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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AIDEN STOCKMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 5:17-cv-1799-JGB-KK

DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S MOTION TO INTERVENE

Date: November 20, 2017
Time: 9:00 a.m.
Courtroom: 1
Judge: Hon. Jesus G. Bernal

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INTRODUCTION

The State of California ("California" or the "State") has moved to intervene in this action, which seeks to challenge the military's policy regarding service by transgender individuals. California's motion should be denied for several independent reasons.

As a threshold matter, intervention should be denied because the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the underlying claims and, in this circumstance, intervention by a third party is not appropriate. As detailed in Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss, none of the existing Plaintiffs has standing to bring this case. In addition, California has failed to establish that it has suffered any concrete injury, or that it faces an imminent threat of future injury. In these circumstances, it is axiomatic that California cannot intervene in a case that is not properly before this Court in the first place. *See Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc.*, 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1650-51 (2017).

Even if this case were to proceed, intervention should be denied because California does not meet the standard for permissive intervention, much less the stringent test for intervention as of right. First, California has failed to show that it has any direct, non-contingent, substantial, and legally protectable interest in this litigation to support intervention as a matter of right. Indeed, as explained below, the military's longstanding policy restricting the accession of transgender persons has been in place for decades without challenge from California.

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Second, California's alleged interests are adequately represented by existing Plaintiffs. Just like Plaintiffs, California characterizes Defendants' policy for transgender persons in the military as an alleged "ban," and then seeks to enjoin the policy. Since California has the same ultimate objective as these plaintiffs, its professed interests are *presumed* to be adequately represented absent a compelling showing to the contrary. California has made no such showing here.

Finally, disposition of this action will not impair California's ability to protect its purported interests, because this case would not have any preclusive effect on the State.

BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2017, Plaintiffs filed this action, challenging Defendants' policy regarding military service by transgender persons. (ECF No. 1). On October 2, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No. 15). Plaintiffs challenge the military's policy regarding transgender servicemembers, which they characterize (incorrectly) as a "Ban," ECF No. 1 ¶ 35-48, and further claim that this purported "Ban" violates principles of equal protection, due process, privacy and free speech. *See id.* ¶¶ 49-77. The Complaint seeks a declaration that the policy is unconstitutional, *see id.* at 19 ¶ 1, and to enjoin the policy worldwide, *id.* at 39 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction asks the Court to "prohibit[] Defendants from implementing the ban on military service by transgender individuals, as expressly directed by President Donald J. Trump on August 25, 2017." ECF No. 15 at i.

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Defendants have now moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and have opposed Plaintiffs' motion, showing, *inter alia*, that they lack irreparable harm and cannot show likely success on the merits. *See* ECF No. 36.

The background of the challenged policy is set forth at length in Defendants' motion. *See id.* at 5-8. In short, the President issued a memorandum on August 25, 2017, setting forth his policy directive to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security and ordering a further study of policies concerning military service by transgender individuals. The President's memorandum states that no policy changes to the status quo will be effective until at least March 2018, should the President determine that any are necessary. *See id.* at 5-6. The President directed the Secretary of Defense to determine how to address transgender individuals currently serving in the military and that no action be taken against such individuals until after a policy review is completed. *Id.* The President's memorandum also "extends the deadline to alter the currently effective accession policy beyond January 1, 2018, while [the relevant Departments] continue to study the issue." *Id.* at 23.

On September 14, 2017, the Secretary of Defense issued Interim Guidance setting forth the policy that is in effect today. *See id.* at 7. The Interim Guidance reaffirms that for now, no current service member will be involuntarily separated, discharged, or denied reenlistment solely on the basis of a gender dysphoria diagnosis or transgender status, and service members who receive a gender dysphoria diagnosis from a military medical provider will be provided treatment for the diagnosed medical

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condition. *Id.* at 7-8. The Interim Guidance also confirms that the military's longstanding accessions policy, "which generally prohibit[s] the accession of transgender individuals into the Military Services, remain[s] in effect because current or history of gender dysphoria or gender transition does not meet medical standards," and that this prohibition remains "subject to the normal waiver process." *Id.* at 7. The Interim Guidance thus maintains the status quo by continuing the longstanding accession policy to permit further review by experts before any change in policy occurs.

