

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA  
SOUTHERN DIVISION**

**APRIL AARON-BRUSH,**

**Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**ROBERT BENTLEY, et al,**

**Defendants.**

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**Case No.: 2:14-cv-01091-RDP**

**ORDER OF DISMISSAL**

This matter is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Attorney General Luther Strange, Julie Magee, and John Richardson. (Doc. # 30). The Motion has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 32 – 41, 43). Defendants contend that the Supreme Court has resolved all the questions underlying Plaintiffs’ claims and this matter no longer presents a live case or controversy. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.

Plaintiffs are a same-sex couple who were married outside the state of Alabama. They filed this action in order to challenge the constitutionality of Section 36.03 of the Alabama Constitution and Alabama Code § 30-1-19. When they filed their Complaint, Plaintiffs asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires Alabama to recognize their same-sex marriage, but that the Defendants in this action had failed to do so in certain respects (as more specifically alleged in their Pleadings). In particular, Plaintiffs sought:

- (a) a declaration that Alabama’s refusal to recognize the marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into outside of the State violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution where Alabama refuses to treat same-sex couples legally married in other jurisdictions the same as different-sex couples; and
- (b) a permanent injunction directing Defendants to legally recognize Plaintiffs’ marriage and the marriages of other same-sex couples validly entered into outside

of Alabama.

(Doc. # 1).

Since this case's filing, there have been significant developments related to it, most of which have occurred outside the litigation itself. Most significantly, in June of this year the Supreme Court decided *Obergefell v. Hodges*, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In *Obergefell*, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other States. Defendants have acknowledged in their filings that, while they disagree with the Supreme Court's decision, it is now the law of the land and that *Obergefell* binds them in this and other cases. Indeed, they have taken steps to effectuate the ruling in *Obergefell*. (Doc. # 43).

Defendants have stated unequivocally that they are following, and will follow, the law of the land with respect to same-sex marriages. (Doc. # 28). Just as they have for other married same-sex couples, Defendants stated that they will consider Plaintiffs' marriage valid upon Plaintiffs filing of a joint tax return (in the case of the Department of Revenue), permit a name change on Plaintiffs' driver's licenses (in the case of the Department of Public Safety), and provide Plaintiffs with other benefits afforded by these agencies to married couples. (Doc. # 28). Defendants have also stated that this is not a special rule that they created for these Plaintiffs alone, but rather it is their state-wide policy in direct response to the Supreme Court's dispositive ruling in *Obergefell*. (Doc. # 33). In fact, the parties have jointly reported to the court that Plaintiffs have been issued a corrected birth certificate, they have also been issued new drivers' licenses based upon their Massachusetts' marriage certificate, and they have been able to file amended joint tax returns. (Doc. # 43).

The Supreme Court's decision in *Obergefell* is not the only development outside this litigation that affects this case. In addition, in cases pending in the Southern District of Alabama,

Judge Callie V. Granade granted permanent injunctions with respect to Attorney General Luther Strange which (1) prohibit him from enforcing Alabama's marriage laws to deny same-sex couples the right to marry, and (2) require the recognition of marriages performed in other states. *Searcy v. Strange*, 2015 WL 328728 (S.D. Ala. 2015); *Strawser v. Strange*, 44 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D. Ala. 2015). The injunctions also granted other relief to same-sex couples.

With this background in mind, the court turns to the question of whether this case has become moot. A case becomes moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief. *Al Najjar v. Ashcroft*, 273 F.3d 1330, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2001). “If, after the complaint is filed, the defendant comes into compliance ..., then traditional principles of mootness will prevent maintenance of the suit for injunctive relief as long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrongful behavior will recur.” *Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990). In cases involving the voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct, courts presume that public officials will not return to the challenged behavior and that the case is moot. *Troiana v. Supervisor of Elections*, 382 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). A case is thus moot if the challenged behavior stops and (i) the termination of the challenged practices is unambiguous, (ii) that termination is the product of deliberation and not an effort to manipulate jurisdiction, and (iii) the new policy has been consistently applied. *Rich v. Fla. Dept. of Corr.*, 716 F.3d 525, 531 (11th Cir. 2013). Each of these elements is met here. (Doc. # 43).

Plaintiffs have stated a concern that, “though the immediate harms with regard to adoption, birth certificate, drivers' licenses, and tax returns have now been rectified,” certain state actors (who not before the court in this case) will continue to enforce the laws which, under *Obergefell*, are unconstitutional, and which Judge Granade has already enjoined Attorney

General Strange from enforcing. (Doc. # 43). There are two easy answers that address this concern. First, these matters are too speculative to constitute a remaining live controversy between the parties to this case. Second, and in any event, if in the future, unconstitutional conduct is perpetrated by state actors who are not parties in this case, it appears Judge Granade will have jurisdiction and the desire to address those matters in her cases.

Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Attorney General Luther Strange, Julie Magee, and John Richardson (Doc. # 30) is **GRANTED**. This case is **DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE**.

Costs are **TAXED** against Defendants Attorney General Luther Strange, Julie Magee, and John Richardson.

**DONE** and **ORDERED** this October 13, 2015.

  
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**R. DAVID PROCTOR**  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE