al., *Conscientious Objection and Refusal to Provide Reproductive Healthcare: A White Paper Examining Prevalence, Health Consequences, and Policy Responses*, 123 Int’l J. Gynecol. & Obstet. S41 (2013); K. Morrell & W. Chavkin, *Conscientious Objection to Abortion and Reproductive Healthcare: A Review of Recent Literature and Implications for Adolescents*, 27 Curr. Opin. Obstet. Gynecol. 333 (2015).

in the agency's analysis." *Id.*

HHS repeatedly complains that it lacks the necessary data to consider costs to patients. *See, e.g.*, 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,252 ("The Department is not aware of a source for data on the percentages of providers who have religious beliefs or moral convictions against each particular service or procedure"); *id.* ("[T]he Department lacks the predicate for estimating the impact on health outcomes of any change in the availability of services."). But HHS could *generate* such data by conducting its own surveys. Indeed, White House guidance on regulatory impact analysis urges agencies to do just that when confronted with significant uncertainties about regulatory effects. *Circular A-4* at 39 ("When uncertainty has significant effects on the final conclusion about net benefits, your agency should consider additional research prior to rulemaking."). An agency does not prove that it is impossible to ascertain the answer to a question by refusing to ask it.

Even if HHS could not *fully* quantify and monetize the Final Rule's expected costs for patients, it should at least have listed procedures, medications, or information that might be denied or withheld due to the rule, described the potential consequences of such denials, and assigned dollar values to *some* of those consequences. *Circular A-4* at 27 ("If you are not able to quantify the effects, you should present any relevant quantitative information along with a description of the unquantified effects"). HHS might, for instance, have monetized the cost of searching for and traveling to an alternative provider but discussed related psychological distress qualitatively.

Instead, HHS blames commenters for not doing its work for it. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,250 (arguing that commenters failed "to answer the difficult question of how this rule would affect access to care and health outcomes, and how to quantify those effects"); *id.* at 23,252 ("No comment attempted a detailed description of the actual impact expected from the rule on access to care, health outcomes, and associated concerns."). But while commenters can supply data to

inform an agency’s analysis, and did so here, the agency bears the ultimate burden of supplying “a satisfactory explanation for its action,” including due consideration of “relevant factors” like cost. *State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 42.

HHS’s criticism of commenters is particularly galling given that the uncertainty surrounding the Final Rule’s effects is largely of HHS’s own making. HHS repeatedly declines to provide guidance within the Final Rule on circumstances under which the rule protects refusals of care. For example, in response to comments warning that the Final Rule could negatively “impact counseling or referrals for LGBT persons,” HHS could have clarified whether the Final Rule’s protections apply to providers who deny care based on objections to a patient’s sexual orientation or gender identity. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,189. Instead, HHS says only that it “does not pre-judge matters without the benefit of specific facts and circumstances” and that invocations of conscience rights “will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” *Id.* Similarly, in response to concerns about denials of HIV or infertility treatment, HHS will not say whether such denials would be protected conduct, noting only that, if it received a complaint on the subject, it “would examine the facts and circumstances of the complaint to determine whether it falls within the scope of the statute in question and these regulations.” *Id.* at 23,188. If HHS will not explain how its Final Rule changes the legal status quo, it cannot expect commenters to assess the costs of that change.

4. HHS Cannot Excuse Its Failure to Assess Patient Costs by Making a Conclusory Assertion that Any Such Costs Are Justified

HHS attempts to excuse its failure to assess the Final Rule’s costs to patients by asserting that “the Department expects any decreases in access to care to be outweighed by significant overall increases in access generated by this rule.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,252. In other words, HHS claims that any costs to patients associated with the Final Rule are functionally irrelevant because they are outweighed by benefits. But even if this were true—and, as discussed in Section II, HHS

has provided no credible evidence of this—a conclusion regarding the Final Rule’s *net* effects does not substitute for a discussion of the relevant factor of cost. HHS must specify who will be harmed by the Final Rule and in what ways they will be harmed, even if it believes those costs are justified by benefits to others. Yet it fails to do so. For example, HHS suggests that conscience protections under the Final Rule might, in some circumstances, extend to ambulance drivers who refuse “emergency transportation of persons with conditions such as an ectopic pregnancy, where the potential procedures performed at the hospital may include abortion.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,187. But the Final Rule’s regulatory impact analysis makes no mention of the potentially severe health consequences of such a refusal.

