

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

RYAN KARNOSKI, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, *et al.*,

Defendants.

Case No. C17-01297MJP

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’  
REQUEST FOR STAY OF  
PROCEEDINGS

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to stay proceedings. Dkt. #89. Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ Motion. Dkts. #91 and #93. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

District Courts have discretionary power to stay proceedings in their own court. *Lockyer v. Mirant Corp.*, 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing *Landis v. North Am. Co.*, 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). When a stay is proposed, district courts must weigh the competing interests affected by the grant or refusal of a stay. *Id.* at 1110 (quoting *CMAX, Inc. v. Hall*, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). The competing interests considered in this analysis include: (1) “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay”; (2) “the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward”; and (3) “the orderly course of justice

1 measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which  
2 could be expected to result from a stay.” *Id.* Additionally, if there is “even a fair possibility”  
3 that a stay will “work damage to someone else,” the party seeking the stay “must make out a  
4 clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” *Landis*, 299 U.S. at 255.  
5 “Only in rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a  
6 litigant in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both.” *Id.*  
7

8 Defendants fail to demonstrate a stay is warranted. Defendants contend that because the  
9 Memorandum Opinion and Order issued in *Doe I, et al. v. Trump, et al.*, Case No. 17-1597  
10 (CKK), 2017 WL 4873042 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2017), preliminarily enjoins the government from  
11 enforcing two sections of the Presidential memorandum at issue here, *see* 82 FR 41319, (the  
12 “Presidential Memorandum”), the Court should stay the proceedings. Dkt. #89 at 2. Defendants  
13 reason that while they disagree with the *Doe I* court’s preliminary injunction, and while they are  
14 considering whether to appeal that court’s Order, they are nonetheless complying with the Order  
15 and a stay is warranted. *Id.* The Court is not convinced.  
16  
17

18 Here, there is a fair possibility that granting Defendants’ stay will harm Plaintiffs. The  
19 Order in *Doe I* did not enjoin Section 2(b) of the Presidential Memorandum; Section 2(b) directs  
20 the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to “halt” all use of their respective  
21 departments’ resources to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures, “except to the extent  
22 necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to  
23 reassign his or her sex.” *See* 2017 WL 4873042, at \*2. Because this directive has not been  
24 enjoined, there is a fair possibility that at least some of the named Plaintiffs (including Plaintiff  
25 Jane Doe) will be harmed if that directive goes into effect. Additionally, granting Defendants’  
26 requested stay “deprive[s] Plaintiffs of an injunction supported by interests not present in *Doe*  
27  
28

1 [I].” Dkt. #91 at 5. This is especially true where the State of Washington asserts interests  
2 different from private plaintiffs, and where Plaintiffs raise claims not considered by the District  
3 Court for the District of Columbia. *See id.*

4 Because there is a fair possibility of harm to Plaintiffs, Defendants “must make out a clear  
5 case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” *Landis*, 299 U.S. at 255.  
6 Defendants do not identify a single hardship or inequity they will face if litigation proceeds, *see*  
7 Dkt. #89 at 2–5. Instead, Defendants merely contend the “orderly administration of justice will  
8 be furthered,” if the Court grants its stay. Appeals to the orderly administration of justice, without  
9 showing any hardship or inequity Defendants will face, fail to persuade the Court that a stay is  
10 warranted. This is especially true where contested issues implicate the public interest; in these  
11 circumstances, it is important for trial judges to develop the full record for review. Consequently,  
12 Defendant’s request for a stay of proceedings (Dkt. #89) is DENIED.  
13  
14

15  
16 DATED this 20<sup>th</sup> day of November, 2017.  
17  
18  
19  
20

21   
22 \_\_\_\_\_  
23 Marsha J. Pechman  
24 United States District Judge  
25  
26  
27  
28