On November 9, 2017, California filed a motion to intervene under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and 24(b)(1)(B), attaching a Proposed Complaint in Intervention. California's Motion to Intervene, Ex. 1 (ECF No. 52-1) ("Proposed Complaint"). The Proposed Complaint raises the same equal protection, due process, privacy and free speech claims that already are set forth in the existing Plaintiffs' Complaint, *see* ECF No. 1, and seeks the same declaratory and injunctive relief. *See id.* ¶¶ 37-60.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An applicant for intervention as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) bears the burden of satisfying four criteria:

> (1) the applicant must timely move to intervene; (2) the applicant must have a significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant must be situated such that the disposition of the action may impair or impede the

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> party's ability to protect that interest; and (4) the applicant's interest must not be adequately represented by existing parties.

Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). "Failure to satisfy any one of the[se] requirements is fatal to the application." *Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents*, 587 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2009). To justify intervention, an applicant's interest must be "direct, non-contingent, substantial and legally protectable." *Dilks v. Aloha Airlines*, 642 F.2d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, when an applicant for intervention and an existing party "share the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation applies," which can be rebutted "only by a compelling showing to the contrary." *Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Geithner*, 644 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2011). Finally, if an applicant's purported interest is unlikely to be impaired or impeded by resolution of the action or the applicant has "other means" to protect that interest, intervention as of right should be denied. *California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States*, 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2006).

An applicant for permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(1)(B) must demonstrate "(1) an independent ground for jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the [applicant's] claim or defense and the main action." *Freedom from Religion Found.*, 644 F.3d at 843. Permissive intervention "is committed to the broad discretion of the district court." *Orange Cty. v. Air Cal.*, 799 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, even if an applicant satisfies the three threshold requirements, the court still may deny permissive intervention. *Donnelly v.*

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Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998). In exercising its discretion, the court may consider, among other things, "the nature and extent of the [proposed intervenor's] interest" and "whether the [proposed intervenor's] interests are adequately represented by other parties." *Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.*, 552 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1977).

ARGUMENT

I. CALIFORNIA'S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE UNDERLYING CLAIMS.

"For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing, whether that litigant joins the lawsuit as a plaintiff, a coplaintiff, or an intervenor of right." *Town of Chester*, 137 S. Ct. at 1651. Because neither the existing Plaintiffs nor California has standing to bring the underlying claims in this case, the Court lacks jurisdiction and intervention must be denied.

While an intervenor may not need independent standing to establish intervention as of right, *see id.*, the Ninth Circuit has held that there is no right to intervene where the existing plaintiffs lack standing in the first place. *See Sanford v. Memberworks, Inc.*, 625 F.3d 550, 560-61 (9th Cir. 2010). Though this scenario typically arises in the class-action context, the rule applies at least as much in an ordinary case. *See, e.g., Ly-Luck Rest. v. Dep't of Labor*, No. C-92-3852 SBA, 1993 WL 121780 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (dismissing case because neither plaintiffs nor proposed intervenors had

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standing). And, where neither the existing Plaintiffs nor the proposed intervenors has standing, intervention also is foreclosed. *Town of Chester*, 137 S. Ct. at 1651.

As detailed in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to Preliminary Injunction, none of the existing Plaintiffs has standing to bring this case because they have not suffered any concrete injury, nor do they face an imminent threat of future injury. *See* ECF No. 36 at 11-18. In sum, Plaintiffs allege that they fear being involuntarily separated from the military, denied reenlistment, or denied transition-related medical care, but none of those alleged injuries are occurring, or will occur, under the Interim Guidance. *See id.* at 13-15. And beyond that, it is unclear whether those currently serving members will be affected by the future policy regarding service by transgender individuals once it is finalized and implemented. *See id.* at 15-18. Plaintiffs also have not been denied accession into the military or a medical waiver. *See id.* at 14. Thus, Plaintiffs have not been injured, much less irreparably injured, by the Presidential Memorandum and Interim Guidance. Without such injury, Plaintiffs lack standing and their claims are not ripe.

For similar reasons, California also lacks standing to bring its proposed claims. For a state to establish standing, "more must be alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents." *Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez*, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). "[T]he indirect effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population." *Id.* California has not identified any citizen who actually

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has been harmed as a result of Defendants' current policy, much less a substantial group of such citizens. And, as detailed in the next section, California's other purported interests in this litigation either fail as a matter of law, or else are entirely speculative. *See infra* Part II. Thus, if the existing Plaintiffs were dismissed from this case for lack of standing, California could not maintain this action on its own because the State likewise lacks standing to pursue its claims.

Because a state cannot intervene where it would result in a case in which none of the plaintiffs has standing, California's motion should be denied.

II. CALIFORNIA CANNOT INTERVENE AS A MATTER OF RIGHT.

A. California Lacks the Requisite Legally Protectable Interest in This Litigation.

Intervention as of right is inappropriate first because California lacks the requisite legally protectable interest in this litigation. To intervene as of right, an applicant must establish "a significantly protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action." *Arakaki*, 324 F.3d at 1083. That interest must be "direct, non-contingent, substantial and legally protectable." *Dilks*, 642 F.2d at 1157. An interest is not sufficiently protectable if it is contingent on future occurrences. *See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. Lynch*, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002). And "the interest must be one which the *substantive* law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by the applicant;" in other words, the proposed intervenor must be "the real party in interest regarding [its] claim." *Saldano v. Roach*, 363 F.3d 545, 551 (5th Cir.

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2004) (emphasis in original). Further, "[a]n economic stake in the outcome of the litigation, even if significant, is not enough" to justify intervention. *Greene v. United States*, 996 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir. 1993).

California proffers several ways in which Defendants' policy for transgender persons in the military purportedly affects the State, ECF No. 52 at 8-10, but none of these alleged effects provides California with a "direct, non-contingent, substantial and legally protectable" interest relating to the policy, such that it would be the real party in interest, *Dilks*, 642 F.2d at 1157. First, all of California's alleged interests are predicated on the policy's purported effects on individuals, which it *speculates* will affect the State's interests in the future. *See* ECF No. 52 at 8 (suggesting that "[e]xcluding transgender Californians from the pool of candidates who can join the California National Guard *may* result in diminished numbers of service members who can provide emergency response and disaster mitigation in dire situations when California needs assistance most.") (emphasis added); *id.* at 9 ("[C]isgender individuals *may* . . . forego National Guard service in favor of an inclusive and nondiscriminatory employer.") (emphasis added); *id.* at 10 (theorizing that the policy "*will likely* . . . prevent California's transgender military service members from obtaining needed medical care from military providers, with the result that the State may be required to pay for such services.") (emphasis added). Such indirect interests do not warrant intervention both because they are "contingent upon the occurrence of a sequence of events," *Brennan v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ.*, 260 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2001); *see S. Cal. Edison Co.*, 307 F.3d

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at 803, and because individuals—not the State—are the real parties in interest, *see Saldano*, 363 F.3d at 551; *Dilks*, 642 F.2d at 1157. [1] Moreover, as explained in Defendants' pending Motion to Dismiss, *see* ECF No. 36 at 6-7, the President has directed a panel of experts to study the policy questions at issue and provide recommendations. The fact that the policy remains under consideration, and may be subject to change in the future, only further highlights the speculative, contingent nature of California's alleged interests and claims.

Second, California's attempt to rely on the doctrine of *parens patriae* is misplaced. Although in some circumstances, a state may assert "*parens patriae*" standing to raise a claim on behalf of its citizens, *see Alfred L. Snapp*, 458 U.S. at 601-04 (holding Puerto Rico had standing to sue individuals and companies for violating federal worker protection laws), California may not do so here. A state may not assert *parens patriae* standing to challenge a federal statute's alleged violation of its citizens' rights. *See Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon*, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923) ("[I]t is no part of [a State's] duty or power to enforce [its citizens'] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State,

[1] These speculative injuries are also insufficient to establish any present harm or an imminent threat of future harm needed for California to establish standing in its own right. *See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); *Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). Absent standing, for the reasons set forth in Part I, intervention cannot be permitted in this case.

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which represents them as *parens patriae*.").[2] Similarly, California cannot rely on *parens patriae* to intervene in a lawsuit challenging the federal government's policy for transgender persons in the military. *See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel*, 866 F.2d 302, 208 n.1 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that "requirement that the applicant must 'assert an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action" is similar to standing), *abrogated on other grounds by Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 630 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2011).