In the absence of an acknowledgement of these costs, HHS’s conclusory assertion that the Final Rule will have a *net* positive effect on healthcare access “add[s] nothing to the agency’s defense of its thesis except perhaps the implication that it was committed to its position regardless of any facts to the contrary.” *Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA*, 28 F.3d 1259, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

5. HHS Cannot Excuse Its Failure to Assess Patient Costs by Claiming that the Costs Are Attributable to Congressional Decisions

HHS’s final excuse for inadequately assessing the Final Rule’s costs for patients is that such objections to the Final Rule “are really objections to policy decisions made by . . . Congress in enacting the Federal conscience and anti-discrimination laws in the first place.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,251. This argument, too, is unavailing. While Congress did pass the statutory provisions underlying the Final Rule, HHS has made a discretionary decision to adopt newly expansive definitions of terms in those provisions and new enforcement procedures. That discretionary decision has costs relative to the status quo, which the APA obligates HHS to consider.

B. HHS Completely Ignores Costs to Provider Organizations of Accommodating Increased Refusals of Care

In addition to failing to adequately assess costs that more frequent conscience-related

refusals of care will impose on patients, HHS completely ignores costs that provider organizations will incur in accommodating such refusals. As the American Medical Association warned in comments, increased invocations of conscience rights by healthcare workers “could significantly impact the smooth flow of health care operations for physicians, hospitals, and other health care institutions and could be unworkable in many circumstances.” American Medical Association, Comment Letter on Protecting Statutory Conscience Rights in Health Care 4–5 (Mar. 27, 2018).

While the Final Rule authorizes employers to request some advance notice of objections, 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,191–92, employers may make such requests only after hiring an employee, and cannot then fire that employee for conscience-based refusals of care. Even large, urban hospitals will likely bear significant costs when accommodating employees who refuse to provide or assist with certain forms of care. *See, e.g.*, Hearing Transcript, *Danquah v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey*, No. 11-cv-06377, (D.N.J. Dec 16, 2011) (indicating that hospital hired additional nurses due to numerous refusals to assist with provision of abortion or related procedures). But such costs are not mentioned in HHS’s regulatory impact analysis. This omission is particularly egregious given that, elsewhere, HHS expressly contemplates “the use [of] alternate staff” and other staffing adjustments to accommodate objections. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,191–92, 23,202, 23,263.

II. THE FINAL RULE’S PURPORTED BENEFITS ARE SPECULATIVE AND UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE

In its regulatory impact analysis, HHS claims the Final Rule will yield three types of benefits: a net increase in access to healthcare, better quality of care, and “societal goods that extend beyond health care.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,246. HHS explains further that the Final Rule will deliver these benefits by, among other things, increasing “the availability of qualified health care professionals” and reducing “moral distress” among providers. 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,246. But HHS cites no credible evidence to support these assertions.

While “an agency’s predictive judgments . . . are entitled to particularly deferential review,” that deference is given only “so long as [the predictions] are reasonable.” *BNSF Ry. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd.*, 526 F.3d 770, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Department’s wholly “conclusory [and] unsupported suppositions” of the Final Rule’s benefits are unreasonable and thus “not [entitled to] defer[ence].” *United Techs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def.*, 601 F.3d 557, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (internal quotations marks omitted). And because the Department relies entirely on these speculative and unsupported assumptions to justify the Final Rule, the rule is arbitrary and capricious. *Nat’l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. Fed. Energy Reg’y Comm’n*, 468 F.3d 831, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (agency action vacated where agency “provided no evidence of a real problem” the action would solve); *Arizona Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife, Bureau of Land Mgmt.*, 273 F.3d 1229, 1244 (9th Cir. 2001) (action found arbitrary and capricious where based on “speculation . . . not supported by the record”).

A. HHS Does Not Adequately Support Its Conclusion That the Final Rule Will Increase the Number of U.S. Healthcare Professionals

HHS claims that “[n]umerous studies and comments show that the failure to protect conscience is a barrier to careers in the health care field,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,246, but the record contains only a handful of anecdotes reporting early retirements for reasons of conscience, and *no* data evidencing a noticeable rate of professional exit. Instead, HHS refers repeatedly to the results of an online survey of self-selecting members of five Christian medical associations conducted on behalf of the Christian Medical and Dental Association in 2009, just after HHS proposed to repeal the 2008 Rule. *See* 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,175–253 nn.15, 38, 309, 316–18, 322, 340, 347, 349. HHS highlights repeatedly that 91 percent of respondents said that they “would rather stop practicing medicine altogether than be forced to violate [their] conscience.” *See id.* at 23,191 nn.46 & 48, 23,246-47. At one point, it pairs this point with a reference to the claim, submitted by the American

Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“AAPLOG”) in 2009, that its members “overwhelmingly would leave the medical profession—or relocate to a conscience-friendly jurisdiction—before they would accept coercion to participate or assist in procedures that violate their consciences.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,247. But HHS conducted no follow-up survey and supplies no quantitative data about actual exits from the profession or relocations in response to the 2011 Rescission. It did not, in short, even try to assess whether the post-survey elimination of the expansive protections in the 2008 Rule prompted survey respondents to actually leave the medical profession. In the absence of “a conscientious effort to take into account what is known as to past experience,” the Department’s “theoretical or model-based approaches” to decisionmaking are not entitled to deference. *Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA*, 862 F.3d 50, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2017), *modified on reh’g*, 883 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. HHS Does Not Adequately Support Its Conclusion That the Final Rule Will Reduce the Prevalence of Moral Distress

HHS contends that the Final Rule “will reduce the incidence of the harm that being forced to violate one’s conscience inflicts on providers.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,249. In making this assertion, HHS claims to rely on “[s]ubstantial academic literature [that] documents the existence among health care providers of ‘moral distress’” *Id.* But while the literature HHS cites does recognize the existence of moral distress among some medical providers, it rarely if ever specifically links that distress to the type of conduct addressed by the Final Rule. One article cited by HHS suggests that moral distress has been generated mainly by “broad systemic changes . . . in how health care institutions are organized, how health care is financed, and how health care resources are managed,” which “reduce[d] the amount of time caregivers are allotted to spend with patients.” Christy A. Rentmeester, *Moral Damage to Health Care Professionals and Trainees: Legalism and Other Consequences for Patients and Colleagues*, 33 *J. Med. & Philosophy* 27, 37 (2008). Another

identifies as sources of moral distress unnecessary tests, incompetent care, inadequate consent for treatment, poor staffing, and cost cuts, among others. Joan McCarthy & Chris Gastmans, *Moral Distress: A Review of the Argument-Based Nursing Ethics Literature*, 22 *Nursing Ethics* 131, 148–49 (2015); *see also* 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,249 n.337 (citing McCarthy & Gastmans). As a result, the Final Rule might *increase* rather than reduce moral distress among some providers, insofar as it leads to a lack of treatment, inadequate care, and inadequate consent for treatment (when patients are denied information about treatment options due to a provider’s religious or moral beliefs). Finally, a third study cited by HHS finds no correlation between moral distress and intention to leave the nursing profession. Fariba Borhani et al., *The Relationship Between Moral Distress, Professional Stress, and Intent to Stay in the Nursing Profession*, 7 *J. Med. Ethics & Hist. Med.* 1, 4 (2014); 84 Fed. Reg. at 23,249 n.330 (citing Borhani et al.). This directly contradicts HHS’s claim that alleviating moral distress will prevent exits from the medical profession. *See State Farm*, 463 U.S. at 56–57 (action is arbitrary and capricious if explanation “runs counter to the evidence”).

HHS’s unsupported assertions regarding the Final Rule’s effects on moral distress undermine the validity of its regulatory impact analysis and the legality of the Final Rule.

CONCLUSION

This Court should grant Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.³

Dated: September 19, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Max Sarinsky

Max Sarinsky

Justin Gundlach (*pro hac vice* pending)

Jack Lienke (*pro hac vice* pending)

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³ Policy Integrity gratefully acknowledges James Meresman and Cris Ray, students in NYU School of Law’s Regulatory Policy Clinic, for assisting in the preparation of this brief.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF
BALTIMORE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ALEX M. AZAR, II, in his official capacity
as Secretary of Health and Human Services;
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01672 (GLR)

**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
UNOPPOSED MOTION OF THE
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY INTEGRITY
TO FILE AN *AMICUS CURIAE* BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S CROSS-
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

This matter having come before the Court by motion of proposed *amicus curiae* Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law, seeking leave to file a brief *amicus curiae* in the above-captioned matter, and the Court having reviewed the file and pleadings herein, hereby finds good cause to allow *amicus* participation.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

The Motion to File an *Amicus Curiae* Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Dated: _____, 2019.

Honorable George Levi Russell, III
United States District Judge