California's reliance on the doctrine of *parens patriae* also fails because it has not pointed to a single current service member in its state who is being harmed by the policy, much less a substantial segment of its population. Absent concrete harm to California residents, any purported indirect effects are speculative at best. *See Alfred L. Snapp*, 458 U.S. at 607 (explaining that, to establish *parens patriae*, "more must be

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[2] Courts have allowed limited exceptions to *Mellon*, but only under circumstances that are not present here. For example, where a state seeks to protect its quasi-sovereign interests meaning "interests independent of and behind the titles of its citizens," this may warrant "special solicitude" in a standing analysis. *See Massachusetts v. EPA*, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1454-55 (2007) (finding state had standing to sue EPA because its territory was impacted by greenhouse gas emissions regulations). California's attempt to plead its way into this exception, with a conclusory statement that it "has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting its residents from a facially discriminatory policy" fails on its face. By its own terms, the State's purported interest "in protecting its residents" from the purported case-by-case effects of the military's policy on transgender military service is directly dependent on the individualized rights of its citizens. ECF No. 52 at 8. Nor does this case fall within the category of cases in which Congress has expressly "overridden any *parens patriae* prudential standing limitation." *See also Challenge v. Moniz*, 218 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1179 (E.D. Wash. 2016) (finding *Mellon* "inapplicable" because the challenged statute expressly provided for challenge by the state).

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alleged than injury to an identifiable group of individual residents, the indirect effects of the injury must be considered as well in determining whether the State has alleged injury to a sufficiently substantial segment of its population."). Indeed, California's own motion acknowledges the speculative nature of its claims. *See, e.g.,* ECF No. 52 at 10 (claiming only that "[d]isposition of this action *may* impair or impede California's ability to protect its interests.") (emphasis added).

Finally, the fact that California has a state statute addressing unlawful discrimination, *see id.* at 9, does not provide it with the necessary protectable interest to support intervention. Courts have sometimes recognized that states have a legally protectable interest when federal law invalidates or preempts state law.[3] However, California does not claim (nor could it) that the Defendants' current policy for transgender service members preempts or invalidates California's state statute. Moreover, the operative interim policy does not establish any new restrictions with respect to transgender service members – indeed, it bars any disparate treatment of current transgender servicemembers. *See* ECF No. 36 at 7-8. And given that the future policy is now being studied by military leaders, California's claim of injury to legal policies is especially speculative and unfounded. Finally, with respect to military accession, the operative Interim Guidance merely leaves in place the longstanding

[3] *See, e.g., Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States*, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008) (federal action directed at invalidating existing state firearms law); *Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 766 F.2d 228, 232 (6th Cir. 1985) (state criminal safety law pre-empted by federal regulation).

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accession policy set forth in DoDI 6130.03, which was most recently modified in 2011. In other words, the current accession policy on transgender military service and California's state statute have coexisted for years – and, thus, California's statutory policy operates now just as it has done in the past. California's purported interest in intervening now in this lawsuit to vindicate its claimed interests is, therefore, unfounded.

Because the State lacks a legally protectable interest in this litigation, its Motion to Intervene should be denied.

B. California has the Same Ultimate Objective as the Existing Plaintiffs and Has Not Made the Compelling Showing Necessary to Overcome the Presumption of Adequate Representation.

California also cannot intervene as of right because its alleged interests are adequately represented by the existing Plaintiffs. A proposed intervenor must show that its interests are not adequately represented by existing parties. *See Perry*, 587 F.3d at 950-51, 955. "When an applicant for intervention and an existing party have the same ultimate objective, a presumption of adequacy of representation arises." *Arakaki*, 324 F.3d at 1086. That presumption can be rebutted "only by a compelling showing to the contrary." *Freedom from Religion Found.*, 644 F.3d at 841. To overcome the presumption, a proposed intervenor "ordinarily must demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance." *Moosehead Sanitary Dist. v. S. G. Phillips Corp.*, 610 F.2d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 1979). Speculation regarding a purported inadequacy is not sufficient. *See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson*, 131 F.3d 1297, 1307 (9th

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Cir. 1997). Moreover, "disagreement over litigation strategy or legal tactics" is insufficient to overcome the presumption. *Id.* at 1306.

Here, California seeks the same ultimate objective as the existing plaintiffs: to obtain a court order declaring Defendants' policy regarding transgender persons in the military unconstitutional, and to enjoin Defendants from enforcing the policy. *Compare* ECF No. 1 at 19, *with* ECF No. 52-1 at 11-12. California's proposed claims mimic those already asserted by the existing plaintiffs. *Compare* ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 49-77, *with* ECF No. 52-1 ¶¶ 37-60. The interests of Plaintiffs and California are, thus, unquestionably aligned.

But a proposed intervenor and an existing party need not have identical interests for the presumption of adequate representation to arise. The relevant inquiry is whether they have the "same ultimate objective" or the same "ultimate bottom line." *Perry*, 587 F.3d at 949, 951. There is no question that they do here, as each seeks invalidation of the same policy for the same reasons. *See id.* 950-51 (presuming adequacy based on shared ultimate objective); *Freedom from Religion Found.*, 644 F.3d at 841 (same). Accordingly, adequate representation must be presumed, and California must make a compelling showing to overcome the presumption.

California has not met its burden here. California has not asserted "any substantive disagreement between it and the existing [plaintiffs]," *Wilson*, 131 F.3d at 1306, much less that their interests are "adverse" or that there is any "collusion" or "nonfeasance" by the existing plaintiffs, *Moosehead Sanitary Dist.*, 610 F.2d at 54. Nor

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does California prove that it "would offer any necessary elements to the proceeding that other parties would neglect." *Perry*, 587 F.3d at 954. At best, it suggests that the State has a unique motivation to seek invalidation of the policy. *See* ECF No. 52 at 11 (arguing that its interests are protecting its residents, and alleviating barriers to entry into ROTC programs and into the California National Guard). But the adequacy of representation is judged by whether existing parties will make necessary arguments and seek the same outcome, not *why* the parties want to make those arguments and/or seek that outcome. *See Perry*, 587 F.3d at 950-52.

California has, therefore, failed to overcome the presumption of adequate representation here, and its motion to intervene should be denied.

C. Intervention as of Right is Not Appropriate Because Disposition of this Case Will Not Impair California's Ability to Protect its Alleged Interests.

Finally, intervention as of right should be denied because "disposition of th[is] action" will not "impair or impede [California's] ability to protect [its alleged] interest[s]." *Arakaki*, 324 F.3d at 1083. California contends that a decision in favor of Defendants "would have far-reaching impacts on California's ability to protect its residents' health, well-being, and economic security." ECF No. 52 at 10. But California does not explain how its ability to protect its interests would be *impaired* or *impeded* by the disposition of this case. Since California is not a party, it "would not be exposed to any preclusive effect of the litigation." *Raines v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1*, No. C09-203Z, 2009 WL 3444865, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2009). The pendency of

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this action would not prevent California from filing a separate lawsuit challenging the policy to vindicate its own alleged rights and interests. *See Lockyer*, 450 F.3d at 442 (impairment prong is not met where potential intervenor has "other means" or an "alternative forum" to protect its interests); *Silver v. Babbitt*, 166 F.R.D. 418, 429 (D. Ariz. 1994) ("Mere inconvenience caused by added expense and delay from having to file a separate lawsuit is not sufficient impairment to justify intervention as of right"), *aff'd*, 68 F.3d 481 (9th Cir. 1995). And any decision of the Court in this case would not bind any court handling any separate challenge brought by California. *See NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of State of Cal.*, 488 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2007). Because the disposition of this case will not impair California's ability to protect its interests, intervention as of right is inappropriate.

III. CALIFORNIA'S REQUEST FOR PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION SHOULD BE REJECTED.

While permissive intervention typically is committed to the court's discretion, *see Orange*, 799 F.2d at 539, this is the rare case in which it is foreclosed. As detailed above, California cannot be permitted to intervene in this case because neither the existing Plaintiffs nor the State has standing to bring the underlying claims in this case. The Court thus lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims, with or without California. *See supra* Part I.

But even if California's claims could properly come before this Court, the State's motion should be denied because the relevant factors all weigh against

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permissive intervention, including "the nature and extent of the intervenors' interest, their standing to raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance, and its probable relation to the merits of the case" and "whether the intervenors' interests are adequately represented by other parties." *See Spangler*, 552 F.2d at 1329. As detailed above, California does not have a legally protectable interest in this case, and all of its purported interests are indirect and contingent upon the occurrence of a sequence of events that may not even happen. *See supra* Part II. Nor is there any indication that California's legal positions and interests will not be adequately represented by the existing Plaintiffs. The existing Plaintiffs present the same legal theories and seek the same far-reaching relief that California proposed, including a worldwide injunction of the challenged policy.

Accordingly, in addition to finding that California has no right to intervene in this case, the Court also should deny permissive intervention.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny California's motion to intervene.

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Dated: November 14, 2017

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